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Abstract
The formation of the self and the relationship between the psychosexual 
subject and normative power-relations have long been a contested field in both 
feminist and queer theory. Losing Oneself argues for a transitory model of the 
gendered psychosexual self; a model of the self as the effect of incorporating a 
separation and as a porous and negotiated entity. Traditional psychoanalysis, 
from Sigmund Freud to Jacques Lacan, has focused on loss and separation in 
the formation of the self. The self is subjugated to a law that both restricts and 
delimits that self as an imagined, complete figure. In two influential readings of 
this loss or incorporation of lack, Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler have both 
formulated melancholic models of the formation of the self. Driven by very 
different questions, these formulations attempt to explain the effects on the self 
by restrictive norms as well as explaining how the self enters the world as 
already a part and effect of that world. This thesis argues for a masochistic 
rather than melancholic incorporation of norms, emphasising the erotics and 
the pleasure as well as the pain and restriction at the centre of incorporation. At 
the core of this argumentation are challenges of the dualism of active/passive 
engagements with the world and the possibility to know oneself. 

Ozon’s cinema offers a unique challenge to the distinction between active and 
passive spectatorship. The films read in this thesis acts as active participants 
in the development of masochism as a model for affective response to an 
enigmatic world and its obfuscated demands on the self. Through readings of 
these films, the present thesis develops a model of the self that is 
simultaneously founded on lack, exclusion and subjugation but that also offers 
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Preface: Writing in the Psychosocial 
The term ‘psychosocial studies,’ couples the terms ‘psychic’ and ‘social,’ 
suggesting a connection or a link between the two. The inner (psyche) and 
outer (social) are linked in the very term and, as a result, a question is posed 
about the nature of this link. If psychosocial studies are understood as an 
interdisciplinary field, the linkage would suggest a merger or a complementarity 
of the two fields of (for instance) psychology and sociology. This might offer a 
more holistic view of the individual. And indeed, there is a richness in literature 
using this perspective. A quick search for ‘psychosocial’ in the British Library’s 
main catalogue provides over 74,000 hits, most of which are concerned with the 
psychosocial situation of patients or students with special needs. The 
psychosocial is, in this perspective, concerned with the connection between the 
individual and society, in particular the impacts of the psychic and the social on 
a patient’s body and its possible treatment. The complementarity of the two 
fields has been both emphasised and problematised by Lynn Chancer and John 
Andrews, who have argued for a revitalisation of psychoanalytic terms in 
sociological studies.  Yet the interdisciplinarity of these models excludes, 1
ignores or glosses over the potentially critical relation between the psychic and 
the social.  
I suggest that we instead read ‘psychosocial’ as a transdisciplinary project. In 
this formulation, the two terms are placed on a different footing. The prefix ‘inter’ 
emphasises mutuality and a movement between two sides or aspects that are 
linked and related. By contrast, the prefix ‘trans’ connotes a movement across 
or beyond something; this particular prefix implies transcending, transgressing 
or translating something into something different or at least towards something 
different. Psychosocial studies if conceived of as transdisciplinary rather than 
interdisciplinary proposes a different relation between the two terms. A 
translation or transformation from one into the other opens up a space for a 
 See Lynn Chancer and John Andrews, ‘Introduction: The Unhappy Divorce: From 1
Marginalization to Revitalization,’ in The Unhappy Divorce of Sociology and 
Psychoanalysis: Diverse Perspectives on the Psychosocial, 2014.
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critical engagement between two disparate fields, and between the experiences 
of something inner and something outer. Moreover, ‘trans’ implies that the link 
between the two fields may not exist in a stable sense. Instead, it is there only 
to be opened up through engagements with and negotiations between; it is 
never quite here nor there. 
Lisa Baraitser cautions against an “easy reference to ‘trans’.”  The 2
psychosocial, she argues, should engage critically with the ‘master texts’ of the 
disciplines used, not to fill gaps in their respective formulations but instead to 
create something new. Baraitser uses Judith Butler’s formulation of melancholic 
gender to argue for an understanding of transdisciplinarity that suggests a 
mixing of terminologies and, more importantly, a practice for creating something 
new. Baraitser argues that “what I have tried to do here is not just identify and 
trace key transdisciplinary concepts that are active in the field of psychosocial 
studies, but show how psychosocial studies is, itself, a transdisciplinary 
practice.”  3
In this thesis, the inner and the outer is central and I will argue for a different 
relation than the one suggested by the melancholic relation between the self 
and the world. To lose oneself connotes going astray, to become bewildered but 
also to become absorbed in something, to be lost in something external. To be 
absolutely clear: in this thesis, the self is a point of reference that is not 
necessarily yet a subject. It is the referral point or the first notion of an ‘I,’ but not 
through a solipsistic reading of Lacan’s mirror phase; instead, this self is already 
addressed by the world and related to the world. The self is what we turn back 
to as already there, in a rediscovery of our selves. By choosing self instead of 
subject or ego, I am consciously moving away from a technical or 
psychoanalytical discussion, whilst turning simultaneously to Foucauldian 
terminology and to a quotidian vocabulary, with all the vagueness that this 
implies as this allows a discussion of the self-reflective ‘I’ across disciplinary 
vocabularies and epistemic orders. The self is both pre-subjective and post-
subjective. It is the point of return in any introspection; it is neither a linguistic 
construction nor is it a body. To introduce a few metaphors that the present 
 Lisa Braitser, ‘Temporal Drag: Transdisciplinarity and the ‘Case’ of Psychosocial 2
Studies’ in Theory, Culture & Society, Vol 32, Issue 5-6, 2015 pp. 207-231, p. 214.
 Baraitser, 2015, p. 226.3
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thesis will draw on: the self is a term that exists in-between and that allows for 
the negotiated translation of metonymic and metaphoric relationality, of the fluid 
and the distinct, of the phallic and the maternal. It is also a nodal point that 
demands translation, of the self to the world and of the world to the self.  
Translation is a key concept throughout this thesis and it connects the 
transdisciplinarity as well as the focus on films and readings of films in this 
thesis. As a practice, translation links the possibility to read and to write about 
films as well as to read and write about gender and sexual difference. I will 
argue in subsequent chapters for a reading of sexual difference as a non-
relation rather than as a specifically masculine/feminine divide. Gender will be 
used to describe a more fluid, mobile concept of difference that functions as a 
translation or a commentary on the assumed ‘original difference.’ As indicated 
above, in this thesis, translation is linked to my usage of transdisciplinarity and 
the placing together of disparate discourses in order to formulate a critical 
practice in the ‘trans’ of translation and transdisciplinarity. In ‘The Task of the 
Translator’, Walter Benjamin argues against the ‘like for like’ version of 
translation, where the translator tries to find the equivalent word, arguing 
instead that a translation is always a commentary rather than a re-writing of the 
original in a different language. Benjamin uses spatial and temporal arguments 
to emphasise the distance between the ‘original’ and the translation. In one of 
the spatial metaphors that Benjamin uses, the translator is standing outside a 
language forest, trying to find the right spot in the forest that will correspond to 
the reverberation or the echo of the original work.  
Unlike a work of literature, translation finds itself not in the center of the language 
forest but on the outside facing the wooded ridge; it calls into it without entering, 
aiming at that single spot where the echo is able to give, in its own language, the 
reverberation of the work in the alien one.  4
This metaphor highlights the distance Benjamin suggests between ‘translation’ 
and ‘work of literature’. In a draft written more than a decade after ‘The Task of 
the Translator’, Benjamin emphasises the ‘technique’ of translation as opposed 
 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Task of the Translator’ included in Walter Benjamin: Selected 4
Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, 1996, p. 258-259
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to an ‘art form.’ “The translation of important works will be less likely to succeed, 
the more it strives to elevate its subservient technical function into an 
autonomous art form.”  Benjamin’s model of translation includes references to a 5
pure language as a pre-Babylonian reference point underlying the languages 
translated from and to as well as a romantic view of the original work of art. 
Benjamin’s metaphor of the translator as standing outside of the language 
forrest that the translation is placed in provides a spatial image for the 
transplantation of something alien into something known. Benjamin was 
concerned with translations from one language to another, specifically of 
Baudelaire into German.  However, as Roman Jacobson has argued, 6
translation takes place between languages but also within languages and 
between verbal and non-verbal sign systems.  In Benjamin’s metaphor, the 7
translation is the product of a technique and is placed in an environment that is 
foreign to the original but known to the translator. Yet, the translation resonates 
with its new environment and it is this resonance that determines if the 
translation is successful or not. This spatial image provides a model for the 
transdisciplinary praxis or technique of this thesis. In displacing concepts from 
different traditions in relation with other traditions as well as verbal and non-
verbal filmic signifiers, this thesis aims to create new resonances between 
disparate fields of knowledge that will echo and resonate to create something 
new, a third space.  
Benjamin is not only occupied with a spatial displacement of languages, but 
also the temporal displacement resulting from the translation coming after the 
original. Benjamin suggests that translations slips into the technique of 
commentary as the translation will always come after. This afterwardsness and 
otherworldliness of the translation is what produces the ideal image of a pure 
language and a work of art as opposed to technique and work in Benjamin’s 
model. Some of the the translations that form the work of this thesis are 
implantations from affect theory into psychoanalytic theory, models of 
 Benjamin, ‘Translation — For and Against’ included in Walter Benjamin: Selected 5
Writings, Volume 3, 1935-1938, 2002, p. 250.
 ‘The Task of the Translator’ was published as a foreword to Benjamin’s German 6
translation of Charles Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens — a section of Les fleurs du mal.
 See Roman Jacobson ‘On Linguistic Aspects of Translation’ included in Theories of 7
Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida, 1992.
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spectatorship into discussions of gender and sexuality in feminist theory, 
models of the feminine into discussions of queer praxis and discussions of 
masochism into models of melancholia. These are spatial displacements, but 
often temporal as well as spatial. In my discussion of melancholia as a model 
for the shaping of the self through an incorporation or translation of an external 
object and/or prohibition, I will not only implant psychoanalytic models for 
understanding loss and limitations to mourning (a spatial displacement) but also 
implant a previous usage of melancholia to understand the exclusion of the 
feminine from a male discourse (Irigaray) into a later usage of melancholia that 
deploys this model to understand the exclusion of same-sex desire in the 
formation of the self (Butler). Butler’s later model is in part a critique of Irigaray’s 
model as she argues that prior to any exclusion of the feminine, an exclusion 
that establishes the feminine must be achieved. In the temporal displacement of 
these models, however, the later will not be read as a commentary on the prior, 
but rather as two disparate fields, or as two disparate language forests to 
continue Benjamin’s metaphor. And the question here is what different echos 
they produce when displaced with each other.  
Emily Apter has written about the ‘time wars’ between women’s time and queer 
time.  In this article she argues for the continued usages of ‘women’s time’ as a 8
model for the return of the outmoded, anachronistic or démodé in theory. In this 
thesis, I return to two models of exclusion of the other that are both démodés, I 
return to Irigaray’s model for the exclusion of the feminine from a male 
imaginary and Butler’s model for the exclusion of same-sex desire from a 
heterosexual imaginary. Both these models suggest how something external — 
demands of foreclosure — becomes the foundation of a gendered ego and both 
these models use Freud’s concept of melancholia. On one level, these models 
are contrary and are competing for the same space, but through displacement 
and the practice of translation, this example of a time war will instead be mined 
for its potential to add to the central theme of this thesis — the relation between 
the self and the exterior and how we manage differences and how we are able 
to live with and be affected by others across these differences. Part of what 
makes these models anachronistic or démodés is their relation to a structural 
paradigm of included/excluded, norm/anti-norm dualisms. At the same time, 
 See Emily Apter, ‘“Women’s Time” in Theory’ in difference: A Journal of Feminist 8
Cultural Studies, vol 21, number 1, 2010, pp. 1-18.
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however, they both expand these dualisms by suggesting something boundless 
in their potential reach. Both models are grounded in attempts to understand 
lived experiences — Irigaray’s model suggests a model for understanding the 
imaginary exclusion that makes symbolic exclusion of women not only possible 
but inevitable, her model reveals the ontological impossibility at the heart of 
representational impossibility. Although this model uses the oppression of 
women as its starting point, the model that comes out of this can be used to 
understand the impossibility of a sustainable self and the impossibility of a 
stable — self identified — ego that opens up a field beyond the duality of male/
female, metaphysic/physic, one/multitude, that Irigaray uses to start her 
discussion. Similarly, Butler’s model from the early days of queer theory uses 
dualities of hereto/homo, normative/non-normative, to formulate a model for the 
self as the result of foreclosed desire and to explain the hatred and indifference 
that the gay community was faced with during the early years of the AIDS 
epidemic. These displacements of theories outside of their context are explored 
as productive sites of translation in Chapter 1. In this chapter, translations 
between the non-verbal and the verbal will also be explored through Jean 
Laplanche’s enigmatic messages and a re-reading of Freud’s model of the 
uncanny, a reading that opens up a link between the translation of theories to 
the translation of the visual, haptic and auditorial that constitute non-verbal 
signifiers, all of which can be enigmatic.  
In Chapter 2, translation as verbal/non-verbal displacement will be linked to the 
displacement of the self in relation to one of this thesis’s main foci: 
spectatorship and screen culture. Benjamin understood film as a development 
of representational art, from painting and sculpture, via photography, to the 
moving image of film. Benjamin argued that photography and film marked a 
move away from the cult of the original work of art, as “one can make any 
number of prints; to ask for the ‘authentic' print makes no sense.”  This 9
difference is further marked in relation to film. “Film is the first art form whose 
artistic character is entirely determined by its reproducibility.”  Film, according 10
to Benjamin is dependent on its exhibition value rather than its cult value. Film 
 Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second 9
Version’ in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 3, 1935-1938, 2002 pp. 
101-133, p. 106.
 Benjamin, 2002, p. 109.10
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is dependent on great numbers of paying viewers to pay for its high cost in 
production. If we link this with Benjamin’s discussion of translation as practice or 
technique as opposed to the work of art, then film challenges the notion of an 
origin or original. The reproducibility of film means that there is no need for the 
manual labour of copying or reproducing an original, like the translation of 
Baudelaire’s ‘Tableaux Parisiennes’.  Films, and writing about films, at once 11
enacts the work of translation, while also questioning the original and the 
distinction between technique and art form. Translating film and interpreting film 
is an example of transdisciplinary work where the two fields cannot be reduced 
to the other field. As an example of what Jacobson called ‘intersemiotic 
translation’ or ‘transmutation’, the interpretative translation of a film enacts the 
untranslatability of film that is part of any translation or any transdisciplinary 
work. Benjamin’s notion of an original an a pre-Babylonian language functions 
as a horizon of perfectibility that translations aim towards but that also functions 
as a the limit or the reminder of the failure of every attempt to translate perfectly. 
Chapter 2 will expand on the untranslatability of film and images while also 
discussing the affective effects of this untranslatability.  
Benjamin compares film to representative art, placing it in a continuum with 
cave paintings, oil paintings and photography. This emphasis and its relation to 
depicting reality, rather than the narrative function of epic poetry and the novel, 
is echoed by both André Bazin and Roland Barthes.  Though these theorists of 12
film and photography come from very different traditions, they both see the 
photographic image and its preservation of time as a reminder of our mortality. 
Bazin writes about a ‘mummy complex’ at the root of realistic art. “No one 
believes any longer in the ontological identity of model and image, but all are 
agreed that the image helps us to remember the subject and to preserve him 
from a second spiritual death.”  Barthes, in Camera Lucida writes about finding 13
a photograph of his mother as a young woman, and in this experience of a 
photograph, Barthes finds what drove him to photography. “The Winter Garden 
 Included in Les fleurs du mal, see Chales Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, Oxford 11
World Classics, 1993. Benjamin’s essay ‘The Task of the Translator’ was written as a 
foreword of his translation of this section of The Flowers of Evil. 
 See André Bazin ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’ in What Is Cinema? 12
Essays Selected and Translated by Hugh Gray, Volume 1, 2005 and Roland Barthes, 
Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, [1980] 1982.
 Bazin, 2005, p. 10.13
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Photograph […] would tell me what constituted that thread which drew me 
toward Photography.”  Barthes goes on to describe this experience in relation 14
to the time of the photograph, its preservation of a past, of something that has 
been, and therefore a reminder that it is no longer. A photograph, Barthes 
argues, “is without future”  and so refuses to become a memory. A photograph, 15
according to Barthes refuses to be memory because it refuses to “transform 
grief into mourning.”  This formulation of photography as refused mourning 16
links it with melancholia and the unmournability of the feminine in Irigaray and 
same sex desire in Butler. By juxtaposing these models or by translating these, 
not by changing the words but by changing the woods and the echos (to stretch 
Benjamin’s metaphor even further) of the same term in different context, the 
temporal aspect of melancholia becomes apparent. The photograph, like a lost 
identity or a lost desire points to an unresolved trauma that haunts the 
spectator. The photograph cannot, Barthes argues, be read: “despite its codes, I 
cannot read a photograph […] the Photograph — my Photograph — is without 
culture: when it is painful, nothing in it can transform grief into mourning.”  The 17
photograph is traumatic in that it cannot be read, cannot be understood in a 
culture, something in the photograph escapes translation and understanding. 
Barthes argues that film, through its use of moving images escapes the 
melancholic aspect of photography, “cinema is protensive, hence in no way 
melancholic […] [i]t is then, simply ‘normal,’ like life”.  Laura Mulvey argues that 18
new “moving image technologies, the electronic and the digital, paradoxically 
allow an easy return to the hidden stillness of the film frame.”  With the 19
possibility to stop or slow down the flow into still images the hidden 24 deaths 
per second is revealed. This aspect of film that Mulvey points out has become 
accessible not only to artists and filmmakers themselves, but through 
accessible technology, to a great number of people, opens up for what she calls 
the ‘pensive spectator’. The pensive spectator, like Barthes looking at the 
 Barthes, [1980] 1982, p. 73.14
 Barthes, [1980] 1982, p. 90.15
 Barthes, [1980] 1982, p. 90.16
 Barthes, [1980] 1982, p. 90.17
 Barthes, [1980] 1982, p.9018
 Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the Moving Image, 2006, p. 66. 19
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photograph of his mother, finds pleasure in contemplating and in what escapes 
comprehension. Mulvey argues that “the delayed cinema dissolves the 
imaginative power of the fiction, as well as the forward drive that, Barthes 
argues, obscures a cinematic punctum.”  This ‘pensive spectator’ points to a 20
possible alternative to the sadistic, consuming, male gaze that Mulvey 
suggested in her early essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ that will be 
further discussed in Chapter 2. The temporality of film and the temporality of 
melancholia as well as the movement of normality that covers the trauma of 
loss resonates or echoes the meaning of these models and film is a medium 
that engages with melancholia and loss as well as the hiding of these puncta 
through spectatorial pleasure.  
The deployment of models of melancholia, loss and punctum places these 
models in relation to psychoanalysis and a psychoanalytic concept of time. 
Lauren Berlant argues that these models focus on the spectacular and the 
unique event for its explanatory force: “trauma theory conventionally focuses on 
exceptional shock and data loss in the memory and experience of 
catastrophe”.  Berlant defines her project as an ongoing process of 21
renegotiation in the face of the exceptional and the traumatic. “I prefer tracking 
the work of affect as it shapes new ordinaries to the logic of exception that 
necessarily accompanies the work of trauma.”  Following this argument, this 22
thesis tracks the going astray, the continuous loss of self in something other, not 
as a unitary traumatic event, nor as a return to that event, but as a continual 
process of self discovery and self evasion. For this thesis, I have mined 
psychoanalytic models for the formation of the self where the event is not 
finalised. In terms of differences, I wanted to map both the formative, traumatic 
event that seems to exclude some others from the possibility of relatability on 
one hand, and the affective relatability that enables the going astray on the 
other. Further, I was looking for models that could contain both of these 
possibilities. For this purpose, I make the argument for using a model of 
masochism rather than melancholia. Both these models use the imagery of 
returning to the self, but where melancholia is founded on trauma and loss and 
 Mulvey, 2006, p. 183.20
 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 2011, p. 10.21
 Berlant, 2011, p. 54.22
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supposes a defining event, masochism constitutes a continuous return to the 
self, and a return that is based on pleasure — albeit in pain — rather than the 
punctum rip in the intelligible of melancholic loss. Barthes’s return to his 
mother’s image can be read as a masochistic return to the painful memory of 
his loss. This loss, and the photograph without future that for Barthes becomes 
his experience of this loss that cannot be read or understood as it stands 
outside of the cultural becomes the punctum that he returns to and does not 
stop writing about. The photograph without future does not stop being 
interpreted and translated for the reader. Barthes argues that it has no culture, 
but it is clear that it creates culture, it creates interpretations. By focusing on the 
return to the sore spot, not just the creation of the sore spot, this thesis tries to 
map how the book about the photograph is written, how the pain is translated 
though it still remains outside the intelligible. The photograph invites a 
continuous return to the limits of our ability to relate to something or someone 
and this return questions the possibilities for translation of the affective. And it 
suggests a relation to an alterity and something unintelligible that does not 
reduce it to sameness. Film, as theorised in the legacy of Barthes, Bazin and 
Benjamin, opens up for this through its demand for an affective spectatorship 
model.  
The pensive spectator suggested by Mulvey, challenges the spectator’s 
passivity, it is through manipulation of the moving image, through slowing down, 
returning and repeating the images of the film, that the film opens up for this 
pensive gaze. This model brings us to the last key concept for this thesis: the 
performative. I have argued that the work of translation creates something new, 
using Benjamin’s argument that translating is related to commentary, I have 
argued that translation is not merely copying an original into a different context, 
but an act of changing the original. Writing about film enacts this aspect of 
translation and points to the performative aspect of translating that is at the 
centre of this thesis. Performative speech-acts as defined by John L. Austin  23
focused on the legal production of truths by certain statements in certain 
contexts, it was then taken up by Jacques Derrida to argue that all statements 
perform their reality in relation to other statements.  Derrida asks if not all 24
 See John L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 1962.23
 See Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc, 1988.24
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statements follow the logic of what Austin had defined as non-serious citations: 
“Isn’t it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, ‘non-serious’, 
citation (on stage, in a poem, or a soliloquy) is the determined modification of a 
general citationality[?]”  This ‘citationality’ is related to ‘translatability’ in that 25
both refer back to a truth or an original that is assumed to have already been 
there. The logic of citationality is that the cited is assumed to have already been 
established, modelling the performative as having always already been 
established. This logic will be further investigated in relation the the notion of an 
author behind the text in Chapter 3 and again in Chapter 7. The temporal logic 
of ‘always already’ follows the same temporal logic as melancholia and trauma 
as mentioned above. In a sense, the ‘always already’ logic cancels history as 
the truth of the present haunts the past and collapses the moment of 
performativity with the history of the performative. Judith Butler took up this 
version of the performative in her early books about gender and sexuality and 
this model informs much of her thinking about the formation of norms as well as 
the subject.  Butler’s model of melancholic gender follows the temporal logic of 26
having always already been achieved; the melancholic formation of gender 
negates not only the lost desire but the history of this desire. The negation of 
homosexuality as formative of the heterosexual, gendered subject excludes the 
memory of this desire, denying that is was ever there. In Excitable Speech, 
Butler discusses performativity in relation to hate speech and legal definitions of 
speech. This is perhaps where Butler comes closest to Austin’s and Derrida’s 
definitions of performative speech acts. James Loxley points out that Butler’s 
early usage of the term was indebted not only to Austin and Derrida but to 
performance theory and its specific usage in theatre and performance arts. “It is 
only in her subsequent books that the Austinian and Derridean heritage with 
which she is more commonly associated comes increasingly into view.”  Some 27
of the examples of performativity in Gender Trouble are indeed from drag and 
performance, but these examples are used to argue for gender performativity as 
a form of citationality without original, in line with Derrida’s reading of Austin as 
mentioned above. However, by using acting as an example of speech act, the 
 Derrida, 1988, p. 17.25
 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, 1990; Bodies that Matter, 1993; Excitable 26
Speech, 1997; The Psychic Life of Power, 1997.
 James Loxley, Performativity, 2007, p. 141.27
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citationality is widened to include non-linguistic acts in the performance of 
gender. This opens Butler’s notion of performativity to bodily performance on 
screen and on stage, this will be discussed further in Chapter 1.  
If performativity relies on citationality, then the problem of change emerges. 
Derrida and Butler both emphasise that change is a result of the impossibility to 
perfectly cite or to perfectly copy, so there is an inbuilt subversiveness in the 
performative. However, as opposed to the translator, the copyist has limited 
ability to effect this change. Butler addresses this impasse from the perspective 
of the relation between the I who speaks and the norm in relation to Nietzsche 
and Foucault in Giving an Account of Oneself.  In this book, Butler renegotiates 28
the moral implications of her previous work and the role of the self in relation to 
norms. She defines the problem as a negotiation of the self as a direct effect of 
the norm and the self as free to act. “The norm does not produce the subject as 
its necessary effect, nor is the subject fully free to disregard the norm that 
inaugurates its reflexivity”,  and argues that this “struggle or primary dilemma is 29
to be produced by a world, even as one must produce oneself in some way.”  30
What does it mean to ‘produce oneself in some way’? and how does this tally 
with Butler’s earlier model of melancholic gender as the result of an 
incorporation of the norm that prohibits homosexual desire? Butler states that: 
“In The Psychic Life of Power, I perhaps too quickly accepted this punitive 
scene of inauguration for the subject.”  And concludes that: “This view of 31
subject formation depends upon an account of a subject who internalizes the 
law or, minimally, the causal tethering of the subject to the deed for which the 
institution of punishment seeks compensation.”  This critique of her earlier line 32
of argument is focused on her reading of Nietzsche, but it is also in Psychic Life 
of Power that she offers a full reading of melancholic gender as the formation of 
the self through incorporation that she had first suggested in Gender Trouble. 
This offers a hint of a critical reading of melancholic gender, and indeed, Butler 
turns to Laplanche and Melanie Klein rather than Freud and Lacan in her 
 See Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 2005. 28
 Butler, 2005, p. 19.29
 Butler, 2005, p. 19, my emphasis.30
 Butler, 2005, p. 15.31
 Butler, 2005, p. 15.32
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readings of gender and self from Undoing Gender  and onwards. This allows 33
for a more ambivalent reading of the implementation of gender. Possibly by 
choice, Butler does not, however, turn to psychoanalysis to reformulate a model 
for gender and self-formation after this turn in her thinking. Instead, she tends to 
use psychoanalysis to theorise aggression and fantasy, and to problematise the 
relation between the aggressive and fragile aspects of the self.  This reflects a 34
move in Butler’s thinking — away from ontological questions and towards 
ethical or relational questions. She instead develops her notion of a partially 
free subject in relation to Foucault and his notion of The Use of Pleasure   and 35
critique, as a model of the subject in relation to itself and the world. This offers 
an explanation of what ‘one must produce oneself in some way’ may mean. 
Subjectivation is not something that happens to ‘one’, but something that ‘one’ 
takes part in. The usage of the indefinite pronoun ‘one’, echoes the indefinite 
pronoun ‘on’ in Simone de Beauvoir’s famous statement ‘One is not born 
woman: one becomes woman.’  The indefinite pronoun hints at an origin that 36
cannot be defined and a self that is not yet a subject. Butler develops this model 
of subject production in her reading of Foucault’s late writings.  
Whereas in his earlier work, he treats the subject as an ‘‘effect’’ of discourse, in his 
later writings he nuances and refines his position as follows: The subject forms 
itself in relation to a set of codes, prescriptions, or norms and does so in ways that 
not only (a) reveal self-constitution to be a kind of poiesis but (b) establish 
selfmaking as part of the broader operation of critique.  37
Butler formulates — based on her reading of Foucault — a model of the self as 
not only the effect of discourse or norms that the self cites from, but through an 
act of selfmaking as critique. Together with the previously quoted argument 
 Butler, Undoing Gender, 2004.33
 See Butler, The Force of Nonviolence, 2020; Notes Toward a Performative Theory of 34
Assembly, 2015; Frames of War, 2009; Precarious Life, 2005. 
 See Michael Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol 2: The Use of Pleasure, [1983] 35
1990.
 See Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, 1949. The quote is: “On ne naît pas 36
femme : on le devient.”
 Butler, 2005, p. 17. 37
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where ‘one must produce oneself in some way’, we can now form a model of 
the self being formed and forming itself in relation to itself and to the norms 
surrounding this self. Butler calls this relationality a struggle that in itself opens 
up for an understanding of freedom: “This struggle with the unchosen conditions 
of one’s life, a struggle — an agency — is also made possible, paradoxically, by 
the persistence of this primary condition of unfreedom.”  ‘One’ here faces 38
unchosen conditions that make up an unfreedom — demanding norms — but in 
so doing, ‘one’ is not merely made woman, but becomes woman, not passively, 
but in co-creation and in critical struggle with the unchosen. So how are we to 
understand the unchosen? And the self that emerges in this encounter between 
the one and the unfreedom of the demands of the world? This lacunae by 
choice in Butler’s developed theory of the subject drives this thesis and is one of 
its key questions. I wish to answer the question of how we can comprehend a 
self that emerges in the encounter with differences in the world. A self that loses 
itself in the unfreedom and struggle, but also the pleasures in difference. In 
Chapter 1, I will map the impasses of melancholia in the formation of a 
gendered self, both as developed by Butler and by Irigaray. I will then suggest a 
reading of masochism via Laplanche and Freud, to suggest how the model of 
masochism suggests a return to the encounter with both the self and with the 
world as enigmatic and as strange. I will develop models of ‘masochism,’ 
‘enigmatic messages’ and ‘the uncanny’ to formulate a model of self formation 
that emphasises the continuous formation of the self through translations of the 
enigmatic. I will place this discussion in relation to feminist and queer critique of 
male and heterosexual dominant cultures, not to essentialise the positions 
offered in these critiques but to maintain a reminder of the political origin of 
these models.  
I agree with Rosi Braidotti’s argument that Irigaray’s feminism of sexual 
difference reflects a political will to be, to have an identity: “women, blacks, 
youth, postcolonial subjects, migrants, exiles and homeless may first need to go 
through a phase of ‘identity politics’ — of claiming a fixed location.”  Irigaray’s 39
project and her vocabulary reflects an attempt to create a possible subject 
position for women and it thereby reflects a sense of not already having this 
 Butler, 2005, p. 19.38
 Rosi Braidotti, ‘Becoming Woman: Or Sexual Difference Revisited’ in Theory, Culture 39
& Society 2003, Vol. 20(3): pp43–64, p. 53.
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position. Braidotti calls this “ontological desire, the desire to be, the tendency of 
the subject to be, the predisposition of the subject towards being.”  This 40
political project is linked to Butler’s project of making gay lives count in her 
formulation of melancholic gender and in her formulations of mournability. The 
choice of melancholia and the refusal of mourning to describe the exclusion of 
women or of homosexuals from who matters and who counts is not incidental 
and by using vocabulary that may seem anachronistic I wish to maintain the 
political traces and struggles of the past that gave us these theories. I also want 
to avoid a theoretical model of différance or nomadism that treats any difference 
or any citation as equal. Toril Moi has argued that “it still remains politically 
essential for feminists to defend women as women” while cautioning against “an 
‘undeconstructed’ […] feminism, unaware of the metaphysical nature of gender 
identities”.  Following this argument, I maintain an uneasy duality throughout 41
the thesis in discussing difference as a general term and the feminine and non-
normative as terms with a political history. There are limitations to how far into 
the essentialisation of the outsider of normativity I am willing to go. Where Moi’s 
argument assumes a political or tactical essentialism that does not imply an 
assumption of gender difference as nothing but metaphysics, this thesis 
remains critical of the distinction between the essential and the ‘metaphysical 
nature of gender identities.’ Starting from the assumption that we translate 
complex messages and affective experiences of the self, the distinction 
between essence and metaphysical creation becomes less important. Diana 
Fuss has argued that essentialism sneaks in through the back door in its 
critiques. Using the ‘always already’ temporal logic, as discussed earlier, in 
Derrida’s (and Butler’s) formulation of the subject, Fuss argues that this trope 
contains the function of essentialism in a non-essential discourse: “Essence 
manifests itself in deconstruction in that most pervasive, most recognizable of 
Derridean phrases, ‘always already’ (toujours déjà).”  Fuss insists that this is “a 42
point of refuge for essentialism which otherwise, in deconstruction, comes so 
consistently under attack.”  I have argued already that the ‘always already’ in 43
 Braidotti, 2003, p. 44.40
 Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory, [1985] 2002, p13.41
 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature & Difference, 1989, p. 15.42
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Butler’s and Derrida’s formulation of performativity and implicitly in Butler’s 
formulation of melancholic gender, poses a problem for the possibility of agency 
and assumes an originary event that escapes deconstruction. I do not, however, 
agree that this equals a return of essentialism. As I will argue in Chapters 1 and 
2, it is possible to model a formation of the self as something enigmatic and that 
escapes deconstruction while still being a part of a continuous process of 
translation that opens up for an affective engagement with the enigmatic self as 
well as with an enigmatic world. This does not mean that the world nor the self 
is an essence or something stable and monolithic. On the contrary, as I will 
argue with the help of Laplanche and and early mention of the uncanny in 
Freud’s work, the enigmatic nature of the self or ‘one’ (as indefinite pronoun, not 
as unifying oneness) is not the effect of foreclosure as a process of 
compartmentalisation of unwanted desires, but of the conflicting and 
unintelligible demands and desires that the self is subject to and through which 
‘one’ encounters oneself. 
Irigaray has been accused of being an essentialist not for letting essentialism 
sneak in through the back door, but by embracing it as a means of constructing 
a female subjectivity, what Braidotti called a ‘desire for ontology’ above.  I 44
agree with Braidotti’s conclusion that there is a difference between Irigaray’s 
earlier work and her later attempts at defining the origin or the pre-history of the 
feminine rather than theorise the feminine as excluded in a male-centred 
discourse that takes male imaginaries and male morphology as the foundation 
of the self and thereby excluding the feminine from the formation of a self. The 
desire for ontology in Speculum goes through the exclusion of the feminine in 
order to formulate the feminine as the desire for being.  This is why Irigaray’s 45
usage of melancholia is different from Butler’s usage of it, not only because the 
two focus on different political projects of the excluded, but for Irigaray, it is the 
refused subject formation of the excluded that is her focus whereas Butler 
focuses on the formation of the normative subject that its incapacity to 
acknowledge subjects that are excluded from the norm as grievable subjects. 
 See Janet Syers. 1982 and 1986 for a critique of Irigaray as a biological essentialist; 44
Moi, [1985] 2002 for a critique of Irigaray’s attempt to define the feminine; Jacqueline 
Rose, 1982 and 1985 for a critique of Irigaray as embracing a problematic notion of 
origin. 
 See Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, [1974] 1985. 45
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This difference in focus means that Irigaray’s formulation of the feminine as a 
melancholic non-subject contains something that is not able to be or even to 
become, bound to be divorced from herself and from the body that does not 
offer an imaginary identification. Irigaray’s usage of melancholic identity is 
therefor more in line with my formulations of the enigmatic self and I use her 
theories to connect melancholic gender with the enigmatic self. In Speculum as 
well as in This Sex Which Is Not One Irigaray speculates about the language a 
feminine self that is excluded could produce.  In This Sex, Irigaray suggests 46
the term ‘parler-femme’ to describe this language production based in both 
ontological and political desire.  Margaret Whitford has argued that Irigaray’s 47
term should be read as a suggestion of what a reading from a feminine 
perspective as a non-stable subject implies. The term should not be read, 
according to Whitford, as an effort to create a women’s language, but to 
question the notion of language as unified.  Whitford’s argument is based on 48
her reading of transfers as opposed to interpretations, where interpretations 
should be understood as mastering discourse, defining the meaning of a text. 
Whitford argues that as Irigaray “suggests we should ‘read as a woman’, 
question ‘male’ writing […] we could apply this to her own writing […] for insofar 
as she desires to ‘speak as a woman’, it can only be from a position of non-
mastery, and we have to read her transferentially as well as interpreting.”  49
There is here an assumption of reading This Sex in the light of Speculum. 
Braidotti suggests drawing the line between the earlier and later Irigaray after 
This Sex. By contrast, my reading of ‘parler-femme’ bridges the theorisation of 
the feminine as denied subject position in Speculum and Irigaray’s later 
attempts to formulate a positive subject position for the feminine. To ‘read as a 
woman’ — understood as to read from the position of denied subjectivity, a 
 See Irigaray, This Sex Which In Not One, [1977] 1985. 46
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subversive act that Butler has defined as an effort to “destroy this position, this 
masculinism, with a cutting edge, indeed, with a threatened castration,”  is 50
something very different from trying to write from this position. Irigaray’s early 
style was one of extensive quotations, placing itself somewhere between 
reading and writing, between commentary and argumentation. This style in itself 
challenges the notion of the Author and what writing is, as well as highlight the 
contradictions in the source text. I do not agree with Braidotti’s or Butler’s stark 
distinction of a line that separates the early and the late Irigaray. However, the 
Irigaray that I will use in this thesis, is the Irigaray that speculates on the 
feminine as impossible subject position, rather than a possible subject position 
for the female writer.  
Masochistic spectatorship 
In this thesis, I will suggest reading the formation of the self through a 
masochistic model — a process of going astray and re-finding oneself. This 
return is both formative of the self and of the turn towards the self as the 
practice of re-finding the self. Through a re-reading of Freud’s concept of 
masochism via Laplanche, I will suggest that the self is formed through a state 
of being-with or being-alongside an alterity that the self is trying to comprehend 
— to translate — and this even before we have words or any notion of another 
self. Laplanche calls these untranslatable codes enigmatic messages and they 
form both the conscious self (what can be translated) and the unconscious self 
(what remains untranslatable) through an implantation of an alterity into the self, 
or rather as the self.  The message of the other contains something that is not 51
reducible to its material reality, nor to any fantasy we can form of it. This third 
reality is what demands translation. It contains an intention and, as Laplanche’s 
third reality is always another human, it contains the unconscious of the other, 
therefore always escaping complete translation. In relation to the above 
discussion of translation, this emphasises the unfinished aspect of translation 
and self-formation. Laplanche’s model does contain an original or Ur-insertion 
of an enigmatic other as the self, opening his model to translation with Butler’s 
 Butler, Senses of the Subject, 2015, p. 155.50
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and Irigaray’s usage of melancholia, while opening up this process to a 
continuous, open-ended process. After spending the Introduction and Chapters 
1-3 mapping this perspective of spectatorship, self-formation and difference, I 
will then draw on Ozon’s films to analyse the spectator that these films produce. 
What this thesis will focus on is how film, and the enigmatic messages that we 
are left to translate, affects and displaces the spectator. I am not, however, 
concerned here with the perception of a film; instead, what I am after is what 
spectatorship can teach us about the formation of the self. Films presuppose a 
spectator and it is this ideal spectator that is the focus of this thesis, rather than 
a lived experience of watching a film.  
As already noted, psychosocial studies raise the question of how the psyche 
and the social are related. Baraitser argues that in “what we could claim as a 
foundational text for psychosocial studies,”  Butler’s The Psychic Life of Power, 52
“creates a ‘new passage’ out of the reading of Freud and Foucault, to offer us a 
story of the tenuous, always strained, but productive relation between psychic 
and social spheres.”  This ‘new passage’ is the result of Butler’s thinking about 53
how norms function to create an ontology — through the incorporation of 
objects and the prohibition against desiring them as foundational of the subject 
— developed in her model of melancholic gender. Butler’s move represents, in 
Baraitser’s argument, a way of conceptualising the psychic and the social in 
order to generate a model of the formation of the subject that can explain a 
subsequent subjectification. “Butler mines psychoanalysis for a response to the 
ontological question of ‘who’ is there to make attachments prior to 
subjectivation, that could lead to subject formation.”  In my vocabulary, this 54
‘who’ is the self — a turning point that does not presuppose the subjectivation 
and insertion in a normative or symbolic order.  
Butler makes careful usage of melancholia and its role in forming the ego. 
Through this, she formulates a twofold model. One the one hand, she accounts 
for the specific incorporation of the lost homosexual object in the formation of 
the heterosexual, gendered subject. At the same time, she offers a general 
model for the internalisation of attachments and the prohibition against these 
 Lisa Baraitser, Enduring Time, 2017, p. 40.52
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attachments. The internalisation of an attachment and its prohibition therefore 
becomes the formation of the internal, an entity that is founded through a 
turning back onto the self. This self is thus already an object with attachments 
and prohibitions, already a nexus of desire and denial. In this account, the self 
is a productive nexus that is already both an inner object and a nexus and agent 
of the norms that formed the internalisation in the first place. This internalisation 
shapes the self as that ‘who’ who is there to make attachments and thereby link 
desire with the continuous incorporation and co-creation of normative systems. 
Butler’s model of melancholic gender offers a model of the self as internalised 
through regulatory norms. It thereby opens up the possibility of psychosocial 
negotiation, a negotiation of the self as displaced and as formed through 
internalisation of societal norms. As I have argued and as I have shown Butler 
to later recognise, the self in this model is the effect of and reflection of a 
prohibition against specific attachments. This model contradicts the notion of a 
productive power as developed by Foucault.  The melancholic event of Butler’s 55
model is the result of a pre-subjective prohibition of homosexual desire, a 
prohibition that enables the continued regulation of the remaining, heterosexual, 
desire. In my reading, this places Butler’s model on the side of stark 
differentiation — of sexual difference in psychoanalytic vocabulary — as this 
model forecloses the potential link between the two. In this thesis I turn to 
Irigaray’s notion of the feminine and Laplanche’s notion of seduction to theorise 
a self that is the result of continuous encounters with alterities and exclusions, 
with what can only be mourned with the greatest difficulty because it cannot be 
symbolised. These alterities and exclusions may per definition be part of the 
normative systems that have defined them as such and as Butler would define 
them in later texts:  
The question of what it is to be outside the norm poses a paradox for thinking, 
for if the norm renders the social field intelligible and normalizes that field for us, 
then being outside the norm is in some sense being defined still in relation to 
it.  56
 See Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol 1: The Will to Knowledge, 1998 [1976].55
 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender, 2004, p. 42.56
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This model for the normative as inclusive of all that is intelligible in the social is 
in a sense contradicted by Butler’s model of melancholic gender, as this works 
to explain a foreclosure of homosexuality from the intelligible on a psychological 
level, barring the ability to mourn these attachments. Yet, these attachments 
are, arguably both intelligible and mournable, though not to the same extent as 
what the normative grants as mainstream. In order to make this distinction, it 
can be helpful to use Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s notion of the periperformative — 
a performative that functions on the outskirts of what it performs — as Sedgwick 
makes clear, the spatial model of the periperformative offers a different view of 
what a performative can do and what it can support: “the localness of the 
periperformative is lodged in a metaphoric of space.”  Rather than the temporal 57
metaphor of Butler’s and Derrida’s citationality, the periperformative does not 
cite what was always already there, but instead acts on the centre from the 
periphery. Not necessarily outside the normative, but also not at its centre, or its 
mainstream. This metaphor includes the possibility of gradation, of gradually 
increasing distance from the centre, rather than Butler’s either foreclosed or not, 
or logic of sexual difference as I define it here. By contrast to Butler’s usage of 
Freud’s model of melancholia in the formation of the ego, Laplanche offers a 
different model for the formation of the self. This model does not rely on 
prohibition, but on the unintelligibility of the adult world, the alien nature of the 
world around us. “The enigmatic signifier is Laplanche’s term for an adult world 
infiltrated with unconscious and sexual significations and messages by which 
the child is seduced but which the child can’t understand.”  These enigmatic 58
messages or signifiers can be prohibitions, but the incomprehensible world is 
not only restricting, but also enticing and seductive. Laplanche suggests a 
masochistic pre-sexual phase that inaugurates the sexual. In this pre-sexual 
phase, the self is first receptive and passive in relation to the alterity of the 
other, a passivity that suggests a turning back to what becomes the interior, the 
self, of which melancholy is one aspect, but not the only one.  
 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity, 2003, 57
p. 68.
 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Forms of Being: Cinema, Aesthetics, Subjectivity, 58
2004, p. 37, Laplanche uses enigmatic signifier and enigmatic message as synonyms. 
My preference for message over signifier is due to the linguistic connotations of 
signifier. Message emphasises the directedness of the enigmatic, that it comes from 
someone, and opens up the enigmatic to non-verbal, non-linguistic communication. 
28
In this thesis I will move ‘beyond’ the melancholic and sexual difference. But this 
is not in the sense of leaving sexual difference and melancholic identification 
behind. Instead, the aim is to explore a parallel mode of being that allows for a 
fluidity and an affective response to the world, one that is not bound in a binary 
or founded on difference, but rather functioning through a being-with. The event 
of the melancholy formation of the self is contrasted by a continuous going 
astray and turning back. ‘Being-with’ is understood in this thesis as affective 
responses to the alterity of the other, an other that is not quite separate from the 
self. This aspect of being is intercepted by prohibitive events as described by a 
melancholic response to loss.  
The usage of ‘feminine’ in this essay may seem like an anachronistic oversight, 
a harking back to a version of feminist theory not yet critical of the essentialism 
of the second wave. However, as I have argued already and to further 
underscore this point — by translating this term to make use of it in a queer 
context, my aim is to reanimate it, enabling it to create new meaning. This also 
guides my return to theories of subjugation that are contemporary though often 
oppositional to Irigaray’s early formulations of the feminine. My return to 
debates of the 70s and the 90s reflects a return to a setting in which essence 
and difference was argued in relation to two different ideas about subjugation. 
The feminine also links identity with sexuality and the model for masochism that 
I will suggest in this thesis. As I will argue in Chapter 1, Freud often conflated 
the feminine with masochism and Irigaray’s citational model of Freudian theory 
builds on this conflation, though she argues that the exclusion of female 
morphology follows the path of melancholia rather than masochism. By linking 
this with a debate of the exclusion of desire in the 90s, the feminine and 
masochism is uncoupled with anatomy and feminine representations, enabling 
a reading of the feminine as decoupled but also linked historically from/with the 
subjugation of women. I suggest reading ‘feminine’ as a placeholder for both the 
passivity in the masochistic turning back on the self and what is excluded in 
psychoanalytic discourse of the development of the psychosexual self. In this 
reading, any reference to morphology or biology becomes secondary. 
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In her foreword to Psychosocial Imaginaries, Butler discusses “metaphorical 
transpositions”  to negotiate the different fields of the psychic and the social or 59
the historical that refuse “an overlapping relation with one another.”  Nor do 60
they “have to remain in a binary framework”  that does not overlap. Butler’s 61
suggestion is that the different spheres always impinge and overlap on each 
other and that their distinction is ever only precarious. This may be true, and I 
will point out several links and connections between the feminine and queer in 
the course of this thesis. Yet I believe something else is happening when a term 
from a different time or a different place goes astray and appears in the wrong 
time or place. An anachronistic appearance of a term long since left on the 
theoretical dustheap, assumed not to be needed again, does something when 
brought back, something more than pointing out the precarious borders 
between different fields of study.  
Like ‘queer,’ the ‘feminine’ is a redeployment of a term of exclusion and 
subjugation, but their different histories and their different contexts give them 
different values and offer different solutions. By its anachronistic status as well 
as through the theoretical context in which it was formulated by Irigaray, the 
‘feminine’ does not offer a possible identification with the excluded. The 
‘feminine’ is produced as passive simultaneously with its value as disruption to 
the discourses that excluded it. This allows for a different possibility, a possibility 
of thinking the exclusion and being-with on both sides of the excluded. As 
argued above, the ‘feminine’ in Irigaray’s usage that I will deploy here, quotes 
male discourses’ usage of this term. Irigaray uses the exclusionary discourse to 
explore the excluded, as opposed to inventing a discourse for the excluded. The 
‘feminine’ thus connotes exclusion, silence and impossibility, even when it 
speaks. These are connotations or resonances that queer does not carry, as it 
has a very different history and a very different formulation. 
Baraitser and Stephen Frosh have suggested that the psychosocial forms 
something new that is not reducible to its various ‘foundational disciplines.’ 
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Instead, the psychosocial as an ongoing negotiation of disparate terms 
becomes its foundation. Indeed, the psychosocial: 
[…] needs to constitute itself in such a way as to constantly unsettle its own 
activities and assumptions, and to aspire to a kind of critical politics that tests itself 
through negation, querying its own premises and always seeking to renew its 
engagement with a space that is neither ‘psycho’ nor ‘social’, and is definitely not 
both, but is something else again.  62
This definition or anti-definition of the psychosocial suggests a negotiation of 
terms and spheres that is not merely questioning the boundaries of 
‘foundational disciplines’ but forms something new. This vagueness risks 
becoming empty if it is not attached to a practice, to a work aimed at producing 
something new. In this preface, I have tried to argue for a model of translation 
and performative practice as a means to fill this void with a method or a practice 
that reflects the materials worked with as well as the theoretical starting points. 
Through Benjamin’s concept of translation as a practice, the psychosocial is 
here grounded in a practice and in a work process rather than in theoretical 
speculations of the psychosocial. In Parting Ways, Butler suggest an ethical 
translation where concepts, meanings and terms are not assimilated or 
removed from their origin. The act of translating terms that are worlds apart is 
necessary for these worlds to communicate, but the otherworldly or the 
anachronistic should not be reduced, consumed or assimilated into the 
contemporary or into the acceptable.  My usage of ‘feminine,’ ‘queer,’ ‘self,’ 63
‘enigmatic message’ and ‘alterity’ in this thesis constitute such acts of 
translation. They represent attempts to bring several spheres of thought 
together while striving not to collapse these spheres. Instead, the aim is to 
make something new, a psychosocial of the present project. The work of this 
thesis is to find a new foundation for the psychosocial by going astray in old 
models of the self and audio-visual representations of the enigmatic.  
 Stephen Frosh and Lisa Baraitser, ‘Psychoanalysis and Psychosocial Studies,’ in 62
Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society Vol13, 2008, pp. 346–365, p. 350.




The Introduction maps out what is at stake in this thesis by introducing its key 
elements. I start with a reading of Stanley Kubrick’s film Eyes Wide Shut (1999) 
in order to introduce some models of reading films that I engage with in this 
thesis, and that I depart form. Starting with a critique of a Lacanian, 
interpretative reading of film and the spectator, I open up a critical account of 
the master discourse of the reader/analyst of films and the reductive tendencies 
in this approach to film. This leads to a critique of the psychoanalytic model of 
difference as derivation from ‘sexual difference’ and its assumption of duality as 
the original difference. This critique leads to the introduction of a Lacanian 
feminist critique by Laura Mulvey in an early formulation of the male gaze as a 
sadistic, consuming gaze that is assumed in the structure of mainstream 
narrative film. The interpretative voice of the feminist critic is then problematised 
through contemporary spectatorship models that move away from difference as 
duality and its explanatory effects, while also building on the differentiation of 
spectatorship as at least two and the more diverse models that this initial 
critique of Lacanian film theory enabled. This chapter also introduces affective 
spectatorship models and their critiques of psychoanalytic models. The 
untranslatability or enigmatic aspect of François Ozon’s cinema is also 
introduced in this chapter. This untranslatability, is not merely a representation 
of the enigmatic nature of film in general, but the specific enigmatic refusal to 
reach conclusions with themes related to this thesis, such as sexual difference, 
spectatorial pleasure and egoic formations of the self in Ozon’s films. Ozon’s 
films, I argue, engages with these themes and refuse definitive interpretations 
and their materiality therefore offers an open-ended engagement with the 
theoretical approaches in this thesis.  
Chapter 1 offers an alternative reading of sexual difference and gender from 
within psychoanalytic theories. Starting with a critique of the phallic and of 
anatomical metaphors within Freud’s and Lacan’s models for sexual difference, 
this chapter then turns to the feminine as an impossible subject position as 
developed in Irigaray’s Speculum. This chapter then maps out a reading of 
Freud via Laplanche that focuses on the self as an ongoing, open-ended 
project, against a phallic closure and against a reading of the self as self-
identical. This chapter bridges the gap between psychoanalytic theory and 
32
affective spectatorship by arguing for a reading of psychoanalytic texts that 
points to a subject in the making, one that is affectively open to the world rather 
than melancholically foreclosed in its egoic identity. Building on the model of the 
self in chapter 1, chapter 2 constructs a methodology for reading films that does 
not suggest a closed interpretation but rather spectatorship as an affective 
experience that invites translations as an impossible project. In this chapter, I 
discuss what an affective spectator means and how a translating spectator can 
be developed in relation to an affective spectatorship model. 
Following these chapters focusing on the self and its relation to differences and 
to itself, chapter 3 introduces Ozon’s films and the the question of the origin of 
films. This chapter discusses auteur theory and turns the focus from the 
spectator as the self assumed to be produced by a film, to the auteur as the 
supposed self behind the film. Arguing with Barthes’s declaration that the Author 
is dead and the temporal impasse of Butler’s and Derrida’s subject formation as 
having already taken place and the exclusion of any doer behind the deed; this 
chapter suggests a doer that might not comprehend the deed. Following the 
previous models of self-formation and self-estrangement, this chapter 
negotiates the demonic, all-seeing Author that still haunts much auteurship 
theory in general as well as specific discussions of Ozon as an auteur. Building 
a notion of Ozon as a somewhat estranged reader of his own films and his own 
intentions, this chapter suggests Ozon as a reader of films and as one 
interlocutor of his own films amongst others, not as a final analyst of the films, 
but as a commentator. Ozon as commentator rather than as Author, also opens 
up for the possibility to read Ozon’s films as dealing with the notion of a 
demonic Author. A point that I will return to throughout the remaining chapters.  
Chapter 4 is the first chapter that offers a close reading of one of Ozon’s films. 
This chapter looks closely at a sibling relationship depicted in Young and 
Beautiful (2013). The depiction of this relationship and how these two siblings 
negotiate their differences and similarities open up for a direct engagement with 
the core questions of this thesis by one of Ozon’s films. To help bridge the gap 
between the sibling relation and the previous discussions of sexual difference 
and gender, I turn to Juliet Mitchell’s recent development of the sibling complex 
and its relation to the Oedipus complex. In juxtaposing these three fields: the 
film; the previously developed model for self formation; and Mitchell’s 
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theorisation of siblings as the first social relation, this chapter offers a 
renegotiation of difference in specific settings, but also suggests how 
translatability and untranslatability between disparate fields and languages 
function to create new meaning. 
After this initial reading of Ozon and a film about difference that explicitly deals 
with gender and sexual difference, chapter 5 returns to the feminine and female 
subjectivity. This chapter focuses on a close reading of 8 Women (2002), a film 
that excludes sexual difference through its usage of an all female cast. The plot, 
and the women, are, however, haunted by the absence of the man who is found 
murdered at the beginning of the film. This film is read in relation to the feminine 
as a denied subjectivity and as other. Asking the question what happens when 
the other is only put in relation to another other and what the feminine is in 
relation, not to the one, to the phallic, but in relation to seven other denied 
subjects. Difference is here negotiated through class, race and generational 
difference, diluting the duality of sexual difference into multitudes of 
differentiations and multitudes of resistance to the stagnation of these 
differences. This chapter also asks the question of pleasure, not only for the 
spectator, but for the reader/auteur and their relation to the demonic Auteur. The 
following chapter builds on the question of pleasure and the relation between 
the auteur and the audience. In chapter 6, the focus is on the sadistic 
tendencies in film, directed not only at the depicted characters, but also at the 
audience. Based on the affective model, the spectator becomes sensitive to the 
film in a way that a disconnected spectator does not imply. In this chapter, I 
focus on Sitcom (1998) and See the Sea (1997) as examples where Ozon is 
exploring the limits of spectatorial pleasure and the power of images to affect a 
spectator. These films are also read as attempts to subvert film language and 
filmic norms. As such, the content and film language is read in relation to the so 
called New French Extreme and the development of queer models beyond a 
norm/anti-norm duality.  
Chapter 7 returns to the question of the auteur and the intention behind the film, 
reading the auteur — like the spectator — as ultimately a masochist in the 
formation of the self and the projected notion of a self as creator/writer, this last 
chapter takes a broader look at Ozon’s work and some of the comments on 
Ozon, in order to defend Ozon as an explorative director rather than an 
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obsessive, compulsive director, a director who lets his films run amok and 
become something he seems to not be quite sure about. This again returns to 
the question of who can interpret a film and the enigmatic nature of the self and 
what the self has done. This concluding chapter suggests that there is an open-
ended aspect to Ozon’s films that render them interesting to the specific project 
for this thesis and for its contribution to contemporary French cinema. In a 
climate where french film has become more genre defined, Ozon’s cinema 
continues to defy categorisation.  
I have added a filmography after the bibliography. There is also a list of 
illustrations after the table of contents. All translations from French are mine 
unless otherwise stated and any italics in quotations are original unless 
otherwise stated. 
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Introduction: Setting the Scene 
Stanley Kubrick’s last film, Eyes Wide Shut, tells the story of Bill Harford’s (Tom 
Cruise) search for a secret society centred on obscure sexual rituals and 
anonymity. The narrative is propelled by Bill’s fantasy of his wife’s infidelity. This 
fantasy causes him to search for another fantasy; a fantasy he wants to look at 
without being implicated. This is the fantasy of the pleasure available for 
someone else. Hearing about the secret society, Bill disguises himself, with 
cloak and mask, as is the custom in this group. This allows Bill to enter 
undetected as an observer, into a fantasy of pleasure and lawlessness that we 
are normally denied but that is assumed to exist somewhere else, for someone 
else. Hidden behind his costume and mask, and the anonymity of the crowd, Bill 
is able to gaze the nudity on display. Like a cinema-goer, Bill can remain 
somewhat passive in the crowd; he is looking without being seen — or so he 
thinks until he is recognised and found out. Bill is warned that he is in great 
danger, breaking the one-way direction of his spectator’s point of view and 
implicating him in the scene and in the monstrosity of the pleasure of others. In 
this turn of events, the spectator becomes the looked at. 
Kubrick’s film offers a narrative of someone becoming a spectator of obscene 
pleasure and the disruptive effect of the returning gaze, a gaze that reveals the 
passive pleasure of the spectator. I shall use Eyes Wide Shut to map out a 
number of traditions of film theory as well as to suggest how film itself can 
construct an argument about spectatorship. My interest here is the formation of 
the self in relation to the world and my argument is that the assumed spectator 
of a film can tell us something about the formation of the self as both passive 
and active, as both the effect of ruptures and foreclosures and of a being-with or 
being alongside in a relation that involves care and similarity as well as rupture 
and lack.  
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The pleasure of the spectator has been theorised as the pleasure of passivity 
and absence by early Lacanian film theorists such as Christian Metz,  and by 64
Laura Mulvey as pleasure through displacement of identification with an active 
(male) character in order to desire the passive (female) object of desire.  65
These early psychoanalytic examinations of pleasure in film focused on the 
meaning of film and the visual pleasure that films can offer a spectator. Todd 
McGowan argues that this ‘first wave’ of Lacanian film theory read Lacan and 
films via Louis Althusser’s notion of ideology and for this reason, these readings 
were limited to the imaginary and the symbolic in Lacanian vocabulary.  66
McGowan contrasts this focus on the imaginary and the symbolic with film 
theory based on Lacan’s concept of the gaze. He points to Joan Copjec and 
Slavoj Žižek as the origin of this ‘second wave’ in the late 80s and early 90s.  67
McGowan uses this critique of early adaptations of Lacan to film theories to 
theorise the excluded and the excessive within films. “The gaze is a disturbance 
in the normal functioning of reality because it indicates that our social reality is 
not simply there as a neutral field.”  This aspect of film or, rather, this aspect of 68
the spectator’s experience of film is contrasted with McGowan’s usage of 
fantasy as “an imaginary scenario that fills in the gaps within ideology. In other 
words, it serves as a way for the individual subject to imagine a path out of the 
dissatisfaction produced by the demands of social existence.”  Fantasy 69
functions on the level of the imaginary and fills the gaps or the causes of 
dissatisfaction within the symbolic order. In Mulvey’s terminology, the threat of 
dissatisfaction and castration in desiring the idealised female object is covered 
by an imaginary identification with the male, omnipotent protagonist. Fantasy 
 Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier, 1982 [1977].64
 Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,’ in Screen Vol 16 Issue 3, 65
Autumn 1975 pp. 6-18. Here quoted from Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory 
Readings, Oxford University Press, 2016.
 Todd McGowan, The Real Gaze: Film Theory after Lacan, 2007. See also Louis 66
Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, 2014 [1970].
 See Joan Copjec, ‘The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception of 67
Lacan’ in October, vol 49, 1989, pp. 53-71 for her critique of the what she argues is a 
Foucauldian “panoptic gaze” that “defines perfectly the situation of the woman under 
patriarchy”, p. 54. She opposes this Foucauldian reading of the gaze to Lacan’s notion 
of the gaze as always failing to see (and therefore define) the self in the mirror screen.
 McGowan, 2007, p. 25.68
 McGowan, 2007, p. 23.69
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functions, for both Mulvey and McGowan, to uphold the symbolic ideology that 
promises pleasure but is unable to deliver on this promise. Mulvey’s solution is 
to break down the pleasure of looking: “the voyeuristic-scopophilic look that is a 
crucial part of traditional filmic pleasure can itself be broken down.”  The 70
means of breaking filmic pleasure suggested by Mulvey is based on what she 
defines as the “three different looks associated with cinema: that of the camera 
as it records the pro-filmic event, that of the audience as it watches the final 
product, and that of the characters at each other within the screen illusion.”  71
For Mulvey, the pleasure of looking at film is augmented by the prioritising of the 
last look, that of the characters looking at each other. This last look allows the 
spectator to identify with an object, and desire its object, from an insulated 
distance that removes the threat of castration from the experience of pleasure. 
As I have shown, Mulvey later develops the concept of a ‘pensive spectator’ as 
an alternative to the ideological look suggested by the films analyses in this 
early essay, for now, however, I wish to focus on this early essay because it 
deals with the subjugation of women and the fantasy of the perfect gaze and the 
pleasure this offer. It should be pointed out, however, that both the ‘pensive’ and 
the analytic spectator in this early essay focus on the trauma implicit in the 
filmic, though in this early essay the trauma is the result of the female’s phallic 
lack and in her later essay, it is the trauma of finitude and unmournable loss that 
serves as a generalised punctum. Arguably, there is therefore already a grain of 
her later argument in this earlier essay. Corresponding to Mulvey’s early model 
of spectatorial pleasure, Bill Harford’s desire is not to partake, but to observe 
the excessive pleasure of other men. His distance from pleasure allows his 
fantasy of a pleasure available to someone else to be maintained. 
Mulvey suggests breaking this fantasy by inserting the other two looks: the look 
of the camera and the look of the spectator. These two looks create a 
discrepancy in our identification with the film’s characters. This disruption 
produces conscious, detached spectators that are less likely to be absorbed in 
the pleasure of film.  
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 721.70
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 721.71
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The first blow against the monolithic accumulation of traditional film conventions 
(already undertaken by radical filmmakers) is to free the look of the camera into its 
materiality in time and space and the look of the audience into dialectics, 
passionate detachment. There is no doubt that this destroys the satisfaction, 
pleasure and privilege of the 'invisible guest,' and highlights how film has depended 
on voyeuristic active/passive mechanisms.  72
Mulvey’s solution to the active/passive impasse is in line with the introduction of 
the camera and spectator characteristic of the Nouvelle Vague, present in films 
such as 2 or 3 Things I Know About Her (1967) or Tout va bien (1972) by Jean-
Luc Godard. These solutions are technical, however, and as such tend to be 
dated and follow trends rather than offer lasting solutions. By contrast, in 
Kubrick’s film the discrepancy of identification takes place within the narrative, 
without inserting the camera. The reversal of the look in Eyes Wide Shut, that 
exposes the anonymous Bill as the spectator, can be read as a challenge to the 
‘invisible guest,’ as suggested by Mulvey. Bill’s pleasure is destroyed and his 
passivity is challenged as he becomes the centre of his drama rather than the 
onlooker onto others’ drama. This reading also challenges Copjec’s critique of 
the gaze as a Foucauldian or panoptic gaze in Mulvey’s argument. Mulvey may 
rely on technical instruments for revealing the fragility of the seemingly stable 
gaze confirming the patriarchal ideology in which it is constructed, but as 
Kubrick’s staging shows, ideology and fantasy is always threatened by a 
reversal or a collapse of the naturalised order and Mulvey attaching this to the 
lack in women and the traumatic display of this lack is not so much a panoptic 
assumption of a pan-ideological apparatus as a quotation from Freudian and 
Lacanian source, sources that we can read differently, but Mulvey’s early 
argument is not directly contradicted by the source-texts that she deploys in 
order to theorise the subjugation and objectification of women in Hollywood 
films. It is not only Bill who is paranoid of the reversal of his gaze, but the 
society in which he finds himself is as paranoid as he is and upon discovery of 
the external gaze must cleanse itself in order to maintain the fantasy of a stable 
gaze.  
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 722.72
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Questioning dualities
Mulvey’s model of scopophilic pleasure is steeped in the model of patriarchy 
and the subjugation/exclusion of women that this thesis takes as one of its 
theoretical starting points. In this model, male scopophilic pleasure is assumed 
to be heterosexual and the passive female is the object of his pleasure. This 
model is grounded in an assumption of lack and rupture where women lack 
something and the two genders are stable and kept apart. Mulvey’s proposal is 
to move away from the pleasure of fantasy that covers this lack and as we have 
seen, she later suggests the ‘pensive spectator’ as an alternative to the 
impasse between male scopophilic pleasure and detached theorising. The 
pensive spectator offers pleasure in critical engagement. However, for now I 
wish to remain in the gender dichotomy of this early essay and explore possible 
pleasures within this model that offers a subversive possibility. 
Gaylyn Studlar has pointed out that Mulvey operates within the “castration fear 
and a polarized account of sexual difference”  that she sets out to criticise. 73
Studlar argues that the divisions of active/passive, sadist/masochist, male/
female are an inherent part of the psychoanalytic theories that Mulvey deploys 
and suggest a turn towards Gilles Deleuze’s reformulation of masochistic 
pleasure instead.  This allows Studlar to formulate a model of spectatorship 74
that is not based on the sadistic, male scopophilia within Mulvey’s model but 
rather on a masochistic idealisation of the female object. “Unlike the sadist, the 
masochist does not seek to destroy the female or to fuck her, as one of a 
countless entourage of degraded, discarded objects, but to cling to her as an 
ideal and to make her the fantasy subject of an almost desexualized 
contemplation.”  Studlar therefore moves away from a sadistic objectification of 75
the female on screen, but it is hard to see how any real female character can be 
developed between the madonna and the whore of this duality, or between the 
sadist and the masochist. Studlar’s theorisation of masochism remains 
anchored in dualism, even though it sets out to explore the other side of it. 
Studlar suggests a reading of Deleuze in relation to Jean Laplanche, but she 
 Gaylyn Studlar, In the Realm of Pleasure: Von Sternberg, Dietrich, and the Masochist 73
Aesthetic, 1988, p. 29.
 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Coldness and Cruelty’ [1967], in Masochism, 1991.74
 Studlar, 1988, p. 22.75
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does not explore the differences between Deleuze’s and Laplanche’s models of 
masochism. The primary passivity of the child in Laplanche’s theory of 
seduction does not entail wooing the mother as an idealised object; this primary 
passivity emphasises the external source of sexuality and desire, it does not 
value or define the form this sexuality takes.  
As mentioned, McGowan suggests introducing the gaze as related to Lacan’s 
real in order to escape the excessive reliance on the symbolic or the imaginary 
to understand film and the spectator. The real in the gaze, McGowan argues, 
reminds the viewer of the failure in the symbolic order and of the failure of 
ideology to uphold its own foundations. By analysing film as a form of fantasy, 
films are able to either fill the gaps or to reveal the gaps of ideology. “The 
political valence of fantasy in a film depends on how the film depicts excess: if it 
uses excess to fill in ideological gaps and pacify the spectator, then it functions 
as an ideological supplement; but if it allows excess to stand out and distort the 
spectator’s look, then it functions as a challenge to ideology.”  76
Excess is defined by McGowan as a means to challenge or pacify the spectator 
and the spectator’s relation to ideology. In McGowan’s analysis of Eyes Wide 
Shut, Kubrick is able to reveal the excess enjoyment in capitalist ideology by 
revealing how the perverse pleasure of the rich is not a result of individual 
enjoyment, but functions as a built-in aspect of the capitalist system. “The 
radicality of Stanley Kubrick as a filmmaker consists in his ability to use film’s 
fantasmatic quality to bring to light the hidden obscene dimension of symbolic 
authority.”  Specifically, McGowan argues that Eyes Wide Shut reveals the link 77
between wealth and obscenity. “We see that wealth does not simply buy 
security and luxury; it buys an obscene enjoyment. In this way, the film 
demands that we acknowledge the link between wealth and obscenity, which is 
a link that capitalist ideology continually works to disavow.”  McGowan’s 78
analysis of Eyes Wide Shut centres on ideology and the usage of excess in 
order to break down the meaning or the symbolic foundation of ideology. 
McGowan’s analysis operates in the field between the symbolism or the 
semantics of the film and the spectator as invested in this meaning.  
 McGowan, 2007, p. 37-38.76
 McGowan, 2007, p. 44.77
 McGowan, 2007, p. 46.78
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McGowan understands the spectator’s investment via the excess or the real, 
which functions as a potentially disruptive supplement to the ideology of 
capitalism. This excessive pleasure is the real that cannot be approached but 
that pulls spectators in at the same time as it distances them from the ideology 
that is being revealed.  
Through each of these characters, Kubrick indicates that the stain of enjoyment 
resides in the structure of symbolic authority rather than in the particular subject 
that inhabits the position. Kubrick uses the fantasmatic dimension of cinema to 
expose this stain and allow us to see its disruption of the image and the narrative in 
his films.   79
In McGowan’s argument, it is not the subject but the structure that causes the 
enjoyment; the excess is not individual but structural and the ideology that tries 
to hide this structure is revealed by exposing this excess to the spectator. If we 
replace capitalist ideology with patriarchal ideology, it would be equally possible 
to submit Kubrick’s film to an updated version of Mulvey’s argument. Just as 
Kubrick is using inter-narrative devices rather than the introduction of the 
camera, excess and the real in the gaze could be used to disrupt the fantasy 
and the scopophilic pleasure of the male gaze by challenging this sadistic gaze 
with the return of the anonymous gaze of the object, actualising the stain in 
patriarchal ideology. In other words, McGowan’s argument could be used to 
develop Mulvey’s analysis of the male gaze. McGowan argues that Studlar’s 
turn from psychoanalysis to Deleuze’s model for masochistic pleasure is a 
turning away, not from Lacan, but from interpretations of Lacan that have been 
prevalent in film theory. “Studlar rejects the idea that the spectator’s desire is a 
desire for mastery, which is exactly what Lacan rejects as well.”  80
The difference is, however, that Studlar is trying to move away from a male — 
sadist — position of mastery, to formulate a position in relation to the maternal 
where one is able to desire without consuming or being consumed. In 
McGowan’s theorisation of the spectator’s passivity, the maternal remains a 
threat. The Lacanian fear of the maternal is inherited in McGowan’s model. 
 McGowan, 2007, p. 47.79
 McGowan, 2007, p. 9.80
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Fantasy proper has nothing to do with affect; it concerns, instead, our relationship 
to the ineffable and unapproachable maternal Thing that appears to embody the 
ultimate enjoyment, which is, as Lacan says, ‘something that is far beyond the 
domain of affectivity.’  81
The maternal Thing must be kept at a distance by ideology or it threatens to 
break down the order of things. McGowan here reveals an ambivalence, where 
a little excess can help dismantle the ideology, but too much excess will 
threaten the fabric of human society. This ambivalence becomes even more 
problematic when the too-muchness of excess is linked to the maternal Thing, 
linking the maternal with dissolution of reason as well as ideology. Studlar 
deploys the pre-Oedipal maternal object in order to explore a relation to the 
desired object that is founded on passivity rather than activity. A relation that 
escapes the maternal Thing and instead remains an object that may be 
threatening, but that the child is able to live with. McGowan’s critique of Studlar 
thus misreads her attempt to explore masochism as a mode of spectatorial 
desire by comparing it to Lacan’s theory of denied mastery. For this reason, 
McGowan is unable to address the critical introduction of the maternal in 
Studlar’s theory.  
For Studlar, the introduction of the maternal as active, through Deleuze’s 
reformulation of masochism, offers an opportunity to think about cinematic 
pleasure in ways that are not subordinated to castration, control or a paternal 
figure. “Deleuze's theory of masochism calls into question psychoanalysis's 
preoccupation with the castration complex, the genital ‘supremacy' of the male 
as interpreted by the patriarchy, and the overwhelming influence and authority 
of the father in the psychosexual development of the child.”  This allows 82
Studlar to explore the fluidity and mobility of sexual desire and identification in 
spectatorship. “Through the mobility of multiple, fluid identifications, the 
cinematic apparatus allows the spectator to experience the pleasure of 
satisfying ‘the drive to be both sexes’ that is repressed in everyday life 
 McGowan, 2007, p. 43.81
 Gaylyn Studlar, ‘Visual Pleasure and the Masochistic Aesthetics,’ in Journal of Film 82
and Video, Vol. 37, No. 2, Sexual Difference (Spring 1985), pp. 5-26, p. 11.
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dominated by secondary process.”  The disavowal of the maternal as a threat 83
that needs to be kept at bay, allows McGowan to formulate a complete and 
closed analysis of Eyes Wide Shut and Kubrick’s cinema in general, an analysis 
that masters the meaning of these films.  
The films compel the spectator to examine the motivations driving the exercise of 
this authority. Of course, not every spectator—and perhaps no spectator—reacts in 
this way, but this is the response that the logic of Kubrick’s films demands. When 
we answer this demand and recognize the obscenity at work in this process, we 
free ourselves from our investment in this authority. In this sense, Kubrick’s 
fantasmatic depictions of the obscenity of symbolic authority are in the service of 
the subject’s freedom. Recognizing authority’s obscenity is the path to freedom 
from it.  84
This quote reveals an inherent problem with the interpretative model in 
psychoanalytic theory in general and in Lacanian film theory specifically. 
McGowan tells us the right interpretation of this film, even if not every spectator 
reacts to it in this way. In this semantic reading of the effects of excess in film, 
McGowan performs a symbolic meta-analysis of the film itself and of the 
spectator seeing the film. In this manner, McGowan’s claim that Lacan’s real 
undermines the symbolic/imaginary readings of traditional Lacanian film theory 
is contradicted by his deployment of a master discourse to define ‘the logic of 
Kubrick’s films.’ 
Phallic adventures 
As pointed out in the preface, this thesis aims at formulating a model of 
spectatorship and self formation that negotiates the affective responses to the 
other. The following excursus will focus on the function of the phallus in 
Lacanian and Freudian theory. This will help us to map out the function of 
difference and the always failing desire for oneness that is at the core in 
Lacanian theory and that McGowan and Copjec theorise through their concepts 
of the real in the gaze. By focusing this following reading on the phallus, I will go 
 Studlar, 1985, p. 13.83
 McGowan, 2007, p. 4884
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to the heart of sexual difference and the effects of sexual difference in Lacan’s 
and Freud’s theories of the self as lacking wholeness. This will help us translate 
between these theories and the theories of the gaze and spectatorship so far 
introduced and to map out the reading of sexual difference that lies at the heart 
of the subsequent critical readings of sexual difference as well as the 
masochistic readings of the self that will emerge from these critiques.  
In Lacanian logic, the phallic signifier defines the separation of the sexes and 
engages the self in a process of sexuation, where the phallic signifier pulls the 
subject to approximate an ideal relation to this signifier. In ‘The Signification of 
the Phallus’, Lacan argues that the phallus functions as a signifier in that it 
attracts the signified subject in a relation of desire.  Desire is defined by Lacan 85
as the difference between “the appetite for satisfaction” and “the demand for 
love”, desire is thus the lack between an appetite and the formulation of a 
demand; desire is the “phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung)”.  Splitting or 86
Spaltung was used by Freud to describe either the different agencies in his 
distinction between the id, ego and superego or as the phenomenon of two 
disparate notions existing simultaneously. In ‘Fetishism’, Freud uses splitting to 
describe the simultaneous notion that woman lacks the penis and the disavowal 
of this notion in the same ego.  In Lacan’s theory of the mirror phase, the 87
splitting takes place in the identification with the image of the self that gives rise 
to “an alienating identity” with the self.  By linking desire of/for the signifier with 88
the splitting of the self in its alienating relation to its image as self, Lacan 
instates the desire of/for the phallic signifier on a bodily plane as well as a 
symbolic. By following the trace of Spaltung through these texts, it is possible to 
trace the linkage between the splitting of the self in its relation to its bodily self, 
sexual difference and the fantasy of similarity this results in and the phallus as 
signifier. 
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The phallic signifier embodies — a metaphor that consciously cuts through the 
levels of meaning here — the splitting between the demand for love and the 
appetite for satisfaction. As a result, the phallic signifier occupies a space that 
the demand can never articulate, or, more precisely, a space that is occupied by 
a misrecognition between the image of the self and the gaze. The phallic 
signifier is therefore not a part of language, nor is it a part of an imaginary, 
alienating identification. Instead, the phallic signifier is a representation of desire 
at the same time as it is working through desire to interpellate the subject in its 
function as signifier. The phallic signifier is the impossible articulation of its own 
desire. It represents the desire to live up to a demand that cannot be articulated. 
The phallic signifier as a signifier of desire can be used to describe the 
discrepancy between an appetite for satisfaction and the possibility of 
articulating this as a demand for love. It can also be described as the 
interpellation of the subject by the phallic signifier; in this latter sense, it 
functions as a demand to satisfy the desire of the Other. This can be used to 
theorise the displacement of the self in a linguistic order and the alienation of 
the self in this order, and it also echoes the alienation of the self in relation to 
the self as an image to identify with. However, Lacan sets out in ‘The 
Signification of the Phallus’ to explain both why the mother is primordially 
considered to “be endowed with a phallus, that is to be a phallic mother,”  and 89
why the “girl considers herself, even for a moment, to be castrated,”  as well as 90
to explain the purpose of the phallic phase and the function of the realisation of 
the mother’s castration. In other words, Lacan sets out to explain the rupture of 
the phallic phase by castration and sexual difference. Sexual difference via the 
notion of castration is a first instalment that will create the conditions for 
sexuation as the desired approximation to one of the poles in sexual 
differentiation. 
Lacan’s explanation of sexual differentiation reverts back to Freud’s description 
of the feminine as the result of the inversion of her active, sadistic desire into a 
passive, masochistic one as a result of her identification with the mother, who is 
perceived as castrated. In Lacan’s version, this drama comes about by the 
realisation that the phallic mother is lacking and is therefore desiring something. 
 Lacan, ‘Signification of the Phallus,’ 2006 [1966], p. 576.89
 Lacan, ‘Signification of the Phallus,’ 2006 [1966], p. 576.90
46
This first incarnation of the Other, the mother, is revealed as lacking, as this lack 
is “experienced in the Other’s desire”. Lacan explains that if “the mother’s 
desire is for the phallus, the child wants to be the phallus in order to satisfy her 
desire.”  This desire to be the phallus is contrasted by a division by desire that 91
“stands in the way of the subject being satisfied with presenting to the Other the 
real [organ] he may have that corresponds to the phallus”: this renders it 
impossible both to be and to have the phallus. The subject thus discovers, not 
that the phallus is to be had or is lacking for the self, “but in the sense that he 
learns that his mother does not have one.” And further: “This seals the 
conjuncture of desire, insofar as the phallic signifier is its mark, with the threat of 
or nostalgia based on not-having.”  In Lacan’s account, the phallic signifier is 92
thus linked with not having in its signification of desire and is then linked to the 
realisation that the mother is desiring and therefore lacking something. This is 
then connected to the penis and the realisation that the mother does not have 
this organ. In this manner, body image becomes linked with the signifier of a 
desire to endow this bodily mark with a meaning that represents lack and 
alienation in general. Lacan emphasises that it is not the penis itself that is 
desired, “for what he has is no better than what he does not have, from the 
point of view of his demand for love, which would like him to be the phallus.”  93
As the boy can imagine himself as having something that his mother lacks, he 
will desire to fulfil the desire of the Other (the phallic signifier) by what he has, 
while the little girl will desire to be what the Other desires. Lacan argues that 
this desire  — for ‘having’ or ‘being’ what is in fact impossible to have or to be — 
leads the boy to a symbolic castration as his thing will never live up to the desire 
of the Other, while for the girl it leads to a masquerade or pretence to be what is 
desired by the Other.  
Paradoxical as this formulation may seem, I am saying that it is in order to be the 
phallus — that is, the signifier of the Other’s desire — that woman rejects an 
essential part of femininity, namely, all its attributes, in the masquerade.  94
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Lacan does not specify the exact nature of this essential yet rejected part of 
femininity. The attempt to be the phallus is a first response to the realisation of 
the lack in the mother/Other. It is only as a secondary response to bodily 
difference that the young boy is assumed to be displacing this phallic signifier 
onto a body-part. This description of sexual difference centres on the 
metonymic split of two disparate reactions to lack and the subsequent desire of 
the Other. The assumed and undefined essence behind or before this split is 
not defined or explored. Instead, Lacan’s interest is in the signifier that initiates 
the split.  
In Gender Trouble, Butler proposes two different readings of Lacan’s 
masquerading women. The first of these emphasises the elusive essence that 
is rejected through her masquerade. In this reading, “masquerade may be 
understood as the performative production of a sexual ontology.”  Here, 95
masquerade is not understood as hiding an essence, but rather as the act that 
produces the very idea of an essence that has been lost. In contrast, in her 
second reading, Butler suggests that masquerade hides a lost femininity: 
“masquerade can be read as a denial of a feminine desire that presupposes 
some prior ontological femininity regularly unrepresented by the phallic 
economy.”  Butler’s argument is that in order to make the first reading possible, 96
Lacan’s “Law [must be read] as prohibitive and generative at once.”  However, 97
Butler concludes that for Lacan, there is something that pre-exists the 
introduction of the law or the division of the sexes.  
Although one can argue that for Lacan repression creates the repressed through 
the prohibitive and paternal law, that argument does not account for the pervasive 
nostalgia for the lost fullness of jouissance in his work.  98
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This nostalgia, as Butler puts it, is not necessarily for something lost but could 
equally be something imagined as lost through the limitation of the law. The law 
imposed would then function to generate the very notion of an essence or a 
feminine jouissance that has been lost. By linking sexual difference with splitting 
or Spaltung, Lacan links the imposition of the phallic signifier with a split that 
was already there, namely the split within the self through the alienated 
identification with a self as mirror image. This split identification with the self 
presumes an ontological identity with the self that has been thus alienated. In 
sum, jouissance before the law is nothing but nostalgia after the law has been 
imposed. My reading here of Lacan therefore contradicts Butler’s conclusion. 
She prioritises the symbolic order and the law in the creation of splits. “Within 
Lacanian terms, it appears that division is always the effect of the law, and not a 
preexisting condition on which the law acts.”  By contrast, my argument is that 99
Lacan’s splitting of sexes becomes a transposition of a split into the symbolic, 
rather than a split as the effect of law and the symbolic, this is in line with 
Copjec’s critique of a ‘Foucauldian reading’ of the gaze mentioned earlier. I do 
this by linking the splitting of the sexes with the split self as the result of an 
alienated identification in the mirror phase. Sexual difference, in my argument, 
becomes the displacement of a split of the self onto the world. Sexual difference 
offers an intelligible difference or splitting that is at once external and internal, 
and — importantly — that can be controlled or mastered. The law that 
metonymically splits the two sexes replaces the split with the self as failed 
identification, and thereby symbolises a primordial split with the self as a split 
with an other. Read this way, Lacan’s theorisation of sexual difference becomes 
a means to control the disentangling force of desire that reveals the split with 
the self. If we read this along with masquerade according to Butler’s first 
suggestion; “masquerade may be understood as the performative production of 
a sexual ontology, an appearing that makes itself convincing as a ‘being,’”  100
then we are able to read sexual difference as the fictive creation of a being 
before the law. I would like to point out two important aspects of my argument at 
this point: first, that my reading of sexual difference as a symbolic 
representation of a split with the self implies that the markers of male/female 
distinctions are arbitrary and can be displaced/symbolised by other markers, 
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such as skin tone, facial or bodily features, language use or any other form of 
difference which becomes ‘naturalised’ after the fact of symbolisation/
displacement of difference. The second point I would like to highlight is the 
difference between my argument and Butler’s suggested reading where the law 
is a productive regulation that creates the assumed origin as its effect. In my 
reading of Lacan here, there is a split that precedes the law, a split that the law 
attaches itself to. This is in line with the psychoanalytic assumption that sexual 
difference is pre-symbolic and the bedrock of the symbolic. However, in 
combination with my assertion that the ‘sexual’ in ‘sexual difference’ is arbitrary, 
my argument is that there is a split/difference with the self that is amalgamated 
with sexual difference in much of psychoanalytic literature on the topic. The 
reason why I still maintain this vocabulary is because I find the theoretical 
model of sexual difference productive and as I mentioned in the preface, I wish 
to reflect the political history of these terms in this thesis. By avoiding a 
nomadisation of difference I do not wish to ossify the terminology, but rather to 
maintain the political and an embodied history of these terms and their relation 
to debates of the subjugation/exclusion of women and the subjugation/exclusion 
of what has been considered as ‘sexual minorities’. 
Jay Prosser has offered a different ground of critique of Butler’s reading of 
sexual difference and the body in Freud’s and Lacan’s models. Prosser’s 
critique comes from his attempt to negotiate the trans experience and the 
specific questions of embodiment that his raises. The below discussion of 
Prosser’s reading of the Freudian body as opposed to the the Lacanian body 
will offer an opportunity to highlight some of the problems that occurs when the 
body is discussed between masquerade and ontological production/origin.  101
Prosser argues that Butler’s focus on gender as performative, and on the body 
as the secondary effect of this performative action, produces the transgender 
body as the primary example of how gender functions as already fake, as 
always already an act that only secondarily produces the body as sexed. In 
Prosser’s study of the transsexual experience, this transformation is focused on 
the body defined not as a set of external attributes or as a screen, but as 
something ‘real.’ Taking issue with Butler’s reading of the Freudian bodily ego, 
Prosser argues that this bodily ego should be understood not as the 
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subordination of the body to the image or fantasy of a body, but rather that the 
bodily ego is a materialisation of the ego. “Freud's bodily ego is designed not to 
dematerialize the body into phantasmatic effect but to materialize the psyche, to 
argue its corporeal dependence.”  Prosser contrasts this with a Lacanian 102
model where the body is the specular image that enables an identification. “If in 
Lacan's mirror stage the body is the ego's misconception, in Freud's The Ego 
and the Id the body is the site of the ego's conception.”  In essence, Prosser 103
argues that Butler’s reading of Freud is overly guided by Lacan. However, as we 
have seen in the reading of Lacan above, the alienated relation to the body — 
and the splitting that this gives rise to — places the body and the projection of 
the body as an ideal I in a desiring relation. The ontology of the image or the 
body as the origin therefore misses the point of the tension field between the 
two. In my reading of Lacan, it is this splitting that is then re-actualised in 
relation to the desire of the Other in the formation of sexual difference and the 
process of sexuation. However, I do agree with Prosser that there is a move 
away from this incorporated body, into the meta-analytic language of the real, 
symbolic and the imaginary in Lacan’s metapsychology. This is one of the 
reasons why I will suggest a turn to Laplanche and his concept of reality as 
something that escapes both translation and understanding.  
In terms of sexual difference, both Freud and Lacan rely on the visual discovery 
of bodily difference for the child to conceptualise lack as a physical marker. In 
Freud’s description there is an assumption that the lacking penis is the cause of 
the notion of lack, whereas in Lacan, the missing limb becomes a marker that 
takes on meaning rather than the root cause of this meaning. This 
misrecognition of lack in Lacan’s theory is visual and fantasmatic, giving rise to 
the masquerade that Butler explores as a potential opening of Lacan to a 
productive and performative power. Prosser instead suggests a materialisation 
of the ego, where the construction of the self is dependent on bodily materiality. 
Arguing that Butler turns gender into mere surface, Prosser suggests that this 
leaves a blindspot for the internal materiality of sex as a ‘real gender.’ By using 
the term ‘real gender,’ Prosser is able to argue for a materiality that is at once 
biological and narrative. The body presents a materiality that is not merely a 
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surface. Prosser suggests that the transexual’s “narrative of becoming a 
biological man or a biological woman” reveals “the materiality of the sexed 
body.”  The materiality of the sexed body is not only the projection of an image 104
but the transition that predates the surgical alteration of the body. This transition 
includes assessments by medical professionals — the creation of a narrative to 
support the claim to be a transsexual, hormonal therapy, all of which goes 
‘deeper’ than the scalpel and the surface appearance of a body. Prosser’s 
materiality focuses on biology as a cause of the self, as opposed to a the 
Lacanian visual identification with an image and a surface. Visual identification 
in the transsexual experience — according to Prosser — does not constitute an 
identification with an ideal I, but rather a traumatic rupture between the I of the 
spectator and the image in the mirror.  
The mirror misrepresents who I know myself really to be: at an angle to Lacan's 
mirror phase, the look in the mirror enables in the transsexual only disidentification, 
not a jubilant integration of body but an anguishing shattering of the felt already 
formed imaginary body — that sensory body of the body ‘image.’  105
In this quote, Prosser distinguishes between a felt (already formed) body (or 
self), and the mirror image that causes a disidentification. The mirror image and 
the disidentification with this image splits the self rather than unites the self as 
an ideal I. This ‘angle to Lacan’s mirror phase’ does not in itself contradict 
Lacan’s concept of the mirror phase. As we have seen in our reading of Lacan, 
the mirroring is not only a jubilant identification. It is also a failure, a splitting of 
the self and a misrecognition that lays the foundation for the alienation that is 
then displaced in sexual difference. It is this alienation that leads either to an 
impossible overvaluation of the penis or to a masquerade to pretend to be what 
the other is lacking and is therefore the foundation of sexuation as understood 
by Lacan.  
Instead, it is Prosser’s notion of a sensory self before the mirror phase that 
contradicts Lacan. For Lacan, it is the misidentification with a whole self as a 
reflection that leads to the formation of an I. In contrast, for Prosser the I has 
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already been formed when the mirror image is contradicting the felt self. The felt 
self is the real self in Prosser’s argument, the material self that discovers itself 
through tactile experiences. It is not clear how this sensory or felt self is 
gendered in the first place, but this model allows Prosser to suggest a split of 
the self, through a misrecognition of the self, a disidentification with what the I 
knows itself to be. It is important to note that the transsexual in Prosser’s mirror 
image is not in the mirror phase. Gender has already been established and the 
subject’s misrecognition of the mirror image reveals the parallel existence of the 
phallic signifier as well as the corporeal misrecognition that is the splitting of the 
self in the mirror phase. Prosser’s reading of the scene highlights the split 
between the bodily, felt, self and the visual self in terms of gender and the 
difference between what Prosser calls ‘real gender’ and body image. It is 
interesting to note that Prosser’s critique of Lacan ends up being very Lacanian. 
Like Lacan, Prosser argues for a ‘real gender’ that is not biological, instead this 
‘real gender’ is rooted in a bodily experience that is actualised in the alienation 
of the seen body and the felt body. These models of ‘real gender’ or sexuation 
lead to difficulties with defining how this alienation becomes linked to sexual 
difference or ‘real gender.’ For Prosser, the bodily self takes on a different 
ontology to the perceived self and, accordingly, the transsexual project 
becomes a project to narrativise bodily ontology into imaginary being. It is 
important to acknowledge, however, that Lacan’s model does not aim to 
describe gender dysphoria. What Lacan is trying to do is to find an explanation 
of how the psychic idea of sex is formed without a biological referent. 
This discussion highlights some of the tensions between Butler’s attempt, on 
the one hand, to formulate an ontology of the psychosexual self in 
psychoanalytic theory that allows for a notion of power rather than law, and, on 
the other, Prosser’s attempt to formulate a concept of ‘real gender’ that is at 
once material or physical and possible to alter. Both Prosser and Butler suggest 
a limit to the formative self, either in the melancholic incorporation of a 
foreclosed other (Butler) or in the materiality of the body (Prosser) in order to 
formulate limitations to the fluidity of gender. One problem with these 
formulations is that they both use overlapping terminology when they discuss 
the fluidity of gender and its limits. I am suggesting a separation in terms, aimed 
at clarifying what I see as a conflation of different modes of difference and 
identity into one term — gender. In order to distinguish the two strata I suggest 
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making a distinction between sexual difference, based on a model of loss, 
foreclosure and splitting on the one hand, and gender, based on cohabitation, 
porousness and fluidity on the other. 
Difference beyond duality 
The above excursus was intended to offer a broad outline of what is at stake in 
my discussion and my reformulation of sexual difference in this thesis. I will 
return to this question throughout this thesis, for now, however, I would like to 
link this back to Mulvey’s early essay that introduced the male gaze in Lacanian 
film theory to track a development of sexual difference and gender in the field of 
film theory. I have shown a critique of Mulvey’s position from the perspective of 
McGowan and Copjec already, now I will instead turn to a critique of the duality 
of male/female, sadist/masochist in Mulvey’s essay. Michele Aaron argues that 
Mulvey’s theorisation of the male gaze introduced gender and difference into 
the field of film theory and that this, by extension, led to the demise of 
psychoanalytic influence on this field. 
As the female spectator emerged as a contradictory figure grounded in the 
complexities of her social formation which were articulated on-screen and lived off-
screen, the psychoanalytic model of spectatorship ceased to be an adequate or 
accurate means of understanding her.  106
Once the spectator became gendered — according to this argument — 
Pandora’s box was opened and the multiplication of differences outgrew the 
duality of psychoanalytic theory. Like Studlar, Aaron turns to Deleuze’s model of 
masochistic pleasure in order to open up spectatorship theory to a theory of 
desire and pleasure that allows for greater diversity and fluidity, while still 
maintaining an openness to “illicit or unspoken or unconscious responses to 
film.”  Aaron makes the distinction between an emotive, moral response to film 107
and a conscious, ethical response. “So the spectator is most definitely moved 
and even implicated in the scene, but being moved, I want to argue, marks the 
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experience as moral but not ethical: involuntary emotion is the opposite of 
reflection and implication.”  Aaron relates this distinction to Freud’s model of 108
masochistic pleasure as taking pleasure in delayed pleasure. “The unpleasure 
is temporary and necessary for the greater pleasure to be experienced; it is an 
essential part of the achievement of joy.”  And further that this delay of 109
pleasure constitutes a conservatism in masochism. “This is a crucial point, 
confirming a conservative paradigm for this behaviour: the indulgence in loss for 
the enhancement of the later gain.”  This reading of Freud is greatly 110
influenced by Deleuze’s reformulation of masochism. For Deleuze, there is a 
centring of the delay of pleasure as opposed to the pleasure in pain itself as 
developed by Freud in A Child is Being Beaten and Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, where he proposes a primary masochism, a pleasure in the passivity 
itself, rather than in the delay of pleasure. The notion of a delay in pleasure, 
places masochism in line with narrative cinema and suspension. Aaron also 
deploys Deleuze’s notion of a contract between the masochist and the desired 
object in order to suggest a tacit but necessary agreement between the film and 
the spectator. 
So the masochist agrees to — both desires and requires — the other party’s 
infliction of pain within a consensual dynamic. In other words, spectatorship is 
characterised by complicity even though it depends upon its suppression for its 
smooth running.  111
Here Aaron uses Deleuze to theorise the tacit agreement between spectator 
and film as well as formulating a non-binary model of activity and passivity or 
male and female positions. This is done through a dismissal of the castration 
complex as a driving force in her spectatorship model. “Of increasing 
importance to my argument is how disavowal manages or contains the socially 
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problematic, that is the ‘perverse’, implications of visual pleasure (rather than 
just the age-old anxieties of little boys).”   112
The maternal object, both as desired and as source of identification, is key to 
theorising the masochistic position for both Freud and for Deleuze. As the 
maternal, pre-Oedipal object has still not been deprived of phallic pleasure, 
there is no lack to be displaced in a binary model. The maternal source of 
masochistic pleasure therefore offers an escape from binarism at the same time 
as it opens the opportunity for an ethical spectator who becomes aware of the 
masochistic process and therefore becomes an ethical, conscious spectator as 
per Mulvey’s challenge to scopophilic pleasure. But one problem arises here. 
These Deleuzian reformulations of spectatorship ignore the function of the real 
as disruption in McGowan’s theory. Is there a way of combining the fluidity and 
continuity of Deleuzian spectatorship theory and the disruptive aspect of desire 
in order to theorise both the disruptive and the continuous aspect of 
identification and desire? The real in Lacanian terms — and in McGowan’s 
usage of this term in film theory — is interlinked with his system of the 
imaginary and the symbolic. In this tripartite model, the real functions as a 
disruption, as excess, as that which cannot fit in the other systems, but it is 
nevertheless intrinsic to the model and as such, it supports the functioning of 
the symbolic and imaginary. As we have seen, in McGowan’s analysis of the 
excessive pleasures in Stanley Kubrick’s films, the real was given symbolic 
value in the final analysis. The real functioned to produce a logic or an order 
that may or may not be correctly interpreted by the spectator. 
The affective spectator 
Affective film studies constitute an alternative to the psychoanalytic models 
discussed so far. The focus here is on those cinematic messages that 
circumvent, bypass or contradict a more intellectual understanding of film. 
Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth have developed a useful definition of 
affect:  
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Affect, at its most anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those forces — visceral 
forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces 
insisting beyond emotion — that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward 
thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a 
barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us 
overwhelmed by the world’s apparent intractability.  113
Affect in this definition marks the starting point of a movement that involves the 
body, emotions and consciousness, but that has not ossified into something 
intelligible. Instead affect exists both before and beyond this movement. Affect is 
a reaction of recoil or interest, movement towards or away from something, a 
movement that is not yet or no longer understood. In the passages discussed 
above, both McGowan and Aaron have moved away from affect as not-yet-
ethical (Aaron) or as hiding the excessive disruption of the real (McGowan). 
Gregg and Seigworth goes on to compare affectivity with a rhythmic response 
or relation with the world, emphasising the relatedness of our bodies with the 
world around them, challenging the distinctness of the two fields. In film theory, 
affective concepts have been developed further by Laura U. Marks to theorise 
the spectator’s embodied relation to the screen.  Distinguishing haptic 114
visuality from optic visuality, Marks develops a theory of a visuality, which does 
not allow for an understanding of what is seen but instead involves a 
multisensory relatedness to the visual. The haptic aspect of visuality involves 
memories, when an absence of understanding forces the spectator to make 
interpretations that are not confined to the visual itself or its coding.  
In a similar vein, Vivian Sobchack has advocated an embodied theory of 
cinematic experience.  Focusing on pain, Sobchack argues its infliction cuts 115
through the metaphysics and brings us back to our senses.  
Indeed, there is nothing like a little pain to bring us back to our senses, nothing like 
a real (not imagined or written) mark or wound to counter the romanticism and 
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fantasies of technosexual transcendence that characterize so much of the current 
discourse on the techno-body that is thought to occupy the virtual cyberspaces of 
postmodernity.  116
The double meaning of ‘back to our senses’ is here used to emphasise both the 
validity of our senses — the undeniable sense of pain — and the sensible return 
to something ‘real’ as opposed to ‘romanticism and fantasises.’ At the same 
time, Bettina Pappenburg and Marta Zarzycka argue that a carnal aesthetic 
“takes into account the (often fearful) collapse of distance between the viewer 
and the art object, fostering an immersive approach where the viewer is no 
longer only a viewer, but rather the subject of an embodied encounter.”  These 117
challenges to spectatorship models — though formulated within different 
traditions — regard the seen as something real, as something outside that 
becomes a part of the self that sees. This concept of the real challenges the 
psychoanalytic emphasis on fantasy, as it externalises the real event rather than 
internalises it as fantasy. In Freud’s early writing there was a shift away from the 
real event that caused the symptom. He gave up his seduction theory to make 
way for a theory of infantile sexuality and thereby a greater focus on the inner 
workings of the child and on reality as fantasy.  118
Here it is important to note that Marks has suggested that her 
phenomenologically formulated theory of haptic visuality could be understood in 
psychoanalytic terms, through the relation to the mother. “In this relationship, 
the subject (the infant) comes into being through the dynamic play between the 
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appearance of wholeness with the other (the mother) and the awareness of 
being distinct.”  This suggested link between affect and the maternal in 119
psychoanalytic theory is unfortunately left undeveloped by Marks. The maternal 
relation that Marks describes emphasises both the connectedness and the 
porousness of the mother/infant relationship and the subtle differentiation that 
this forms. Her formulation focuses on both the relation with and distinction from 
the mother, but there is no mention of sexuality. This may of course be a result 
of the briefness of the passage. It does, however, raise the question: How would 
this intriguing link look if we were to take into account a psychoanalytic theory of 
sexuality, as well as a theory of the object relation that is shaped between and 
with the mother? I will return to these questions in the following chapters, but for 
now, I would like to introduce Ozon’s cinema and its role in the writing of this 
thesis. 
Ozon’s enigmatic cinema 
Kate Ince has pointed out that Ozon’s films “distinguish themselves clearly from 
earlier gay male filmic production in France through never having gay 
communities as their social setting, through their absence of reference to SIDA 
(AIDS), and through never having overtly politicised narratives.”  Ozon’s role 120
as a post-gay director who is not tied to ‘gay issues’ allows his films to explore 
sexuality and identity in a way that is nonetheless informed by a queer critique 
of the stability of sexual identities. “One of the most provocative aspects of 
Ozon’s cinema, and one of the reasons for his early critical attention, concerns 
the audacious and candid ways in which his films tackle issues of gender, 
sexuality, and identity.”  In a sense, Ozon, by turning away from ‘gay issues’ 121
and the domestication of something queer in these ‘gay issues,’ avoids what 
Leo Bersani has called de-gaying gayness. Instead he embraces the queer as 
challenging not only norms but the stability of anti-norms as well, and the 
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stability of the self as a result.  Ozon’s move away from the traditional issues 122
of ‘gay film’ does not mean that his films are any less provocative or informed by 
issues of identity, fluidity and sexuality. “Ozon’s oeuvre is decidedly consistent in 
its desire to blur the traditional frontiers between the masculine and the 
feminine, gay and straight, reality and fantasy, auteur and commercial 
cinema.”  This fluidity and the boundlessness of sexuality characterises most 123
of Ozon’s films. “Sexual desire as represented by Ozon is almost always 
multidimensional and consistently astonishing (even to its own bearer) in its 
capacity for boundless reinvention.”  The astonishing nature of sexuality and 124
pleasure as explored by Ozon, makes his films an excellent partner in exploring 
the affective and enigmatic nature of film and the formation of the self through 
the encounter with the enigmatic other. “Ozon formally, as well as thematically, 
displaces, mocks or otherwise defamiliarizes the conventions of erotic 
narrative.”  Ozon’s cinema is queer in the sense that it defamiliarises the 125
‘erotic narrative,’ whether the protagonist is gay, straight or fluidly moving 
between expressions of desire. There is always some twist that challenges the 
assumed direction not only of the plot but also the characters’ sources of 
pleasure.  
Andrew Asibong points out that transgression of taboos are often revealed to be 
futile in Ozon’s cinema. “Ozon’s film — and indeed so much of his cinema — is 
constantly urging the spectator to look at how utterly superficial the (usually 
sexualised) acts that take place in the name of subversion and transformation 
really are.”  The superficially subversive and sexual acts are instead 126
incorporated in the family and the norm. Like an echo of the monitoring 
sciences in Foucault’s History of Sexuality, the father/scientist in Sitcom (1998) 
is unfazed by the insurrection of his family members, laconically accepting the 
changing norms around him. The panopticon eye of the story, he is at once 
disinterested and eerily aware of everything that is happening around him.  
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The queer in Ozon’s cinema is not so much in his taboo-breaking displays of 
sexuality and identities as in the evasiveness of these positions. Ozon, like 
many of his characters, follows his pleasure. “I follow my pleasure, that’s all.”  127
This hedonistic statement does not mean that Ozon’s films ignore the 
melancholic, repressive functionings of norms, nor that they merely deploy the 
production of sexualities. Ozon’s films stay clear of what Foucault called “a 
sergeant of sex, an accountant of the ass and its equivalents.”  Rather than 128
representing various deviations from the norm and reducing them into 
identitarian or definitional categories, Ozon’s films stay elegantly clear of 
definitions of desire and pleasure. I argue that Ozon’s films actualise various 
aspects of power, pleasure, desire and taboo, both between characters and in 
creating spectatorial pleasure. 
These characteristics of Ozon’s cinema both motivate and begin to explain my 
choice to work with his films in this thesis. I wish to explore spectatorial 
pleasures in relation to the formation of the self and its displacement through 
affective engagement with film. It is my argument that spectatorial pleasure is 
not in itself good or bad, it does not contradict a critical view or an ethical 
engagement with that which is viewed; spectatorial pleasure can be both 
disruptive and conformist with an ideology. By reading it through masochistic 
pleasure and enigmatic signifiers, the pleasure of the spectator can help us 
understand the psychosocial and the formation of the psyche, of an inner as 
both productive and oppressive, as dependent on both seduction and on 
prohibition. This opens onto a theory of how the normative functions to form the 
self and how the self can resist, enjoy and find pleasure in resisting norms. 
My choice of Ozon, however, remains precarious, and a riddle even to me. I 
would not call myself a fan of Ozon, there are many aspects of his films that I do 
not appreciate. There is a preference for white, upper-class characters and 
environments that whitewash and simplify his films and that — with a few 
exceptions such as See the Sea and Criminal Lovers — tend to exclude 
working-class experiences of sexuality and identification. There is also the 
heavy-handedness with which Ozon uses filmic ‘tricks’ — the intention behind 
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narrative and scenic choices can be rather obvious. This is also evident in what 
I would call Ozon’s ‘readiness for the gender-studies classroom.’ The main 
narrative in his films can often feel obvious and his desire to undermine 
heterosexual couplings a bit too simple. What fascinates me in Ozon’s cinema, 
however, is the side-stories and the peripheral relations that take place while 
the main narrative unfolds more or less predictably. I will come back to this 
aspect in chapter 3, a chapter dedicated to Ozon and his method of making 
films as well as the role of the auteur.  
Ozon is somewhat a hostage to his hedonistic search for ‘fairy-tales without 
guilt’. There is an anti-political celebration of pleasure that denies and excludes 
roughness and poverty from his films. In an interview where he talks about 
Young and Beautiful (2013) — a movie that tells the story of a young prostitute 
— he argues that for him it was important that the protagonist was from the 
upper-classes, that money was not a problem for her. Ozon did not want her 
prostitution to be caused by poverty. Instead, she is a youth trying to figure out 
her sexuality.  And though this removal of anything that could distract the 129
spectator and the narrative can be explained, and is key to making this film into 
what it is, there is a recurring exclusion of what disturbs the idyllic and the 
purified in the form of a white upper class. This exclusion is problematic and 
deprives Ozon’s cinema of a depth and breadth that I find unfortunate and 
problematic. 
When I began working on Ozon, I intended to write only one chapter about 
Young and Beautiful. The other chapters were going to use other cultural 
objects to think through the formation of the self between gender and sexual 
difference. However, I found a pleasure in writing about Ozon’s films that I did 
not find in the other objects I was using. This pleasure comes, paradoxically, in 
part from the aspects that I find problematic. Ozon’s focus on pleasure and his 
recurring uncomplicated narratives — where the distracting world is relegated to 
a peripheral existence — allows for thematic readings and a concentration on 
idealised relations. In turn, this approach to storytelling allows for a focus on the 
issue that is being dealt with as well as an un-judgmental approach to 
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characters — as in Young and Beautiful — or a complete focus on scenery and 
narrative — as in Water Drops on Burning Rocks — when it works. But it is this 
same focus that becomes problematic when it excludes the gritty and 
complicated questions of race in France — as in 8 Women (more on this in 
chapter 5). In sum, my choice to work with Ozon is as much about my own 
pleasure as it is about his exploration of pleasure and its vicissitudes. I treat the 
seduction of Ozon’s films with suspicion as it is the very pleasure of looking on 
that can remove us from sympathising with the characters and from being 
implicated in these films. 
Conclusion 
I opened this introduction with a brief reading of Kubrick’s Eyes Wide Shut. The 
themes and the filmic language of this work helped me to map out a number of 
different models of analysing films. In the process, there emerged a critique of 
the limitations of a phallic, foreclosing formulation of loss in the formation of the 
subject, not so that we can move on to something else, but so that we can find 
a way to supplement such foreclosure with something else. This something else 
was pinpointed through affective spectatorship theory and the maternal in 
psychoanalytic theory, a maternal that is not reducible to the maternal Thing that 
must be given up to give way for language and social bonds.  
In the next chapter, I will continue to investigate the maternal and the feminine 
to explore a type of relationality that is not based on foreclosure. In this chapter, 
I defined the phallic in relation to Lacan as well as Butler’s and Prosser’s 
critiques of him. I suggested that the split that the phallic and sexual difference 
refers back to was an experience of a split of the self and an alienation from the 
self as the formation of the self. By formulating a critique of McGowan, I have 
suggested that the maternal can be something other than the maternal Thing 
that must be excluded to give way for the symbolic and the possibility of stable 
relations. In this critique, there is also an opening for the kind of critique of 
meta-languages or master discourses that the feminine may offer. 
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1 Freud and Femininity  
In the previous chapter, I mapped out a connection between the maternal in 
psychoanalysis and affective spectatorship theory. These two entities both 
operate in the borderlands of language and visuality and between passivity and 
activity. In this chapter I will specifically develop ‘femininity,’ ‘passivity’ and 
‘masochism’ in order to define them for the broader arguments offered in this 
thesis. 
In their discussion of Jean-Luc Godard’s Contempt (Le mépris, 1963), Leo 
Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit argue against a psychologisation of its characters.  130
Contempt tells the story of a French writer, Paul — played by Michel Piccoli — 
who is invited by an American producer to rewrite a film script. The film in the 
film tells the story of Ulysses and the producer is looking to make the film more 
commercial. In a key scene, the writer’s wife, Camille — played by Brigitte 
Bardot — gets a ride in the producer’s sports car. The writer himself is left 
behind and has to find his way to the producer’s mansion on his own. As 
spectators, we follow Paul, rather than Camille. Therefore we are left in the dark 
as to what happens between Camille and the producer during the ride and in 
the mansion before Paul arrives. When Paul finally gets to the mansion, his wife 
is angry and refuses to talk to him. For the remainder of the film, the couple are 
trapped in a vengeful dance of insinuations, distrust and contempt. Mixed up 
with this drama are scenes where the writer and the director are discussing the 
psychology of Ulysses and panoramic views of statues and actors from the film 
that they are making. Paul keeps returning to what happened during the time 
between his wife’s departure with the producer and his own arrival at the 
mansion. Camille dismisses his questions and refuses to talk about what 
happened. As spectators we share the writer’s lack of knowledge. We are left 
out of the scenes that could fill this gap with certainty. Along the lines of 
McGowan’s method of interpretation, we could follow the logic of the film and 
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64
conclude that nothing happened, that the assumed unlimited pleasures of the 
wealthy function to trigger the writer’s fantasy. The lacuna is left to be filled by 
Paul, who obviously imagines the unlimited enjoyment of the rich producer. Like 
Bill in Eyes Wide Shut, Paul’s fantasy of his wife’s infidelity and of the pleasures 
accessible to the rich and successful drives the film’s narrative.  
As already noted, Bersani and Dutoit cautions against reading the logic of the 
film to fill in the gaps. They argue that “the only certain thing about all such 
speculations is that they remove us from the film. All this is in our heads, not on 
the screen; the characters’ motivations, unarticulated by them and invented by 
us, are substitute for our only legitimate activity: the activity of looking and 
registering what we see.”  Psychologisation of the characters amounts to 131
playing “the game of the enigmatic signifier — that is, to be complicit with the 
anti-cinematic visuality it embodies.”  Anti-cinematic visuality is here defined 132
as a fantasy that fills the gaps of cinematic visuality. The gaps left for us to fill 
may not lend themselves to be filled with meaning, but the enigmatic signifier at 
least invites us to take part, to displace our selves in the visual and become a 
part of what is seen. The gaps could then be something else than the maternal 
Thing or the Lacanian real. Such gaps invite us and reveal the porous 
connection between the self and an other; this can then be conceptualised as 
an aspect of the maternal via seduction, and of the self as constituted as an 
effect of this seduction. 
In Freud’s narrative of sexual difference, of the separation of masculinity and 
femininity, it is the feminine that is created; the feminine position needs to be 
explained while the masculine is described as a continuation of the normal 
development of the child. In a lecture on femininity, Freud argues that the little 
boy and the little girl go through the same stages — until a certain point. “Both 
sexes seem to pass through the early phases of libidinal development in the 
same manner.”  As Freud is interested in “how a woman develops out of a 133
child with bisexual disposition,”  the problem for Freud is to explain how and 134
 Bersani and Dutoit, 2004, p. 51.131
 Bersani and Dutoit, 2004, p. 51.132
 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures On Psycho-Analysis. (1933) in SE 22 133
Lecture XXXIII, Femininity, p. 117.
 Freud, 1933, p. 116.134
65
when the young girl is separated from the young boy in her development 
towards being a woman. Freud’s formulation of the problem implies that the 
child from which both sexes develop is a boy. “We are now obliged to recognize 
that the little girl is a little man.”  This formulation where ‘little man’ and ‘child’ 135
occupy the same position as the origin of the two sexes, implies that the little 
girl will later divert from this origin in order to become a woman. In the phallic 
phase, the two sexes are still equivalent in their search for pleasure.  
In boys, as we know, this phase is marked by the fact that they have learnt how to 
derive pleasurable sensations from their small penis and connect its exited state 
with their ideas of sexual intercourse. Little girls do the same thing with their still 
smaller clitoris. It seems that with them all their masturbatory acts are carried out 
on this penis-equivalent, and that the truly feminine vagina is still undiscovered by 
both sexes.  136
Freud describes the masturbatory acts of the phallic phase as equivalent for 
both boys and girls, though Freud points out the difference in size between the 
penis and the clitoris, the pleasure the child can derive from the two are similar. 
This phallic phase is distinguished, in this quote, from the ‘truly feminine 
vagina’. The feminine is defined as a departure from the phallic, from the clitoral 
pleasure of the phallic phase. This definition of the feminine requires a transfer 
of erotogenic zones from the clitoris to the vagina, “the clitoris should wholly or 
in part hand over its sensitivity, and at the same time its importance, to the 
vagina.”  The boy, on the other hand, does not suffer from this need to transfer 137
erotogenic zones, “the more fortunate man has only to continue at the time of 
his sexual maturity the activity that he has previously carried out at the period of 
the early efflorescence of his sexuality.”  This transfer of erotogenic zone is 138
only part of the transformation from child to woman. The transfer to vaginal 
pleasure is “one of the two tasks which woman has to perform in the course of 
her development”  to become separate from man. For both the little girl and 139
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the boy, the “mother (and the figures of wet-nurses and foster-mothers that 
merge into her)”  is the first object choice and like the penis, the boy can hold 140
on to his first choice until the incest prohibition finally forces him to give up on 
this choice and later replace this first object with similar objects. The girl’s 
position is different; the girl needs to replace her object choice as well as her 
erotogenic zone, “in the Oedipus situation the girl’s father has become her love-
object”  and it is this love object that is then given up through the incest taboo 141
and later returns as “her final choice of object.”  The achievement of femininity 142
is here described as the effect and accomplishment of a process that precedes 
the Oedipus complex. The sexual division is a fait accompli by the time the child 
enters the Oedipal situation. Freud asks “how does she pass from her 
masculine phase to the feminine one to which she is biologically destined?”  143
The masculine, phallic phase is here defined as the joint origin of both sexes, 
the phase when the girl is ‘a little man’. The feminine is acquired and is the 
result of a break from the pleasure and object choice that the Oedipus complex 
is supposed to prohibit. This prohibition before prohibition shapes femininity as 
separate from masculinity. How, then, does Freud explain this departure from 
the masculine origin? 
According to Freud, the transformation of the young girl and the formation of 
femininity is the result of the anatomical difference between her and boys. “The 
castration complex of girls is also started by the sight of the genitals of the other 
sex. They at once notice the difference and, it must be admitted, its significance 
too.”  The sight of male genitals leads to the “discovery that she is 144
castrated”  and this “is a turning-point in a girl’s growth.”  Freud explains that 145 146
“the little girl has hitherto lived in a masculine way, has been able to get 
pleasure by the excitation of her clitoris and has brought this activity into relation 
with her sexual wishes directed towards her mother, which are often active 
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ones” . This masculine expression is blocked by “the influence of her penis-147
envy”  and she gives up on her active sexuality. 148
Her self-love is mortified by the comparison with the boy’s far superior equipment 
and in consequence she renounces her masturbatory satisfaction from her clitoris, 
repudiates her love for her mother and at the same time not infrequently represses 
a good part of her sexual trends in general.  149
The phallic phase comes to an end through narcissistic pain caused by her 
comparison with ‘the boy’s far superior equipment’ and as a result she gives up 
her love object as well as the active, phallic, clitoral pleasure. The move away 
from the mother and from the active, clitoral masturbatory pleasure happens in 
tandem and the reversal of the active phallic pleasure follows the withdrawal 
from the maternal object. “Her love was directed to her phallic mother; with the 
discovery that her mother is castrated it becomes possible to drop her as an 
object, so that the motives for hostility, which have long been accumulating, 
gain the upper hand.”  The love object was a phallic mother, a mother who 150
could satisfy her own needs, but as the girl discovers that the mother, like 
herself, lacks the ‘far superior equipment’ of the boy, the phallic mother is 
castrated just like the girl herself. The girl gives up on her active pleasure, not 
because her clitoris could not provide this pleasure, but because the mother, 
and herself, was discovered to lack the penis. This lack inverts narcissistic 
pleasure and withdraws her love of the mother in order to create a female 
position.  
Freud argues that there are two levels of identification with the mother. On one 
level, the pre-Oedipal is an identification based on love, while the secondary 
level is based on the wish to take her mother’s place in the Oedipus complex. 
This secondary identification functions through the turning inward of the 
previous love for the mother. Envy of the missing anatomic marker forces the 
girl to give up on her mother as her object of identification. As a result, she will 
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revert already ambiguous feelings towards the mother into the self as passive. 
Through this move, feminine pleasure is made passive and reversed back onto 
the self, in marked contrast with the active, phallic pleasure that the little girl 
who was a boy had felt before this moment. 
A woman’s identification with her mother allows us to distinguish two strata: the 
pre-Oedipus one which rests on her affectionate attachment to her mother and 
takes her as a model, and the later one from the Oedipus complex which seeks to 
get rid of her mother and take her place with her father.  151
The aggressive feeling of the Oedipus complex, and the will to take the 
mother’s place, had already been achieved in the girl prior to the Oedipus 
complex. And as the introjection of these ambiguous feelings are based on the 
pre-existing identification with the mother, this introjection of the mother as no-
longer-phallic, contains the prohibition against the active, phallic pleasure. As 
the mother was excluded, the daughter must also be excluded. This narrative 
hints at a sexual identity and identification in the girl that precedes the loss of 
the phallic self and the phallic mother. Freud acknowledges this in the 
distinction he makes between pre-Oedipal play with dolls and Oedipal play. 
Before the loss of the identification with the phallic mother, the dolls play 
“served as an identification with her mother with the intention of substituting 
activity for passivity.”  In her relation with the phallic mother, the girl had been 152
passive, and playing with dolls “was not in fact an expression of her 
femininity”  but instead an ambition to be phallic (as the mother was still 153
perceived to be). When the pre-Oedipal girl plays with dolls, she pretends to be 
the active mother who “could do with the baby everything that her mother used 
to do with her.”  It is only when the mother and the self is revealed to be 154
passive, that the girl uses dolls to practice passivity by displacing the wish for a 
penis into the wish for a child.  
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The phallic and the phallus 
Juliet Mitchell has argued in her introduction to Feminine Sexuality that Freud’s 
concept of the castration complex is key to his understanding of the difference 
between the masculine and feminine. “For Freud, identification with the 
appropriate parent is a result of the castration complex which has already given 
the mark of sexual distinction.”  In the presentation of Freud’s model for the 155
feminine above, this model corresponds to the castration complex, and the 
penis envy that this complex leads to, in the preparation of a feminine position 
as a function of the internalisation of the first love object as a passive, no-
longer-phallic object. There is, however, a prior identification in Freud’s 
presentation, as evident in the play with dolls. Freud distinguishes two levels or 
‘strata’ of identification. One was an identification with the phallic — active — 
mother and the other was the internalisation of the passive, no-longer-phallic 
mother and, with it, the internalisation of the absence of the phallus. It is this 
second strata — the castration complex and its two different outcomes — that 
constitutes Mitchell’s concept of sexual difference in Freud’s model. Mitchell 
argues that it is the phallus that marks the difference between the sexes in 
Freud’s model. “Freud always insisted that it was the presence or absence of 
the phallus and nothing else that marked the distinction between the sexes.”  156
But in Freud’s version, the phallic was a phase of activity and auto-eroticism. 
This signifies an access to pleasure rather than anatomical difference. 
How do we move from the phallic as an adjective to describe an attitude to 
pleasure towards discussing the phallus as a noun, as something that can be 
present or absent — had or no-longer-had? In Mitchell’s argument the phallus 
as noun is the result of a child’s fantasy of what the mother wants. “In fantasy 
this means having the phallus which is the object of the mother’s desire (the 
phallic phase). This position is forbidden (the castration complex) and the 
differentiation of the sexes occurs.”  Mitchell’s subsequent reading of Lacan is 157
based on the pleasure the child could give himself (as the child was always a 
boy in this stage) in Freud’s model. This pleasure becomes a fantasy that the 
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child has something to be desired — something that gives pleasure. However, 
this fantasy is forbidden and this leads to the two different solutions, or rather 
the two different outlooks on the castration complex; to ‘not yet having been 
castrated’ or to ‘having already been castrated.’ Prohibition is a part of the 
internalised loss of phallic pleasure for the girl, while prohibition becomes 
internalised as regulation for the boy. 
In this early work by Mitchell, she refutes the distinction between gender and 
sex as incompatible with psychoanalysis. She argues that gender is a 
sociological concept that focuses, not on the creation of a self, but on the 
formation of a person that has already been created. “Psychoanalysis cannot 
make such a distinction: a person is formed through their sexuality, it could not 
be ‘added’ to him or her.”  Mitchell later holds on to her opinion that gender is 158
a sociological term, but in her introduction to the reprint of Psychoanalysis and 
Feminism from 2000, she concedes a role for the term gender. Commenting on 
Nancy Chodorow’s work, Mitchell argues that gender should be understood as 
a sociological term, “the Anglo-Saxon feminist meaning of ‘gender’, as socially 
inscribed by learning and identification, both unconscious and conscious, is a 
term appropriate to a sociological use of Object Relations theory.”  Mitchell 159
argues that this application of the term takes its origin in the mother/daughter 
relationship. “A girl identifying with her mother who in turn identified with her 
mother is one important aspect of the transmission of gender roles.”  Mitchell 160
thus defines the term gender as an aspect of identification. This corresponds to 
the phase before the castration complex in Freud’s model. The young girl who 
was really a little boy, enjoyed playing with dolls as a way to identify with the 
phallic mother. This gender identity predates the castration complex’s two 
possible solutions. In a later work, Mitchell argues that the “minimal differences 
are between brothers and sisters, not between fathers and children.”  These 161
minimal differences, become, for Mitchell, a means of exploring gender in a 
non-sociological way; “the ‘difference’ that marks ‘gender’ may be based not 
 Mitchell, 1982, p. 2.158
 Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radial Reassessment of Freudian 159
Psychoanalysis, 2000a [1974], from introduction added in 2000, p. xxiv.
 Mitchell, 2000a [1974], p. xxiv.160
 Mitchell, 2000a [1974], p. xxxiv.161
71
only on the differential effects of the castration complex but on the construction 
of a distinction between brother and sister.”  These minimal differences have 162
been the theme of Mitchell’s two latest books.  In Psychoanalysis and 163
Feminism, Mitchell’s focus is on Freud’s theory of sexual difference and an 
attempt to use this theory to map out how sexes are made from a 
psychoanalytic perspective and therefore can be made differently. “To Freud 
society demands of the psychological bisexuality of both sexes that one sex 
attain a preponderance of femininity, the other of masculinity: man and woman 
are made in culture.”  In Mitchell’s argument from 1974, the mother has been 164
excluded by Freud, due to his  focus on the father and his negligence of the pre-
Oedipal stage. This is the result, according to Mitchell, both of Freud’s cultural 
context and of Freud’s role as a male analyst. “The Oedipus complex which can 
almost be said to stand for the structure of patriarchal culture, hid the pre-
Oedipal phase, as Freud, a male analyst, echoing in his way the ways of the 
culture, obscured the role of the mother for his women patients.”  In Mitchell’s 165
argument, the Oedipus complex reflects and reprises the structure of patriarchal 
culture. As a result, this model works both to explain and reinforce or make 
normal the introduction to patriarchal culture. Mitchell argues against “the 
danger of reading Freud’s descriptions as prescriptions; it is often the fault of his 
method of presentation that makes us do so. It is far more the fault of the social 
status of women.”  The Oedipus complex as reflection of a patriarchal society 166
is thus the effect both of Freud’s position within a patriarchal structure, and of 
our own positions — as readers — within  patriarchal structures. Echoing 
Simone de Beauvoir’s postulation that one is made woman, Mitchell’s statement 
that ‘man and woman are made in culture’ argues that Freud’s theories remain 
useful tools for the project of undermining patriarchal cultures.  
In her argument from 1974, Mitchell concedes that it is necessary to maintain 
the father as the founding figure of culture. If culture is patriarchal, the father 
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must be foundational in the reproduction of patriarchy. “The new Oedipal 
identification contains the power of the authoritative father, which is the special 
characteristic of the superego… As he was soon to realize, it is the father and 
not the two parents who play this particular role.”  This position contrasts with 167
Mitchell’s exploration of the minimal differences between siblings and the 
possibility of a maternal law that this enables in Mad Men and Medusas. 
“Inserting lateral relationships enables us to see the parthenogenetic complex, 
which reveals another axis of sexual differentiation, another prohibition and 
‘law’.”  This other prohibition and law functions in a symmetric way with the 168
paternal Oedipal law, in that its outcome is differentiated by the sex of the child. 
With the paternal law, based on the castration complex, Mitchell argued in 1974 
that: “In both sexes, castration is the signal to give up the mother — but for the 
boy only so that he should wait for his turn and in good time get his own 
woman.”  Later, in 2000, Mitchell argues for a maternal law against 169
parthenogenetic procreation — the ability to have a child of one’s own. “This 
Oedipalized mother then prohibits the child’s fantasy of parthenogenetic 
procreation: You cannot make babies.”  It is a  prohibition that acts on both 170
sexes but with different outcomes for the two sexes, “the girl will grow up to be 
in the position of the mother (in whatever way — actual or symbolic — she may 
use it), but the boy will not.”  The mother is no longer a mere pre-Oedipal 171
identification that haunts the woman’s love object; instead, she becomes an 
Oedipal limitation to the fantasy of how babies are made. “This prohibition we 
might call ‘The Law of the Mother’, on a par in principle with ‘The Law of the 
Father’ in the castration complex.”  In both these arguments, the sex that is 172
being made in culture relies on a biological or anatomical difference, with the 
psychological effects of these distinctions being made, reflecting a broader 
culture. The foundation that this — so to speak — is written on, comes from a 
reaction to the body as a ‘real’ outside. Thus we can see that gender as identity 
 Mitchell, 2000a [1974], pp. 71-72.167
 Mitchell, 2000b p. 346.168
 Mitchell, 2000a [1974], p. 111.169
 Mitchell, 2000b, p. 344.170
 Mitchell, 2000b, p. 344.171
 Mitchell, 2000b, p. 344.172
73
in the pre-Oedipal and the pre-castration complex, and gender as an effect of 
minimal difference between siblings, exists on a different level than sexual 
difference as an effect of the maternal or paternal law. 
Anatomical impasses  
Mitchell’s maternal law, as well as her reading of Freud’s paternal law, relies on 
biological and anatomical differences between genders. The girl realises that 
she will never have a penis, and that this is not a personal punishment, but the 
mark of belonging to a group. And the boy realises that he cannot give birth to 
his own child, and that this lack marks his belonging to a group rather than a 
personal shortcoming. Mitchell links sexual difference to biology and to 
anatomy, but argues that the values that are inscribed on these differences are 
relative and depend on the culture in and through which they are inscribed. In 
doing so, Mitchell reinforces the importance of sexual difference in the formation 
of the self and the child’s introduction to culture. Mitchell’s arguments in Mad 
Men and Medusas hysterise the male position in a similar way that Freud’s 
paternal law hysterise the young girl and forces her to give up on clitoral 
pleasure and to transfer this to a vaginal pleasure. The boy’s development 
through the Oedipus complex was regarded as less problematic because he is 
able to hold on to the first love object, while the girl has to give up on hers. By 
introducing the maternal law, Mitchell hysterises the boy as well as the girl and 
show how both sexes are acquired or made, rather than using the male as the 
norm from which the female diverges. The anatomical and biological distinctions 
that mark sexual difference in these models contain the germ of a cultural 
importance that is ascribed and incorporated though the parthenogenic and 
castration complexes. Michell’s argument would seem to reinforce the notion 
that a woman’s function is to reproduce while man’s function is to enjoy. 
However, her model at least enables a level of sexual difference that does not 
take female lack for granted. As opposed to Karen Horney’s formulation of 
womb envy,  Mitchell’s parthenogenic complex does not suggest a prior or 173
more primary envy ‘behind’ penis envy, but instead posits two parallel 
introductions of laws that enforce sexual difference. This model is therefore 
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helpful for a formulation of sexual difference that does not rely solely on female 
lack, working on a plane parallel to a more porous, pre-Oedipal relationality.  
In the same year that Mitchell published Psychoanalysis and Feminism, Luce 
Irigaray published Speculum of the Other Woman, in which she argued for a 
move away from regarding anatomical or biological differences as the origin of 
sex. In Irigaray’s argument, the biological or anatomical does not have any 
meaning on its own. On the contrary, these differences are ascribed meaning 
through their valuation and the significance that these are given. Irigaray thus 
turns Freud’s (and Mitchell’s) arguments upside-down, by arguing that biological 
or anatomical ‘reality’ is only given meaning retrospectively, through a valuation 
of male identity when perceived as the norm. “It is not that she lacks some 
‘master signifier’ or that none is imposed upon her, but rather that access to a 
signifying economy, to the coining of signifiers, is difficult or even impossible for 
her because she remains an outsider, herself (a) subject to their norms.”  174
Here woman as other, as outsider, is produced by and through exclusion from 
the creation of norms that are nevertheless applied to her. It is this exclusion 
that gives meaning to the categorisation of humans as male or female, and of 
their bodies, not what is applied to the anatomical or biological markers. These 
markers are already signifiers; they carry meaning already. “Every time Freud 
— and anyone else after him — falls back upon the unavoidable facts of 
anatomy, biology, or genetics, an important historical objective is thereby 
revealed and concealed.”  In other words, the use of these already signifying 175
differences as unavoidable facts of anatomy, biology or genetics, actually 
reveals a reliance on the normative that works to exclude and subjectivise 
woman. This is what is revealed in a rhetorical move, which seeks to hide them 
as already established facts, as the bare minimum of sexual difference. Irigaray 
deploys a mimetic strategy to specularise — to make visible — or rather tactilise 
— to make felt — the female body and its difference. Her strategy aims at 
revealing a phallic economy and its exclusions. Though it is not always clear  in 
Irigaray’s texts, I will suggest a reading where it is not, at this stage of her 
thinking, an effort to value the female body as a carrier of unique traits. It is 
 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 1985a [1974], p. 71.174
 Irigaray, 1985a [1974], p. 90.175
75
instead an effort to make something intelligible that has been excluded; 
something that has been refused and barred from the signifying economy.  
Perhaps it is time to return to that repressed entity, the female imaginary. So 
woman does not have a sex organ? She has at least two of them, but they are not 
identifiable as ones. Indeed she has many more. Her sexuality, always at least 
double, goes even further: it is plural.   176
The move to the plurality of the excluded is not a move to the body as a pre-
existing form of symbolisation. Rather, it is a return to the body as what has 
been excluded from and therefore produced by a specific symbolisation. For 
Lacan, woman was the excluded in discourse, yet about whom discourse never 
stops. Irigaray’s turn to the excluded body poses the question: what does the 
excluded say of herself? As this excluded cannot speak, but is only spoken of, 
Irigaray turns to the body spoken of to find a different symbolism. However, the 
aim is not to find an original or essential truth about the excluded. Irigaray 
attempts to read the symbols of the excluded as if it symbolised something. 
The little boy is narcissized, ego-ized by his penis — since the penis is valued on 
the sexual market and is overrated culturally because it can be seen, specularized, 
and fetishized — but this is not true for the little girl’s sex organ(s).  177
The boy is able to develop an ego because his penis is visual, but it is not the 
anatomy of the penis that produces this, nor is it the anatomy of the girl’s sexual 
organ that gives the plurality of her sexuality. It is the valuation of the penis on 
the sexual market, in the exchanges that defines the two sexes. As the body is 
already a part of signification within the sexual economy, the body itself cannot 
be the origin of the sexual difference. Instead it is the exclusion from the norm 
or the coinage of signifiers that distinguishes the excluded female from the 
normative male.  
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Furthermore, Irigaray’s model for understanding the differentiation of sexes 
entails reading Freud’s castration complex as a melancholic process for the girl. 
In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud describes mourning as a process, an 
ability to redirect over time the libidinal attachment to an object onto other 
objects.  By contrast, in the melancholic reaction, this process is arrested for 178
some reason, the object is not allowed to be mourned. If an object has to be 
given up before the mourning process can run its course, the lost object is 
instead internalised and becomes a part of the ego. Irigaray argues that “you 
will be struck by the way the libidinal economy of the little girl, after she finds out 
that both she and her mother are castrated, crosschecks with the symptoms of 
melancholia” . The reason why the girl is unable to mourn her mother, as the 179
boy is able to, is that the girl does not have another foundation for her ego. The 
boy has his penis that has a value on the sexual market, but the girl only has 
her identification with her mother. “What is more, mother, whom the little girl is 
identifying with and using to build her ego, suffers from the same misfortune.”  180
Hence the melancholic process of internalising the lost object and making it a 
part of the ego, is doubly denied for the girl whose identifying object has 
suffered the same destiny as herself. For the internalised object that could 
shape her ego is an already castrated mother. “The economy of female 
narcissism and the fragility of the girl’s or the woman’s ego make it impossible 
for the melancholic syndrome to establish a firm and dominant foundation.”  181
As opposed to the penis — a visual representation with a value in the sexual 
economy — the girl has to be content with an internalised maternal object 
already revealed as castrated. In Freud’s model — as we have seen — this 
marks the difference in reactions to the castration complex for the two sexes. 
Yet, where Freud’s presentation is ambivalent both in its relation to biology and 
about the origins of how we value genital organs, Irigaray is clear that this is not 
derived from actual anatomical difference but from the valuation of one 
anatomical marker. As she points out, the feminine has been devalorised from 
the outset. Therefore, woman, when made through a dysfunctional 
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melancholisation of the maternal as a devalorised and already excluded origin, 
reproduces the exclusion that makes woman the same but less than man. As 
the boy develops his ego, “some ‘mirror’ is needed to reassure it and re-insure it 
of its value. Woman will be the foundation for this specular duplication, giving 
man back ‘his’ image and repeating it as the ‘same.’”  Woman is thus created 182
in order to serve in relation to the (always male) ego, to the norm and to the 
symbolisable. She is not allowed to be an other, according to Irigaray. “If an 
other image, an other mirror were to intervene, this inevitability would entail the 
risk of mortal crisis. Woman will therefore be this sameness — or at least its 
mirror image — and, in her role of mother, she will facilitate the repetition of the 
same, in contempt for her difference. Her own sexual difference.”  183
In Irigaray’s early texts, sexual difference is a rallying cry rather than a 
precondition for her political project. Her mimetic exploration — of those images 
or tactile experiences that are excluded in an economy where the penis and the 
one is valued above the vagina and the multitude — is a critical engagement 
with the internal contradictions in existing theories of sexual difference, rather 
than a formulation of a positive, existing femininity that is something. This early 
formulation of femininity as the excluded, and Irigaray’s method for making it 
speak through mimetic interventions in key texts that have defined her as 
excluded, provides a helpful tool. It allows for a use of femininity as that which 
has been excluded and pacified but that can still speak and be felt. The non-
specular discovery of relationality with the self and the mother opens up for a 
theorisation of the porous fluidity that can exist on a parallel level to sexual 
difference, as I have formulated so far through Lacan, Freud and Mitchell.   
Melancholia and gender  
Butler argues that Irigaray’s model of the feminine as excluded, and the sexing 
of materiality through the materialisation of the excluded, precludes the 
possibility of non-heterosexual relations. “As a consequence, then, without this 
heterosexual matrix, as it were, it appears that the stability of these gendered 
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positions would be called into question.”  Instead, in Butler’s critical 184
development of Irigaray’s reading of melancholia, the focus is on the 
achievement of masculine and feminine positions prior to entry into the Oedipus 
complex, and prior to any exclusion of the feminine.  
The oedipal conflict presumes that heterosexual desire has already been 
accomplished, that the distinction between heterosexual and homosexual has been 
enforced (a distinction which, after all, has no necessity); in this sense, the 
prohibition on incest presupposes the prohibition on homosexuality, for it presumes 
the heterosexualization of desire.  185
Homosexual desire needs to be precluded; without this, the prohibition of 
heterosexual incest cannot work as foundational. As we have seen, melancholia 
leads to an internalisation of the lost object. Butler uses this model in relation to 
Freud’s theories of the formation of the ego in The Ego and the Id,  where he 186
speculates that a melancholic response to loss may be more common than he 
had previously assumed and that the ego may in fact be made up of the 
internalisation of the lost object. “Giving up the object becomes possible only on 
the condition of a melancholic internalization or, what might for our purposes 
turn out to be even more important, a melancholic incorporation.”  The ego as 187
a bodily ego is thus formed by the incorporation of lost objects. This lost object 
is precisely that which has been foreclosed before the entry into the Oedipal 
situation. The object as well as the prohibition of this object is then the 
foundation of the ego as internalised or incorporated self.  
Consider that gender is acquired at least in part through the repudiation of 
homosexual attachments; the girl becomes a girl through being subject to a 
prohibition which bars the mother as an object of desire and installs that barred 
object as a part of the ego, indeed, as a melancholic identification. Thus the 
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identification contains within it both the prohibition and the desire, and so embodies 
the ungrieved loss of the homosexual cathexis.  188
Butler’s usage of melancholia in the formation of gender differs from Irigaray’s. 
Irigaray makes use of melancholia to understand the exclusion of the feminine 
as a failure to incorporate the lost object, or rather where the incorporated 
object is revealed as already lacking. This is contrasted with Butler’s 
reformulation of melancholia to create a model for incorporating the lost object 
as the self. Irigaray argues that the girl is left to incorporate an already castrated 
mother, “is she not born of a castrated mother who could only give birth to a 
castrated child, even though she prefers (to herself) those who bear the 
penis?”  And it is this melancholia of never having lost, because the mother 189
was always excluded, that refuses the girl a secure identification through an 
incorporation of her image. She is defined by the refused “desire for re-
presentation, for re-presenting oneself, and for representing oneself in desire is 
in some ways taken away from woman at the outset as a result of the radical 
devalorization of her ‘beginning’ that she is inculcated with,”  and therefore 190
already lost. In Irigaray’s version of melancholia and the loss of identification, 
the feminine is excluded and only the male is allowed a form. As a result, 
woman has been denied an identity, a separate body. “Now woman cannot 
mime, pretend, any relation to her own sex organ(s) because she has been cut 
off from any access to idea, ideality, specula(riza)tion, and indeed a certain 
organic ‘reality.’”  In later essays, Irigaray argues that the feminine is 191
something pre-existing though not something tangible. She relates this to 
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divinities and angelic notions in order to argue for a theological and 
philosophical rupture where the feminine is excluded.  192
As a whole, in her early formulation of the feminine, Irigaray links melancholic 
refusal of identification and specularisation of the self with the feminine as 
excluded. This usage is distinct from Butler’s usage of melancholia as a model 
for the formation of the self through incorporating an object and its prohibition. 
Butler’s usage sets up a model where norms are incorporated into the very 
formation of the self. In contrast, Irigaray’s usage of melancholia explores the 
limitations of the self by exploring its failures of specularisation and 
identification. Nevertheless, these seemingly contradictory models actualise two 
layers of identification through loss and parental laws, as well as the fragility or 
porousness of the self. In Irigaray’s formulation, the porousness of the self is 
explored through loss and the feminine as excluded. My question is whether it is 
possible to rethink this through a non-melancholic relation, and through tactile 
relationality with an other instead of a refused identification?  
Feminine as sexuality or as gender? 
In Butler’s critical reading of Freud, the masculine and feminine are dispositions, 
or positions of desire for the other in a heterosexual framework. The feminine 
and masculine are at once gender and sexuality. Butler’s quarrel with this is that 
gender and sexuality are accomplished; they are the effects of a process in 
which these positions are created as already having been there — through the 
melancholic formation of the ego. “To accept this view we must begin by 
presupposing that masculine and feminine are not dispositions, as Freud 
sometimes argues, but indeed accomplishments, ones which emerge in tandem 
with the achievement of heterosexuality.”  In Irigaray’s reading of Freud, the 193
feminine is excluded and the young girl is therefore unable to achieve an 
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independent ego formation based on the feminine. The feminine as already 
castrated, as foreclosed through melancholic loss forces the girl to become the 
reflection or negation of the masculine, which does allow for an ego formation. It 
is important to note here that Mitchell pointed out that the terms masculine and 
feminine underwent an evolution in Freud’s theory. He began by understanding 
these terms as relating widely to male and female bodies and assumed 
dispositions. But, eventually, they became more technical. In Freud’s later 
writings, the masculine and feminine relate to desire rather than identity. And 
this desire was defined by activity and passivity rather than choice of object. 
The bisexuality of the infant and the duality of masculine and feminine 
dispositions are therefore — in this reading — not signs of hetero- or 
homosexuality, but of a capacity for both active and passive desires in the 
infant. These capacities are cut off by the castration complex, which divides the 
capacity for active and passive autoeroticism.  
The very young infant, auto-erotically satisfied. With a bisexual disposition, finding 
itself in an image given to it by another; this would seem the halcyon condition of 
human prehistory. Everything Freud writes confirms that there is no important 
psychological sexual differentiation in his pre-Oedipal situation. But this situation is 
not a stage, not an amount of time, but a level. At another level, the culturally 
determined implication of the sexual difference is always waiting.  194
In Mitchell’s reading, the bisexual prehistory has not been foreclosed, it exists 
on a different level than the achieved sexual difference and the cultural 
implications that this difference enforces on the two. As this implies, in Freud’s 
attempts at explaining the development of femininity there is a confusion of 
terminology, a problematic slippage between femininity as an achieved 
disposition and femininity as the fundamental female disposition. In New 
Introductory Lectures, Freud warns against the presumption that femininity is 
linked with passivity or that masculinity is linked with activity.  
Women can display great activity in various directions, men are not able to live in 
company with their own kind unless they develop a large amount of passive 
adaptability. If you now tell me that these facts go on to prove precisely that both 
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men and women are bisexual in the psychological sense, I shall conclude that you 
have decided in your own minds to make ‘active’ coincide with ‘masculine’ and 
‘passive’ with ‘feminine’. But I advise you against it. It seems to me to serve no 
useful purpose and adds nothing to our knowledge.  195
The passivity of femininity as achieved disposition is instead the result of the 
girl’s realisation that her mother is already castrated and that she shares this 
situation with her. This realisation turns the girl away from her mother and 
directs her desires for the lost phallic mother inwards, making her passive and 
active — bisexual in Freud’s sense — desires for her mother into a passive 
desire to be loved by her father and to carry his child. The child also represents 
a replacement of the penis and the active autoerotic pleasure she might derive 
from this.  
In Irigaray’s reading of Freud, this inward turn of the already castrated mother 
and the already impossible ego formation, together with the already impossible 
morphological identification, results in a melancholic limitation of identification. 
This incorporation takes the loss and castration as its object to internalise rather 
than the maternal morphology. Femininity, in Irigaray’s reading is therefore 
constituted as loss. Butler points out that this argument is problematic as a 
ground for feminist theory because it defines the excluded as feminine and the 
feminine as excluded. Irigaray therefore risks “idealizing and appropriating the 
‘elsewhere’ as the feminine.”  This reading of Irigaray, however, conflates 196
‘feminine’ with ‘women.’ If the feminine is instead read as a disposition — 
illustrated by the refusal of identification that Freud’s narrativisation of sexual 
difference and castration implies — then a different meaning of ‘feminine’ 
becomes possible. The feminine as idealised ‘elsewhere’ does not have to be 
connected to this or that morphology, but rather to a failure of morphology to 
provide a secure identification. The feminine as ‘elsewhere’ then becomes a 
clear limitation within Freud’s narrativisation of the formation of the self, not an 
embodied identification. The feminine is the failure of embodied identification. 
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Enigmatic gender
In ‘Gender, Sex and the Sexual’ Laplanche maps out his model of how the 
psychosexual self is formed as gendered and as sexed.  In Laplanche’s 197
model, gender is the name or category that is ‘assigned’ to the child. Prior to 
any sexual difference in Freud’s or Lacan’s sense, the child is being named 
through gender. “Assignment is a complex ensemble of acts that go on within 
language and within the meaningful behaviour of the family circle. One could 
speak of an ongoing assignment, of a veritable prescription.”  This 198
prescription of gender is the continuous communication of expectations that the 
child be a certain way. In Laplanche’s argument, gender is not necessarily a 
duality — male or female, though it often is. “It is ordinarily double, as in 
masculine-feminine, but it is not so by nature.”   199
Laplanche distinguishes between nature and gender, placing sex on the side of 
nature. But this distinction is not simply biological, though Laplanche’s own 
vocabulary can be ambiguous when it comes to sexual difference. On one 
hand, he emphasises Freud’s focus on the visual marker of sexual difference, 
thereby basing sexual difference on perceived anatomical difference rather than 
any underlying biological function. Laplanche then asks if this “perceptual 
anatomical difference” is “a language, a code?”  This suggests that the 200
perceived either/or of sexual difference offers a rudimentary code of absence or 
presence. On the other hand, Laplanche emphasises that this symbolisation of 
sexual difference is only one aspect of the sexual, it is also related to 
reproductive functions. “Sex is dual. It is so by virtue of sexual reproduction and 
also by virtue of its human symbolization, which sets and freezes the duality as 
presence/absence, phallic/castrated.”  Laplanche’s theorisation of sexual 201
difference, like Freud and Lacan before him, seem to fall back onto something 
that is left undefined — the bedrock of biology. For there is no reason why a 
rudimentary code based on anatomical difference between having or not having 
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something should be linked to reproduction and biology. By juxtaposing ‘human 
symbolisation’ with ‘sexual reproduction,’ Laplanche mixes the rudimentary 
code of a perceived difference with biology. This muddles the term ‘sexual 
difference,’ leaving it to mean two different things. Accepting for now 
Laplanche’s insistence on sexual difference taking place on the side of 
perceived anatomical difference rather than having biological implications, I will 
focus the following discussion on the function of this rudimentary code as one of 
the meanings assigned to ‘sexual difference.’  
Speaking anthropologically, I should like to insist again upon the following point: it 
is claimed that with castration we have reached the ‘biological bedrock’, and 
certain Freudian formulations suggest precisely this. But it is, in fact an anatomical 
bedrock of which we should speak, and what’s more a false or deceptive anatomy. 
The castration complex is based upon a perceived anatomy, one which is illusory 
and peculiar to the human species. 
202
In this manner the rudimentary code of sexual difference simplifies the plurality 
of gender into an either/or logic, “gender will be domesticated, symbolized by 
the oversimplified code of presence/absence, phallic/castrated, the 1/0 of 
computers.”  Sexual difference thus turns the complex messages of the 203
prescription of gender into a rudimentary code of male and female. As gender 
originated from an other, rather than from the child’s fantasy based on the 
perception of an anatomical difference, the prescription of gender falls into what 
Laplanche calls enigmatic messages. In this model, the prescription of gender 
always contain a surplus or noise that comes from adults reactivating “their own 
infantile sexuality.”  This reactivation formulates something that the child 204
cannot understand, something that the child has to try to translate to make it 
intelligible. Sexual difference is the rudimentary code that the child then uses to 
translate the prescription of gender given by the adult world. The failure to 
 Laplanche, 2011, p. 112, from the essay ‘Starting from the Fundamental 202
Anthropological Situation’.
 Laplanche, 2011, p. 113.203
 Laplanche, 2011, p. 176.204
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translate this enigmatic message in full results in the formation of an 
unconscious that is untranslatable, this is what Laplanche calls the sexual.  205
Laplanche’s model for gender and sexual difference is based on his generalised 
theory of seduction — or the fundamental anthropological situation — that 
sidesteps the Oedipal situation and instead argues that the most fundamental 
human experience is the “radical asymmetry”  between the child and the adult 206
world. In this reformulation of the origins of sexuality, the primary instalment of 
sexuality is a result of the unbinding effect of the other’s ‘seduction.’ Like 
prescriptive gender assignments, the adult other’s communication contains 
something that the child cannot comprehend and is unable to translate. In an 
early text Laplanche used the image of the nursing mother to argue that the 
breast does not only turn into a sexual object for the child (as Freud 
emphasised) but that the breast is already a sexualised zone for the mother.  207
As a result, Laplanche argues that human sexuality is always traumatic and 
always masochistic. This is a result of both the passivity of child in relation to 
the mother (in the image of the nursing mother) and the traumatic event of the 
mother’s messages that cannot be fully understood or translated. As a result, 
the other’s messages are internalised as “an alien internal entity and with the 
drive as an internal attack, so that the paradox of masochism, far from 
deserving to be circumscribed as a specific ‘perversion,’ should be generalized, 
linked as it is to the essentially traumatic nature of human sexuality.”  Human 208
sexuality is therefore unbinding in Laplanche’s formulation, it is the result of a 
foreign implantation of a drive that cannot be understood. Laplanche argued in 
 Sexual is Laplanche’s transposition of the german word Sexual as opposed to the 205
french word sexuel. By making this distinction, Laplanche wishes to distinguish 
between genital sexuality (le sexuel) and Freud’s concept of sexuality as something 
polymorphously perverted (le sexual) and not reducible to genital sexuality. This 
distinction is lost in translation and I have followed John Fletcher’s suggestion of 
italicising sexual when used for this purpose in Laplanche’s writings. “When Freud 
speaks of enlarged sexuality, the sexuality of the Three Essays, it is always the sexual. 
It would have been unthinkable for Freud to have entitled his inaugural work, ‘Three 
Essays on the Theory of the Sexed — or of Sexuation’. ‘Sexualtheorie’ is not a 
‘Geschlechtstheorie’. It is a sexuality that has been called ‘non-procreative’ and even 
primarily non-sexed, as distinct from what is called precisely ‘sexed reproduction’. The 
sexual, then, is not the sexed; it is essentially perverse infantile sexuality.” (Laplanche, 
2011, p. 161).
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a later essay that the “unconscious is thus in no sense an other ‘myself’ in me, 
possibly more authentic than me,”  the unconscious is something other in me, 209
something that cannot be comprehended. In the example of gender and sexual 
difference, it is a surplus that is created between the rudimentary model of 
sexual difference and the complex plurality of gender. This surplus is 
internalised as an other, as a traumatising and unbinding unconscious sexuality. 
In my earlier reading of Lacan, a split occurred as the result of the alienating 
encounter with one’s mirror image. This split was then given symbolic form 
through the castration complex and its two possible outcomes. The split in 
sexual difference was therefore dependent on a split of the self, its value and 
meaning drew energy from this splitting. Laplanche’s reading of sexual 
difference turns this narrative on its head. Instead of a mirror phase where the 
self is alienated from the self, sexual difference is dependent on the visual 
discovery of an anatomical difference. As opposed to Lacan’s model, there is 
nothing in itself traumatic in the discovery of an anatomical difference, the value 
— like the value of the penis on the sexual market, in Irigaray’s argument — 
comes from the enigmatic gender that is ‘prescribed’ to the child. Laplanche’s 
model does not place any preexisting value on anatomical difference, the value 
given to this anatomical difference instead derives from adult gender messages. 
“Primary identification: far from being a primary identification ‘with’ (the adult), 
this is, I propose, a primary identification ‘by’ (the adult).”  In placing gender as 210
prior to sexual difference, the child is prescribed conflicting and plural messages 
around gender before the discovery of sexual difference as anatomical 
difference. When anatomical difference is discovered, the child has already 
been implanted with an alien and alienating desire that is deployed to translate 
the visual discovery of difference. 
Whereas Laplanche undermines any solipsistic (Lacan’s mirror phase as 
explanation) or biological (infantile sexuality as already there) foundation of the 
sexual (or sexual to follow Fletcher’s translation of Laplanche’s term), his model 
still falls back on Freud’s reification of anatomical difference. On the other hand 
it is significant that Laplanche explores this difference via imagery from zoology 
rather than a vocabulary based on drive theory. “The erect posture makes the 
 Laplanche, Essays on Otherness, 1999, p. 111.209
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female organs perceptually inaccessible; but this contingency has been raised 
by many civilizations, and no doubt our own, to the rank of a major, universal, 
signifier of presence/absence.”  In this formulation, anatomical difference has 211
been ‘raised to the rank of a universal signifier’ — making it unclear what comes 
first, the gendered civilisation, or the anatomical difference.  
For my purposes, what matters here is a potential plurality in gender and the 
separation between this level on one side and the level of binary sexual 
difference on the other. In my argument, sexual difference is grounded in 
foreclosed desire; as in Butler’s melancholic gender, Mitchell’s maternal and 
paternal laws, and Irigaray’s theory of foreclosed imaginary identification. These 
all work around the formation of the ‘rudimentary code’ of ‘this, therefore not 
that’ in various forms. I am therefore positioning my argument between 
Laplanche’s critique of the symbolic order as unified and Lacan’s critique of 
anatomical difference as the origin of sexual difference. 
Butler has argued that for “Laplanche, gender is resituated as part of the terrain 
of the enigmatic signifier itself. In other words, gender is not so much a singular 
message, but a surrounding and impinging discourse, already circulating, and 
mobilised for the purposes of address prior to the formation of any speaking and 
desiring subject.”  Gender as message comes before desire is formed. 212
Prescriptions by adults are in fact the origin of a child’s desire in Laplanche’s 
model. The child, in this model, is first of all passive, or masochistic, in its 
relation to adults. Jacques André has argued that this places the child on par 
with the feminine in Freud’s terminology.  If Butler universalised Irigaray’s 213
formulation of a melancholic response to the foreclosure of a visual marker with 
which to identify into a formulation of melancholic gender as the foreclosure of 
desire, then my suggestion is to universalise the feminine as an experience of 
foreclosure before the conceptualisation of homo- or heterosexuality. I do this 
 Laplanche, 2011, p. 178.211
 Butler, ‘Seduction, Gender and the Drive,’ Included in Seductions and Enigmas: 212
Laplanche, Theory, Culture, 2014 pp. 118-133, p. 128.
 Jacques André, Aux origines féminines de la sexualité, 2014 [1995], p. 3 “La 213
question de l'angoisse, la perte d'amour où elle prend sa source, impose de penser 
ensemble la fémininité et l'infantile le plus précoce, le plus primitif, renouvelant par là 
même les termes de l’enigme.” “The question of anxiety, the loss of love in which it 
takes its source, makes it necessary to think femininity and the most precocious, most 
primitive infantile together, thereby renewing the terms of the enigma.” My translation.
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by moving back to Irigaray — via Laplanche — and by such means I postulate 
the feminine as a masochistic turning back on the self and as an experience of 
foreclosure that is not yet understood, not yet translated into a foreclosure of 
something. Only the inscription of ‘this, therefore not that,’ enables a rereading 
of the feminine that is not dependent on anatomical difference for its 
functioning.  
Here it is helpful to note that Bersani has used Laplanche’s reformulation of 
desire and the origin of sexuality to formulate a theory of sexuality that unbinds 
the self. “Sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self.”  214
As this shows, in Bersani’s early formulation of sexuality and his reading of 
Freud and Laplanche, the sexual is opposed to structure and to intelligibility. 
Sexuality breaks up the self as a notion of a wholeness and as something that 
can be understood. In his reading of Freud, Bersani emphasises those aspects 
of passivity and dependency of the child that Laplanche also pointed out. “From 
this perspective, the distinguishing feature of infancy would be its susceptibility 
to the sexual. The polymorphously perverse nature of infantile sexuality would 
be a function of the child’s vulnerability to being shattered into sexuality.”  215
Bersani concludes that “sexuality — at least in the mode in which it is 
constituted — could be thought of as a tautology for masochism.”  In this early 216
text, Bersani’s formulation of masochism is based on a shattering of the self that 
takes place as the result of the child’s ‘susceptibility to the sexual’ at the time of 
its inauguration. As I have discussed, Laplanche emphasised the child’s 
passivity and dependency on the adult world in the implantation of the 
unconscious and the sexual in the child. It is this aspect of sexuality and 
masochism that Bersani here uses to argue for an understanding of sexuality as 
something subversive and opposed to the structured self. 
Significantly, this formulation of masochism differs from the function of 
masochism in my own model of the roles played by sexual difference and 
gender in the formation of the self and its relatedness to the world. My usage of 
masochism focuses on the aspect of turning back. Masochism inflicts pain or 
displeasure on the self, but it is also a turning back on the self as an introjection 
 Leo Bersani, The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art, 1986, p. 38.214
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or incorporation of the enigmatic messages from the other. To use Laplanche’s 
model of gender and sexual difference, as discussed above, the prescription of 
gender does not have to be unbinding (though it certainly can be). Yet it will 
always be a return to the self through the assumptions or demands of someone 
else. It is helpful here to begin to gather together the threads of my argument so 
far. I am now in a position to redefine the specific form of masochism as a 
turning back, a turning back that is unbearable and therefore unintelligible. 
Melancholic turning back is a version of turning back that is unnameable and 
therefore unmournable. Melancholia as a limit and process of formation of the 
self as ‘this, therefore not that’ then becomes a subcategory of masochistic 
turning back as the process of turning back and of eroticising the asymmetrical 
relation with a world that cannot be fully understood. On the extreme end of 
melancholia and sexual difference, the self is the result of the collapse of a 
masochistic relationality that threatens the self. On the other end is the porous 
relationality of masochistic enjoyment of this asymmetrical relation. 
Above, melancholic responses to loss were discussed in terms of lost desire 
(Butler) or lost identification (Irigaray) but were not yet linked to any subversive 
function. For Butler, melancholic gender is the incorporation of norms. Its 
subversive or non-conformist aspect is only actualised in the repeated 
impossibility of these norms to coincide with the lived experience of a gendered 
self. For Irigaray, on the other hand, the feminine that is the result of a 
foreclosed identity becomes subversive in itself. Her political project is to revert 
Lacan’s postulation that the feminine is what discourse never stops talking 
about to making the feminine itself never stop talking. In Bersani’s argument 
from 1986, the sexual itself — defined as masochism — is the subversive force. 
“Psychoanalysis is an unprecedented attempt to give a theoretical account of 
precisely those forces which obstruct, undermine, play havoc with theoretical 
accounts themselves.”  This subversive aspect of the sexual is contrasted 217
with what Bersani calls the narrative aspect of Freud’s theoretical framework. 
Narration makes the disruptive intelligible. Laplanche calls this binding and 
unbinding and he has contrasted the therapeutic work of binding with the 
unbinding work of analysis: 
 Bersani, 1986, p. 4.217
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[…] the psychoanalytic act — sometimes quite rare — is something else. A work of 
unbinding, it tries to make new materials surface for a profoundly renewed 
narration; and of course, we shall not be surprised that the psychoanalyst is also 
cautious and sparing: for isn’t his work of unbinding allied with that of the sexual 
death drive?  218
Laplanche links the ‘analytic act’ with the sexual death drive and thereby with 
the masochistic pleasure in displeasure that this signifies. The sexual and the 
‘analytic act’ are read as disruptive or as unbinding of the narrative. For 
Laplanche, the ‘analytic act’ is a source of renewed translation and renewed 
narrativisation of disruptive elements. Bersani, in this early text, instead 
valorises the disruptive for its ability to undermine the stable or structured self. 
In ‘Is the Rectum a Grave?’ Bersani argues that the sexual as passive and 
masochistic first of all explains the subversive potentiality of homosexual 
desire.  In this argument, male homosexual desire reveals the possibility of 219
being both phallic and passive. “Phallocentrism is exactly that: not primarily the 
denial of power to women (although it has obviously also led to that, 
everywhere and at all times), but above all the denial of the value of 
powerlessness in both men and women.”  The sexual as masochistic in the 220
sense of passive is here used by Bersani to argue that the sexual as unbinding 
and as powerlessness becomes something threatening to the stability of the self 
and in this case, the stability of masculinity and of patriarchy at large. 
Bersani’s argument, however, is based on a conflation of the sexual as a whole 
(what Laplanche would call le sexual) with genital sexuality in its assumption 
that homosexual desire would automatically reveal the passivity inherent in the 
phallic subject. In Laplanche’s model, as already discussed, the sexual is the 
surplus between the enigmatic prescriptive message of gender and the 
rudimentary code of sexual difference that the child use to translate adults’ 
enigmatic messages. The sexual, in Laplanche’s model, is therefore what 
cannot be fitted into sexual difference. The sexual would thus disrupt the 
rudimentary code, forcing a new narrative or a new translation to be formed. In 
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Bersani’s argument, however, genital sexuality is already sexed and is assumed 
to be in place. Phallocentrism as a denial of the value of passivity only becomes 
threatened by homosexuality if sexual difference and the coded link between 
the phallic and the male is established. “Male homosexuality advertises the risk 
of the sexual itself as the risk of self-dismissal, of losing sight of the self, and in 
so doing it proposes and dangerously represents jouissance as a mode of 
ascesis.”  This line of argument follows Bersani’s development of the 221
subversive potentiality in his book Homos.  From this point onward, Bersani 222
focuses his reading of the potentially subversive and liberating effect of 
homosexuality, not strictly on the sexual, but on the conflation of the object of 
desire and the object of identification. A sociality that does not distinguish 
between the same and the desired opens up for potentially new relations. “What 
is inconceivable in the Freudian scheme is identification as libidinal recognition. 
But this is not quite accurate; it is conceived of within the Freudian scheme, but 
only as a perversion. And it is of course the perversion of homosexuality.”  In 223
this later text Bersani opens up towards an ethical reading of homosexuality, 
which is presented as having a potential for a more ‘authentic’ living with an 
outside world not strictly separated as an external world. The merger of the 
object of desire and the object of identification displaces something of the self 
into the outer world and vice versa. This argument touches on the line of 
argument in the present thesis. But where Bersani seems to be driven by the 
question why is homosexuality a threat to society?, and how can this be used 
to undermine the stable self as a constrictive and normating figure? In contrast, 
in this thesis, the question is how sexual difference and gender are formed 
through and in the formation of the self. The questions addressed here are 
therefore more ontological than ethical, though this is a distinction that should 
not be ossified into too clear separations. The self is here assumed to be 
formed in relation to an outer world and in relation to other selves. However, as 
what I am interested in is what Laplanche calls the ‘fundamental anthropological 
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situation,’ or the relational formation of the self, sexual difference cannot be 
assumed as in Bersani’s argument.  224
Admittedly, in later essays, Bersani has moved away from his valuation of gay 
sociality as an exploration of relationality to the same, and has instead explored 
relationality to the world through a oneness that is prior to any separation into 
identities or differences. In Thoughts and Things, Bersani has explored the 
maternal relation as a relationality that opens up for a oneness with the world 
that does not exclude a differentiation of the self in relation to it. “Oneness in the 
world is not without spaces between the subject and the world. It is in those 
spaces that the subject discovers him- or herself replicated in or as 
otherness.”  225
Enigmatic messages
In a final attempt to tie the strands of this chapter together, I will once again 
return to Freud. The focus is now on his usage of the term ‘uncanny’ in two 
different texts, with two different valences for the creation of meaning, and for 
relationships with the world. In The Uncanny, Freud argues that the uncanny is 
 In Receptive Bodies Bersani return to the ethic/ontological question of how we 224
relate to the world, or rather how we are a part of the world already. In his 
‘Forewarning’ Bersani links the relatedness with the world to intrauterine experiences. 
He also returns to his previous The Freudian Body to reemphasise the masochistic 
solution to sexualise the pain of the shattering of the self as a means to survive this 
shattering in the encounter with an enigmatic world. “I speculated in The Freudian 
Body that “the human organism survives the gap between the period of shattering 
stimuli and the development of resistant or defensive ego structures” that can manage 
or metabolize these stimuli only by masochistically sexualizing the influx of stimuli.” (p. 
38), These arguments come close to my argument here, but again, Bersani — rather 
than turning to Irigaray or Ettinger to theorise the intrauterine and the co-formation of 
selves as a being-with in intrauterine fantasies, Bersani turns to Peter Sloterdijk, and 
though critical, Bersani’s argument seems to rely on a monadic reading of the self that 
though extended to some close external inputs that can affect us, leaves the dualism 
of self/other intact. “Our connections to an otherwise alien and indifferent outside can 
therefore be said to include opportunities for a sublimated repetition of our earliest 
experiences of being nourished and protected by the spherically encompassing 
nobjects of the placenta, the umbilical cord, intra- and extrauterine sonorous 
presences, and the air we breathe. Sloterdijk, like Foucault, proposes a “care of the 
self,” a discipline of self-training that would make us receptive to the emergence of a 
welcoming With-Me, an occasion, within otherness, for self-augmentations.” (p. 102) 
This partial non-phallic reading of being with still maintains the phallic rupture or the 
‘this therefore not that’ of melancholic differentiation as I have suggested here. See 
Receptive Bodies, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2018
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the repressed made present.  Freud describes a scene on a train, where he 226
sees a reflection of an old man without realising that he is seeing his own 
reflection. This is given as an illustration of uncanny doubling; another is the 
notion of an eternal soul. Such a soul is at once an escape from mortality and a 
reminder of this mortality. Written in 1919, Freud was on the verge of describing 
the death drive as a compulsion to repeat traumatic memories. The haunting in 
The Uncanny is describing both a prototype for the compulsion of repetition and 
a doubling of the self. The haunting ghost is derived from a doubling of the self, 
a splitting where the ego is at once an object, giving way for primary narcissism, 
and a function of an inner or active self with a will and direction. Freud’s essay 
focuses on the frightening that makes the alienated reappear and that 
challenges the continuity of the familiar. The uncanny is here anti-narrative in 
that it tears through the textures of normality and disrupts the order of things. 
But in an earlier text — Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, written in 
1901 but first published in 1905, there is a brief mention of the uncanny with a 
different emphasis. This text was written before Freud’s second topology; he 
had not started using the id, ego and superego yet, and he was not yet 
preoccupied with repetitions or doublings. In this earlier text, Freud is discussing 
his patient’s recollection of hearing her parents having sex in the room next 
door. “Children, in such circumstances, divine something sexual in the uncanny 
sounds that reach their ears. Indeed, the movements expressive of sexual 
excitement lie within them ready to hand, as innate pieces of mechanism.”  227
In this passage, the uncanny is a sound that does not quite make sense. The 
child both recognises and does not recognise the noises from her parents’ 
bedroom. In this text, the temporality of the knowing and not knowing is different 
from Freud’s later version. Instead of disrupting a narrative, the uncanny forces 
the child to make up (or divine) a narrative. The doubling here is not between 
the self and the ego, but between the self and an unknown that resonates with 
something ‘innate.’ In this logic, the child’s reaction to the uncanny makes of her 
a co-creator of the sound. Like the spectator, the child has to use something 
innate, already there, to understand the unknown; the child and spectator 
therefore both recognise something of their selves in the uncanny. The sounds 
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correspond to something the child already knows, without knowing it. Through 
divination this unknown known is brought back and used to give meaning to the 
sound. This is done not just in relation to symbols, but through something 
innate, something mechanical that is not yet symbolised, that exceeds meaning 
in a strict sense. The sound is uncanny in that it is not known, it requires the 
child to divine something. It requires a giving of meaning to the sound. This 
opens up for an affective model of co-creation of a narrative that is already a 
part of hearing or seeing. The uncanny of Freud’s early text contradicts the 
uncanny of his later years. In the earlier work, the uncanny sound requires 
meaning to be produced while the later text focuses on the breakdown of 
meaning. This is a difference in focus, as the production of meaning is actually a 
result of the breakdown of meaning. However, the earlier text helps us to see 
the uncanny as more than disrupting the narrative or the known. It is also a 
means to shape a narrative. In the early version of the uncanny, the child gives 
meaning by relating the noise to something already known without being 
understood. Through an act of divination, the child is not merely understanding 
what is going on in the parents’ bedroom but the child is creating meaning to 
make sense of what is going on. 
The mechanical within 
In the passage from 1905, Freud suggests that the uncanny sound reacts with 
something that ‘lie within them ready to hand.’ Here, the uncanny is given 
meaning through a connection with something that is already within, something 
innate, mechanical even. So what is this within, innate and mechanical in the 
child that the uncanny relates to and actualises? Innate and mechanical 
suggests that the child has an internal blueprint for comprehending the sexual 
meaning of the sounds. Nevertheless, the uncanny noise that the child has to 
translate is an excellent example of an enigmatic signifier. In Laplanche’s 
model, the first uncanny message is implanted as a self and is only then able to 
function as this self. “The first, passive phase is, so to speak, the implanting, the 
first inscription of the enigmatic signifiers,” and once this is achieved, the 
“second phase is bound to a reactualisation and reactivation of these signifiers, 
which are henceforth attacking internal ones,” and causing the self to function 
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both as an object and as a subject with a will and direction.  This scene can 228
be read along the lines of the distinction between gender and sexual difference 
developed in the present chapter. The child uses the rudimentary code of 
sexual difference to understand the gendered noise coming from next door. At 
once, this example illustrates the function of the encounter between a 
rudimentary code and a complex message with many layers, and undermines 
the neat separation into gender, sexual difference and sexual in the discussion 
above. The noise from next door must first of all be interpreted as having 
something to do with sexual difference before this code can even be used in an 
attempt to translate the complex message. In the neat model of anatomic 
difference as foundation for sexual difference, this connection is made logical, 
but in the quote from Essays on Otherness, there is no neat code to fall back 
on. Instead the original implantation was as enigmatic as any of the following. 
The distinction between gender and sexual difference can therefore not be 
based on an assumed codification of visual data, but must, as Butler has 
argued with her notion of melancholic gender, be installed through prohibition 
and foreclosure, with their origin in demands from the outside. This is then 
similar to the prescriptive gender in Laplanche’s model and the distinction must 
perforce lie in the severity of prohibition rather than in any assumed model of 
sexual difference.  
By contrast, Butler’s model of melancholic foreclosure as the foundation of the 
gendered self contradicts her attempt to reformulate the psychoanalytical 
project by replacing Lacanian law with Foucauldian power. Foreclosure as a 
foundation of the self functions as an absolute prohibition rather than a 
regulating power. By using Laplanche’s model of sexuality as the effect of a 
seduction, it is possible to theorise a sexuality that is initiated by both the norms 
and the unconscious desires of the surrounding world. While being wary of the 
anatomical narrative in Laplanche and Freud, Laplanche’s model of an 
implanted self and an implanted unconscious allows for a sliding severity 
between the extremes of foreclosure and the fluid and contradictory enigmatic 
message from next door. The scene where the child hears noises from the 
bedroom is a version of this process as described by Laplanche. But as we 
have seen, the child (and the adults) is both active and passive in this 
 Laplanche, 1999, p. 132.228
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encounter with the enigmatic. The child is both having its self implanted and is 
deploying an already established self to interpret the enigmatic message. There 
is therefore an unbinding and a binding aspect to every encounter with an 
enigmatic message. The uncanny is both narrative and anti-narrative. The 
potentially traumatic effect of the message both threatens to destroy the stability 
of the self and to reinforce it, through the incorporation of the potentially 
traumatic into a narrative of the self.  
As we have seen, in Marks’s theorisation of haptic visuality, this visuality 
functions as a counter to the narrative aspect of visuality. The haptic disrupts or 
constructs an experience that is not narrative but nevertheless moves between 
the screen and the spectator, implementing the spectator and constructing a 
different temporality.  
Bersani posited that the psychoanalytic notion of sexuality is disruptive of the 
narrativisation and thematisation of sexuality; at the same time, psychoanalysis 
is an attempt at narrativising and thematising this same sexuality. Reading 
Freud as an aesthetic text, Bersani argued that it hints at the disruptive while 
simultaneously covering it. “Freud’s work is a special kind of esthetic text: it 
seeks to stabilize the perturbations of sexuality in a theory about the subversive, 
destabilizing effects of human sexuality on the human impulse to produce 
forms.”  This splitting of the self makes sexuality possible. At the same time 229
this origin of sexuality installs sexuality as a disruptive, splitting, shattering 
force, at least according to Bersani. Such a shattering works against 
narrativisation, thematisation and ultimately against the coherence of the ego. In 
Bersani’s definition, art is the replication of the sexual as disruptive. “If the 
sexual is, at the most primitive level, the attempted replication of a shattering (or 
psychically traumatizing) pleasure, art … is the attempted replication of that 
replication.”  The enigmatic signifier is an effect of the erotisation that a child is 230
unable to translate. As this process is not fully translated, Laplanche argues that 
the enigmatic signifier lies somewhere between the fantasy and the real, it is an 
undigestible nexus that forms the ego. Bersani formulates this as a process 
where the ego vampirises the world. “The ego is a collector who transports inert 
objects from the outside to the inside. Instead of desiring the world, the ego 
 Leo Bersani, 1986, p. 112.229
 Bersani, 1986, p. 111.230
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vampirizes it.”  The ego is here the result of the shattering effect of sexuality, 231
but it is also an attempt to narrativise, to contain this disruptiveness. The 
formation of a stable self and the porousness of this self are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather two aspects of the same process of making sense of the 
enigmatic, to create a narrative to give meaning to the unknown.  
In an essay about the pleasure of pain and disgust, Avgi Saketopoulou recounts 
one of her patient’s experience of pleasure through disgust. Her patient had 
been approached in a bath house by a man the patient found repulsive, but the 
patient was also surprised to find that the abject stranger elicited his desire and 
the two ended up having sex, which gave the patient immense pleasure. To 
make sense of this story, Saketopoulou turns to Laplanche and Bersani to 
theorise pleasure and sexuality as an experience of shattering the ego. 
Saketopoulou suggests a reading of the formation of the ego as a function of 
the translation of enigmatic signifiers. 
To this vast and unremitting array of uncanny transmissions that leak out of the 
caretaker and into the infant, Laplanche (1995) gave the name implantation. The 
infant is propelled to translate these implants in order to make sense of what 
radiates out toward her. The ego develops out of this translating process as an 
apparatus that constructs meaning and binds enigma.  232
The ego in this quote is constructed as an ego of consciousness and rationality. 
By contrast, Laplanche’s concept of implantation accounts both for the 
translatable and the untranslatable. The ego that is the result of this process 
thus contains both conscious translations and unconscious failed translations — 
what Laplanche terms das Andere, or the alien thing inside us.  The enigma 233
and the incomplete translation is crucial for Laplanche. The infant is unable to 
translate fully the messages from the adult, and they therefore remain as 
 Bersani, 1986, p. 95.231
 Avgi Saketopoulou, ‘To Suffer Pleasure: The Shattering of the Ego as the Psychic 232
Labor of Perverse Sexuality,’ in Studies in Gender and Sexuality, Volume 15, 2015, 
Issue 4, pp. 254-268, p. 260.
 See Laplanche, 1999, p. 63, Laplanche distinguishes between das Andere as the 233
thing in us (the unconscious) and the der Andere as the other that is the cause and 
origin of the alterity in our selves (see Laplanche, 1999, p. 72). This terminology is 
borrowed from Freud but I ascribe it to Laplanche as he adds a theoretical distinction 
between these terms that Freud does not. 
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enigmatic implantations. These implantations are the origin and the contents of 
the unconscious in Laplanche’s theory. This notion of the unconscious is 
different from Lacan’s unconscious, which is focused on language as a function 
of the big Other. “If, for my part, I speak rather of a ‘message’, this is for at least 
two well-defined reasons: first, the message can just as easily be non-verbal as 
verbal; for the baby it is principally non-verbal.”  234
Saketopoulou continues her explanation of her patient’s pleasure by referring to 
Bersani’s notion of a shattering of the ego. 
When amplified, the interimplication of pleasure/pain can create an experience that 
leaves the subject “momentarily undone” (Bersani, 1986, p. 100). This unraveling 
of the self “disrupt[s] the ego’s coherence and dissolve[s] its boundaries” (p. 101), 
an experience that Leo Bersani calls self-shattering. Bersani’s arresting theoretical 
move parts ways with our traditional approach to productive psychic life as resting 
on integration and synthesis.  235
This process was discussed above in terms of a binding and unbinding in 
relation to the difference between analytic work and therapeutic work in 
Laplanche’s theory. As argued previously, it is a process that reveals the 
enigmatic other that had been implanted as well as the enigmatic nature of the 
message at hand. In itself, the message functions on the level of the 
symbolisable or understandable and, simultaneously, on a level that escapes 
meaning and forces us to grasp or divine the limitations of the self as a stable 
entity.  
Gila Ashtor has argued against this conflation of the shattering encounter in the 
formation of the self and the experience of an encounter with the enigmatic. 
“Saketopoulou’s grounding of ‘excitement’ in the early ‘misalignment’ confuses 
the phenomenological—that is, literal, felt, experience of ‘excess’ (pleasure/
 Jean Laplanche, ‘The Unfinished Copernican Revolution’ in Essays on Otherness, 234
1999, p. 74, Laplanche here defines his difference from Lacan and Lacan’s priority of 
language. The quote continues: “Second, emphasizing ‘language’ effaces the alterity 
of the other in favour of trans-individual structures.” Laplanche’s focus on message 
instead of language therefore emphasises a move away from meta-language to the 
reality of encounters with others. 
 Saketopoulou, 2015, p. 262.235
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pain)—with the structural, psychic event of how drive-based sexuality 
develops.”  236
I have argued, however, that for Laplanche, the ego is never finished. As we 
encounter enigmatic signifiers, or messages, we are forced to return to the 
translation process, to a turning back towards the self that founded the inner 
and the ego. By opening up for a non-melancholic formation of the self through 
a foreclosure/incorporation of a lost object, towards a masochistic formation of 
the self — as suggested by Laplanche — we can also account for an 
unfinished, uncontained self able to experience the shattering reformation of the 
itself in encounters with others, with der Andere. In short, Ashtor’s critique 
misses the point, where the self can still be undone by the phenomenological 
experience of an alterity. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have mapped out some discussions of the ‘feminine’ within 
psychoanalytic theory as well as some discussions within feminist and queer 
critiques of the ‘feminine’ within psychoanalytic theory. I have also pointed to 
some contradictory positions in Freud’s writing that cannot be explained as 
development of his theoretical or metapsychological apparatus, but rather the 
result of the enigmatic nature of sexual difference and its connection to the 
formation of the ego that he kept returning to without being able to give a final 
answer to. This navel of the dream of a stable sexual difference lead to 
productive moments that I have been working through, not in order to solve its 
enigmatic nature, but rather to reveal this enigmatic core. In my discussion of 
Irigaray’s and Butler’s usage of melancholia to understand ego formation and 
gender formation (or lack thereof), I have pointed out the productive aspects of 
Irigaray’s model of feminine melancholia as a model of gender incorporation 
that is open-ended and enigmatic in its formation. This has been contrasted with 
Butler’s model of melancholic heterosexuality and ensuing gender as a model of 
foreclosure and an attempt to explain or interpret rather than to leave the 
enigma of sexual difference open. However, my argument has been that 
melancholia by its nature acts as an ‘always already’ achieved identity and I 
 Gila Ashtor, ‘The Ideology of Transference: Laplanche and Affect Theory,’ in Studies 236
in Gender and Sexuality, Volume 9, 2018, Issue 2.
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have argued for a return to the feminine and to the masochistic model of the 
feminine in order to model the failure of ego-formation and the failures to 
achieve stable gendered formations. In returning to the feminine, I do not wish 
to return to the notion of woman-as-passive — but rather to masochism as a 
method to deal with the overwhelming demands and the obfuscate nature of 
those demands on the self. Through a reading of Laplanche, I have challenged 
the Freudian narrative of development from a phallic to either a feminine/
masochistic reversal of the sadist/phallic phase, or a continuation of the phallic/
sadistic direction of sexuality. Laplanche instead emphasises the masochistic 
phase as prior to the sadistic/phallic phase, this is important to my argument 
that ego formation and the gendered self that the self is relating to has a 
universal masochistic aspect. The overwhelming and enigmatic demands on the 
child that does not yet know what is going on is a profound human experience 
and an experience that forms the porous relation between self and world and 
this is the foundation of the affective model of spectatorship that I will propose 
throughout this thesis as an alternative to the closed ego of melancholia and 
phallic or feminine ego formations.  
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2 Methodology: How to Read a Film? 
There can be no spectacle 
without an element of cruelty as 
the basis of every show. 
Antonin  Artaud 
Theatre of Cruelty  
[T]here is nothing like a little 
pain to bring us back to our 
senses 
Vivian Sobchack  
Carnal Thoughts 
François Ozon’s film A Summer Dress (1996), is set in a lush landscape in the 
summer. Two young men are staying together in a cabin and as we encounter 
them, they are sunbathing wearing only speedo-style swimwear. After a brief 
argument, one of the young men leaves with his bike for the beach. The setting 
suggests summer holiday, simple lazy days and we follow young people in their 
physical prime. The scenes are limited in view, suggesting an intimacy and 
ignorance of the surrounding world and the problems the characters may face in 
their day to day lives outside of this idyllic setting. The only reference to the 
outside world is when one of the characters asks his lover to mind the 
neighbours. But we never see these neighbours. As spectators, we remain 
within the intimate world between the three characters of this film. The 
protagonist, Luc (Frédéric Mangenot) shares a summer house with the camp 
Sébastien. Their simple cabin is set in a green and lush surounding, with a 
beach and a harbour within cycling distance. At the start of the film, Luc is 
annoyed by Sébastien’s impromptu performance of a singalong to Sheila’s 
Bang Bang. Luc tells Sébastien that he should stop playing his shit song and 
think of the neighbours. As Sébastien refuses to stop, Luc puts on some clothes 
and cycles to the beach where he goes for a swim. He is then approached by a 
young Spanish girl and he follows her to a wooded part of the beach to have 
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sex. On noticing that someone has taken his clothes, the Spanish girl offers him 
her dress, an offer he reluctantly accepts. We then see him cycling home, wind 
in his new dress, with a big smile. Once home, Luc passionately lets Sébastien 
fuck him on the kitchen counter. When Luc cycles to the harbour the following 
day to return the dress, he apologises for the tear in it and says he tried to fix it. 
Instead of taking the dress, the girl tells him to keep it, saying that he will 
probably have more use of it.  
This fifteen-minute short film is told with a straight narrative, one event after the 
other, and with few clues about the reasoning behind the actions we see. The 
lack of back-story and contexts tempts the viewer to interpret the film, especially 
Luc’s behaviour. It would be possible to see the smiling Luc on his way home in 
a dress as experiencing a liberating, cathartic, moment where the involuntary 
cross-dressing forces him to listen to Sébastien’s words before he left — ‘I don’t 
give a shit about the neighbours.’ And after this he can finally enjoy being 
fucked by his lover. The dress then becomes a symbol and it is true that Luc 
might need it more than the Spanish girl. In light of previous discussions, the 
crossdressing could be interpreted as an embrace of feminine/masochistic 
sexuality, Luc is markedly passive in both sexual encounters. He lets himself be 
seduced by the girl on the beach, and then by his lover once back in the cabin. 
The fluidity of Luc’s sexuality is pointed out by Kate Ince (who seems to have 
mixed up the names of the characters in this quote), “in the course of a day, 
Sèbastien [sic] goes from ‘gay’, to ‘straight’, to ‘gay’ again.”  I have previously 237
mentioned Bersani and Dutoit’s caution against what they call “to play the game 
of the enigmatic signifier.”  Though I do not share their concern, and I have 238
instead argued for an introduction of the enigmatic or the uncanny as a method 
to affectively experience a film and to become co-creator of the narrative of a 
film. However, I do share their reluctance to psychologise and to fill the gaps in 
a narrative with fixed meaning. As I made clear in my critique of McGowan, I 
wish to avoid what Vicky LeBeau has argued is one of the dangers of 
psychoanalytic theory when applied to cinema. “The same meaning and for 
everyone? The very idea of a typical dream, it seems is going to confirm the 
 Kate Ince, ‘François Ozon’s Cinema of Desire,’ in Five Directors: Auteurism from 237
Assayas to Ozon, 2008, p. 114. 
 Bersani and Dutoit, 2004, p. 51.238
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suspicion that psychoanalysis imposes a master plot on its various subjects.”  239
However, while cautious of the risk of ossifying the enigmatic into specific 
meanings, I do not share Bersani and Dutoit’s reluctance to engage in 
speculative translation work on films. As I have argued, this continuous 
translation of works of art as a form of commentary does not necessarily close 
off meanings but can instead multiply meanings and my performative 
translations will aim to preserve the enigmatic navel of the dream rather than to 
cover it with set explanations. A Summer Dress is full of enigmatic signifiers, the 
dress being one of them. Thibaut Schilt points out that “[f]abrics in movement, 
like that undulating dress, occupy Ozon’s cinema nearly as much as characters 
themselves, fluttering in the light summer breeze, twirling to the sound of music, 
or brushing against luxurious marble floors.”  Schilt uses the example of the 240
dress to paint a picture of a weave of desires and often contradictory themes in 
Ozon’s cinema, but also to argue for a non-metaphorical usage of textures and 
fabrics as a theme in his films.  
A Summer Dress also uses dance and music — Sébastien’s performance at the 
beginning of the film is the catalyst of the ensuing narrative. He dances to Bang 
Bang, using his fingers to shoot Luc as he leaves for the beach. He sings along 
with Sheila about lost love and a childhood friend who left her love unrequited. 
Sébastien uses these words at once to chase away and perhaps to tell his lover 
that he is unable to receive his love because he cares too much about what the 
neighbours think. Even when reduced to what we see and what we hear, the 
enigmatic signifiers are there, demanding to be interpreted and, in the process, 
involving us in the film. The enigmatic is not only present in the assumed intent 
of characters or directors, but in the very fabric of the film. 
When we engage with a film, we involve multiple registers; the associations 
from images, soundtrack, dialogue, background noise, clothes, the tonality and 
quality of the film stock or sensor used, and the editing, angles and quality of 
voices all pull us in different directions. A film must be experienced; a scene can 
be picked apart, its techniques can be analysed and described, but it cannot be 
re-presented to the reader through a text such as this, a reader has to 
experience the film directly. I have argued for the translatability of film, using 
 Vicky LeBeau, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Play of Shadows, 2001, p. 74 239
 Thibaut Schilt, François Ozon, 2011, p. 2.240
104
Benjamin’s and Jakobson’s models for translation as a form of commentary, yet 
at the centre of ‘translatability’ is the ‘untranslatability’ of any text or image. The 
punctum in Barthes’s reading of photography escapes meaning. Yet is also 
produces meaning, and my ambition is to follow the meaning generated without 
laying claim to any truth about the film. My argument here is that even on the 
representational level, there is a selection and an interpretation at play. So the 
act of just seeing the film that Bersani and Dutoit suggest, is an evasive ideal 
that like the punctum exists outside culture, outside the text about a film. As a 
reader of this text, you are at least temporarily dependent on my description. It 
is not possible for me to quote a film the way I can quote another text. I can 
present still images, locutions from characters and I can tell you about the 
sound or the camera movements, but these are already interpretations, already 
translations. As I have argued, however, this act of translation is not merely an 
unfortunate aspect of this project, but it actualises the discrepancy and the 
escape from intelligibility that forces us to interpret, to translate and to move 
away from any fixed meanings. My limited descriptions, failures and 
misinterpretations, actualise the enigmatic signifier at play and the translation 
work that a film demands. At the same time, I am driven if not haunted by a 
demand to let the films speak in these texts, to let the language of the film 
transpire through my descriptions and I will try to give them voices that are 
distinct from my own argumentative voice throughout this thesis. 
As noted in the introduction, Mulvey’s early essay ‘Visual Pleasure in Narrative 
Cinema’ uses the distance between film and its commentary as a political tool, a 
means of destroying the pleasure that is made possible by a narcissistic, ego-
centred enjoyment of cinema. “It is said that analysing pleasure, or beauty, 
destroys it. That is the intention of this article. The satisfaction and 
reinforcement of the ego that represent the high point of film history hitherto 
must be attacked.”  Mulvey used the translation from film to text, and her 241
analytical dissection of film, as a tool to undermine the ego-supporting pleasure 
that it may produce. Mulvey bases her argument on Lacan’s early distinction 
between the imaginary and the symbolic and the valuation of the symbolic over 
the imaginary. In his seminars from the early 1950s, as well as in his essay ‘The 
Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,’ Lacan emphasises that it is 
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 713.241
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important for the analyst to move away from a narcissistic, ego-focused therapy 
by introducing the big Other as the incomplete symbolic order.  In Seminar I, 242
Lacan distinguishes between empty speech (imaginary, narcissistic) and full 
speech (symbolic, introducing the lack of the Other). This focus on the gaze as 
a function of identification grounds Mulvey’s model of the male gaze in an early 
usage of the gaze in Lacan’s terminological development. In the early 
formulation of the mirror stage, the gaze functions to establish identification with 
the ideal image of the self. Later, this ideal self and the misrecognition with the 
image of the self (as we have seen in the section on the phallic above) leads 
Lacan to formulate the real as that failure to be whole around which the subject 
compulsively turns. The gaze in his later formulations becomes the reminder 
that the subject is on its own. “The horrible truth,” according to Copjec’s critique 
of early Lacanian film theory, “is that the gaze does not see you. So if you are 
looking for confirmation of the truth of your being or the clarity of your vision, 
you are on your own”.  The gaze in this later formulation is thus not a sadistic, 243
controlling look, but rather the reminder of the self’s helplessness and its 
lostness in the world. The female object of heterosexual desire is not the 
reminder of lack and potential castration in Copjec’s reading of Lacan, instead it 
it is the gaze itself that reveals the self to be lacking. Mulvey’s model of visual 
pleasure and the gaze as desiring and identification led to a number of critiques, 
from Judith Mayne’s critique of the focus on the male gaze  and Mary Ann 244
Doane’s critique of the assumption of identity in Mulvey’s model  to critiques of 245
assumptions around female passivity in Mulvey’s essay  as well as the 246
 ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 242
Experience,’ in Écrits, pp. 75-82. Dominiek Hoens and Ed Pluth divides Lacan’s work 
into three periods: the imaginary (1936-1952), the symbolic (1953-1962) and the real 
(1963-1981) all dealing with the problem of closing off the symbolic, this closing off 
needs another register in order not to stop sliding and be locked into a determined 
meaning. See Dominiek Hoens and Ed Pluth ‘The Sinthome: A New Way of Writing an 
Old Problem?’ in Re-inventing the Symptom: Essays on the Final Lacan, 2002 pp. 
1-18.
 Joan Copjec, Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists, 1994 [2015], p. 36243
 see Judith Mayne. ‘The Woman at the Keyhole; Women's Cinema and Feminist 244
Cinema,’ in New German Critique. 1981 pp. 27-43.
 See Mary Ann Doane,'Misrecognition and Identity,’ in Cine-Tracts, 1980, pp. 25-32245
 See Tania Modleski, The Women Who Knew Too Much: Hitchcock and Feminist 246
Theory, New York: Methuen, 1988
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equation of pleasure and active gaze.  In a response to some of this critique. 247
Mulvey has written that: “At the time,” she “was interested in the relationship 
between the image of woman on the screen and the 'masculinisation' of the 
spectator position, regardless of the actual sex (or possible deviance) of any 
real live moviegoer.”  In this defence, Mulvey focuses on Freud’s metaphoric 248
language of masculine libido in order to explain the assumption of a male gaze 
as the generalised spectator. In her ‘Afterthoughts’ essay, Mulvey addresses 
what she calls the “trans-sex identification” of the female spectator assuming 
the male pleasure of scopophilia  as well as the identification with a female 249
protagonist who “temporarily accepts 'masculinisation' in memory of her 'active' 
phase.”  These readings of the female spectator and the female protagonist, 250
though they purport to separate the sex of the spectator from the Freudian 
metaphors of sexual desire, reinforce the sex of the spectator/protagonist by 
assigning qualitative difference to the male/female spectator and protagonist. 
Copjec’s critique on the other hand ignores the consequences of the gendered 
metaphors in play in Freud’s and Lacan’s vocabulary. As I have shown already, 
while introducing the phallic and feminine metaphors, the alienation of the self 
from itself is given gendered meaning through the instalment of an ostensibly 
stable gender separation. I have also previously stated my intention to ground 
the vocabulary of this thesis in debates of exclusion/subjugation of women/the 
feminine as well as the queer/non-heterosexual. This is why I remain with the 
vocabulary of Mulvey’s ‘Visual Pleasure’ essay rather than her later attempt to 
undermine the binary structure of her argument in this early essay. Clifford T. 
Manlove has argued for a return to a Lacan closer to Copjec’s reading in order 
to open up film readings to a potential for female agency in film.  Manlove, 251
though critical of Mulvey’s reading of Lacan and scopophilia, argues that her 
“thesis — that the pleasure found in one person gazing at another can be used 
 See Kaja Silverman, 'Masochism and Subjectivity’ in Framework, 1980, pp. 2-9247
 Laura Mulvey, ‘Afterthoughts on “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” inspired 248
by King Vidor's Duel in the Sun (1946)’ published in Framework in 1981, here quoted 
from Visual and Other Pleasures, 1989 [2009], p. 29
 Mulvey, 1989 [2009], p. 33249
 Mulvey, 1989 [2009], p. 37250
 See Clifford T. Manlove, ‘Visual "Drive" and Cinematic Narrative: Reading Gaze 251
Theory in Lacan, Hitchcock, and Mulvey’ in Cinema Journal, 2007.
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for power — has the potential for broad application despite the steady criticism 
and revision by many of her colleagues in feminist and film studies.”  I would 252
like to extend this to take Mulvey’s as well as Irigaray’s challenge to the implicit 
and often explicit reference to gender difference and morphological differences 
in both Lacan and Freud very seriously. 
My solution — rather than to gloss over the gendered metaphors of Lacan’s and 
Freud’s vocabulary — will be to explore a different source of pleasure in film, a 
pleasure that leaves the self open to affective engagements and goings astray. I 
have already discussed the masochistic model of returning to the self and of 
eroticising the discomfort of helplessness in the face of enigmatic demands. I 
also briefly discussed Studlar’s critique of Mulvey’s sadistic, scopophilic model 
and her own formulation of a masochistic spectatorship model. I mentioned that 
her model is heavily indebted to Deleuze and his male-centred reading of 
masochism. In response to this, Studlar has tried to develop a specific model for 
female masochism.  In this essay, Studlar points out a common problematics 253
in the analysis of ‘women’s film’ and female masochistic characters: “Part of the 
confusion in film studies regarding female masochism may be the result of the 
feminine stereotypes that the perversion puts into play.” Studlar concludes that 
a “performance of dramatized powerlessness allows the masochistic female 
subject to use suffering and, in particular, suffering attached to ‘sacred’ aspects 
of femininity such as sexual purity as the deceptive cover for the exercise of 
forbidden powers — and pleasures.”  And indeed it becomes hard to 254
distinguish between the masochistic woman character as performance with 
supposedly subversive effects and the submissive woman character who 
reenacts the subjugation of women. Kaja Silverman has argued that “it does 
seem to me that pathological masochism is almost by [its] very definition a male 
rather than a female phenomenon.”  Concluding that it “is an accepted — 255
indeed a requisite — element of ‘normal’ female subjectivity, providing a crucial 
 Manlove, 2007, p. 103.252
 See Studlar, ‘Masochistic Performance and Female Subjectivity in Letter from an 253
Unknown Woman’ in Cinema Journal, 1994
 Studlar, 1994, p. 44254
 Kaja Silverman, ‘Masochism and Male Subjectivity’ in Camera Obscura, 1988, p. 36255
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mechanism for eroticizing lack and subordination.”  So how are we to use 256
masochism without falling into the trap of reproducing the feminine/perverse as 
subjugated/excluded? Silverman argues that her project is to bring “the male 
subject face to face with his desire for the father, as well as with the passivity 
and masochism that are both a part of this ‘normalcy,’ and a path leading 
elsewhere.”  After having assumed at the start of the essay that there is a 257
“double nature of perversion, that we understand it as simultaneously a 
capitulation and a revolt.”  Male masochism thus has something of a revolt 258
inherent in its perverse nature, despite being a passive perversion, submissive 
to the father by its very nature. However, while Silverman concludes that the 
gender reversal of masochism does not offer an escape from the symbolic order 
they are part of, she proposes that her essay is “less concerned with articulating 
new forms of male subjectivity than with complicating our understanding of the 
forms which it presently takes.”  In this thesis, my focus is not so much on the 259
gender troubles of the late 1980s and their potentially subversive effects on the 
symbolic order. Instead, what I am concerned with is the affectability of the self, 
the possibility of going astray and what ultimately blocks this affectability and 
set limits to what can affect our selves. So rather than the subversive effects of 
gender displacements or the gender conformity of masochistic submissiveness, 
I am more interested in the porous nature of a self modelled on the masochistic 
return to self as opposed to the sadistic/phallic defence of self.  
In Mulvey’s early model of scopophilic pleasure, narrative film functions on an 
imaginary level, offering pleasure through identification between the viewer and 
the characters. Through this identification, the object of desire (woman) 
becomes desirable through a narcissistic insulation through identification with 
the desiring position (man). In this logic, the man is the active, desiring subject, 
while woman remains the passive, desired object. For Mulvey, the way out of 
this deadlock — as for Lacan of the 1950s — is to introduce the Other. The act 
of analysis or interpretation introduces full speech as a step away from 
narcissistic pleasure, and the male/female, active/passive dichotomy that this 
 Silverman, 1988, p. 36256
 Silverman, 1988, p. 59257
 Silverman, 1988, p. 32258
 Silverman, 1998, p. 62259
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relies on. Mulvey’s understanding of film as imaginary, and as offering 
identification and narcissistic pleasure, follows an early focus on the visual 
aspect of cinema, as I have showed, André Bazin, Walter Benjamin and Roland 
Barthes all regarded films as the continuation of visual art and the preservation 
of time. Compared to texts, radio, records, even theatre, film offers moving 
images for consumption. Another early Lacanian film theorist, Christian Metz, 
focused his studies on the semiotics of film rather than its pleasures. Like 
Mulvey, he sees a tendency for film to lend itself to narcissistic pleasure rather 
than symbolic meaning, but rather than destroying this pleasure through 
analysing it, Metz is interested in transforming the method of seeing film. 
“Reduced to its most fundamental procedures, any psychoanalytic reflection on 
the cinema might be defined in Lacanian terms as an attempt to disengage the 
cinema-object from the imaginary and to win it for the symbolic, in the hope of 
extending the latter by a new province.”  Metz’s project is to open film to the 260
study of meaning, semiotics, and to analyse film as a language or as a set of 
signifiers. This model is also grounded in a reading of early Lacan that focuses 
on a dialectics between the imaginary and the symbolic, and the importance of 
analytic work to interpret and translate to the symbolic to full speech. Though 
Metz articulates this in early Lacanian terminology, it is significant that he 
suggests extending the symbolic to a new province. Metz’s proposed move is 
not one-directional but expands the symbolic towards the imaginary. Cinema is 
part of the imaginary, and Metz’s project is to pull it towards the symbolic, but as 
an effect of this it is also a project to extend the symbolic. What Metz suggests 
is not a translation from imaginary to symbolic, but rather an exploration of a 
meeting point, a semiotic field, that is both symbolic and imaginary. 
A Summer Dress, offers an abundance of pleasure for the spectator: from that 
of looking at two beautiful young men and a woman, to the joy of the main 
character as he is liberated by a dress, or the delight of a camp dance-show to 
the tune of Bang Bang. All set in a lush, summery environment that connotes 
summer holiday, lazy days by the beach and guilt-free sexual encounters. In 
line with Silverman’s argument, the pleasures that this film offers to the 
spectator is not exclusively supportive or disruptive of an order, but is both 
disruptive and supportive. The question then becomes what is disrupted and 
 Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier, 1982 [1977] p. 260
3.
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what is supported in Ozon’s cinema? And what methods are used to create 
these effects? This chapter will focus on models of spectatorship that will enable 
further explorations of these fields of tension, and to explore pleasure in film in a 
manner that is not reduced to the narcissistic pleasure of the ego in relation to 
the desired passive object. In this chapter I will investigate filmic pleasure along 
masochistic lines that blur, diffuse and expose passive/active dichotomies. I will 
also propose a reading of the meaning of film, or the language of film, through 
an exploration of Laplanche’s seduction theory and translation of enigmatic 
signifiers. This theory sidesteps the hard lines in Lacan’s model and returns to 
Freud, to explore the border spaces between language and the body. The 
methodology suggested for reading films is closely related to translation rather 
than textual analysis. These readings are suggested as a means of exploring 
Metz’s extension of the symbolic without being hampered by Lacan’s restrictive 
distinction between the symbolic, the imaginary and the real. They also 
constitute an attempt to discover the pleasure of film through a different path 
than the patriarchal model pointed out by Mulvey as well as the masochism 
suggested by Studlar. Sexuality and pleasure is not the prerogative of patriarchy 
or heterosexuality, and this exploration of pleasure as disruptive and as healing 
points to an aspect of queer theory that has opened up for sexual politics as 
embrace of pleasure. Third, this is also an attempt to explore the irreducibility of 
film to semiotics. Film as a medium is not only symbolic, it is also affective, 
involving emotions and sensations that are corporeal and not directly related to 
the multitudes of media being deployed. In order to discuss this aspect of film, I 
will turn to notions of haptic and corporeal cinema as further explorations of the 
body/language boundary.  
The pleasure of the gaze 
In ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,’ Mulvey analyses the specific 
pleasures that narrative cinema offers for the viewer. She defines her subject of 
study only vaguely as “the Hollywood style … (and of all the cinema which fell 
within its sphere of influence)”  On this basis Mulvey makes a number of 261
claims and assumptions. These can be summed up as follows: (1) narrative 
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 713.261
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cinema relies on the same socially established interpretations of sexual 
difference as the subject looking at the film; (2) cinema is a system of 
representation and as such it reflects the unconscious as formed by the 
dominant order; (3) this dominant order is a heterosexual, patriarchal order 
whose language mainstream film adopts as a means of providing visual 
pleasure. Against this, Mulvey suggests using psychoanalytic theory to analyse 
this visual pleasure and the dominant order that has shaped the unconscious. 
“Psychoanalytic theory is thus appropriated here as a political weapon, 
demonstrating the way the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured 
film form.”  In spite of this, Mulvey’s arguments are not restricted to patriarchal 262
forms or representations that are conveyed through mainstream film; she takes 
issue with all the “ease and plenitude of the narrative fiction film.”  The simple 263
pleasures that narrative, mainstream film offer are detrimental, according to 
Mulvey, not only because of their patriarchal forms, but also because of the 
simple plenitude of representations that feeds the ego of the viewer. “The 
satisfaction and reinforcement of the ego that represent the high point of film 
history hitherto must be attacked.”  Mulvey’s model of a straight, male gaze is 264
complicated by a film such as A Summer Dress, where the male body is 
objectified and aestheticised as something pleasurable to the viewer. The 
Spanish woman’s body is not used to the same extent to entice the viewer. 
Further, Luc is both the object of pleasure and the protagonist, both a source of 
identification and a source of desire.  
This is reminiscent of Bersani’s argument in ‘Gay Betrayals,’ where, as shown 
earlier, it is suggested that gay sociality questions the distinction between an 
object of desire and an object of identification, further undermining the stable 
self that was suggested in The Freudian Body and in ‘Is the Rectum a 
Grave?’  This argument was first formulated by Bersani in Homos where he 265
warns against a de-gaying of gayness.  In ‘Gay Betrayals,’ however, the focus 266
is on a critique of identity politics that links back to Bersani’s earlier readings of 
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 711.262
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 713.263
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 713.264
 Both ‘Is the Rectum a Grave?’ and ‘Gay Betrayals’ are included in Bersani, 2009.265
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Freud and Laplanche to undermine the stability of the ego through readings of 
sexuality as a self-shattering experience. In ‘Is the Rectum a Grave,’ Bersani 
argues for a valuation of powerlessness as a means of moving away from 
phallocentrism, defined as pleasure derived from power.  Bersani links this 267
argument with his postulate in The Freudian Body, namely that masochism is 
tautological to sexuality and that sexuality is inherently shattering because the 
masochistic aspect of turning away from a phallic position of power undermines 
the stability of the ego. By focusing on the shattering aspect of sexuality, 
Bersani formulates a critique of the kind of phallic pleasure identified by Mulvey. 
He suggests that scopophilic pleasure may not be sadistic or consuming of the 
female object, but that the pleasure derived come from undermining the phallic 
— in the sense of powerful and stable — self. 
In this context, A Summer Dress can be read as a contradiction of Mulvey’s 
structural assumptions, using similar tools to Bersani in order to undermine the 
stability of scopophilic pleasure and the object of this pleasure. This film offers 
different pleasures to the ‘Hollywood style … (and of all the cinema which fell 
within its sphere of influence).’ Of course, this kind of exemption might lead to 
an argument, where any film that does not conform to the theory is simply not a 
part of the category under discussion. This would then fail to acknowledge A 
Summer Dress as a valid critique of Mulvey’s assumptions about narrative 
cinema. I will instead argue that the pleasure available to the viewer in A 
Summer Dress does not contradict the pleasure in Mulvey’s model, even if the 
objects and directions of the gaze are altered. A Summer Dress is not only a 
queer intervention against heterosexual assumptions, but the very embrace of 
spectatorial pleasure in this film challenges Mulvey’s claim that spectatorial 
pleasure is necessarily supportive of a sadistic egoic formation. Luc’s position is 
not only at once one of identification and desire for the spectator, but he is also 
markedly passive in his sexual encounters. Sébastien’s initial performance of 
Bang Bang can be read as a failed attempt at seduction, on the beach, it is the 
Spanish girl who initiates the sexual encounter and finally, back in the cabin, it is 
Sébastien who is the active part. The masochistic pleasure on display, however, 
does not exclude agency, Luc decides with whom and when to have sex, 
contradicting not only Mulvey’s model of sadistic/phallic desire, but also 
 See Bersani ‘Is the Rectum a Grave?’ included in Bersani 2009, p. 24.267
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Studlar’s assumption of absolute passivity and submission in the masochistic 
position. A Summer Dress therefore offers a reading against the grain of the 
theoretical models so far presented.  
The spectatorship model  
Mulvey’s theory of the male gaze came out of a feminism that was critical of the 
ideological positioning of women as passive. At the same time, it was a 
theorisation of the pleasures of spectatorship as well as the insertion of sexual 
difference into film theory. As mentioned previously, this opens up for further 
differentiations as well as a problematisation of the pleasure and the active/
passive dualism of her polemic essay.  Spectatorship-studies have taken up 268
these aspects and developed more refined theories and models for 
understanding our pleasures and engagements with film, as well as the 
question of what a spectator actually is. Patrick Fuery points out that “the 
relationship between film and the spectator has become increasingly more 
complex in recent years.”  This complexity is, according to Fuery, due to the 269
“development of certain theoretical approaches which emphasise the role of the 
spectator as an active agent in the construction of the text, as well as a 
development of those theories that focus on positions of subjectivity and 
intersubjective processes.”  Spectatorship models have become more 270
complex as a result of the development of theories relating to the spectator as 
active and passive. The question raised by spectatorship theory is thus: what is 
the role of the spectator in relation to the film and its characters as well as in 
relation to the narrative arch, soundtrack, cinematography and the auteur — the 
(often invisible) presumed origin of the film. This is a move away from thinking 
about cinema as an ideological apparatus where the screen functions as a 
mirror for the viewer. This complexity has been described by Judith Mayne as 
the negotiation between an ideological subject and a viewer that is not engaged 
 See Michele Aaron, Spectatorship: The Power of Looking on, 2007, p. 24. An earlier 268
formulation of a critique of sexual difference in Mulvey’s approach to film theory was 
written by D. N Rodowick: ‘The Difficulty of Difference’ in Wide Angle, 1982, and 
further developed in The Difficulty of Difference: Psychoanalysis, Sexual Difference, 
and Film Theory, 1991.
 Patrick Fuery, New Developments in Film Theory, 2000, p. 24.269
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with the cinematic material on an ideological level. “I am opposing, in other 
words, the cinematic subject and the film viewer so as better to situate the 
spectator as a viewer who is and is not the cinematic subject, and as a subject 
who is and is not a film viewer.”  Mayne defines the purpose of her 271
spectatorship model: “to understand the complicated ways in which meanings 
are both assigned and created.”  This model helps us to move away from 272
Mulvey’s deterministic views of narrative cinema and the male gaze, and to 
develop a more critical engagement with her notions of the pleasure that 
narrative cinema offers and the productive and problematic usage of such 
pleasure.  
In trying to define the spectator (as a function), Aaron re-reads cinematic theory 
to argue that the spectator “is born in the vanishing point generated by 
perspective, is summoned into hypothetical existence by the visual structure. 
What comes into being is the transcendent yet absent spectator — an illusion of 
agency indeed.”  The spectator is here assumed in the visual structure of the 273
film. The spectator is not only the assumed point of view at the screen at any 
given moment, but it is the ‘visual structure’ that assumes the spectator. This 
visual structure consists of the combined scenes, their relation and the symbols 
that they contain and communicate to the hypothetical viewer. The spectator is 
thus not only the empirical viewer, but it becomes possible to analyse the 
spectator by attending to the ‘visual structure.’ Thus the spectator is in a 
hypothetical position. The abstraction of the spectator as a hypothetical position 
does not mean that the spectator becomes void of difference. In Aaron’s model, 
the spectator’s differentiation is a key aspect in a move away from a focus on 
the ultimate meaning or ideology of a film towards an interest in the various 
ways of seeing a film. 
A major problem with the classical model and its assertion of a hypothetical all-
inclusive spectator-subject, was its failure to address difference: how differences 
between spectators meant that there were different ways of experiencing film.  274
 Judith Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship, 1993, p. 36.271
 Mayne, 1993, p. 81.272
 Aaron, 2007, p. 10.273
 Aaron, 2007, p. 24.274
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The spectator is a subject with an involvement, distance and critical 
engagement with various ideologies that the film may or may not engage with. 
Aaron argues that it is ‘difference’ that enables spectatorship theory to develop 
into a theory that does not predetermine the spectator or the effect the film will 
have on the spectator. Furthermore, Aaron states that the notion of difference 
became a part of spectatorship theory via Mulvey’s insistence on “gender as 
primary theme within the debate on spectatorship, thereby prioritising the 
discussion of difference within the evolution of film studies.”  Gender is 275
therefore used as a tool or a vehicle for thinking about difference and this 
difference is the seed that breaks the monolithic aspect of apparatus theory. 
According to Aaron, this seed of difference is also what prompted a move away 
from psychoanalytic theory in spectator theory. Aaron’s focus here is on the link 
between passivity and femininity that is inherent in some psychoanalytic work. 
Mulvey uses this link to analyse the activity and passivity of female and male 
characters and the activity of the male gaze. In her model, this gaze requires 
the male character in a film to serve as a mirror to desire the female, passive, 
object that are assumed in psychoanalytic theory. Aaron’s point is that once 
these theories were opened to difference, they outgrew the reductionist 
readings rooted in psychoanalytic theory. 
As the female spectator emerged as a contradictory figure grounded in the 
complexities of her social formation which were articulated on-screen and lived off-
screen, the psychoanalytic model of spectatorship ceased to be an adequate or 
accurate means of understanding her.  276
Aaron suggests a reading of Mulvey (and of psychoanalysis in general) as a 
dual, either/or, model of two sexes. The problems of this model are brought out 
by the complexity of the female gaze that is active as well as passive, together 
with passive or active female and male characters on screen. 
 Aaron, 2007, p. 24.275
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The pleasure of the spectator 
Where Mulvey was openly critical of the pleasures of looking, Aaron argues that 
pleasure can be a disruptive force. “Spectatorial pleasure, or rather the passion, 
desires and fantasies that underpin it, evidences the prevalence and pull of illicit 
or unspoken or unconscious responses to film.”  This difference is related to 277
the ways Aaron and Mulvey assign pleasure. For Mulvey, the pleasure of the 
male gaze is problematic as it reinforces the active, desiring male subject while 
the female object is the passive cause of pleasure. Aaron, instead, sees 
pleasure as a complex result of both passivity and activity. To make this 
argument, Aaron refers to Deleuze’s critique of Freud’s theories of masochism 
and sadism. The masochist, in Aaron’s argument, is not passive, but is instead 
a part of the creation of pleasure; the masochistic spectator is willingly entering 
a masochistic relation with the film. The delay of pleasure is enhancing the 
pleasure of the spectator and as such Aaron is complicating the model of the 
passive, masochistic, female object of the sadistic, male, active protagonist and 
spectator.  
What Freud suggests is that the pleasure of recovery is not only experienced 
through the pain of loss, but is actually increased by it. The unpleasure is 
temporary and necessary for the greater pleasure to be experienced; it is an 
essential part of the achievement of joy. This is a crucial point, confirming a 
conservative paradigm for this behaviour: the indulgence in loss for the 
enhancement of the later gain.  278
In this reading of masochist pleasure, the delay of pleasure is key, rather than 
the pain that may be caused by what is seen. The pleasure of delay is 
expanded to any form of suspense, becoming a key ingredient in any narrative. 
“Suspense, then, further normalises or popularises masochism; it gives 
masochism a (narrative) method.”  This narrative method engages the viewer 279
in a consensual relation with the film, where a certain level of pain is assumed 
and required. “In other words, spectatorship is characterised by complicity even 
 Aaron, 2007, p. 48.277
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though it depends upon its suppression for its smooth running.”  This 280
Deleuzian notion of masochism as delayed pleasure and its relation to the 
idealised mother stands in contrast to the notion of masochistic pleasure 
developed by Laplanche as a result of the ‘fundamental anthropological 
situation’ that assumes the not-yet-consensual relation. “With the philosophers, 
we remain stuck in the adult-adult relation,”  a relation that assumes 281
reciprocity and at least potential equality. Aaron’s attempt to destabilise the 
male/female and active/passive dualities through the use of pleasure in 
opposition to Mulvey opens up a reading of the pleasures of narrative film as a 
critical device. This also allows for a reading of pleasure and the denial of 
pleasure through narrative devices as critical engagements with notions of sex, 
gender and sexual difference. In Mulvey’s account of visual pleasure, the 
spectator identifies with the active protagonist in order to desire the passive 
object. Aaron’s move is to complicate these positions and the assumed active/
passive positions both on and off screen, as well as the male/female divide on 
and off screen. 
In both these theories, the spectator is presumed to identify and desire objects 
on screen, yet Aaron adds a separate desire to know in relation to the narration 
and the displacement of pleasure as a function of suspense. Aaron suggests 
the possibility of unspoken or unconscious responses to film as aligned with her 
notion of a pleasure that is not necessarily reproductive of the ideological order 
within which a film has been produced.  
The body and the screen 
Laura U. Marks argues that there are aspects of images that cannot be 
understood purely visually. These aspects encourage viewers to engage 
through memory and as embodied beings in the world. An image can be more 
corporeal than optic. Accordingly, Marks defines two categories of  vision: the 
optical and the haptic. Haptic visuality can be caused by the quality of an image 
as well as by the state of the viewer. A haptic image is an image that does not 
 Aaron, 2007, p. 91.280
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allow for identification. This can be because we are too close to perceive an 
object, or the image is blurred or has some other qualities that refuses a visual 
understanding of what is seen. “Haptic cinema does not invite identification with 
a figure — a sensory-motor reaction — so much as it encourages a bodily 
relationship between the viewer and the image.”  This closeness to the 282
perceived is not a function of the narrative, but of visual itself. “The haptic image 
forces the viewer to contemplate the image itself instead of being pulled into 
narrative.”  This haptic aspect is thus at once a closeness of the viewer and 283
the viewed and a distance from the message of the cinematic. Viewers are 
pulled in close, but also left to their viewer’s own references for understanding. 
“Haptic visuality requires the viewer to work to constitute the image, to bring it 
forth from latency.”  Such a bringing forth from latency requires a process of 284
decoding or translation. “Objects, bodies, and intangible things hold histories 
within them that can be translated only imperfectly.”  Therefore, Marks’s 285
embodied optics cannot be reduced to a straightforward identification with one 
of the objects on the screen. Instead this model includes the body in a process 
of interpreting an object that is not simply reducible to an object. Marks argues 
that “it is not proper to speak of the object of a haptic look as to speak of a 
dynamic subjectivity between looker and image.”  The haptic relation does not 286
allow for the distance required for a subject-object relation, instead the subject 
is displaced in the image and the image becomes a part of a tactile being of the 
body. 
The haptic image as a carrier of meaning, yet simultaneously as an impression 
without meaning, is reminiscent of Laplanche’s notion of the message and the 
translation of the enigmatic signifier. The affective response does not entail 
identification or symbolisation, but a process of translating, of divining meaning. 
The image that is too close, that cannot be understood, is taken in and attached 
to the affect it evokes. As such the image/message carries something un-
translated and un-translatable into the self. Here then, is a link between 
 Marks, 2000, p. 164.282
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phenomenological affect theory and psychoanalytic theory of how the self is 
constructed. 
Feeling the screen 
Haptic cinema has been posited as a means of achieving an embodiment of the 
spectator and of the screen. Lucy Bolton argues that “by factoring the body into 
the cinematic experience one can mimic the specular spectator, but highlight 
the realm of embodiment.”  By mimicking the specular spectator, Bolton 287
argues that haptic cinema can deploy a strategy both imitating and subverting 
the spectatorial pleasures identified and criticised by Mulvey. Bolton argues that 
“mimesis is a strategic way of operating outside of patriarchal discourse in order 
to render the feminine visible”  by inserting an embodied identification 288
between spectator and screen. Bolton’s suggestion include using silence and 
pauses to enable an embodied identification between spectator and character.  
So, silence and pauses, as opposed to dialogue, could convey interiority without 
perhaps requiring obvious articulation or representation: just as the spectator 
watches in silence, so they witness the woman on-screen experiencing self-
reflection and repose.  289
Another means of making the audience feel is through a more brutal, infliction of 
pain. As already noted, Sobchack argues that “there is nothing like a little pain 
to bring us back to our senses,”  and away from metaphysical arguments. It is 290
also a turn toward the affective, or what Ashtor called the phenomenological 
direct experience. In a similar vein, Martine Beugnet defines the haptic return of 
and to the senses as a move away from a detached gaze towards a feeling 
gaze that engages with the object as a body. 
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A haptic regime of visuality implies a process of acquiring knowledge that is not 
synonymous with a detached, scientific gaze, but, on the contrary, is rooted in a 
sensual engagement with its object: a process of understanding that calls for a 
yielding into the object.  291
Beugnet describes a displacement that takes place between the viewer and the 
character in haptic cinema. This implies not only an embodied identification, but 
also a slippage or a disruption of the division between these two sides. In 
Cinema and Sensation, Beugnet has further argued for a return to the 
materiality of films and the thinking of films in their own medium and away from 
methodologies that seek only to confirm the theories the are based on. “Indeed, 
the analysis of the films proper (all questions pertaining to the materiality and 
the aesthetic dimension of the works), left out of the main agenda, often 
appears as a mere by-product and process of verification of these chief 
methodologies.”  By returning to the materiality and the haptic aspect of film, 292
there is an attempt to place focus on the filmic rather than on film theory as 
theory about film.  
In Bettina Papenburg’s contribution to Carnal Aesthetics, she argues for the 
grotesque as a means of breaking down the divide between spectator and 
character, by breaking down the unity of the character:  
In my adaptation of Mikhail Bakhtin’s work, the concept of ‘the grotesque’ refers to 
the subversive use of the body to pose a challenge to existing power constellations 
by drawing on tropes of excess, inversion and transgression as well as by resisting 
fixed form, completion and closure.  293
This is further echoed by Patricia MacCormack’s development of mucosal 
spectatorship, where the un-contained offers the possibility of transformation 
and a limitless identification. “Mucosal spectatorship implies the spectator’s 
 Martine Beugnet, ‘Tactile Visions: From Embodied to Encoded Love,’ in Carnal 291
Aesthetics: Transgressive Imagery and Feminist Politics, 2013, p. 181.
 Beugnet, Cinema and Sensation: French Film and the Art of Transgression, 2007, p. 292
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ethical responsibility is to be open to the creative intimacy of mucosal relations, 
that is open to transformation without intent.”  These developments of an 294
incorporated spectatorship that defies the split or duality between the spectator 
and the screen borrow from, but are not confined to, Marks’s interest in a 
cinematic language that transcends cultural and linguistic confines. Both 
Sobchack’s essays on carnal aesthetics and Marks’s essay on haptic cinema 
tend to use a terminology from phenomenology and they focus on the 
limitations of the body and the interconnections of our senses without 
developing a notion of the self or an inner. How can we translate the affective, 
phenomenological concepts of haptic visuality and mimesis to a psychoanalytic 
context? 
As mentioned before, Marks hints at a possible usage of the mother-infant 
relation to understand haptic concepts in a psychoanalytic vocabulary. This 
suggestion is developed by Griselda Pollock via Ettinger’s concept of the 
matrixial to understand dynamic differentiations that does not follow a phallic 
either/or logic. On this basis she argues that difference of/from the feminine is 
distinct from a phallic differentiation.  
We need to imagine a non-derivative, originary sexual difference of/from the 
feminine, a possibility which Lacan intuited when he acknowledged a psycho-
symbolic dimension ‘beyond the phallus’, that is a psychic dimension not organised 
by the unique phallic signifier tracing the signifying field by means of a binary logic 
plus/minus, presence/absence.  295
Pollock here bridges the gap between phenomenology as informed by Merleau-
Ponty and a phallocentric psychoanalysis. This development of a ‘psycho-
symbolic’ that is not under the sway of phallic logic is then deployed to 
understand carnal or mucosal aesthetics as “a being with the others whose 
traces are so delicately retrieved without repossession. The ‘being with’ of co-
eventing is sustained without phallic closure.”  This bridge enables a 296
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psychoanalytic reading of the haptic in terms of identification and ‘being with’ as 
opposed to a phallic ‘being through loss’.  
The masochistic spectator 
In A Child Is Being Beaten, Freud defines the masochist position and the 
fantasy of being beaten as both the replacement for a denied genital relation 
and as an expression of the prohibition against this genital relation.  
It is not only the punishment for the forbidden genital relation, but also the 
regressive substitute for that relation, and from this latter source it derives the 
libidinal excitation which is from this time forward attached to it, and which finds its 
outlet in masturbatory acts. Here for the first time we have the essence of 
masochism.  297
The fantasy of being beaten by the father that has been displaced onto a 
generic father figure and a generic child, reveals, according to Freud, an 
underlying fantasy of having a genital relation with the father that is at the same 
time accepted as prohibited. This form of disavowal is reminiscent of the 
functioning of melancholia in Butler’s model of the acquisition of gender and a 
self. There the loss of the object is denied through a process of incorporation as 
a part of or the foundation of the ego. A return to Freud’s definition of 
masochism returns us to the father and away from the maternal relation. This 
contradicts Aaron’s challenge of the male/sadistic gaze. It would also make it 
problematic to use masochism in relation to Pollock’s usage of the matrixial and 
Marks’s suggestion of the mother-infant relation as a model for haptic cinema. 
By linking masochistic fantasy with prohibition and punishment, Freud links it to 
the paternal law rather than a maternal function. However, in a later essay, The 
Economic Problem of Masochism, Freud returns to a definition of masochism as 
an inversion of sadism.  
 Sigmund Freud, ‘’A Child is Being Beaten’ A Contribution to the Study of the Origin 297
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The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfils the 
task by diverting that instinct to a great extent outwards — soon with the help of a 
special organic system, the muscular apparatus — towards objects in the external 
world. The instinct is then called the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery, or 
the will to power. A portion of the instinct is placed directly in the service of the 
sexual function, where it has an important part to play. This is sadism proper. 
Another portion does not share in this transposition outwards; it remains inside the 
organism and, with the help of the accompanying sexual excitation described 
above, becomes libidinally bound there. It is in this portion that we have to 
recognize the original, erotogenic masochism.  298
Sadism is here defined as that part of the libido that is a destructive force used 
sexually as a means for domination and destruction. The masochistic function is 
a result of this destructive force not being directed outward, to an object, but 
instead being reverted inward, within the organism. Combined with the previous 
definition, this understanding of the masochistic function internalises the 
forbidden genital relation as a sadistic relation. The reversal of sadism onto the 
own self is the result of the sadistic relation with the object that is then 
internalised. Sadism is therefore directed against the self as an object in this 
version of masochism.  
Laplanche’s theory of seduction and of enigmatic messages reverses Freud’s 
sequential description of sadism and masochism. For Laplanche, sexuality is 
always masochistic in its primary form as it is a result of a primary seduction or 
what he calls ‘the fundamental anthropological situation’ of being cared for and 
therefore being dependent on another.  The child does not divine the meaning 299
of the sounds form the parents’ bedroom based on a scripted instinct but as the 
result of a drive that has already been scripted through the introduction of 
enigmatic signifiers as already there. The child was first passive, being 
seduced, before becoming active. Laplanche offers us a means of connecting 
the strands of this chapter, the affective aspect of the divined that is not quite 
known but felt. This is like the message from the screen that makes us passive 
 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Economic Problem of Masochism,’ (1924) in SE 19, pp. 298
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and active at the same time. Laplanche’s model also offers us a way out of the 
narrow connotations of Lacan’s usage of the symbolic and imaginary.  300
To explain this category of the message I have often stressed the expression Freud 
uses to describe the primal data offered to the infant: i.e. that part of its experience 
which it has to master straight away, to order, to ‘translate’, so as to assimilate it to 
its own system.  301
The message has to be translated into its own system, and it is the failures to 
do so that constitutes the unconscious in Laplanche’s view. This perspective 
enables us to use a Freudian concept of masochism and sadism without giving 
up on the intimate and fluid differentiations that occur in the relation to the 
maternal or the parental before a symbolisation or a full development of the 
super-ego at the end of the Oedipal period. 
The shattering of the self as argued for by Bersani and Saketopoulou can then 
be understood in line with this multitude of imagos. They entail identification and 
potential mimetic failures, as well as the potential for these to fall apart from 
time to time, a process that is linked to the structural aspect (to use Ashtor’s 
terminology) of the formation of the self in Laplanche’s theory. This would then 
allow us to understand the carnal or haptic cinematic experience as both 
affective and as formative and re-formative of the spectator. Such a work of 
translation is also applicable to the process of viewing a film that contains an 
excess of image, sound, meaning, symbolism and so forth, moving from the 
textuality of the film and its colouring via music and body language to verbal 
communication. These messages cannot ever be fully understood and should 
not be reduced to symbols with lexical meaning.  
Conclusion 
In short, this chapter has been a defence of the pleasures of looking at films. 
Through theories of masochism it is possible to explore the potential pleasure of 
 I say connotations as I agree with Pollock’s and Ettinger’s suggestion that there is a 300
hint at a symbolic that is not phallic in Lacan’s later seminars, especially in his seminar 
on the sinthome.
 Laplanche, 1999, pp. 74-75.301
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spectatorship without the dualism of active/passive, male/female. Here 
pleasure, if not subversive in itself, is at least not suspicious in itself. I have also 
argued for an embodied and affective understanding of the spectator. In order to 
merge this with psychoanalytic theory, I have used Laplanche to develop 
Freudian and Lacanian concepts in relation to readings of films that are open to 
corporal and affective aspects. I have further argued that this pleasurable and 
embodied displacement of the ‘I’ can be analysed as masochistic pleasure. This 
is not only to be found in the delay of pleasure as a narrative device but through 
the displeasure of the bodily displacement of the self through carnal aesthetics, 
as well as through silences inviting an identification that is nevertheless not 
complete, opening up for tentative reflections about the inner lives of 
characters.  
The pleasure through pain that I have discussed is the pain on display, but also 
the pain of losing oneself (or loosening the self?) in a story and becoming a part 
of something we do not control. Antonin Artaud argued that there “can be no 
spectacle without an element of cruelty as the basis of every show. In our 
present degenerative state, metaphysics must be made to enter the mind 
through the body.”  The transformative aspect of Bersani and Saketopoulou’s 302
notion of the shattering ego relies on a shattered construction of the ego, as a 
mix of untranslated messages, imagos and failed identifications. Film, like other 
forms of art, can stir up this conglomeration and shatter the sense of a whole 
self. Bersani contrasts the effects of shattering the self with the effects of 
narrativisation and the systematisation of the knowledge about this shattering 
aspect. In this chapter I have argued that narrative is not opposed to shattering, 
but instead an aspect of the shattering. As spectators we are all the child in the 
room next door, trying to divine what is going on. As spectators we make 
meaning of the potentially shattering images or sounds, we produce the 
narrative that connects and makes sense of the enigmatic messages. To be a 
spectator is to be a translator, and this is the method of looking at films 
deployed in this thesis, to translate and to suggest what kind of spectator is 
produced through the work of translation initiated by films. As Freud mentioned, 
the uncanny message responds to something innate and mechanical, this 
innate and mechanical can be affective responses, but also translations into 
 Antonin Artaud, ‘The Theatre of Cruelty - First Manifesto,’ in The Theatre and Its 302
Double, 2010 [1978], p. 70.
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ideas. And these translations can shatter not only the self but the ideas that the 
self holds dear. And this is the method of enquiry that this thesis will deploy in its 
readings of films.  
So far in this thesis, I have mapped out and engaged with theoretical debates 
around gender and sexual difference. These constitute the driving questions 
behind this thesis. I have argued for a reading of the feminine, of masochism 
and of melancholia as various ways of ‘turning back’ into and onto the self and 
thereby various ways for this self to be related to and formed through the 
implantation of something outer as something inner. This has been done under 
the title ‘psychosocial’ as defined in the preface. It has also been an attempt at 
defining the psychosocial as the various relations to a ‘real’ that is not reducible 
to the material effects of an outer world, but that exists in the often unconscious 
prescriptions of and by this outer world. 
With the help of Laplanche and Bersani I have tied together models of 
foreclosure of desire (Butler) and of identification (Irigaray) into a model of 
masochism as a general turning back and as the formation of the self as well as 
a loss of self that forces the self to be reshaped. I have also used Mitchell to 
explore a model of foreclosure that is not necessarily phallic, but that can be the 
result of a prohibition against giving birth. I have pointed out and argued against 
the anatomical or biological leaps in Freud, Lacan and Laplanche; these leaps 
actually presume the sexed body that they set out to explain.  
In the following chapters, the model of self-formation through implantations of 
gender and sexual difference developed so far will be brought to bear on a 
series of works of art. Films by Ozon will be analysed along lines of self-
formation and dissolution in relation to gender and sexual difference. It should 
be pointed out, however, that this neat separation does not reflect the working 
process of this thesis. Ozon’s films have been instrumental in reformulating my 
theoretical position on gender and sexual difference. This should be evident in 
the chapters to come, where the theories presented so far will be engaged with 
and reformulated by often unruly cinematic explorations of gender, desire, 
difference and similarities, often seducing the spectator into the passive position 
of the child hearing strange noises from another room. The thesis is divided in 
two parts, one theoretical and one where theory is put to work to understand not 
only theoretical notions of gender, but ‘real’ narratives, characters and images. 
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These resist, diversify and take the theory in other directions. Lebeau has 
pointed out the similarity of origins of psychoanalysis and cinema,  in the 303
following chapters, the objective is not only to put psychoanalytic theory to work 
on film. The following chapters make psychoanalysis attend to what is on 
display. If psychoanalysis was born out of Freud’s attempt to listen to the 
hysterics on display in Charcot’s theatre, Ozon’s films offer a means of 
unbinding the theoretical framework in which we try to understand them. If 
Freud “seeks to stabilize the perturbations of sexuality in a theory about the 
subversive,”  then the following readings are attempts at destabilising and 304
highlighting the precarious aspects of expressions of gender and desire, 
whether these are found in works of art or in everyday life.  
 See Lebeau, 2001.303
 Bersani, 1986, p. 112.304
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3 Ozon Behind the Scene: Origin of the 
Films 
[T]he birth of the reader must 
be ransomed by the death of 
the Author. 
Roland Barthes 
The Death of the Author 
The remainder of this thesis will focus on films by Ozon. In this chapter I will 
introduce Ozon’s cinema as well as different voices on it, it will also introduce 
some of Ozon’s own comments on his cinema, presenting Ozon as one of the 
interlocutors of his films. I will also raise the question of the auteur behind the 
film, both as a general question about who is behind a film and the more 
specific one about any subject behind or before a statement or message. To 
avoid what Metz calls the ‘nosography’ of the filmmaker,  this chapter will not 305
focus on the biographical data of Ozon’s life, and his own interpretations of the 
films under discussion will not be presented as truths or revealing intentions 
behind the films. The following readings of Ozon will focus on the films, on what 
they communicate and how they shape a potential viewer, rather than what 
might have been the intention behind the films and Ozon’s own commentary will 
be one of the interpreters or translators of his films. I will start with an account 
and a discussion of some of Ozon’s statements with regards to his work 
process and his method of making films as well as statements about his place 
in his generation of French directors. I will then go on to a more broad 
discussion of the auteur and the subject that speaks in order to link this to the 
underlying questions of self and masochism. 
Films by Ozon have their own language and represent something unique both 
in French cinema and in world cinema. Ozon has been heralded as a gay 
 See Metz, 1982 [1977], pp. 24-27.305
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director amongst others in his generation.  Ozon also displays a characteristic 306
refusal to remain within the confines of genres typical of French cinema.  It 307
has even been posited that Ozon represents “France’s first mainstream queer 
auteur.”  From one perspective, therefore, Ozon can be understood as a very 308
typical French director. His films are placed in the auteur tradition of artfully 
expressive films that resist genre restrictions — a category of films that tends to 
be premiered through state-sponsored funding in France. At the same time, 
however, Ozon’s films break with the mainstream French art house films of 
“either knowing cynicism or else saccharine, apolitical romanticism,”  a break 309
that early on placed him within the so called ‘New French Extreme’.  This is 310
another category that is both typically French and a departure from such 
typicality. Ozon has acknowledged links with some of his contemporary 
directors, a group lumped together as the ‘New French Extreme’. Saying that “It 
was in the U.S. that people made the connection between us,” conceding that 
“for all of us it was a way to show sexuality differently from the way that French 
cinema had done before. It was a way to break something.” And then he defines 
this new as: “We were able to mix pornography, in the case of Catherine 
Breillat, in very intellectual movies, and for Gaspar [Noé] and me, to make gore 
movies or B movies. It was something new in French cinema.”  Ozon here 311
speculates on possible connections between his own cinema and those of his 
contemporary, after they had been lumped together. Ozon’s voice on his own 
cinema is reactive and interpretative of his own cinema, but also of the reason 
why his cinema might have been compared to that of Breillat and Noé.  
 See Alex Hughes and James S. Williams, ‘Introduction’ in Gender and French 306
Cinema, 2001, p. 7.
 See Colin Crisp, Genre, Myth, and Convention in the French Cinema 1929–1939, 307
2002.
 Ince, 2008, p. 113.308
 Andrew Asibong, ‘Meat, Murder, Metamorphosis: The Transformational Ethics of 309
François Ozon, in French Studies, 2005, Vol. LIX, No. 2, 203–215, p. 204.
 See James Quandt, ‘Flesh and Blood: Sex and Violence in Recent French Cinema’ 310
included in The New Extremism in Cinema: From France to Europe, ed. Tanya Horeck 
and Tina Kendall, 2011, pp. 18-25, first published in Artforum, 2004.
 From an interview with Robert Sklar, ‘Sex, Violence, and Power in the Family: An 311
Interview with Frangois Ozon’ in Cineaste, Fall 2005, pp. 48-50, p. 49.
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Ozon expands on his dismissal of what is considered good in the same 
interview: “I make a film a year. I need to follow my instincts, or my desire. If it's 
a failure, if it doesn't work, if it's a bad film, I don't really care about it. I'm in the 
tradition of [Rainer Werner] Fassbinder, of directors who like to work. If it's good, 
it's good. If it's not good, the next one will be good.”  Ozon expresses a desire 312
for work rather than for the result of his work. This attempt to follow his desire 
and his ‘instincts’ is grounded both in a love of working and not getting too 
distracted by the great narratives. “It's not good when, as a director, as an artist, 
you are thinking all the time, 'I should do that.’”  If we read ‘instinct’ and 313
‘desire’ along the lines of the discussion of Freud’s uncanny and Laplanche’s 
enigmatic signifier, Ozon’s productivity and focus on work rather than perfection 
can be read as an attempt to express something that he is not able to verbalise 
or think through in any other form than film-making, through the work or 
technique of producing films. Though Ozon does not make this leap, I would like 
to suggest that we can read something into this description of his method and 
his attitude to work. If we return to Benjamin’s distinction between work of art 
and translation as technical labour in line with commentary, then Ozon’s 
approach to his work seems to be closer to that of commentator, implying a 
distance to his work. This distance is also implicit in his acceptance that not 
every film will be good. If we take this leap from Ozon’s self-commentary, a 
commentary that, like Benjamin’s translator is a statement after the fact, after 
the work has been done, then we can discern an attempt to dislodge the 
judgment of taste from the work of making a film. It should also be pointed out 
that much of Ozon’s production functions as a commentary on previous film 
makers or previous film traditions, placing his films as comments or translations 
of previous work into his own specific views of cinema. In later chapters, I will 
argue that Ozon’s characters are often trying to make sense of something 
enigmatic, either an outer event or loss, or their own desire. If we see this as 
more than a clever filmic trick to entice our interest, then his willingness to make 
‘B movies’ can be read as an attempt to find something that is not yet 
articulated, something that will vanish once articulated.  
 Interview with Sklar, Cineaste, 2005, p. 49.312
 Interview with Sklar, Cineaste, 2005, p. 49.313
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I will argue that, in line with the earlier chapters in this thesis, ‘instinctual’ and 
‘desire’ can be brought to bear on Ozon in a very distinct way. As noted above, 
Asibong has argued that Ozon’s value comes from his refusal to pander to the 
saccharine, apolitical romanticism of French intellectual and cultural climate. 
Asibong argues that Ozon’s cinema “challenges — with a seriousness that is 
easy to miss beneath an often garish surface — the impasse of sheer 
indifference often claimed, or indeed championed, as an ineluctable 
consequence of the postmodern era.”  Asibong therefore regrets “that Ozon is 314
not a ‘committed’ filmmaker.”  However, as I have implied so far in this 315
chapter, and in line with my focus on the enigmatic aspect of the self, one of the 
values and the specific style of Ozon’s cinema, are the direct result of his lack of 
commitment. Ozon’s films are explorations without answers. Read along his 
refusal of the big narratives and his resistance towards seeing his film as a gay 
film, this reluctance against taking his films seriously, even at the level of them 
being good or bad, opens up for a work process that aims to dislocate the 
judgemental aspect of his work, opening up his work to a stream-of-
consciousness method. Yet, it is obvious — as Asibong points out — that 
underneath the garish surface, these films do care for some of these great 
narratives and refuse the ‘sheer indifference’ of ‘the postmodern era’. It bears 
pointing out again that Ozon in no way should have the final say on his films, 
and though Ozon as interviewee and public persona may take on a role of camp 
irony in regards to his own films, I think it is a grave mistake to reduce his films 
to this posturing. My suggestion is instead to read these films as very serious 
attempts to achieve something that may not fit perfectly into the great narratives 
of gay or even queer film, to follow ones desire and ones instincts is a serious 
attempt to discover something through the work of cinema. When Ozon talked 
about his film Young and Beautiful, and the protagonist’s search for her own 
desire, he stated that he thinks and hopes that the film has asked more 
questions than it has answered.  My argument is that this is not merely a 316
platitude or a selling point, but as a statement of intent. This is further evident in 
 Asibong, 2005, p. 204.314
 Asibong, 2005, p. 215.315
 See ‘Entretien avec François Ozon’ par Yves Alion, in Dossier Jeune et Jolie, 316
L’avant scène Cinéma numero 605, septembre 2013, pp. 6-12, p. 9 “Je pense et je 
souhaite que Jeune & Jolie pose plus de questions qu’il n’apporte de réponses…”
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Ozon’s experimentation with the process of making films, inviting actors to take 
part in the creation of the narrative. This all hints at a seemingly lax attitude 
toward the end product, but I argue that it can also be read as a very serious 
attempt to bring out something that a strict, intellectual or preconceived idea 
would miss. Ozon’s uncommitedness paired with a deep care for the work and 
pleasure of his films, is what makes them interesting and distinct from the 
traditions, genres and generations that he works in relation with. This reflects a 
will to articulate something that is inarticulable, to give voice and visibility to 
something that is not reducible to identity or sexual difference in the sense of 
‘this, therefore not that,’ but to something that stirs the wonder of the child 
listening to the noise next door. By their form they also question if the parents 
know what they are doing in that room. The openness of his films invites the 
spectator to think but without giving clear answers. Ozon’s cinema offers a 
unique opportunity not only to illustrate and merge the theories discussed so far, 
but they formulate a critical development of key problems within these theories.  
It must be made absolutely clear here that Ozon’s films have been instrumental 
in the development of my arguments. As mentioned in a previous chapter, at 
first I intended to use one of Ozon’s films — Young and Beautiful — as a means 
of discussing gender in relation to Mitchell’s model of the sibling relationship 
and the smallest of difference as a mode of relationality. But as I started working 
on Ozon’s film, I found that it did more than to illustrate or make an argument 
more lucid. Instead, it resisted my initial argument and drove my model in a 
different and unexpected direction. In a sense, this resistance and productive 
engagement with a film is what has driven this chapter and so much of this 
thesis. Surprised to have been affected to such a degree, not only emotionally, 
but on the level of my text and my thinking about gender, I wanted to figure out 
how this had happened. This then led me to spectatorship theory and to 
questions of authorship and subjectivity that is so central to this chapter and 
that has informed so much of my thinking around gender and sexual difference. 
Ozon’s films have enabled me to work through an initially muddled idea of the 
duality between rigid and mouldable aspects of gender. This has led me to 
reformulate sexual difference and gender as aspects of the formation of the self 
in the encounter with an other, together with a reformulation of passivity and 
activity as well as a means of thinking about femininity and the limitation of the 
specularisable self. These films have therefore had a key role in the production 
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and development of my theoretical bearings and my overall argument. It was in 
the meeting between theory and art that this thesis really took shape. 
The Father of the film
8 Women (2002) — further analysed in chapter 5 of this thesis — centres 
around a murder mystery where eight women find themselves isolated in a 
French mansion (the phone line is cut and the only car available is not working 
— faithful to the whodunnit genre). The only man in the house is found 
murdered early in the film, and the murderer is one of the women. Ozon had 
first wanted to remake George Cukor’s The Women (1939) before finding the 
script for 8 Women by Robert Thomas. Still, Ozon kept the glamorous, chaotic 
and staged form of Cukor’s original film. As the women accuse each other, pry 
on and expose their inner secrets, their love for the dead man is revealed as 
built on sinister calculations and material needs. Meanwhile, desires between 
the women bloom. The full title of Cukor’s film is The Women (and it’s all about 
men). In Ozon’s hands this statement becomes a question. Even if the love of 
the one man in the script is put under scrutiny, in his absence he remains the 
driving force of the story. In an interview published the same year that 8 Women 
was released, Ryan Gilbey asked Ozon about the absence of fathers in his 
films: “I think one day I will have to make a film about a father in which he is 
there for the whole film. But not for the moment. For the moment, I prefer the 
father away. Or dead.”  In general, there is an absence of fathers in Ozon’s 317
works, but still fathers or father-figures tend to dominate the narrative and the 
characters of many of his films. Leading up to 8 Women, feature films like 
Sitcom (1998), Criminal Lovers (1999) and Water Drops on Burning Rocks 
(2000) all feature dominating father figures. Of his feature-films it is only See the 
Sea (1997) and Under the Sand (2000) that do not have father figures as 
central narrative devices. Under the Sand revolves around a woman’s denial of 
the loss of her husband who is markedly older than her, so it could be argued 
that he is a father-figure as well. Schilt talks about ‘monstrous fathers’ in some 
of these films. “At first glance these monstrous father figures might seem to 
 Gilbey, ‘An Interview with François Ozon,’ in Projections 12, 2002.317
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comprise a critique of the role of the patriarch within the Ozonian family.”  The 318
father in 8 Women is then described as a sadist who is tormenting his family. 
“Marcel, the unseen paterfamilias in 8 femmes, though first assumed to be a 
victim of one of the eight women’s murderous scheme, is later revealed to be a 
sadistic manipulator and possibly incestuous father.”  This description of the 319
paternal figure in 8 Women is extended to Ozon himself by Asibong. Quoting an 
interview with Ozon where he discusses the project that will become 8 Women, 
Asibong states that:  
When discussing his early feelings about the projects that would become his film of 
8 femmes, Ozon mentions his childhood love of dolls and doll’s houses. The 
remark is potentially far more interesting than an amusingly camp gesture. It 
captures what is at stake in so many of Ozon’s films and happens merely to be 
exemplified in 8 femmes: Ozon’s characters, along with the actors that play them, 
are so often puppet-like creatures in his doll-loving hands, sadistically prodded and 
pulled — rather like the dead parents of Victor [1993] — to perform whatever 
function the grown-up boy director wants to see enacted.  320
Asibong’s conclusion here is a case of “to play the game of the enigmatic 
signifier.”  He psychologises not only the characters beyond what is actually 321
present in the film but extends this psychologisation to the director behind the 
film. In contrast, in my critique of this reading of Ozon’s role in the film, I will 
avoid any speculations about Ozon’s psychology or intention behind the film. 8 
Women is full of references to film history as well as to the careers of the actors 
in the film, references that entice the viewer to speculate on meanings within 
and outside the film.  In the French New Wave, film-makers did not try to hide 322
their background as film critics or their knowledge of film history. As such they 
often had characters comment on the filmic language used; they made films 
about the making of films and would often include cameras in specific shots. 
 Thibaut Schilt, François Ozon, 2011, p. 38.318
 Schilt, 2011, p. 39.319
 Asibong, 2008, p. 74.320
 Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of Being, 2004, p. 51.321
  For a collection of fan readings and discussions of 8 Women, see Darren Waldron, 322
‘‘Une mine d’or inépuisable’: the queer pleasures of François Ozon’s 8 femmes/8 
Women (2002)’ in Studies in French Cinema, Volume 10 Number 1, 2010, pp. 69-82.
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This dissolves the fiction of the film and reveals the construction of filmic 
pleasure and the fictitiousness of the story. Admittedly, Ozon is not as blatant as 
Jean-Luc Godard in his meta-commentary. Yet, there is a clear exposure of the 
filmic illusion in the form of borrowed scenes, theatrical sets, references to 
previous roles and actors looking directly into the camera, seemingly talking 
directly to us. 
Ozon moves freely between genres, themes, settings and epochs, but some 
themes keep coming back. There is a recurrent fascination with families, both 
as violent structures and as porous and disintegrating constellations. Another 
theme is sensualism; Ozon’s cinema often pursues pleasure, both between 
characters on screen and as a seduction of the spectator. Physical beauty is 
explored and dwelt upon through long shots of semi-nude, young bodies. This 
can be contrasted with a reluctance to dwell on scenes of ecstasy and sexual 
acts. The latter are often brief and quite uninteresting, something that is 
enforced by the lack of mutuality in scenes of sexual excitement. The failure or 
terror of families is contrasted by explorations of kinship relations outside the 
nuclear family. These relations are often transient, intergenerational and based 
on mutual hedonism. Kinship is not based on group belongings or political 
positionings, and do not offer any permanent escape from the haunting families 
to which they stand in contrast. 
In films like Swimming Pool (2003), Water Drops on Burning Rocks, Criminal 
Lovers or Victor, Ozon explores intergenerational seductions where unequal 
relations are the ground for the possibility of liberating and/or consuming 
pleasures. By contrast, films such as Angel (2007) and 5x2 (2004) depict 
oppressive marriages that show the limitations of this pleasure in inequality. 
These last two films focus on heterosexual, passive-aggressive relations, while 
the films exploring pleasure in inequality are markedly non-heterosexual and 
openly non-monogamous. This does suggest a critique of the heterosexual 
couple trying but failing to conform to a monogamous ideal, spilling over into the 
micro-terror of the heterosexual family. Even if there is a critique of the 
heterosexual family in Ozon’s cinema, obvious in films such as Sitcom, 8 
Women or In the House (2012), he does not offer any alternative to this 
constellation. Asibong argues that this is a development in Ozon’s cinema of the 
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2000s,  however, Ozon’s films never offered any stable alternative to the 323
family. As I showed at the beginning of this chapter, when Ozon was speaking 
about A Summer Dress, he divulged an unwillingness to categorise his work as 
gay or as dealing with only gay themes. This reveals a reluctance to have his 
films used as political narratives with a solution. Ozon does not seem to be out 
to show an alternative to the heterosexual, bourgeoisie family or the micro 
violence and terror in this constellation. Instead, his films reveal lustful fairy-tale 
stories of pleasures without guilt. In an interview with Robert Sklar, Ozon 
explains that “[i]t’s difficult to generalize from all of the characters, but I think 
that very often my characters are seeking the principle of pleasure, and they 
have to accept the principle of reality.”  This reference to Freud’s Beyond the 324
Pleasure Principle is, on one level, clear evidence of Ozon’s engagement with 
psychoanalytic theory but also an endorsement of pleasure in his films. In 
contrasting the category of gay film and gay politics with the fairy-tale without 
guilt, Ozon implies that guilt-free pleasure is the ethical position of his films.  
The pleasure pursued in A Summer Dress is remarkably fluid and refuses 
categorisations such as gay or straight. As mentioned earlier, Ince points out 
that the main character in A Summer Dress defies any stable definition of 
sexuality. The encounters in this film can be read as gay and straight, but this 
film is also about escaping self-imposed prohibitions from assumed neighbours, 
about crossdressing and the escapism made possible through a public display 
of traversing assumed norms. There is also an identification that is developed 
through the exchange of the dress between the protagonist and his female 
lover. All of these themes are present without becoming the main theme of the 
film. The moral of this story is not to be found in any of these interpretations or 
readings, but in the liberating joy of pleasure. Pleasure finds many different 
expressions and its forms are not what matters. There is no specific norm that is 
challenged, though a number are touched upon. Ince argues that Ozon is a 
queer film maker, quoting Butler and Tim Dean to argue that queer should be 
understood as a deconstruction of or critical distance from a heterosexual norm.  
This is indeed a possible reading of Ozon’s films. But based on my argument 
above, Ozon’s film is not focusing on the norms that Luc is ascribing to his 
 See Asibong, 2008, p. 82.323
 Sklar, ‘An Interview with François Ozon’ 2005, p. 50.324
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neighbours in order to justify his self-imposed prohibitions. This film can instead 
be read using a different definition of queer — one formulated by Teresa de 
Lauretis; in this, queer signifies a step away from social formations of 
lifestyle.  In this definition, queer is not only a critique of a norm, but an 325
exploration of sexuality that is not defined by the social formations of gay, 
lesbian, bi- or heterosexual, but by an exploration of the cracks in the joints 
between these categories. As such, the category of queer, she suggests, names 
and enacts the dysfunctionality of these categories. This echoes Bersani’s focus 
on sociality within gay communities as the critical aspect of these gay 
communities. By challenging the distinction between object of desire and object 
of identification, this sociality undermines the phallic, stable formation of self 
and identity, therefore undermining these in their formations. ‘Queer’ then 
becomes less of a maintaining a distance or a critical view of the norms, and 
more about exploring those norms for the surplus pleasures that they might 
produce. Read from this perspective, Ozon’s short film is a queer celebration of 
the pleasure of transgression and the transgression of pleasure, enacting norms 
as tools rather than suggesting an escape from them. Luc is not freed through a 
coming out process or through finding a new community, but by finding the joy 
and pleasure of transgression. This transgression is dependent on the norms 
but does not cancel them. To use Ozon’s statement above, Luc escapes the 
reality principle that has hindered his pleasure and finds the transgression as a 
further source of pleasure. 
And the Author of the film 
What does it mean that a film is by Ozon? The beginning of an answer may be 
based on André Bazin and Alexandre Astruc’s theorisation of what distinguishes 
films from other media, and their search for an origin or an auteur of the film. In 
the process, Astruc coined the expression caméra-stylo to describe the notion 
of a hand and an auteur that stands behind the narrative, like the author behind 
the book. Bazin and Astruc argued that this origin is not the writer of the script, 
as this is only the bare structure from which a film is made. The cinematic work 
comes after the writing of dialogue. The director was instead hailed as the 
 Teresa de Lauretis, ‘Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities’ in differences, Vol 325
3, no. 2, 1991, p. iii.
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origin, as the auteur with the overall view. Using the French term auteur, 
Andrew Sarris introduced these theories to the American context through his 
recurrent movie reviews in the Village Voice from the 1960s. This terminology 
has given rise to auteur theory. In French, auteur is the equivalent to author, but 
it also has a wider meaning of origin and intent behind any act. An auteur can 
be the auteur of theft or the auteur of a discovery.  This wider meaning is lost 326
if we translate auteur to author, an auteur can be the origin and intent in a way 
that does not imply origin like we assume origin in the author of a text. The 
auteur is not in charge of every aspect of the process of making a film, but the 
idea and the end product is influenced by the auteur to a degree that we can 
say that the director intentions the film. From this perspective, the phrase films 
by Ozon makes sense and this is often how we regard films; we talk about the 
development of this or that director. Even when we deal with directors who 
change genre for every film they make, we look for and we often find links, 
techniques, angles, colour palettes, choice of music, of actors or subtle aspects 
such as textures, tonality or a feeling invoked by their various films.  
Not long after the invention of the auteur to describe a director, the notion of the 
author came into question in contemporary literary and linguistic theory. Barthes 
famously declared the author dead in an essay from 1967. His argument was 
that the author was “the epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology, which 
has attached the greatest importance to the 'person' of the author.”  This 327
interest in the author’s person is challenged by Barthes’s claim that “it is 
language which speaks, not the author”.  This claim has become a shorthand 328
for many different schools of thought around this time. Influenced by “Russian 
Formalism and the New Criticism, anti-authorialism appeared as a reaction to 
biographical positivism.”  The aim — according to Burke — was not removing 329
the author, the author was simply overlooked in favour of the text. “The death or 
 These examples are borrowed from Larousse Dictionnaire: “L’auteur d’une 326
découverte (= découvreur). La police recherche les auteurs du vol (= les voleurs)” “The 
auteur of a discovery (=discoverer). The police are looking for the auteurs of the theft 
(= the thieves).
 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author,’ first published in Aspen 1967 here 327
quoted from Image Music Text, 1977. p. 143.
 Barthes, 1977 [1967], p. 143.328
 Seán Burke, The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in 329
Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, 1992, p. 15.
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disappearance of the author was not at issue but rather the incompatibility of 
authorial categories with immanent analyses.”  Lacan often repeated that it is 330
language that speaks us, the subject being the effect of language, not the other 
way around. In contemporary feminist and queer theory, this notion is notably 
maintained through Butler, in her theories of the performative. Butler argues that 
“[c]onsidered grammatically, it will seem that there must first be a subject who 
turns back on itself, yet I will argue that there is no subject except as a 
consequence of this very reflexivity.”  Aspects of this has been discussed in 331
earlier chapters and I have linked this with Butler’s model of melancholia and 
the problem of agency in general. As neither Lacan, nor Butler approaches the 
subject from a literary or filmic perspective, I will return to Barthes to explore his 
critique of the author as the origin of the message.  
We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological' 
meaning (the 'message' of the Author- God) but a multi-dimensional space in which 
a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of 
quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture.  332
Barthes argues that the author is displaced through the complexity of the text 
that is written, as the text does not have one single origin or preexisting 
purpose. Instead the text consists of a multitude of different sources and 
purposes. These are not original, they do not originate in the author, but rather 
in the language that the author uses. How does this translate to a director as 
auteur? A film clearly does not have one single origin, there is the script writer, 
the cinematographer, the actors, the colourists, the set designers, the costume 
designers, the light technicians, the producers, and so forth. The auteur of a film 
is not just producing a tissue of citations or relying on a capitalist ideology that 
raises the importance of the individual behind the text. Behind a film there are a 
number of subjects that are created by their actions. Rather than a single origin, 
the director instead functions as a coordinator, a point where individual 
performances are organised to enable an end product. The director is no longer 
 Burke, 1992, p. 16.330
 Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, 1997, p. 68.331
 Barthes, 1977 [1967], p. 146.332
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an absolute origin, the author as coordinator is not the same as the ‘Author-
God’ whom Barthes rallies against, the coordinator/manager is a part of a 
different capitalist ideology. One that is perhaps more capitalist than the Author-
God, who can be read as a reminiscence of an aristocratic or ancien régime 
focus on the king or God, rather than the capitalist coordination of labour forces. 
Barthes suggests that the reader should take the place of the author as the 
object of study. This is of course in line with the spectatorship model that was 
developed in the previous chapter. In Barthes’s defence of the spectator/reader, 
there is a focus on the reader and reading but also on the author as a reader. 
Barthes argues that “a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination” and 
this destination “is without history, biography, psychology; he is simply that 
someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written 
text is constituted.”  Here, the reader is not a person, the reader does not 333
have a biography, a psychology or history. Instead, the reader emerges as an 
ideal and idealised receiver, the empty placeholder that the text is directed 
towards and who is assumed as its recipient.  
Barthes concludes his essay with the statement that “the birth of the reader 
must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”  The abstract reader, when 334
defined as the ideal point at which ‘all the paths of the texts’ is ‘constituted,’ 
resembles the Author who has been pronounced dead in that they are both 
ideal positions that constitute the text. The notion of an origin, of an intent 
behind the act of writing seems necessary in order to give meaning to a text. To 
reverse this and let the notion of a reader give meaning to a text may solve the 
temporal problem of the subject as a result of the text, but the idealised reader 
is no longer a subject. Deprived of history, biography or psychology, there is no 
subject left, only an empty placeholder to give meaning to a text. As already 
noted, Aaron defines this in relation to film and spectatorship as the spectator 
being the result of an implicit point of perspective assumed by the film. “The 
spectator is born in the vanishing point generated by perspective, is summoned 
into hypothetical existence by the visual structure.”  335
 Barthes, 1977 [1967], p. 148.333
 Barthes, 1977 [1967], p. 148.334
 Aaron, 2007, p. 10.335
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Returning to the phrase films by Ozon, the films are here given meaning in 
relation to the name — Ozon — and the by links the films to a subject, or is it 
rather an empty placeholder? Like Barthes’s reader, does the name Ozon have 
a history, biography or psychology? Or is Ozon in this sentence just a 
construction or a sum of the various readings by readers? Metz warns against 
psychoanalytic interest in the maker behind the film as psychoanalytic 
nosography, where the maker is analysed either for a pathology or for a 
psychology.  This is what Bersani and Dutoit calls psychologisation of either 336
characters in the film or the auteur behind the film. In order to avoid this pitfall 
and recognising that the reasons ‘behind’ actions, whether by fictive characters, 
auteurs or writers, will remain enigmatic and outside our reach, I argue that we 
instead reverse the notion of the spectator. In this definition, the spectator is the 
sum of perspectives that merge into an assumed spectatorial position, which 
include the assumed origins of the narrative. Just as this perspective assumes a 
hypothetical reader/spectator, it also assumes a maker/author.  
The phrase films by Ozon, does not, then, serve only to delineate and define a 
subcategory of the category ‘film’, but also to define the name on the other side 
of the ‘by’. The ‘by’ is thus turned to define the assumed and hypothetical origin 
or maker behind the film. Just like the reader in Barthes’s essay, the maker here 
lacks history, biography and psychology. History only exists between films; 
bibliography replaces biography; psychology is replaced by meaning within and 
between films or texts. Any meaning that is assigned to Ozon in the following 
discussion is thus only tentative, hypothetic and most importantly, has no claims 
as to the wishes, wills or ambitions of the actual person Ozon, even when 
Ozon’s own readings of his films are presented, these are read as readings 
after the fact with no absolute knowledge. Like the father in 8 Women, Ozon is 
at once absent and present in his films, but unlike Asibong, I read the father’s 
haunting absence not as an incarnation of Ozon as the master manipulator but 
instead as a comment on the haunting absence/centrality of the auteur as an 
empty placeholder assumed to be ‘behind’ the film. 
 See Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema, 1982 [1977], pp. 24-27.336
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Voices on Ozon 
To date there are three published monographs on Ozon, one by Asibong from 
2008, one by Schilt from 2011 and a third by Boyd van Hoeij that had been 
scheduled to be released in March 2019.  Alice Stanley has also written an 337
unpublished doctoral thesis about Ozon’s cinema.  Notable articles relating to 338
his development or genre placement are James Quandt’s ‘Flesh and Blood’ and 
Frédéric Bonnaud’s ‘François Ozon: Wannabe Auteur Makes Good.’  In 339
Quandt’s essay on what he names the French Extreme, Ozon’s films are briefly 
mentioned. Quandt argues that “[t]he critic truffle-snuffing for trends might call it 
the New French Extremity,”  thus grouping a number of French directors 340
together to point out a trend towards the violent and extreme in their films. 
“Ozon’s first feature, the suspense thriller See the Sea (1997), alternates 
oblique terror with shock shots — of a toothbrush dipped in a shit-filled toilet or 
the subliminal suggestion of a sutured vagina.”  After this judgement, Quandt 341
goes on to point out a development of Ozon’s cinema, away from the shocking 
and gory, to a more mature expression.  
Ozon has since matured — e.g., the classical, contained Under the Sand (2000), 
starring an exquisitely anguished Charlotte Rampling — but on the nascent enfant 
terrible whose every kink was calculated (especially in the screeching satire of 
Sitcom), morality seemed a canard, a pretext for provocation.  342
Quandt values this difference as a development from a childish, nascent, enfant 
terrible, who was calculating provocations to a mature, classical, contained, 
 Andrew Asibong, François Ozon, 2008; Thibaut Schilt, François Ozon, 2011; Boyd 337
van Hoeij, The Cinema of Francois Ozon: Exquisite Transgressions (Directors' Cuts), 
forthcoming.
 Alice Stanley, Representations of Sexuality in the Films of François Ozon, University 338
of Warwick, Department of French Studies, 2009.
 James Quandt, ‘Flesh and Blood: Sex and Violence in Recent French Cinema’ first 339
published in Artforum, 2004, included in The New Extremism in Cinema: From France 
to Europe, Ed. Tanya Horeck and Tina Kendall, 2011, pp 18-25; Frédéric Bonnaud 
‘François Ozon: Wannabe Auteur Makes Good,’ Film Comment, 37:4, 2001, pp. 52-55.
 Quandt, 2011 [2004], p. 18.340
 Quandt, 2011 [2004], p. 19.341
 Quandt, 2011 [2004], p. 19.342
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exquisitely anguished cinema. This valuation of Ozon’s different expressions as 
a development from infancy and provocation to a mature and withheld implies 
that this development is a move in one direction, that the attempts to provoke a 
viewer were expressions of a childishness that Ozon — and the rest of the 
French Extremity — should hurry up and grow out of. There is a refusal to 
understand the purpose or the effect of the provocations in films like See the 
Sea or Sitcom. Bonnaud’s short article agrees with this valuation of Ozon’s 
development and maturation. And he blames Ozon’s heavy-handedness in his 
early films for his own inability to see their sublime qualities. This point is also 
made by Bert Cardullo in his review of Under the Sand. He argues that Ozon’s 
earlier production was full of “mannerisms” that “disappear in Under the Sand,” 
but that Ozon’s “desire to reveal the fragility and vulnerability that underlie 
seemingly secure or solid bourgeois appearances” still remains.  This opinion 343
has been challenged by Asibong, who argues that “both the dismissal of Ozon’s 
early work and the banal approval accorded to his recent offerings founder on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of his cinematic project as a whole.”  As 344
mentioned earlier, Asibong argues that Ozon’s value as a director lies in his 
uncompromising critical stance towards contemporary French culture. 
Far from pandering to a French artistic and intellectual climate that increasingly 
celebrates expressions of either knowing cynicism or else saccharine, apolitical 
romanticism, Ozon’s work challenges — with a seriousness that is easy to miss 
beneath an often garish surface — the impasse of sheer indifference often claimed, 
or indeed championed, as an ineluctable consequence of the postmodern era.  345
The problem with either of these positions is that they disregard a large number 
of Ozon’s films. For Quandt, Bonnoaud and Cardullo, Ozon’s early production is 
dismissed rather than opened up to analysis of the purpose and function of the 
gruesome and shocking images and narratives. For Asibong, on the other hand, 
it becomes difficult to come to terms with Ozon’s production after Under the 
 Bert Cardullo, ‘The Space of Time, the Sound of Silence’ in The Hudson Review, 343
2002. pp. 473-480, p. 473.
 Andrew Asibong, ‘Meat, Murder, Metamorphosis: The Transformational Ethics of 344
François Ozon’ in French Studies, Vol. LIX, No. 2, 2005, pp. 203–215, p. 204.
 Asibong, 2005, p. 204.345
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Sand, and especially from Angel (2007), where Ozon takes a turn towards a 
more saccharine filmic language. This dilemma is present in Asibong’s 
presentation of Ozon’s later work in his monograph on Ozon.  
In my readings of Ozon’s films, I will avoid these dualisms and models of 
development/deterioration and instead see them as attempts to deal with 
specific stories, problematics and filmic methods that reflect each other. We can 
assume a development of skills and expression over time as any director 
becomes more familiar with the tools of the trade, but to understand this duality 
in Ozon’s films as merely the expression of a maturation is to reduce the 
significance of these choices.  
At the outset of her thesis, Stanley implicitly acknowledges this split in Ozon’s 
cinema.  
Although not as radical as queer theorists or film critics may wish, Ozon’s films 
often use comedy and irony to illustrate the problems of a restrictive patriarchal 
society and the way it can harm individuals, thus unsettling the normative 
assumptions on which the majority of social structures are still based.  346
This duality is also present in Ince’s positing of Ozon as a mainstream, queer 
auteur.  
In addressing Ozon’s oeuvre up to 5 x 2 in this chapter, one of my aims is to show 
that the condemnation of Ozon’s ‘immaturity’ typified by Bonnard’s criticism has 
served to mask the depth and brilliance of Ozon’s exploration of sexuality, and his 
originality as France’s first mainstream queer auteur.  347
As mentioned earlier, Ince also points out that “Ozon’s films distinguish 
themselves clearly from earlier gay male filmic production in France” , 348
implying that her usage of the term queer is not merely a marker of 
homosexuality or non-straight sexuality in his films. Yet the comparison does 
 Stanley, 2009, p. 1.346
 Kate Ince, ‘François Ozon’s Cinema of Desire,’ in Five Directors Ed. Kate Ince, 347
2008, p. 113.
 Ince, 2008, p. 113.348
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imply a conflation of the identitarian and anti-identitarian strands of queer. As 
mentioned earlier, de Lauretis contrasted the usage of queer with the term gay 
and lesbian as a means of moving away and beyond that particular coupling.  
“Queer Theory” was arrived at in the effort to avoid all of these fine distinctions in 
our discursive protocols, not to adhere to any one of the given terms, not to 
assume their ideological liabilities, but instead to both transgress and transcend 
them — or at the very least problematize them.  349
Queer theory here becomes a short-hand, including but also to transcending the 
categories of identity-based politics of lesbian and gay. De Lauretis later 
suggested that this move might have gone too far, being removed from its roots 
in lesbian and gay studies. She notes that queer “has quickly become a 
conceptually vacuous creature of the publishing industry.”  The short-hand has 350
taken on a life of its own and lost its purpose as a transgression of identity 
politics. In Michael Warner’s definition of queer, it still maintains its roots in gay 
and lesbian activism as well as studies, but as a group that is impossible to 
define. In this way, the queer and subsequent queer theory becomes a 
constantly anti-normative project that refuses the stability of identity as well as 
the comforts of institutional stability.  
Nervous over the prospect of a well-sanctioned and compartmentalized academic 
version of "lesbian and gay studies," people want to make theory queer, not just to 
have a theory about queers. For both academics and activists, "queer" gets a 
critical edge by defining itself against the normal rather than the heterosexual, and 
normal includes normal business in the academy.  351
Adopting these early definitions of queer highlights the contradiction in Ince’s 
suggestion that Ozon is a mainstream queer auteur. But this duality also opens 
 Teresa de Lauretis, ‘Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities, An Introduction,’ in 349
differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 1991.
 Teresa de Lauretis, ‘Habit Changes’ in Figures of Resistance pp. 199-216, first 350
published in differences, 1994, pp. 296-313, p. 200.
 Michael Warner, ‘Introduction,’ in Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social 351
Theory, 1993, p. xxvi.
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up Ozon for readings that do not have to choose between one or the other, 
where the two aspects are part of a dynamics of exploring filmic forms 
unrestricted by the critic’s need for queer positioning. 
As a result of their setting in middle-class bonne société and the haute bourgeoisie 
respectively, and their high degree of theatricality, these three films have been 
assumed to lack any dimension of critique. But it is precisely in their theatricality 
that Sitcom, 8 Femmes and Gouttes d’eau do contain a critique of patriarchy.  352
This also contradicts a linear development of Ozon’s films, the heavy-handed or 
immature aspect of a shocking or theatrical scene reveals a duality in the mind 
of the critic, rather than in the intention of the film maker. By not being shocking, 
although the material is disturbing in some of these films, the glamorous look of 
a glossy film with no content reveals the depth of the film. Ince points out this 
play with dualities in Ozon’s films on various levels.  
As might be expected of dramas about shifts in identity and sexual orientation, 
Ozon’s films highlight oppositions of all kinds. One of the most prominent recurring 
binary oppositions is between cleanliness, associated with states of safety and 
stability and dirt, which is linked to conditions of danger and infections.  353
The binary of dirt and cleanliness, as well as the shocking images that Quandt 
and Bonnard turned away from, can be seen as mirrors held up against the 
viewer, over-saturating the disgust that we feel for the intruder or the one that 
breaks the glossy image of middle-class stability. Schilt argues that Ozon is 
working in the midst of dualities, blurring and undermining categories, both in 
terms or genre and in terms of identities and sexualities as depicted on screen.  
I want to propose that despite tremendous diversity in terms of cinematic choices 
(on generic, formal, and thematic levels), Ozon’s oeuvre is decidedly consistent in 
 Ince, 2008, p. 123.352
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its desire to blur the traditional frontiers between the masculine and the feminine, 
gay and straight, reality and fantasy, auteur and commercial cinema.  354
Schilt’s suggestion here is that there is an innate contradiction between the 
variations of genre, narrative and textual choices and the blurring of lines 
between the dualities of other categories. What I will argue, with the help of 
Ince, is that it is in the choice of genre as well as in choices of theme that 
dualities are not only questioned but inquisitively looked at. They are studied 
and exposed as arbitrary but also pregnant with meaning and burdened with 
structure.  
Asibong points out another aspect of Ozon’s cinema, a tendency to “revel in a 
more thoroughly generalised blurring of the very contours of desire”  and there 355
is another, linked tendency in Ozon’s film.  
Ozon’s film — and indeed so much of his cinema — is constantly urging the 
spectator to look at how utterly superficial the (usually sexualised) acts that take 
place in the name of subversion and transformation really are.  356
The subversive, queer acts of non-straight and non-normative behaviour are 
revealed as not so queer after all. In the duality of mainstream and queer, of 
normal and subversive, Ozon’s films refuse to offer an escape, to point to a 
ready-made solution to subvert and be free. In contrast with passing, listless 
shots of sexuality and nudity, Asibong points out how Ozon turns toward 
emotionally charged symbolisms: 
Ozon’s cinema turns instead, again and again, to the blood of horror, to the tears of 
melodrama and to the songs of musical to push his spectators towards an 
environment they really were not expecting, towards an improbable aesthetic 
register that truly does break with the terms of all that has proceeded it.  357
 Schilt, 2011, p. 5.354
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This definition of Ozon’s novelty seem to assume that the spectator already 
sees Ozon as a queer or even gay film maker, with the expectation of seeing a 
queer film. Without this assumption, the move to the melodrama, horror 
aesthetics or the musical loses its subversiveness. And with Ozon’s films from 
Angel onwards, this becomes more and more difficult to assume. However, this 
points to an interesting aspect of the auteur model. When we are about to 
engage in a film by a director such as Ozon, it is difficult not to expect 
something subversive and something pleasurable; it is hard not to invent 
undertones and unspoken desires between characters. This is something that 
Ozon’s films are constantly playing with — flirting with our expectations — 
holding back, giving us something else altogether, pulling us back in again with 
a hint, a promise of something lustful. As such, Ozon’s films are constantly in 
conversation, not just with film history, but with the expectations of his faithful 
followers as well as with a wider public, a public charmed by sometimes 
saccharine French film and the sublime, mature exploration of the exquisitely 
anguished bourgeoisie.  
Conclusion 
Is Ozon a queer director? Following Warner’s definition, this becomes a difficult 
title to give to Ozon but, based on the above discussion, and in light of 
Laplanche’s discussion of binding and unbinding, I would argue that there 
certainly are queer moments in Ozon’s cinema, just as there are gay and 
lesbian moments, trans moments, straight moments and feminist moments. But 
none of this defines the oeuvre. Any one of these terms would over-simplify a 
cinematic production that is more complex and far-reaching. At the same time, 
Ozon is constantly in dialogue with these concepts and notions, not only 
through explicit themes and engagements, but through the implicit engagement 
of a spectator in a film by a gay cineast with a great interest in theory, both of 
film and in a wider sense.  
The symbolism and the seductive method of much of Ozon’s films tease out an 
interest from an audience that is not always met, and when met it is brushed 
aside, instead focusing on the interpersonal rather than on the great theory or 
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the great structure at issue. My argument is that this focus on specificity, and on 
relationships between characters rather than on the big subtending issue, does 
not constitute a lack of political analysis in Ozon’s films. Instead it is a refusal of 
great theories and of reductions of problematics to standard solutions.  
Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth A. Wilson have argued for a more fluid reading, 
not just of the identities and sexualities that are covered by the term ‘queer,’ but 
also of the mechanisms that are covered by the ‘normative.’ Their argument is 
that through a slippage into a theorisation of the normative as exclusive, 
oppressive and as unified, the queer as anti-normative divorces itself from a 
Foucauldian tradition, where there is no such thing as a static power that only 
operates through prohibitions.  
Our hypothesis is this: antinormative stances project stability and immobility onto 
normativity. In so doing, they generate much of the political tyranny they claim 
belongs (over there) to regimes of normativity. For in taking a stand against 
normativity, antinormative analyses must reduce the intricate dynamics of norms to 
a set of rules and coercions that everyone ought, rightly, to contest.  358
The separation of two different spheres at loggerheads with each other shapes 
both the analysis of the norm and of the position of the anti-norm. Using this 
definition of queer as an internal aspect of the normative rather than an external 
force against the normative, it would be possible to align Ozon’s cinema as both 
mainstream and queer, and as both queer from within and as a part of the 
normative fabric that is being challenged. In Ozon’s cinema, there is still the 
presence of the excluded and the oppressive, so it offers a unique opportunity 
to discuss aspects of queer debates as well as mechanisms of exclusion and 
foreclosures, not only as absences but as anti-formulations within the fabric of 
the mainstream and the normative. This critique of not only the norm but the 
anti-normative stance also highlights and speaks directly to the main argument 
of this thesis. That is, it is not enough to move ‘beyond’ in the sense of leaving 
behind notions of rigid sexual difference in favour of more fluid and porous 
models of gender, identity and sexuality. A more productive ‘beyond’ still 
includes the rigid aspect as well as the fluid and it is in this very tension that the 
 Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth A. Wilson, ‘Introduction: Antinormativity’s Queer 358
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queer can be negotiated, not as a solution but as a critical project that remains 
critical of its own stagnation and presumptions. 
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4 The Smallest of Differences, Ozon’s 
Siblings  
The distinction between them 
[brother and sister] is minimal 
and the prohibition on their 
un ion ( the inces t taboo) 
establishes that smallest of 
differences which is necessary 
to inaugurate society. 
Juliet Mitchell 
 Psychoanalysis and Feminism 
This chapter will focus on sibling or sibling-like relations in Ozon’s cinema. In his 
depictions of the bourgeois family, sibling relationships are both carriers of 
family values, as in Time to Leave (2005), and escape from these values, as in 
8 Women. Siblings can also be depicted as fragmented and isolated from each 
other, as in Sitcom, or as merging identifications in Young and Beautiful. 
Mitchell argues that the “sibling relationship is important because, unlike the 
parental relationship, it is our first social relationship.”  The social or lateral 359
relationship represents an alternative to the Oedipal relationship that parental 
relations offer. But this social relationship also poses different sets of challenges 
in the formation and displacement of the self. Mitchell argues, and we will return 
to her conceptualisation of the sibling relation throughout this chapter, that the 
sibling undermines the uniqueness of the self in ways that parental relations do 
not. This displacement of the self as unique interacts with the Oedipal lateral 
relations and the two axes are dependent in Mitchell’s argument. By calling the 
sibling relation social, Mitchell relates this to her conceptualisation of gender as 
opposed to sexual difference. This issue was touched upon in the introduction 
and in this chapter we will use the sibling relation and Ozon’s cinema to further 
 Juliet Mitchell, Mad Men and Medusas, 2000b, p. 20.359
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a discussion of the distinction and interlinkage between gender and sexual 
difference as modes of formations of the self. The aim is also to think through 
kinship relations that Ozon’s films suggest inside and outside the sibling 
relation.  
The distinction between gender and sexual difference can be read through 
Lacan’s usage of Roman Jacobson’s distinction between metonymy and 
metaphor. Gender as metaphoric relation focuses on the fluid linkage between 
various gender positions. Sexual difference, by contrast, enacts a metonymic 
logic of no linkage or no relation. This is exemplified by Lacan’s declaration that 
‘there is no sexual relation’ (‘Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel’). Unfortunately, the 
English translation of rapport as relation misses a wider meaning of rapport in 
French. ‘Rapport sexuel’ can be translated as ‘sexual relation,’ but rapport also 
describes something like a common ground, a common understanding as well 
as similarities. This aspect is present in the English word rapport — to have a 
good rapport with someone — but in French, there is also a sense of similarity, 
a linkage of something. As an example, the French word allows for things, ideas 
or notions to have a rapport between each other. For instance, an example can 
be judged to have no rapport with the idea being presented. The sibling 
relationship functions as an alternative to the lack of rapport, as between 
siblings there is both difference and similarities. There is rapport between 
siblings. This distinction forms the ground for Mitchell’s exploration of the sibling 
relation and the specific hysterisation that refutes the metonymy (or lack of 
rapport) between self and other.  
The focus of this chapter is the sibling relationship in Young and Beautiful. This 
film depicts a sibling relation and it uses this relationship as a means for the 
spectator to enter the film. Ozon often plays with the link between theatre and 
film, creating distance through framing and theatre-like shots. Then he breaks 
this down through intimate shots, where the camera takes the place of one of 
the characters. This second aspect is developed in Young and Beautiful to 
depict the intimacy and distance between two siblings. The camerawork 
represents the relation or the rapport between the characters of the film, but 
also between the spectator and the film. As spectators we are implanted in this 
story through a lateral, social relation that allows for a link or rapport to develop. 
The analysis of this film enables a discussion of sibling relations, not only on 
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screen, but as an aspect of spectatorship. The identification of spectator and 
character is achieved through a series of scenes: the initial juxtaposition of the 
viewer’s and one character’s gaze, the gaze of a young boy who looks on as 
other lives unfold, and a scene where two characters are presented as copies 
through the filming of a mirror image. Ozon’s choices of identification can be 
read as an ironic play with some traditional notions in spectatorship theory. By 
using phallic maternal characters (for example Swimming Pool) or a younger 
brother (Young and Beautiful), the sensualism on screen may be understood as 
a distanced expression of a fantasy life. Or, alternatively, it is the barely 
comprehended, enigmatic message of the child listening to the uncanny sounds 
from the parental bedroom, having to divine their meaning, grasping to translate 
and comprehend. This is a long way from Mulvey’s notion of a phallic male 
figure for the male gaze to protect itself. Rather than insulation, Ozon’s gaze 
makes the spectator more vulnerable. The ironic play with gazes in his films is 
not only a comment on film theory, but a device to include us in different ways.  
Ozon often incorporates a spectator within the narrative and uses this position 
to lure and seduce the spectator into the film. At the same time, this suggests a 
way of watching, a way of engaging with the material. The spectator is 
confronted with what is assumed to be the subject of the film and the uncanny 
feeling of not being identical to this subject. We here have two forms of 
uncanny. First, the process of a doubling/estrangement of the self and, second, 
the estrangement of the not quite understood. The first aspect relates to Freud’s 
theorisation of the ego as both object and assumed origin of the inner, 
conscious self. The doubling/estrangement of this aspect of the self illustrates 
the formation of the ego in Freud’s text The Uncanny.  The second aspect 360
illustrates Laplanche’s focus on the enigmatic message and that there is always 
something that escapes understanding and translation in the other’s seduction. 
This duality relates to a notion of the self as fixed and ready, with sexual 
difference as a fait accompli, as well as a notion of gender formation as never 
stable, always open to a level of reinterpretation. The uncanny and the 
enigmatic connects these two layers of sexual difference and gender.  
The two characters I shall focus on in this analysis are Victor (Fantin Ravat) and 
Isabelle (Marine Vacth). Isabelle is the main protagonist in the film and Victor is 
 Sigmund Freud, ‘’The ‘Uncanny’ (1919) in SE 17 pp. 217-256.360
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her younger brother. Victor is not a central character in the main narrative, but I 
will argue that he is key in the relationship between the spectator and Isabelle. 
In this sibling relationship, desire and identity is dealt with in a fluid and unstable 
manner. As opposed to other relations in this narrative, the siblings are marked 
by fluctuation and instability. They have their own dynamic, opposed to the more 
stable relations between Isabelle and her customers and parents. 
The brother’s gaze 
Ozon’s Young and Beautiful is a coming-of-age film about discovering one’s 
pleasures and desires as well as getting to know one self. It is divided in four 
acts — the four seasons — starting with summer. In line with many of Ozon’s 
films, the start of the film reveals an idyllic landscape in what looks like the 
south of France. Isabelle and her family are on holiday, spending their summer 
in a large summer house. The decor is comfortable and lush, but not luxurious. 
The house where they spend their time has nothing of chartered or mass 
holiday resort about it. Yet, they are not alone on the beach. All this implies a 
comfortable middle class existence, avoiding both extravagance and hardship. 
The scenes with Isabelle are split between her on the beach on her own, with 
her brother or with other teenagers and her spending time with her family in the 
house. Just before her 17th birthday, Isabelle decides to have sex with Felix, a 
young German whom she has met on the beach. The cute and adolescently 
awkward seduction ends in a sex-scene on the beach that leaves Isabelle as 
cold as the viewer. After this encounter, Isabelle ignores Felix’s approaches and 
she eventually leaves by car with her family. 
The film then moves into autumn, and the scenery is changes from summer and 
the seafront to Paris, the metro and hotel rooms. The colour and tone of the 
images goes from warm to cold and Isabelle dresses in jeans and a green army 
jacket. We then see Isabelle change into an evening dress as she meets up 
with an older man in a hotel room. It becomes clear that Isabelle has taken up 
work as a call-girl, meeting her customers in various hotel rooms. One key 
customer stands out: Georges (Johan Leysen) who displays a tenderness and 
an uncertainty that reveals empathy for Isabelle.  
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As autumn turns to winter, Isabelle’s double life comes tumbling down. During 
one of their encounters, Georges has a cardiac arrest during intercourse. 
Isabelle runs away but is soon contacted by the police who have already 
spoken to her mother. This is a pivotal moment where Isabelle is confronted by 
her family’s emotional reaction to her hidden life. Isabelle agrees to see a 
psychologist and she makes an effort to conform to her mother’s expectations. 
She starts socialising with her classmates and eventually starts dating Alex, a 
boy her age. This period of normality turns out to be yet another temporary 
phase and this too comes tumbling down during an early morning love-making 
scene with Alex. Isabelle inserts her finger in his anus as he is struggling to get 
an erection. This seems to reveal the deep disconnection between the two and 
his childhood innocence is contrasted by her professional knowledge of bodily 
pleasures and the functioning of the male body. In the last episodes of the film, 
Isabelle meets with Alice, Georges’s widow. Together they talk about sexual 
desire and the desire to be desired as a young girl. They then go to the room 
where Georges died. They lie down on the bed in a scene of reconciliation and 
intimacy. As Isabelle wakes up, there is a sense of closure despite the 
ambiguity of whether the scene with her lover’s wife actually took place or not. 
As we leave her there, Françoise Hardy sings about finally becoming herself. 
This film follows some of the themes in Ozon’s cinema that I have already 
highlighted. Isabelle is at once passive and active throughout this film, and the 
meeting with Alice functions as a commentary on this theme, the wish to be 
desired as young and attractive — similar to the staging of the young bodies in 
A Summer Dress. A theme that is here given a melancholic tone as Alice 
reminisces on lost youth. Alice — played by Charlotte Rampling, one of Ozon’s 
favourite actors — voices the loss of youthful beauty, but also a chance to 
reflect on the pleasures of being an object of desire, suggesting that Isabelle 
has lived out a fantasy. It is notable that the film contains no real consequences 
or any of the dark realism that is normally associated with the genre of films 
dealing with prostitution, nor the romanticised image of the happy prostitute as 
in Pretty Woman (1990), on the other side of the spectrum. This film can be said 
to avoid some of the gritty aesthetics of more realistic films about teenage 
prostitution, but Ozon does offer a non-judgmental portrayal of a young woman 
exploring her sexuality and the wish to be desired by others. The question is: 
How does this film achieve this? Apart from the exclusion of disturbing realism, 
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how does this film ask us to sympathise and empathise with Isabelle? There are 
several methods at play here. What I will focus on is the gaze of the younger 
brother and the porous relationality that this relationship suggests as a model 
for the spectator. It should be mentioned too, however, that another device that 
Ozon makes use of, and this is another method that he deploys throughout his 
cinema — is the use of soundtrack. Isabelle and her development is 
accompanied by songs by François Hardy, a well known singer — especially in 
France. Her lyrics offer a kind of meta-commentary no the narrative, but her 
voice also offers something familiar, something safe and intimate. Her songs 
are a part of a cultural heritage and by using her lyrics to comment on Isabelle’s 
life events, these events become something familiar and safe, by association.  
I will now make the argument that Victor, Isabelle’s younger brother, functions 
as a bridge between the spectator and Isabelle. This bridge not only enables 
the spectator to view the narrative, but also interrupts and questions this 
narrative as well as the spectator’s place within it. By referring to Victor and the 
identification between Victor and the spectator as Victor’s gaze or the brother’s 
gaze, I wish to put this relation into critical communication with Mulvey’s theory 
of the male gaze. Victor does not simply allow an omnipotent identification so 
the male gaze is able to desire the young and beautiful Isabelle at a safe 
distance. Instead, the identification with Victor allows for an empathic intimacy 
with Isabelle, that eventually blurs the lines of identification and differentiation. 
Victor’s positioning sometimes invades the angle of the spectator, making his 
position an uncanny presence in the sense of a doubling/estrangement in a 
place where we should be alone. At other times he functions as the curious 
viewer, the involved bystander who tries to understand the narrative taking 
place around him in the sense of the uncanny as something enigmatic. His 
naive questions are often contrasted by Isabelle’s mother’s and stepfather’s 
assumption that they, the grown-ups, know what is going on. Victor plays the 
role of a spectator who is engaged and willing to know, something that is often 
contrasted by the adults’ assumptions that they already know what is going on. 
Like the child divining what is going on next door, Victor is both active and 
passive in his interpretation/translation of what is happening. 
The young girl who becomes a prostitute in this story is not treated like a victim, 
pervert or even a femme fatale. Instead she is portrayed as a teenager 
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exploring her sexuality. She is not the victim of abuse, either at home or from 
her clients to any significant extent. There is a marked absence of attempts to 
moralise her choices. As mentioned, songs by François Hardy are used to 
accompany the story: a song about being lonely whilst among others is heard 
while we watch a montage of Isabelle having sex with various clients. Phil 
Powrie has argued that Ozon’s usage of music “creates an interlude, a 
metaspace, where the listener is unable to identify only with the male or the 
female on screen, but shuttles between both ludically.”  In the specific 361
interlude where we see Isabelle and her customers accompanied by Hardy’s 
melancholic voice, the effect is not so much a haptic hearing as Powrie argues 
for in his reading of 5x2, but rather an effect of distancing from the acts. This 
distance from the acts, interestingly, functions to make a proximation to Isabelle 
possible. By creating a sense of loneliness in the spectator by the choice of 
music and juxtaposing this with images of a young girl having multiple partners, 
the potential shock value of the montage is deflated into associations of being 
disconnected from the world and a general sense of loneliness. Ozon thus turns 
us away from the possible sadistic gaze consuming the young woman and the 
sympathetic gaze that would take pleasure in Isabelle’s victimhood. Instead we 
are made to see the hollowness of the sexual act, both for Isabelle and for us as 
spectators. As a result, there is nothing shocking in the actual sex she is having.  
Ozon thus constructs a type of gaze that is neither the male scopophilia of 
Mulvey’s theory nor the masochistic, idealising look posited by Studlar. Instead 
we are invited into an empathetic, caring gaze where Isabelle is not fetishised to 
represent anything but herself. Oddly, the spectator is both left outside these 
scenes and invited to feel with them. This duality refuses simple explanations or 
psychologisations of Isabelle and instead leaves the enigmatic at the centre. 
We are left to ‘deal’ with it. 
Siblings and desire 
When asked if Victor is his alter-ego within the narrative, Ozon responded that 
Victor is an incorporation of the spectator. “The younger brother is not me, it’s 
the spectator. The spectator who, for an hour and a half, will try to understand 
 Phil Powrie, ‘The Haptic Moment: Sparring with Paolo Conte in Ozon's 5x2’ in 361
Paragraph, 2008, pp. 206-222, p. 219.
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this young girl.”  Ozon uses the view of the younger brother to guide the 362
spectator. The film opens with a scene where we see a young girl on a beach 
through the binoculars of an unknown voyeur (see image 1). The image of a 
woman seen through binoculars connotes notions of a peeping Tom and the 
scopophilic pleasure of Mulvey’s male gaze. We are immediately confronted 
with this unknown gaze that occupies the point of the spectator. At this point, as 
we are not yet aware of the protagonist whose position we share, this uncanny 
merger seems to split our gaze and confront us at once with an other as the 
origin of our gaze. And we are confronted not only with an other occupying the 
place of our gaze, but with the dubious intentions of this other who is looking at 
a beautiful girl on a beach. While we look at the girl, and the uncanny feeling of 
not knowing the intention or the meaning of the gaze that we see through, the 
sound of crickets is taking over, further emphasising a sense of eeriness in the 
scene. This first shot actualises an unnerving displacement of the self with a 
self that we are not yet sure if we can trust. Should we distance ourselves from 
the gaze that is enforced upon us? Or should we follow in the pleasurable 
voyeurism of the gaze that is lingering over the young woman’s body? We are 
here dealing with a playful renegotiation of the assumed male gaze and the 
pleasures and perils of spectatorship in general. This playfulness does not shy 
away from inflicting uneasiness on the spectator.  
In the next scene, we see the back of an adolescent boy with binoculars in his 
hands, the beach in front of him. The sound of crickets is toned down and the 
scene has lost its eeriness. In the next scene, we are closer to the woman on 
the beach, the hand of the boy is hanging over the woman’s body, forming a 
shadow on her back. Even if we at this stage are aware that the gaze belongs 
to an adolescent boy, this rupture of the assumed male gaze is only partial. The 
gaze may not be predatory, but it is still a gaze understood within a 
heterosexual setting. It is still a male gazing upon a young woman. His hands 
are lingering over the young woman’s body, casting a shadow as a projection of 
 Asked if Victor is Ozon, he replies: “Le petit frère, ce n’est pas moi, c’est le 362
spectateur. Le spectateur qui va pendant une heure et demie essayer de comprendre 
cette jeune fille. Et puis, de toute façon, un spectateur est toujours comme un enfant 
quand il va au cinéma. C’était pour moi évident de commencer le film de son point de 
vue à lui. Ce que je trouvais beau, c’est que la complicité entre le frère et la soeur 
s’arrête quand elle couche avec son amant allemand. Dè lors, Isabelle ne veut plus 
parler à son petit frère. Parce qu’elle veut le protéger, qu’elle sait qu’elle va traverser 
des moments compliqués, que son petit frère ne peut pas comprendre. À ceci près 
que l’on voit bien qu’il a quand même tout compris.” Dossier Jeune et Jolie, p. 12.
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a fantasy. This scene brings back some of the eeriness that we just experienced 
not least because the looming hand is reminiscent of horror films. The shadow 
who attacks Marion in Psycho (1960) seems to be present in this scene. But 
instead of killing the young woman, the hand wakes her up and the suspension 
is released by the co-occupier of our gaze entering the screen. This is the first 
time we see Victor from the front and his gaze no longer occupies ours. The two 
immediately start a conversation about Felix. As Isabelle asks questions about 
Felix, Victor turns away from the scene and starts throwing pebbles into the 
water. As Victor exits our gaze and enters the film as a character, he tells 
Isabelle that Felix was looking for her. 
Isabelle: Tu l’as vu ?(Did you see him?) 
Victor: Oui, il est passé à la maison. (Yes, he came by the house) 
Isabelle: Et maman l’a vu? (And mum saw him?) 
Victor: Ben, ouais. (Well, yeah.) 
Isabelle: Qu’est-ce qu’elle a dit ? (What did she say?) 
Victor: Ben, qu’il était super beau. Tu viens déjeuner ? (Well, that he’s really hot. 
You coming for lunch?) 
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Image 1: in the opening shot in Young and Beautiful, we see Isabelle on the beach 
through binoculars. This oversaturated version of the male gaze invites a mockery of the 
scopophilic pleasures of the spectator.
In this exchange, Isabelle asks about her mother’s opinion as well as whether 
Victor has seen him. Victor on his side, plays along, tells her that their mother 
found him beautiful, all the while he throws pebbles into the water. He seems to 
have an ambivalence to the conversation, after waking her up and clearly 
knowing what she wants to hear, he turns away from her, looking out to the 
ocean and his bouncing pebbles rather than at her. When he is close up, the 
intimacy seems to prompt him to look away, as opposed to when he looked at 
her through binoculars. Isabelle on her side is asking for her mother’s opinion 
rather than her brother’s. In her eyes, Victor might remain too young to 
understand, an assumption that is partly contradicted by his responses that 
reveal an understanding for what she wants to hear. Before moving on to the 
next scene, let us consider what has happened in terms of  displacements. The 
boy who is placed in our gaze is separated from us, as the film reveals itself to 
pose less of a threat to the spectator. At this stage, the boy no longer occupies 
our gaze, the identification with the boy is no longer uncanny in the sense that 
he doubles our gaze and inserts an intimacy with an unknown and enigmatic 
presence. The boy still functions as a viewer of the drama and the identification 
between the spectator and the boy remains, but it becomes less threatening. 
We discover Isabelle’s thoughts and reactions through the boy’s queries. He 
embodies our will to understand and also our frustration of not getting the 
answers we want.  
As the two are walking up the stairs from the beach, they are yet again engaged 
in a conversation that leaves more questions than answers. 
Isabelle: Tu me promets de rien dire à Maman ? (Do you promise not to say 
anything to mum?) 
Victor: Ouais, mais pourquoi tu lui dis pas ?  (Yeah, but why don’t you tell her?) 
The two of them share a secret, something that mother should not know about. 
As they approach the stairs, Victor continues his inquisition. This of course 
engages the will to know in the spectator. We want to know, but we are also on 
some level aware that what we want to know is most likely going to be a banal 
fact; so the pleasure of not knowing becomes a goal in itself. We are happy to 
be manipulated in this way, to be pulled in to the narrative through a subtle 
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withholding as suspension. The masochistic but tacit contract that Aaron and 
Deleuze identified is not breached here and the uncanny is replaced with 
familiarity with filmic form and its pleasures. The looming threat of the male 
gaze occupying our field of vision is replaced with a safe spectatorial pleasure 
and the narrative has been given a first plot, a first driving force. The tension 
created before has been gently nudged into the will to know. If at first we were 
disconcerted by the doubling of our gaze and the troubling scopophilic peeping 
Tom look at the start of the film, this tension has been given a narrative function; 
we now want to see, to pry and to find out what secret the two are keeping fro 
mother, and from the spectator. This staging also creates a bubble of trust and 
intimacy between the two siblings. 
Victor: Allez, Isabelle dis-moi, t’es amoureuse ? (C’mon, Isabelle, tell me, are you 
in love?) 
Isabelle stops to look at him. 
Isabelle: Et toi, tu le trouve comment ? (And you, what do you think about him?) 
Victor, clearly shy and surprised by the question, answers: Je sais pas… Je suis un 
garçon. (I don’t know… I’m a boy.) And then he runs up the stairs. 
When Isabelle directs the question directly at Victor, instead of asking him what 
mother thinks, Victor is clearly embarrassed and runs away. His will to know 
was turned back on him and his response is to walk away, after asserting that 
he is a boy. In this scene we get to know Isabelle and the power she has over 
her younger brother as well as the limits to Victor’s ability to challenge his sister. 
In this scene a contract between the two is broken, the desire to know is 
confronted with a mirror and a question rather than seductive suspense. This is 
a subtle form of the breach that set up the association of Ozon’s earlier films 
with the French Extreme, it reveals a will to challenge the spectator and to stage 
a bourgeois turning away from the uncomfortable. 
On one level, Isabelle is here redirecting the desire she is displacing on others 
back to those others. By directing the question to her brother, she de-centres 
her desire by revealing the displacement that Victor formed part of. Up until the 
point when Isabelle returns the question, Victor can safely displace his desire 
for Felix and for his sister into his curiosity about their relationship. But when 
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she turns the question around, his desire and its potentially non-normative 
nature are both revealed. When their desires were able to intermingle and mix, 
they were occupying a space that relates them as similar-yet-not-same. Their 
desire (as well as our desire) created a porous interlinking where the distance/
difference is negotiated and fluid. This, however, is broken by Isabelle’s naming 
(by asking) of Victor’s desire; the identification is interrupted by the requested 
symbolisation of desire. By this process of nomination, the desire becomes a 
part of the ideological/subjective level and thus threatens to displace and 
undermine the subject. In other words, Isabelle’s question brings Victor’s 
displaced desire into the open. We are confronted with the uncanny, unspoken 
desire as this is transformed into something that could be said.  
If Victor’s questions hint at his desire, then this desire should not simply be 
understood as a desire for Felix, but also as a mixture of desires between 
himself and his sister. In an analysis of normativity on the level of ideology, we 
can understand why Isabelle’s question breaks the contract of desire within a 
heterosexual ideology. Isabelle destroys the contract of not asking and makes it 
possible to reveal non-heterosexual desire by demanding that Victor responds. 
Isabelle invites Victor to introduce his desire so as to displace hers, in an 
attempt to validate it. By engaging in this identification, Victor is now invested in 
the desires of her sister towards Felix, but also her desire for Victor’s desire for 
Felix, and her mother’s desire for Felix that he is asked to narrate. Like our gaze 
in the opening of the film, both are seeing themselves and their objects of desire 
through the gaze of an other. In this interplay, there is a threat of a loss of self 
both when these gazes mingle and when they separate. And what does Victor 
do? He defends himself by inserting his sexual difference from his sister. Faced 
with the displacing threat of the other’s gaze and desire, he inserts his sex to 
find footing before running away from his sister. If we read their intermingling of 
desires in terms of gender until this point, opening up for a fluidity and 
renegotiation between the two, Victor’s assertion that he is a boy is a defence 
on the level of sexual difference. Sexual difference and the lack of rapport 
implies that there is no common ground here. Victor splits off from the lateral, 
potentially fluid relation/identification by breaking this off with sexual difference 
as foreclosure. If we view Victor as the representative or the incorporation of the 
viewer in the narrative, this confronts us with a defensive reaction to the 
protagonist and the film. Confronted with our prying will to know what the two 
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are talking about, our proxy leaves the scene as Isabelle confronts our desires. 
It is also an enactment of one possible response, that coming from a spectator 
whose gaze is informed by normative views on sexuality. In effect, the scene is 
a mini-drama of our potential turning away from Isabelle’s sexuality later in the 
film. 
Desiring siblings 
In Mad Men and Medusas, Mitchell argues for a rearticulation of the sibling 
relationship to understand the creation of and function of gender as well as 
sexual difference. It is in this relationship that the child is forced to develop a 
self as a notion of something separate and unique.  
The sibling relationship is important because, unlike the parental relationship, it is 
our first social relationship. The mode of psychoanalytic treatment obscures this 
and the theory ignores it. On the advent of a younger sibling (or sibling substitute), 
the subject is displaced, deposed and without the place that was hers or his: she/
he must change utterly in relation to both the rest of the family and the outside 
world.  363
The introduction of another self in a lateral relation displaces the uniqueness of 
the I. The I is therefore forced to develop its separateness from this other, more 
equal self. This relation, according to Mitchell, introduces hysteria into the 
centre of the self. Hysteria should here be understood as a displacement of the 
I as a general condition or as an aspect of the formation of the self rather than a 
strict pathology. This displacement of the self can lead to hysterical reactions 
that are pathological, but there are also non-pathological aspects of hysteria in 
Mitchell’s argument. The hysterical condition is one where our self is struggling 
to define its boundaries. The self becomes porous and dislodged, as 
exemplified through the sibling relation. In the scene between Isabelle and 
Victor, this takes the form of a displacement of desire in the other, a 
displacement that then reaches its limit when Isabelle asks Victor to name his 
desire, his interest in her relation with Felix. Between Isabelle and Victor, the 
escape from the porous exchange of desires thus takes the form of sexual 
 Mitchell, 2000b, p. 20.363
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difference. It is this difference that protects Victor from merging with and having 
his desires confused with Isabelle’s. 
  
[…] hysteria involves a desperate and exiting degree of mental and bodily 
identification whereby one thinks and feels through another person who, though all-
important, is not experienced as a separate being; not, in other words, as another 
person in an ‘object relationship’.  364
We can easily draw links between Mitchell’s model of sibling relations as a 
floating together, and haptic spectatorship. The relation to the screen in haptic 
visuality (or sound in Powrie’s argument) is not one of object relationship. It is 
not an other, separate from the self that is encountered. Instead, it is the 
dissolution of the self through intimacy with the other. Mitchell develops a model 
of sexual difference that offers an escape from this hysteric state, in line with 
Freud’s narrative of the child’s sexual theories. In Freud’s developmental 
rhetoric, the progression of these sexual theories takes as its starting point the 
discovery of sexual difference in a visual field. According to Freud, the child sets 
out with a “neglect of the difference between the sexes” . This ‘neglect of the 365
difference’ takes the form of attributing to everyone, including women, the 
possession of a penis. This neglect is in line with the phallic phase as discussed 
above and follows the same logic of placing the male position as the norm and 
the feminine as the deviation. Following on from this assumption and the 
continued ignorance of female genitalia prompts the child, at least according to 
Freud, to assume that if the child “grows in the mother’s body and is then 
removed from it, this can only happen along one possible pathway — the anal 
aperture.”  At this stage sexual difference is still negligible, the absence of a 366
penis, if seen in a sibling, is excused as being small but still there. The third 
stage in the development of children’s sexual theories is caused, as Freud sees 
it, by the child seeing the parents having intercourse. At this third stage, the 
difference is given a qualitative interpretation, a “sadistic view of coition” . This 367
 Mitchell, 2000b, p. 75.364
 Sigmund Freud, ‘On the Sexual Theories of Children.’ (1908) in SE 9 pp. 205-226, 365
p. 215.
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165
primal scene further underscores the link between passivity and masochism 
with the female position in Freud’s thinking. His narrative of sexual difference 
emphasises the child’s notion of self and separation in relation to the parental 
world. It therefore links the formation of the self through a turning back on the 
self through masochism. Here, the feminine or maternal is a fantasy that gives 
meaning to this primal scene as well as to the returned desire for a self that is 
different or unique. 
In her return to Freud, Mitchell rereads Freud’s analysis of sexual theories in 
children through his own narrative of the child’s development. At the same time, 
she includes what Freud omitted: the development of the girl’s sexual theories. 
Mitchell’s version of the child’s sexual theories emphasises a path that Freud 
hints at but never develops, namely the repressed womb as origin and the 
ability to produce babies. In his essay on the uncanny, Freud mentions 
intrauterine fantasies but does not develop them as separate from castration 
fantasies. Castration is instead allowed to represent any separation, loss or 
absence. Castration, of course, re-inaugurates the phallus as the assumed 
universal. Mitchell points out that “men must also submit to a prohibition on their 
parthenogenetic fantasies — they have to become ‘those who cannot give 
birth’. Castration introduces only one mode of symbolization.”  The theory that 368
babies are born from the anus does not exclude anyone from the possibility of 
bearing children. As sexual difference is asserted, however, this does not only 
take place through the lack of a penis, but also through the ability or inability to 
bear children. This reading comes with the potential of defining sexual 
difference in a non-phallic manner. Mitchell inserts a maternal signifier, a 
prohibition on becoming a mother that can generate a symbolic not only based 
on the phallic, but also on a prohibition of the fantasy that has the anus as the 
gender-neutral origin of children.  
Mitchell’s project is guided by a de-gendering of hysteria and a re-insertion of 
sexuation in dual terms. Both the phallic and the maternal limitation of the ability 
to give birth are prohibitions and, as such, introduce two forms of symbolisation. 
These two levels of sexual difference offer an escape from girls’ exclusion from 
the symbolic and the imaginary, as problematised by Irigaray. Earlier in this 
thesis, it was argued that Mitchell’s maternal law offers a model for sexual 
 Mitchell, 2000b. p. 332.368
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difference that does not depend on the girl or the mother lacking something. 
The hysterisation and dissolution of difference between the siblings can help us 
understand the scene between Victor and Isabelle. But Ozon seems to show an 
introduction of sexual difference that is less dependent on a paternal or 
maternal law and more of a defence against the hysterical merger of their 
desires. The clash that causes Victor to hold up his sexual difference towards 
his sister seems to refer to a heterosexual logic of ‘I’m a boy, therefore I can’t 
desire another boy,’ rather than their different functions in the reproductive 
order. Here, Ozon shows that sexual difference is not dependent on the Oedipal 
situation but is the direct result of two siblings separating their uniqueness from 
each other at the level that Mitchell calls gender. This would allow for a greater 
fluidity. Victor and Isabelle seem to show how these two levels are coexisting 
and respond to a threatening dissolution of the self rather than any falling back 
on sexual theories of reproduction. 
In Mitchell’s discussion of hysteria in relation to the sibling relationship and the 
formation of sexual difference, there is an emphasis on being and potential loss 
of being that is actualised through the sibling. The displacement threatens the 
very existence of the self. “The hysteric feels catastrophically displaced, non-
existent, because another stands in his place.”  The desire of both Victor and 369
Isabelle are intermingled. As mentioned, Isabelle needs the confirmation of 
others in order to validate her desire. Her desire can only be sustained if it is 
based on someone else’s desire. This also fits with the general narrative of the 
film, where Isabelle apparently displaces her own desire in order to discover 
those of others so that she can discover her own in turn. 
Victor, on his side, being too young to explore himself, lives vicariously through 
his sister, exploring his desire through hers. The sibling relation is a microcosm 
of the film’s narrative. But it also actualises the uncanny aspect of adult or 
genital sexuality seen from the eyes of someone who is not yet there. By 
following their coming of age in their own relationship, but at different stages, 
we can interpret the central narrative of Isabelle exploring her desire through 
the exploration of others. Victor is both displaying our desire for knowing what is 
happening and being a part of what is happening. He wants to know as a way to 
experience, just like we as spectators want to know but struggle to understand 
 Mitchell, 2000b, p. 107.369
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Isabelle’s actions. When Isabelle asks Victor if he likes Felix, the entanglement 
of their desires is revealed. The displacement of their selves in the other is 
articulated and in the open, this breaks with the contract of suspense, of being 
close but not the same, of living through her but at a safe distance. To get away 
from the hysterical potential of this, Victor asserts his being as opposed to hers. 
He exists by being separate from her; the insertion of sexual difference between 
the two asserts his being by being as distinct. Sexual difference defends itself 
against the fluid and the hysterical potential, but this fluid space is not excluded. 
It is still there as a part of how we relate to the screen and how Victor relates to 
Isabelle. Sexual difference is inserted to define his separateness, to try to 
salvage it and with it, his uniqueness, his existence. The desire for Felix is not 
the root cause of Victor’s shying away from this intermingling of desires. 
Heterosexuality, as well as sexual belonging, is used as a defence to avoid the 
potential of a hysteric collapse of the difference between Victor and Isabelle. 
This point opens up for sexual difference taking the form of various differences 
to create order.  
The ego as defence 
Victor asserts himself as unique and whole, by asserting that he belongs to one 
side of sexual difference. When challenged by Isabelle, Victor defends himself 
by inserting his symbolic being as his absolute being. He is a boy; therefore he 
is not her, he cannot experience the desire that he developed through Isabelle. 
Paul Verheaghe argues in his presentation of Lacan’s four discourses that it “is 
the master-signifier which aims at obliterating the lack, posing as the guarantee 
for the process of covering that lack. The best and shortest example is the 
signifier ‘I’ which gives us the illusion of having an identity in our own right.”  370
Victor uses ‘I am a boy’ as a master signifier to a similar effect. By inserting this 
master signifier into the discourse, he asserts himself as a master in the sense 
of ‘master of his own house’ — Victor is the master of himself, his I is his and he 
knows it is. Sexual difference offers meaning to this I. The I is this and not that 
and therefore the I is unique and separate. This asserts him as being beyond 
doubt; it defends him from the hysterisation of desires that was taking place 
 Verheaghe, Does the Woman Exist?: From Freud’s Hysteric to Lacan’s Feminine, 370
1999 [1996]. pp. 104-105.
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between himself and his sister. By placing this ‘I’ in relation to the noun ‘boy,’ the 
master signifier is already placed in relation to a series, as the noun can signify 
many people. Victor asserts his distinctness by nominating himself as a boy in 
contrast to Isabelle, but this contrast simultaneously places him in relation to a 
series or a chain of signifiers that are not unique. Even though this argument 
focuses on the symbolic aspects of the scene, the act of separation is not only 
taking place on a symbolic level. Victor physically walks away after he has 
uttered his defence. This gesture can, of course, be interpreted as a failure to 
uphold the uttered difference, a failure that risks hysterisation. The master is not 
a strictly symbolic entity. It originates in the imaginary relation to the self as an 
ideal image that we try and fail to identify with. 
Lacan recognised the first encounter with the master in the mirror stage, where the 
child meets the other as an alienating totality. The confrontation with this total 
master results in the depressive position, from which the child flees through an 
identification with the master, that is, the specular ‘Urbild’ or primary image which is 
a basis for the ulterior Ego-ideal.  371
Mitchell’s notion of hysterisation through the sibling relationship together with 
Ozon’s depiction of Isabelle and Victor, reveal or emphasise that sexual 
difference or the master signifier is not stable, nor is it a phase or a stage that is 
left behind. Rather, it is a coexisting, contemporary aspect of the self that can 
be actualised in relation to the almost same. As mentioned in relation to 
McGowan’s model of the Lacanian gaze and spectatorship, this substratum is 
still treated as a threatening underbelly to the established self. In contrast, 
Ozon’s depiction of Victor and Isabelle reveals a non-threatening aspect of this 
porous relationality. It is only when this clashes with the ideology of ‘I’m a boy, 
therefore I cannot desire boys’ that this relationality collapses and sexual 
difference is resorted to in order to prop up the self.  
 Verheaghe, 1999 [1996], p. 60.371
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The empathic gaze 
In the first scene, our gaze was intruded on by a gaze that we could not yet 
place. This placed us in a hysterical position. Our selves were positioned at a 
point occupied by a different self rather than the distanced, anonymous gaze 
that we are accustomed to in cinema. The scene where Victor inserts sexual 
difference to create distance between himself and his sister can be viewed as 
the catharsis of this hysterical position. Victor separates himself from his sister 
so that we do not have to. After this initial scene, Victor’s function changes. This 
is illustrated by two key scenes. In the first, Victor is once again doubling our 
gaze but this time by illustrating a different version of the spectator. Victor walks 
through the summerhouse, silently looking through open doors, at the different 
scenes taking place. He looks without taking part in any of the scenes. In the 
first room his mother and stepfather are sleeping, in the second, there is a 
family. The mother plays with the youngest infant while the other children sleep. 
The father is on the bed, using his laptop. In the third room, Victor sees his 
sister, masturbating by lying on top of the pillow and thrusting her pelvis against 
it. Victor’s role in this scene is the silent spectator. He does not intervene in the 
scenes, he is merely observing from a distance. Like us, he consumes the 
visuals of the film without adding to them. We, like Victor remain passive. 
However, there is another way to read this scene. Rather than being the 
distanced, objective viewer, Victor has already been identified as the son/
brother/child in relation to these scenes. He is not looking at strangers. This 
makes his distance all the more interesting. It enacts our distance/intimacy with 
the characters and it also enacts the contract between spectator and film. We 
act as if we know these people and we fill the film’s gaps with our desire to take 
part, thus co-creating the film. The distance/intimacy is an illustration of the 
masochistic relation to the film, but also of the vicarious living-through-the-
brother as spectator. For the rest of the time spend in the holiday home, Victor 
plays the one wanting to know. After Isabelle sleeps with Felix, Victor is waiting 
in Isabelle’s room, eager to find out how it was. Isabelle dismisses him. After the 
dispassionate sex-scene, Isabelle is more and more dismissive of Felix as well 
as Victor who is no longer a part of the bubble of intimacy. He is no longer 
included in the secret kept from their mother. This distance introduces another 
difference that functions like sexual difference in the first instance. This 
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difference is based on experience, and as well shall see, perhaps a will to 
protect her younger brother who Isabelle might assume is too young to 
understand. But also too close and too able to understand. As they leave to go 
back to Paris Isabelle does not even look as the family drives past Felix who is 
on his bike. Victor points out that it was Felix, expecting a reaction from 
Isabelle, but she remains unmoved. Her mother and stepfather are shown 
giving each other a look, as if they know what is going on. But, in fact, Victor is 
the only one trying to understand what is going on with his sister. Victor is 
clearly surprised by his sister’s dismissal of her former lover. Like us, Victor 
divines that there is something going on that we are still unable to grasp. The 
secret between the two siblings were only the first layer of the onion, this new 
secret is excluding the spectator as well as the brother. The parents’ reaction, 
like the insertion of sexual difference, is another defence, a means of not 
engaging with Isabelle. 
When they return to Paris, and the narrative focuses on Isabelle’s experiences 
as a prostitute, Victor all but disappears. This changes after Isabelle’s secret is 
revealed to her family. Her mother displays an emotional response; her 
stepfather tries to downplay the whole thing; and the psychologist tries to get 
answers from her and to rationalise her behaviour, giving meaning to its 
enigmatic aspects. Her brother reveals that he knows, but from a distance. This 
distance does not equal disinterest, instead it is through this distance that he 
reveals concern and intimacy.  
Victor: Qui c’est qu’est mort ? (Who died?) 
Isabelle: Un vieux que j’ai rencontré… (An old man that I met…) 
Victor: Et t’as fais quoi avec lui ? (And what did you do with him?) 
Isabelle: J’ai couché avec lui. (I slept with him.) 
Victor: C’était comment ? (How was that?) 
Isabelle: Ça dépendait des fois… En général, ça se passait bien. (It was different 
from time to time… most of the time, it was ok.) 
Victor: Et pourquoi tu l’as fait ? (And why did you do it?) 
Isabelle: Parce que j’aimais ça. (Because I liked that.) 
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In this dialogue, Victor is the one person close to Isabelle who is not judging 
her. When comparing this exchange to the scene analysed above, it is clear that 
we are no longer in the master discourse. The I that speaks is no longer 
asserting itself as a complete entity. Isabelle speaks from an insecure position: 
she is trying to understand herself. Through the naive and simple questions that 
Victor poses, Isabelle is able to renegotiate herself and it is made clear that she 
does not know the answers. The self has become enigmatic, its split has 
become obvious. Victor, on his side, functions as the desire with no clear object. 
His desire to know is not directed at an object. His desire is not to know who his 
sister is nor who the old man is. Instead, his desire is to know his sister’s desire; 
he wants to know why. He wants to understand his sister and himself. Isabelle 
is — in the dialogue analysed here — faced with herself through the eyes of 
Victor. It is through this will to know that Victor’s and Isabelle’s desires can once 
again return to the fluidity prior to the cathartic scene, where Victor inserted his 
sexual difference as master signifier to distance himself. This lack of protection 
is once more explored in a scene where the identification/difference between 
Victor and Isabelle is illustrated. In this scene Isabelle is preparing to go to a 
party. She is getting dressed while Victor is watching from bed.  
Victor: Et y aura qui ? (And who will be there?) 
Isabelle: Des gens de ma classe. (People from class.) 
Isabelle: Ça va ? Je suis pas trop moche ? (How’s that? I’m not too ugly?) 
Victor: Non, ça va. Tu te maquilles pas ? (No, it’s ok. No makeup?) 
Isabelle: Tu crois ? (You think?) 
Victor: Ben ouais, un peu quand même… (Well yeah, at least a little…) 
Victor gets up and stands behind her as she is applying eyeliner by the mirror. 
Their faces are parallel, looking into the mirror, hers being better lit than his. 
Victor: Y a une fille dans ma classe, tu sais qu’elle fait ? (There’s a girl in my class, 
you know what she does?) 
Isabelle: Quoi ? (What?) 
Victor: Elle roule une pelle pour 5 euros. (She offers kisses for 5 euros.) 
Isabelle: C’est pas cher. T’as payé, toi ? (That’s cheap. Did you pay?) 
Victor: T’es folle ! J’ai pas besoin, moi ! (You’re crazy! I don’t need it!) 
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Isabelle: Y a pas de honte, c’est bien pour s’exercer. (There’s nothing to be 
ashamed of. It’s good for practice.) 
Victor shrugs his shoulders and returns to the bed. 
Victor: Tu vois mon pote Marco ? (You know my friend Marco?) 
Isabelle: Euh oui, je crois… (Eh yeah, I think so…) 
Victor: Il voudrait coucher avec une fille… (He want’s to sleep with a girl…) 
Isabelle: Laisse tomber, il a pas des moyens ! (Drop it, he can’t afford it!) 
Victor: T’as pas arrête ? (You haven’t stopped?) 
Isabelle: Mais si ! Je déconne… (Of course! I’m messing with you…) 
The siblings have once again returned to an open conversation where Isabelle 
is not trying to hide. There is a lightness in the bantering dialogue. As they 
speak, Victor moves in and out of the mirror image in front of Isabelle. This 
underscores their similarity, their co-occupation of the same space and 
potentially the same self. Victor suggest that Isabelle should use at least some 
makeup, revealing an interest in living through her again. As she puts on her 
makeup, his face is a double of hers in the mirror and in the frame that we are 
presented with. 
Bersani and Dutoit have pointed out in their reading of Todo Sobre Mi Madre 
(1999) that Almodóvar ‘codes’ the son as gay even though his sexuality is kept 
out of the narrative.  A similar point could be made about Victor here. His 372
identification with his sister, his interest in her appearance could be interpreted 
as coding him as gay. But this would miss the point of Victor’s relation to the 
enigmatic message and Isabelle as devoid of knowledge, his position is to want 
to know, a want that opens a void in the narrative. Isabelle needs the 
confirmation that makeup is all right before she can apply it, and Victor identifies 
with her as she applies it. The distance between them seems to be erased, but 
as in Lacan’s mirror stage and as in Prosser’s trans mirror-scene, this merger 
reveals an alienation and a distance. The usage of a mirror in this scene can be 
understood as an insertion of a critique of a traditional analysis of film based on 
spectatorship as identification on an imaginary level. This identification/
alienation is not the only thing going on in this scene. As opposed to the mirror 
reflection of their faces, there is the framing of these faces as a mini-seriality of 
 See Bersani and Dutoit, 2004.372
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selves. They work as copies, one weaker than the other as the gaze is on 
Isabelle, whose face is well lit. Victor is secondary, his face behind Isabelle, his 
gaze on her. This serialisation of their faces does not only imply a mirroring but 
a displacement, a hysterisation of both. In this temporary space, the master 
signifiers of gender and sexuality do not seem to matter, they are displaced by 
this double hysterisation of their desires. In Mitchell’s theorisation of 
hysterisation as propelled by the displacement of the self through the 
serialisation of this self by the introduction of a sibling, this process is described 
as catastrophic. This catastrophe in turn pushes the child back to a fantasy of 
being the mother’s only love. This position and this intimacy, however, is 
refused by the threat of castration. 
In itself the sibling situation is catastrophic, not traumatic. Entering the Oedipus 
complex seems the solution to the catastrophe of the displacement by the sibling, 
but this incestuous hope of being the mother’s only love is vanquished by the 
trauma of possible castration.  373
The Oedipus complex is here secondary to the sibling situation adn receives its 
meaning as a result of the sibling displacement. The sibling as repetition is a 
catastrophe that pushes the child to regress into a fantasy of unity with the 
mother. But in the scene between Victor and Isabelle, none of this seems to 
take place. The displacement is not catastrophic; Victor and Isabelle seem to 
enjoy living through each other. As opposed to the initial scene, where Victor 
turns away from the displacement, the hysterisation here is not depicted as 
catastrophic. Instead of turning away, Victor moves out of the scene and starts 
telling his own story, related to Isabelle’s but still about others’ desires. The two 
of them are existing in a mutual hysterisation that is not catastrophic, that does 
not revert them to traumatic symbolisation through castration but to a temporary 
co-existence. This can be compared to Ettinger’s theory of matrixial fantasies — 
the fantasy of intrauterine co-existence — something that is not in itself 
frightening. These matrixial fantasies offer a non-traumatic possibility for the 
feminine non-subject in Irigaray’s model. Ettinger makes use of the porousness 
of the melancholic self as a denied stable self as a possible relationality that is 
 Mitchell, 2000b, p. 332.373
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liveable. The merger through multiple surfaces that she names borderlinks that 
hold both difference and similarity does not in itself constitute a catastrophic 
event.  
While castration phantasy is frightening at the point of the emergence of the 
original experience before its repression, the matrixial phantasy (from matrice, for 
womb) is not frightening at the point of its original emergence, but becomes 
frightening when the experience is repressed.  374
Victor and Isabelle seem to exist in this not-yet-frightening fantasy, but their 
borderlinks are taking place in a sibling relationship, not in the maternal fantasy 
that Mitchell suggests that this relation would push them back into. Victor and 
Isabell do not return to the Oedipal situation for comfort, instead they coexist in 
a caring merger and porous relationality where the borders are not lines, but 
rather spaces that allows for cohabitation and being-withness.  
I would like to deepen the analysis of the phallic gaze and briefly delineate the 
difference, within the phallic scope, between the post-Oedipal “active” gaze 
emanating from the “armed eyes” and linked to lost archaic part-objects. Thus at 
least three kinds of gaze should be differentiated: (a) a phallic, post-Oedipal gaze, 
which recuperates the object in an imaginary way, through domination and control; 
(b) a phallic objet a tracing loss or archaic lack through castration; and (c) a 
matrixial object/objet a.  375
So what is this matrixial gaze? And how is it different from the phallic gazes? 
Ettinger describes it as an incarnation of the feminine; that which eludes the 
phallus. As such it is not dictated by the trauma of castration but can remain 
hysterical in a non-catastrophic way. Ettinger argues that with Lacan’s 
development of the term sinthome, this non-phallic can be given a place within 
the subject. 
 Bracha L. Ettinger, The Matrixial Borderspace, 2006, p. 47.374
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With the concept of sinthôme, a holy trinity is once more produced in the 
convergence of woman/psychosis/art-creation, inasmuch as all three elude 
the phallus. But the contribution of the new perspective developed in 
relation to the sinthôme is the idea that eluding the phallus does not 
necessarily mean a complete detachability from subjectivity, but rather the 
creation of a secret site within it.  376
The feminine as term for what eludes the phallic, traumatic, is here related to 
sinthome as a function of holding the subject together even if the symbolic/
imaginary/real are not linked. The sinthome functions to bind these fields 
together.  The sinthome is the fourth link that binds the ruptured unity. 377
Ruptured because Woman/God or the Other of the Other keeps intruding, 
keeps returning and therefore refuses to stop being written.  In our usage of 378
these terms, the feminine is what escapes castration and symbolisation. This 
constitutes sexual difference that is never realised but always approximated and 
therefore does not stop being written. This feminine is the outside of the 
symbolised, an outside that does not exist but drives symbolisation because of 
this. In the scene where Isabelle is preparing for her party, Victor’s sexuality is 
hinted at when he says he does not need to kiss the girl in his class. Is this 
because of the five euros, or because he is not interested in kissing girls? When 
he talks about Marco, he reveals that Marco wants to have sex with a girl. He is 
being very specific here. Does this imply that Victor and Marco have been 
experimenting but that Marco is still keen on sleeping with girls?  
This takes place as Victor moves out of the matrixial borderlinks that were 
staged through the doubling of their images in the mirror and the linking of their 
desires. Victor is here attempting to insert his own desire again, though he 
continues to speak about others. He tries to lure in Isabelle into his story, he 
acts coy, moves to the bed and retells his friend’s desire. But Isabelle is not able 
to follow Victor in this. Instead she places her own self as an insulating function 
and the hysteric relation is broken. We never find out about Victor’s desire, 
Victor and we with him, are left outside the narrative. Victor goes back to being 
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 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII: The Sinthome, 1975–377
1976, 2016, p. 12.
 Lacan, 2016, p. 5.378
176
a boy. Next time we see him he is playing video-games, still with an attentive 
gaze, but unexplored. We are left with our catharsis unresolved.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have discussed aspects of spectatorship as displacement of the 
self in relation to Mitchell’s theories about siblings and a maternal law, and how 
this plays out in the sibling relationship in Young and Beautiful. I claimed at the 
beginning of this chapter that this relationship is important and recurring in 
Ozon’s cinema, not only in his family narratives, but also in his placement of the 
spectator as participant, as an equal but also as displaced and hysterised in 
relation to the spectator. The sibling relation is explored in Young and Beautiful 
for its differentiating as well as merging aspects, but these aspects are also 
present between lovers in The New Girlfriend (2014), between the women of 8 
Women, and in many other films. But Young and Beautiful stands out in its 
focus on siblings and sibling-like relations. 
In this context, I have also explored Lacanian concepts and shown their 
shortcomings as they place the split, the alienation, between the self and its 
reflection or between the self and language. Conversely, the sibling relation and 
spectatorship reveals an experience of the uncanny and the other that is not 
reducible to the solipsism of a split or alienation of the self. Instead, it reveals an 
alienation of the self in the encounter with an other who cannot be fully 
understood. 
In trying to understand Isabelle and her motives, we are driven to feel both what 
she is going through and what her younger brother is going through in relation 
to her, an older sibling who is experiencing things that the younger sibling 
cannot quite grasp. It is by not fully understanding what is taking place and by 
not knowing the psychology of Isabelle that we can be affected by this story.  
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5 The Feminine, or the Fallen Goddess in 8 
Women 
for a woman “woman” cannot 
remain a radical Other, as she 
can for a man; otherwise all 
women would be psychotic. For 
a woman, she is a border-
Other. 
Bracha Ettinger  
The Matrixial Borderspace 
The main focus of this chapter is the film 8 Women, Ozon’s adaptation of a play 
by Robert Thomas.  In this movie with an all-female cast, differentiation is 379
negotiated along lines of class, race and generational difference. By linking the 
feminine and the hysteric with a film about eight women who are struggling to 
construct a kinship and community after the death of a father, Ozon is playing 
with notions of female desire as elusive and with stereotypical notions of 
hysterical women under the thumb of the father, even when the father is absent. 
This link was previously pointed out in relation to Cukor’s film Women (and it’s 
all about men). 8 Women can be read as suggested by Asibong as all about the 
Father/Director, but I will suggest a different reading of the subtle differences 
between its characters. In Lacan’s discussion of feminine jouissance, he defines 
two different versions. One is dependent on and the effect of castration. The 
other escapes the phallic signifier and is therefore not in thrall to castration. In 
this chapter, this second jouissance will be explored as having potential for 
reimagining the feminine outside the phallic and outside the father’s control. In 
the following interpretation of 8 Women, I will argue that Ozon is playfully 
deploying a desire of the demonic father, but the father in this film is actually 
 Ozon’s adaptation was released in 2002. Thomas’s play has been adapted to 379
screen before in the 1957 La nuit des suspects (Night of the Suspects), directed by 
Víctor Merenda. 
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revealed as castrated. His position is undermined by the reality of the female 
jouissance that plays out around him when he is removed.  
The real centre that the spectator is made to desire is not the absent father, but 
the female characters on screen. The theatricality and aestheticisation of the 
eight women at once distances them from the spectator and entices the 
spectator to fill that distance. This aspect of the film is reminiscent of Studlar’s 
development of masochistic spectatorship as a pleasure in looking at and being 
passive in relation to the goddess-like woman, as opposed to a sadistic, 
voyeristic gaze that consumes her. The question I will pursue here is if 8 
Women confirms this model of spectatorship. Or, alternatively, do the female 
characters manage to escape this madonna/whore dualism and instead build a 
different relationality. Through markers of race, class, generation, sexual and 
emotional differences, I argue that these women define their differences through 
intersections of relations, but not through borders that are fixed, but rather 
through uncanny explorations and re-findings of the other. Using Lacan’s three 
modes of jouissance together with Irigaray’s development of a feminine 
jouissance that is not clearly directed towards an external object, but rather 
towards a tactile experience of the self, I will suggest a feminine jouissance that 
is embodying what Ettinger calls the border-Other. This also links the feminine 
to the affective experience of the other in Laplanche’s theory of seduction. 
One of the foci of this chapter is a scene that depicts a maid’s insurrection 
against her master. In the previous chapter, I discussed gender and sexual 
difference as acted out between two siblings. These two siblings were 
negotiating a potential hysterisation (Mitchell) or the borderspaces (Ettinger) 
between them. I argued that sexual division as a non-relation or a non-rapport 
was inserted as a defence against a hysterisation threatening the limitations of 
the self. I also argued that there were moments where this hysterisation could 
be lived with, where the porousness of the self was not experienced as 
threatening. The gender difference between Victor and Isabelle allowed for a 
sexual difference to fall back on when the intimacy and lack of separation 
between the two became too much. In this chapter, my readings will focus on a 
film with an all-female cast, and the question is: what difference will they fall 
back on when their hysterisation becomes threatening? By using the notion of 
sexual difference to read a film where only one gender is represented, my 
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intention is not to subordinate other differences to a primordial sexual 
difference. My intention is to highlight the psychoanalytic notion of non-relation 
as an aspect of difference distinct from difference as potentially porous and 
overlapping.  
And it’s all about women 
The entirety of this film is set in a mansion from the 1950s. The drama is acted 
out between eight female characters who discover that the man of the house 
has been killed. In an act of theatricality and in a pastiche of the classic matinée 
as well as the beautification of its idealised female characters we are introduced 
to the actresses we are about to spend an hour and a half with before the start 
of the film. This is done not with soft-focused images but by a combination of 
stills of colourful flowers together with their names. This introduction is then 
followed by a panoramic view of a wintery landscape. The snow lies heavy, 
hiding trees, plants and covering the mansion; this is contrasted with a deer, 
fragile and alive, standing in the deep snow by the mansion window. We are 
then brought into the mansion and confronted with a cacophony of colours and 
warmth that will stay with us for the rest of the film. A majority of this film takes 
place in the reception hall. Like a theatre, we are often confined to this room 
while the characters enter and exit the stage. The decisive events often take 
place somewhere else, outside the reaches of our gaze. After a brief 
introduction of some of the characters, we still remain in the reception hall when 
the maid finds the father of the house murdered in his bed. We are alerted to 
this — just like the rest of the women — by the sound of the maid’s scream and 
then her description of the scene she has witnessed. As we hear her scream, 
we are looking down at the women looking up from their place in the reception 
hall. The scream comes from behind us and the gasping faces look past us. 
This emphasises the exclusion of the more dramatic scene of finding the body. 
We are confronted with the frustration of wanting to know, but also a complex 
identification with the person screaming as well as the women looking on.  
As the maid screams behind us, while the characters seem to look at us for 
answers, we are startled with her. Where she is trying to make sense of the 
death of the head of the house, we are trying to make sense of the situation. 
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Her voice invites us to divine what may have happened, but we are kept at a 
distance from the event itself. As the maid returns, the scene is retold to us and 
the other women. The camera now places us on an equal plane with the other 
women of the house. We find out that a knife was planted in his back and, since 
the dogs had not been stirred, the conclusion is drawn that it must have been 
one of the women in the house who murdered Marcel. And so the scene is set 
for a classic murder mystery. 
The women now start interrogating each other, trying to find the culprit. In 
keeping with the genre, secrets are revealed, motives unveiled and truths 
undone. In accordance with Ozon’s thematics, these revelations are centred 
around sexual abuse, hidden pregnancies, closeted lesbian relations and 
unrequited incestuous love as well as accompanied by impromptu sing and 
dance performances by the actors. The narrative of 8 Women is a homage to 
the classical whodunnit and this is also supported with slapstick comedy while 
mixed with melodramatic and musical genres. There are eight people in an 
isolated house (the phone lines are cut and the car has been sabotaged), the 
victim has been stabbed in the back (excluding any theories of suicide) and, 
consequently, the culprit has to be one of the women. As the charges are 
directed towards the various characters, it becomes clear that they all had 
motive and opportunity; they are therefore all potentially guilty of the murder. 
And, since they all have a motive, they all have a level of guilt. In a final twist to 
the story, Marcel reveals that he staged his own murder only to then commit 
suicide. The reason for his suicide only confirms the collective guilt, as it is the 
result of his realisation that his place in the household was all a sham. The 
omnipotent father figure is unmasked in the fact that, as a reason for his final 
suicide, he quotes all the truths that we have learnt throughout the film. There is 
no explanation of how the father — locked in his room this whole time — could 
have heard all this. 
Critical reception of 8 Women 
As has been briefly discussed, it has been argued that the absent father as master 
manipulator of his family is an incarnation of Ozon the director: 
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The absent but present man of this film would be none other than the director 
himself. He continues to work behind the camera and to deliver such beautiful and 
alluring images.  380
The director is here positioned as absent and quiet, yet the engine behind the 
stage. The director is both the cause and in control of the narrative. As I have 
shown, Asibong takes this one step further, linking Ozon’s oeuvre with a 
statement about his fascination for dolls’ houses. On this basis, Asibong views 8 
Women as an example of a troubling tendency in Ozon’s films. The absent 
director/father is here transmuted into a sadistic grown-up boy who directs with 
a vicious hand to get what he wants from his actresses (and his audience?). 
Asibong clarifies his critique of 8 Women by declaring that:  
The women are, more than ever, in thrall to his memory, to his fantasy, to the 
empty signifier ‘Papa’. This continued prostration to the name of the father despite 
everything results only in the women’s turning on each other in a generalised, 
decidedly non-playful cult of sadism.  381
This analysis goes further than Lee’s critique, who still acknowledges the value 
of this film as a playful study of the actresses as they interpret and deliver this 
script to us.  
Although there are moments of suspense punctuated with exposure, laughter and 
songs, the real interest of this film is to see these eight actresses play together, 
even if it means having a little surprise at the end of the film in order to foil the 
expectation of the spectator.  382
 Mark D. Lee, The French Review, 2004, pp. 602-603, p. 603. “L’homme absent 380
mais présent de ce film ne serait autre que le réalisateur lui-même. Qu’il continue à 
travailler derrière la caméra et à nous livrer des images aussi belles et séduisantes.”
 Asibong, 2008, p. 77.381
 Lee, 2004, p. 602. “Bien qu'il y ait des moments de suspense ponctués 382
d'exposition, de rires et de chansons, le véritable intérêt de ce film est de voir ces huit 
actrices jouer ensemble, quitte à avoir une petite surprise a la fin du film afin de 
déjouer l'attente du spectateur.”
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Though this enjoyment of the film is made suspect in Asibong’s analysis, Lee 
and Asibong both assume an identification between Ozon and the absent 
father/master. Before I continue with a detailed discussion of the film I would like 
to suggest a different reading of the father. Rather than assuming that Ozon 
identifies with the absent father, I argue that the absent father represents an 
incarnation of the idealised Director within the narrative. In this analysis, then, 
the dead father is not a representation of Ozon the director, but rather of the 
ideal Director in whose thrall Ozon finds himself. Ozon is therefore identified 
with the dolls in the doll’s house, rather than with the master who directs his 
dolls.  
8 Women and the feminine 
The narrative in 8 Women could be used to illustrate Lacan’s definition of 
Woman as a category within which there is (potentially) one that has escaped 
castration. One of the women seems to have killed the father. One has acted on 
the wishes they all had and therefore broken with the fantasy of ‘Papa’ as the 
patriarch of the family. In the few scenes when Papa is alive, his gaze is 
directed towards the female characters together with us. His function in the film 
is similar to ours, his absent yet central role is an echo of the absent spectator. 
Papa exists in the dark room, passive yet at the centre of the story. If we use 
Mulvey’s model of the male gaze, Papa would function as the object of 
identification. He is the object through which we as viewers can enter the 
cinematic narrative and also through which we can turn our gaze, via the 
narcissistic ideal ego on the screen, to the object of desire: woman, or women 
in this case.  The screen surrogate allows the spectator to enjoy the desired 383
object at a safe distance, allowing for a “satisfying sense of omnipotence”. This 
omnipotence is reflected both in the relation between the viewer, the spectator 
and the screen and within the narrative, where the male protagonist would 
embody a heterosexual ideology of male dominance. This complicity between 
the ideology in the narrative and the ideology of the spectator creates a 
hegemonic patriarchal space.  
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 715.383
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8 Women can be viewed as a challenge to Mulvey’s suggestion of the effects of 
disrupting the promise of illusion offered by cinematic art, to introduce the 
materiality of the camera and the self-awareness of the audience as audience. 
The theatricality of this film makes the camerawork obvious. Cameras are 
keeping their distance. We often see the story unfold from a safe, unengaged 
distance, scenes are often framed with the help of windows and doors. This 
technique is mixed with a camera angle that is level with the actresses, placing 
the spectator as one among the characters, creating a duality in the spectator’s 
approach to the narrative. The set often feels like a stage, with actors entering 
the scene rather than the camera following them. The duality of restricted view 
and a levelled, inviting view, creates a frustration in the viewer. This point is 
highlighted when the sight of the dead father is denied to us. We have to wait a 
long time before our gaze is allowed into the room where the father lies, 
assumed dead. This frustration functions as a masochistic enticement. The 
limitation of the view of the spectator creates a desire that enhances the illusion 
and the “satisfaction and reinforcement of the ego that represent the high point 
of film history [and that] hitherto must be attacked.”  However, Ozon is not 384
interested in removing the pleasure of the film. He paints it in pastel colours and 
have the actors singing and dancing for the pleasure of the viewer. 
If we analyse the end of the film in Mulvey’s terminology, what are we to make 
of Marcel’s suicide? The omnipotent if absent father reveals himself as 
castrated, as defeated by the women. He could not bear the story that was 
unravelled to him and so he kills himself. The suicide also questions Asibong’s 
critique because the dolls are no longer passive creatures, acting around the 
father/director. Instead, the father/director kills himself to escape the failure of 
his fantasy. The women’s desires turned out to not be enthralled to the father; it 
is this realisation that seems to cause his actual suicide. In 8 Women, the 
spectator may identify with the absent father, but as the women are arguing, this 
object of identification becomes less and less stable. What the women are 
interested in is not the father but the killer. Ozon’s depiction of the narrative 
turns Cukor’s film on its head. Instead of a film about women that is all about 
men, Ozon’s work challenges the centrality of the male gaze, the male 
 Mulvey, 2016 [1975], p. 713.384
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spectator and the male director. In Ozon’s film about women, it is still all about 
women.  
Mimetic woman 
In an interview from 1975, Irigaray defines her usage of mimesis as a method 
by which to insert the feminine within a discourse that has always excluded 
her.  In this interview, she speaks of mimicry or mimesis as a strategic usage 385
of what has historically been assigned to women. Irigaray says that one “must 
assume the feminine role deliberately.”  This deliberate assumption of the 386
feminine role — of what has been assigned to the feminine — is developed as a 
strategy to disrupt or destroy the discourse that excludes the feminine. Irigaray 
prefers this strategy to direct confrontation of the masculine discourse. This 
does not aim to recreate the feminine as essence but to avoid reproducing the 
position of the (male) subject assumed to be able to speak in a reaffirming way. 
Mimesis as strategy is aimed not only at the subordination of phenomenological 
women, but at the foundations of (masculine) discourse as excluding.  
Whereas a direct feminine challenge to this condition means demanding to speak 
as a (masculine), ’subject’, that is, it means to postulate a relation to the intelligible 
that would maintain sexual indifference.  387
The mimesis that Irigaray suggests is a strategic imitation of the role and the 
position of the feminine within masculine discourse to avoid the (patriarchal) 
masquerade of being an imitation of the masculine subject. The feminine in this 
reading enacts something queer by strategically choosing the excluded as the 
impossible subject position of a political project. This subject position is 
foreclosed as identity. So its political usage forecloses any possible 
identification with this particular position. In my usage, I suggest that this queer 
potentiality of the feminine should be explored by emphasising its link to 
 This interview has been reprinted in The Irigaray Reader, and in This Sex Which Is 385
Not One, 1985b [1977]. The following references will be to the latter. 
 Irigaray, 1985b [1977], p. 76.386
 Irigaray, 1985b [1977], p. 76.387
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masochistic pleasure and as a challenge to the active/passive duality. The 
feminine is not simply or singularly tied to female bodies. However, the female 
body enabled Irigaray to think the feminine as having a physicality and 
morphology that has been used to undermine and exclude the feminine as 
passive, receptive and as lacking. 
My usage of the term ‘feminine’ reflects a will to engage critically with this term. 
It is linked both to the phallocentric discourses voiced by Freud and Lacan and 
to the mimetic engagements with this term by Irigaray and Ettinger. In my 
usage, I do not wish to make it a comfortable term. Instead, I wish to build on 
earlier definitions of this term, offered by Freud and Lacan. I am momentarily 
deploying it as a term developed by Irigaray and Ettinger, as something rather 
than as a lack of something. Irigaray’s and Ettinger’s different ways of deploying 
the term ‘feminine’ link it to the maternal, to passivity, to corporeal experiences. 
It is also connected to inter-corporal experiences of tactile relationality and 
porousness of the self in relation to the self (as in Irigaray’s ‘This Sex which Is 
Not One’) or to the maternal other (as in Ettinger’s Matrixial Borderspaces). The 
term, as I deploy it here and as I put it to work in relation to Ozon’s study of an 
all-female narrative, occupies a borderspace of its own: between exclusion and 
positive value, between lack and something. By assuming the not-yet-subject 
position of the feminine, a mimetic strategy enacts two separate strategies. The 
first is to attempt to proximate a different subject position from the excluded 
position of the feminine. The second is to undermine the logic of exclusion by 
questioning the metaphysical logos of the (male) discourse that has excluded 
the (feminine) as external to the logos of the master discourse. Quite simply, the 
position of the feminine in relation to the discourse under critique is impossible 
to define with the tools available within that discourse. As such this position can 
only be tacitly divined.  
The feminine touch  
In This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray explores a feminine corporeality and a 
feminine sexuality based on its position within a master discourse that has tried 
to expel its body.  Irigaray starts out by redefining female pleasure as tactile 388
 Irigaray, 1985b [1977].388
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rather than visual, whereas the pleasure that she excites is visual and she is 
made into a mirror for the male gaze. By contrast, her pleasure, for herself, is a 
tactile affair. The sex which cannot be seen feels itself.  
Woman takes pleasure more from touching than from looking, and her entry into a 
dominant scopic economy signifies, again, her consignment to passivity: she is to 
be the beautiful object of contemplation. While her body finds itself thus eroticized, 
and called to a double movement of exhibition and of chaste retreat in order to 
stimulate the drives of the “subject,” her sexual organ represents the horror of 
nothing to see.   389
The ‘subject’ in this passage is of course the male subject, gazing at the female 
object, at once enticed by her scopic beauty and terrified by her lack. For 
Mulvey, this horror was displaced and managed through an identification with 
the omnipotent male protagonist. For Irigaray, instead, what is at play, is 
feminine sexuality. What becomes of this inverted, involuted and convoluted 
feminine that seems to take place on the inside, hidden from the scopic gaze? 
Irigaray, using the method of mimesis, theorises the result of the feminine’s 
inversion through passivity, through the hampering of the active libido. Instead 
of the visual, it is the touch, the hidden, that becomes Irigaray’s springboard to 
theorise feminine sexuality from within but reaching beyond; her mimesis aims 
at the formulation of a feminine sexuality and a feminine desire and thus a 
feminine subject. However, this move is not enough for Irigaray. The feminine is 
not merely an other that seeks to find its own discourse. It is also the internal 
lack in this discourse. Irigaray thus uses the non-visible form of the female sex 
to theorise a logic that escapes the logic of discourse. Discourse should here be 
read in the Lacanian sense of social link. See for instance Seminar XVII, The 
Other Side of Psychoanalysis, where the four discourses are presented as four 
possible social links. And yet the feminine is excluded in the formation of these 
links. This is why — as we have seen — there can be no sexual rapport 
according to Lacan. The visibility of male sex is contrasted a plurality that 
cannot be reduced to one, the touching walls, sides and folds of the female sex. 
In many ways, this becomes a physical representation of masochism as 
feminine. Masochism, in Freud’s interpretation, in its feminine form, is an 
 Irigaray, 1985b [1977], p. 26.389
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inversion of desires for an other. Irigaray’s incorporation of this notion follows 
Freud mimetically. As we have seen, the not-visible sex organ is turned into 
something else. Rather than a lack, it is a complexity, it is a plural, sensory 
imagination. Irigaray then uses this imaginary to formulate a symbolic that 
would rest on this plurality rather than on the singularity of male discourse.  
What she says is never identical with anything, moreover; rather, it is contiguous. It 
touches (upon). And when it strays too far from that proximity, she breaks off and 
starts over at “zero”: her body-sex.  390
This re-formulation questions the logic of the (male) master discourse as a solid 
entity by introducing the non-visual, that which the gaze cannot reach. The 
tactile opens up an excluded mode of the self. In this mimetic reformulation of 
Freud’s argument, we can also see an opening for affective, tactile aspects that 
have been excluded as the feminine and the non-visual, non-represented. The 
masochistic turning back on itself caused by the lack of penis in the mother and 
the self is here given a bodily representation that is not imaginary, not visual, 
but tactile. Rather than Marks’s formulation of haptic vision as engaging with 
images, Irigaray’s tactile turn back on the self opens up for a haptic visuality. 
Here the visual creates a tactile experience of the self by denying visual 
representation. Haptic visuality would then not be a result of the failure to make 
an image intelligible, but a result of the refusal of an image with which one can 
identify. The feminine as tactile experience is here closeness as well as 
exclusion: it is an exclusion as implosion rather than through a delimited 
formation of the self. It is the failed turning back since there was nothing to hold 
on to during the turn. 
In 8 Women, active sexuality or the active search for satisfaction has been held 
back. But as the patriarch dies, it is all let out, their truths come out one after the 
other and the group of women finally get to speak of who they are. What has 
been hidden comes out. The desire that is expressed by the women in this story 
only rarely involves the father figure. Instead they are directed between the 
women. Even the maid, who had been Marcel’s mistress, reveals that the 
person she really loved was his wife. His sister had an affair with the other maid 
 Irigaray, 1985b [1977], p. 29.390
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in the house. His mother-in-law who killed her husband, showed no interest in 
helping him and his wife share a passionate kiss with the same sister who was 
having an affair with the maid. His eldest daughter was not in fact his but the 
daughter of his wife’s first and never forgotten love, who died in a car crash 
before her birth. In sum, his presence in the house seems to have had no 
lasting effect other than to conceal the desires of the women. Once they think 
he is gone, their desires are openly displayed and expressed.  
De-centring the elsewhere  
In Lucy Bolton’s theorisation of women’s cinema, she uses Irigaray’s concept of 
speculum and bent mirrors as metaphors for a cinematic project to explore the 
inner lives of women.   391
It is my contention that, in likening the filmmaker’s camera to an Irigarayan 
speculum rather than a flat, reflective device, film can be conceived of as a means 
of ‘getting inside’ the subjectivities of women, revealing and examining interiority 
and consciousness.  392
The speculum as device for examining and exploring the not-yet-visual figure of 
the female is here placed in relation to cinematic technique for exploring the 
not-yet-visual. The methods that Bolton suggests articulates a mimetic method 
of undermining the male gaze. 
Mimesis in the work of Irigaray is a strategy of subversive imitation: the idea is that, 
by replicating a scenario or representation in which the female is the object of 
masculine discourse, such replication being effected by a knowing and informed 
woman, the fallacy of the original may be highlighted.  393
 Bolton, 2011.391
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Bolton points out that cinema can be used to produce mimetic challenges to a 
discourse that excludes the feminine as a mirror without its own shape. Bolton 
suggest that haptic cinema could be analysed as mimesis of the female 
corporeal and tactile experience.  
It is possible to consider haptic cinema in this way, in that by factoring the body into 
the cinematic experience one can mimic the specular spectator, but highlight the 
realm of embodiment.  394
Haptic film serves two functions, according to Bolton. First, it displaces the male 
gaze; second, it reveals the place of the spectator as someone quiet and 
disembodied. Bolton is critical of Mulvey’s refusal to develop a feminine cinema. 
“Mulvey called for the destruction of pleasure in the voyeuristic-scopophilic look, 
but did not propose an alternative ‘feminine’ cinematic language.”  Against 395
this, Bolton suggests a theorisation of feminine cinema, where the position of 
the spectator is questioned by the contents of the cinema. Bolton argues that:  
[…] silence might be used to challenge the visibility and accessibility of character 
and to complicate representation and reception. So, silence and pauses, as 
opposed to dialogue, could convey interiority without perhaps requiring obvious 
articulation or representation: just as the spectator watches in silence, so they 
witness the woman on-screen experiencing self-reflection and repose.  396
Silence in cinema is here used as a method of mimetic exploration of the 
feminine relationship to corporeal identity, and also to challenge the position of 
the spectator. By not filling the gap in discourse, by not letting the absence of 
the elsewhere be talked about, this gap or this elsewhere is actualised in the 
pause, in a silence that enables an identification with what cannot be spoken. In 
8 Women, however, there is no end to the words. If they are not speaking, they 
are singing. Like the hysteric, filling the gap out of fear of what might be said if 
silence left space for it. The incessant talking does not mean that there is no 
 Bolton, 2011, p. 42.394
 Bolton, 2011, p. 25.395
 Bolton, 2011, p. 51.396
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space for silence, however. As Powrie suggested in his reading of the 
soundtrack to 5x2, voices have a haptic aspect as well.  The incessant talk 397
and over-saturation of valences functions, like silence, to blur out meaning. In 
turn, this opens up a haptic subjectivity with the characters on screen.  
The insubordinate maid 
In a scene that follows the revelation that Mamy killed her husband and thereby 
deprived her daughter, Augustine of a father, Gaby, wife of the murdered Marcel 
is confronted by Louise, one of the maids in the house. We see Gaby enter the 
room as Louise is giving orders to herself, bossing herself around.  
Louise: Louise, mon manteau, s’il vous plaît. Posez-le moi là… Non plutôt ici ! 
[Louise, my coat, please. Just put it there. No, here instead.] 
As Gaby slams the door, Louise turns around, towards the camera, her eyes are 
not quite directed towards us and she is smoking a cigarette. 
Gaby: Mais à quoi jouez-vous, Louise ? Vous vous prenez pour la maîtresse de 
maison ? [What are you playing at, Louise? Do you think you’re the lady of the 
house?] 
Gaby enters the frame and Louise comes closer, without looking at Gaby directly. 
Louise: Oui. J’en ai marre d’être votre bonne. [Yes. I’m bored of being your maid.] 
As Louise says this, she flicks off some ash from her cigarette, which lands 
outside the frame, presumably on a table. Gaby, shocked, brushes the ash off 
the table. Louise, in return, grabs Gaby’s fur stole and uses it to wipe the table.  
Louise: Vous appelez ça nettoyer ? Mais passez-moi votre chiffon là! je veux que 
ça brille ! [You call that cleaning? Give me that cloth, I want it to shine!] 
Gaby: Non mais vous êtes complèment folle, où vous croyez-vous ? [You are 
crazy, where do you think you are?] 
Louise: Dans une maison assez mal tenu, je dois dire… La maîtresse de maison 
me semble bien légère et faisant preuve de peu d’autorité ! [In a badly managed 
 See Phil Powrie, ‘The Haptic Moment: Sparring with Paolo Conte in Ozon's 5x2,’ 397
2008.
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household, I must say. The lady of the house is incompetent and doesn’t instil any 
authority.] 
Gaby: Mais comment vous permettez-vous de me juger, Je vous rappelle que vous 
êtes mon employee ! [How dare you judge me? I will remind you that you are my 
employee!] 
Louise: Mais si je suis votre employée, ce n’est ni par nécessite, ni pour Monsieur, 
c’est pour vous, Madame… Hélas, vous m’aves déçue aujourd’hui par votre 
attitude, votre manque de poigne, votre médiocrité… [If I’m your employee, it is not 
out of necessity, nor for him, it’s for you, madam. And today I was very 
disappointed with your attitude, your lack of gravitas and your mediocrity.] 
Then Louise exits the frame she shared with Gaby. The camera angle changes 
and we see Louise walk past a window, still with a cigarette in her hand, looking 
slyly in our direction but without meeting our gaze. A sad melody is gradually 
introduced as Louise extinguishes her cigarette in a vase before turning directly 
towards Gaby. She removes her apron whilst walking towards Gaby, who is now 
outside the frame, behind our gaze. Louise’s eyes are finally fixed on Gaby as 
she unties her apron, throws it on the floor, rips off her collar, unties her 
headband and shakes her hair to make it fall naturally. Through this 
transformation, at once seductive and challenging, Louise becomes more like 
Gaby, her bosom is exposed like the lady of the house and her hair falls in a 
similar style, but it is less groomed, like a younger, grittier, and livelier version of 
Gaby. Louise steps on her apron on the floor and a photo slips out of the 
apron’s pocket. Gaby picks it up and asks if this is her former employer. Louise 
confirms and says that she loved her. As Gaby exits the room, the camera 
slides back to Louise, followed by a panoramic transfer to a painting on the wall, 
behind Louise. The painting is of Gaby as a young woman.  398
In this scene, Louise expresses her love for her mistress, a love that she has 
evidently been hiding. She has been Marcel’s lover for five years and it was as 
such that he employed her in the house. But the object of her desire was not 
Marcel, instead it was the woman whose husband she shared and whom she 
relieved from her marital obligations by keeping her husband satisfied (as she 
expressed in a previous scene). 
 The painting is from the cover of Belle de jour, a film from 1967 in which Catherine 398
Deneuve played a housewife who develops a double life where she works as a 
prostitute in an upscale whorehouse in Paris after the war.
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In the beginning of this chapter I suggested that Marcel is not the incarnation of 
Ozon, but instead the incarnation of the Director, the auteur and the genius in 
whose thrall Ozon works. It is also possible to read Marcel as the incarnation of 
the spectator, that absence in the centre of the film. The spectator is also a 
demonic figure for the auteur caught between the genius of past and the 
expectation of new acts of genius. In between the two, is not Louise an 
incarnation of Ozon in the film? Ozon has been the lover of the Director/
Spectator for years, through him he was invited to this doll’s house, driven by a 
will to please his two masters. Louise talks about the pleasures that she was 
able to offer the master of the house, in line with a feminine jouissance that is 
still phallic, masochistic and castrated. But the divine object, the object that was 
really desired, was instead the actress. As the director dies, the directed also 
dies and the divine turns out to be human, just like Louise. As the divine order 
that gave meaning to Louise’s subordination is revealed as an arbitrary division 
between similar humans, between siblings, Gaby becomes the hated other. If 
Young and Beautiful challenged the male gaze, 8 Women challenges Studlar’s 
celebration of the goddess as a masochistic, unattainable object. In the 
absence of the demonic Other, the un-castrated mOther as an escape from the 
threatening castration turns out to be just as hollow. Gaby becomes just another 
woman, serialised, like Mitchell’s siblings, reversing the move form hysteric 
seriality to Oedipal uniqueness. As the never-castrated mother falters, the 
relation between Louise and Gaby instead becomes a social, levelled 
relationship, allowing for identification instead of difference. Louise’s love for 
Gaby, it seems, could only be expressed after its failure. Her love for Gaby was 
based on the distance between them. Once that distance was removed and 
they were equals, the love is lost. As long as Gaby conformed to Louise’s 
fantasy of perfection, she could be loved, but not openly. Gaby’s husband was 
instead used as a proxy for the truly desired object. 
The silence of the maid 
Up until this point, Louise has largely remained silent. At the same time, she is 
offered as a possible point of entry and identification for the spectator. Like us, 
she is invested yet an outsider to the drama. Whereas the other women are 
constantly talking to fill the silence, Louise has been mainly tacit and spoken 
193
about. She is the ‘jeunesse’ whom Marcel preferred to the older ladies and their 
accusations against her go mainly unanswered. Instead, she mainly expresses 
herself through movements and facial expressions. She is the one who finds 
Marcel dead as she walks in to his room with a tray of toast and tea. In the 
scene before she brings it up to his room, she licks the jam of her finger in a 
sensual gesture. This implies not only an aesthetisation of her, but hints at 
hidden pleasures and desires underneath her silence. Implying that this silence 
is not merely the result of the submissiveness demanded by her profession but 
instead a thin cover for something else.  
When Gaby’s sister Augustine faints and Gaby orders Louise to administer her 
injection, Louise reluctantly accepts the order. She argues that it is not her 
place; she is merely the maid and what would happen if people were no longer 
confined to their place? But as Gaby orders her to do it, she submissively 
accepts her mistress’s order and gets ready to give the medication to 
Augustine. As she does so, we see Louise over Augustine’s surprisingly sensual 
underwear, licking her mouth as she penetrates Augustine’s buttock with the 
syringe. The other women are looking on from behind the sofa. Once again, 
Louise acts while the rest of the women are looking on. Louise is the only one 
who expresses her pleasure and this forms a bond between her and the 
spectator. It is through Louise that we are implanted in this scene. The scene 
where Louise licks her moth is reminiscent of the scene where she licked the 
jam off her finger. As the remainder of the cast enact any fear of syringes, the 
maid seems to embody the pleasure of the scene. This specific scene is also a 
representation of the murder scene that we are denied, with its attendant 
sadistic pleasure of stabbing a helpless victim. Louise, and with her the 
spectator, may enjoy the eroticised penetration of Augustine’s skin. As Louise is 
asked to perform this potentially sadistic act, something she only reluctantly 
agrees to, she remains relatively passive, challenging the dualism of the 
sadistic/masochistic positions. The scene upsets heterosexual assumptions of 
desire and also the active/passive dualism. Louise, as both active and passive, 
both masochistic and sadistic, challenges assumptions of stability as well as 
suggesting that there is an active side to masochistic pleasure. She does not 
conform to a notion of feminine desire as passive and, at the same time, she is 
not taking a fully active, masculine position. Instead, her actions remain 
resolutely ambiguous and her expressions of pleasure, like the scene where 
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she licks the jam off her finger, retains an enigmatic function for the spectator. It 
remains unclear what her pleasure and her agenda is. Hence the enigma of the 
murder mystery is transposed onto Louise and, as she is the entry point, the 
way in to the story for the spectator, what happens to her also happens to us. 
Her puzzling expressions resonate with previously implanted enigmatic 
messages in the spectator, triggering attempts at translating. By her various 
gestures, we have to relate to the enigmatic as something haptic, as the self 
touching the self. The one incident where she steps out of her role as a quiet 
and passive maid is given a partial explanation in the scene of insurrection 
described above. The lack of structure in the household undermines Gaby’s 
ideal position of not lacking. Gaby’s order to inject Augustine reveals her 
dependency on Louise, not just to serve, but to do things that her mistress is 
incapable of. 
In Bolton’s argument, a tacit female character may be a tool to invite the 
spectator into the story. By not filling the space with words, the silence shared 
by viewer and character may trigger identification. Furthermore, this 
identification between the spectator and Louise also works through physical 
acting. Louise is very correct in her dealings with her employers, but her disdain 
is ill-concealed. As such, she offers a respite from the over-the-top expressions 
of the other women. Then, by going ‘out of character,’ Louise offers an ironic 
distance to the story, and this distance helps us enjoy the theatricality of the 
other characters. In line with Bolton’s argument, we are allowed to become part 
of the story by means of Louise’s silence and her hinted-at emotions, implied 
through the enigmatic message of her facial expressions. When Louise’s 
relationship with Marcel is first revealed, she is happy to reveal how she was 
able to give him orgasms that he had never before experienced. This reveals a 
desire to satisfy Marcel, to give him pleasure. But is there also an allusion to 
Marcel as a woman in this? In the sexual logic of patriarchy, the male orgasm is 
rarely seen as evasive. Louise’s desire for Gaby, however, follows a different 
logic: this is the desire for the divine, the Other who is not lacking.   
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Being the Other, in the most radical sense, in the sexual relationship, in relation to 
what can be said of the unconscious, woman is that which has a relationship to 
that Other.  399
As Louise discovers Gaby’s inability to live up to the image of the divine Other 
of the Other, Gaby inevitably fails and is emptied. No longer a revered and 
distant object of Louise’s desire, Gaby is reduced to a castrated despot in her 
own home. So what is the position of Gaby in the scene discussed here and 
above? When the scene ends, we are presented with an image of Gaby as a 
young, beautiful and eroticised woman. But this is not through the eyes of 
Louise, instead the painting hangs behind Louise. In a manner, the painting is a 
double of Louise. As Louise removes her symbols of servitude she herself 
becomes both a sexualised object and a sexual subject. Her pleasures have 
been implied throughout the narrative. But in this moment, her desire and 
desirability is in the open rather than in those scenes where the other women’s 
gazes are absent. Louise’s transformation is caused by the failure of Gaby (as 
mother) to remain an incarnation of the Other.  
Lacan’s logic of sexuation as presented in his seminar Encore follows this logic: 
on the male side, for all it is true that they are subjugated the phallic function; on 
the female side, the formula says for not all it is true that they are subjugated to 
the phallic function. Something in the female thus escapes the symbolic and the 
discursive — this social link is dependent on the signifiers that these speaking 
beings are defined by.  
A man is nothing but a signifier. A woman seeks out a man qua signifier (au titre de 
signifiant). A man seeks out a woman qua — and this will strike you as odd — that 
which can only be situated through discourse, since, if what I claim is true — 
namely, that woman is not-whole — there is always something in her that escapes 
discourse.  400
 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, 399
The Limits of Love and Knowledge/Encore, 1972–1973, 1998, p. 81.
 Lacan, 1998, p. 33.400
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Woman, as not-whole, therefore (partially) escapes the discourse, the social link 
that defines her. Woman can therefore only be known through the discourse 
produced by her partial escape from the phallic function. She is the exception 
that forms the link between subjects. How are mother (Gaby) and daughter 
(Louise) to be understood, then? Is there no social link between these two 
women? The rupture in their relationship as a result of the removal of the father 
seems to hint at this. However, it is only through this rupture that the maid 
becomes a subject who speaks for herself. Reminiscent of Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
introduction to Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth — the killing of a 
master is not the death of one but the birth of two subjects. How should we 
understand this social link between two women who are only known through the 
exclusion of the social link? 
The maid in 8 Women has, until this point, been defined as based on her role, 
on her social position rather than by her personality, as opposed to the other 
women in this narrative. Nevertheless, there is a discrepancy between her role 
(maid, servant, employee, if sometimes insubordinate) and her personality 
(seductive, secretive, enjoying). Louise is a canvas that cannot be filled 
immediately. Again, she offers a possible identification for the viewer, her spying 
gaze tends to be present as the story develops. The other maid — Madame 
Chanel — is of course also defined by her role rather than by her personality, 
but this role is not questioned in the same way. Her role does not offer the 
contrast that Louise does. This assignment of roles does offer some evidence 
that Ozon prefers young, white characters. The black maid remains peripheral 
and stereotypical whereas the younger and blonde maid is used to propel the 
narrative and to develop a personality as odds with her role in the household.  
As apparent from the scene with Louise and Gaby, they seem to move fluidly if 
not freely between the masculine and the feminine. This in itself does not 
contradict Lacan’s theorisation of the feminine. Lacan points out that these 
boxes can be inhabited by anyone, man or woman.  
One ultimately situates oneself there by choice — women are free to situate 
themselves there if it gives them pleasure to do so. Everyone knows there are 
phallic women, and that the phallic function doesn’t stop men from being 
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homosexuals. It is, nevertheless, the phallic function that helps them situate 
themselves as men and approach women.   401
One can also situate oneself on the side of the not-whole. There are men who are 
just as good as women. It happens. And who also feel just fine about it. Despite — 
I won’t say their phallus — despite what encumbers them that goes by that name, 
they get the idea or sense that there must be a jouissance that is beyond. Those 
are the ones we call mystics.  402
The sexual division of these bodies happens not in how they place themselves 
in the male/female relation to desire, but in relation to the discourse that define 
them. These discourses place the bodies as secondary effects. The gendered 
body is the effect of the signifier in the discourse. And the discourse that defines 
the others is the discourse of the master. 
Every dimension of being is produced in the wake of the master’s discourse — the 
discourse of he who, proffering the signifier, expects therefrom one of its link 
effects that must not be neglected, which is related to the fact that the signifier 
commands. The signifier is, first and foremost, imperative.  403
In Lacan’s theory of the feminine, there is a different solution to this appellation 
of the discourse; this is the function of The Woman. As she is not whole, she 
escapes the imperative of the master signifier. She is the surplus that escapes. 
In the scene with Louise and Gaby there is no point of identification, Gaby is 
placed in the past as the Other, as the one who escaped the imperative of 
castration. Despite this, we see her now, she is the castrated object of lost 
desire. Louise is desiring but her object is fallen, and the doubling of her by the 
still (dead) image on the wall castrates her, as well as the repetition of her lost 
object. This scene repeats an aspect of the maternal Thing in the Oedipal 
situation. The mother is discovered to have already been castrated. Her escape 
from castration is revealed as false. Once the words of desire are able to be 
 Lacan, 1998, p. 71.401
 Lacan, 1998, p. 76.402
 Lacan, 1998, p. 32.403
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spoken, it is already too late. This point is further emphasised in the following 
scene, where we return to Augustine, sitting in front of three angled mirrors. We 
see her from behind as well as fractured in the three mirrors. In one of them, our 
gaze is met by hers. From the setting we are led to believe that she is about to 
transform herself. Just like Louise, after this scene she returns to the rest of the 
women with an elaborate dress and hairstyle. But this change is only superficial. 
Once the other women have acted out their surprise they return to treating 
Augustine as they did before her transformation. As in the scene between Gaby 
and Louise, this female jouissance is not locked to a female body. Rather, 
female jouissance or jouissance beyond the (lack of the) phallic is a mode that 
enables a different solution of the Oedipus complex, one not confined to the 
castration of the master’s discourse.  
As this solution is not a metaphor that ties the imaginary with the symbolic and 
the real to form an interlinked subject, this solution must be understood in a 
different way. In a later seminar, Lacan develops a theory for a subject where 
these links are not tied together. Instead, Lacan inserts the sinthome to keep 
the symbolic, real and imaginary tied together. The sinthome functions on a 
level similar to the real, as a repressed linkage. It is the necessary link that 
takes on the function of the impossibility of a meta-language, or the Other of the 
Other, as Lacan called it. As there can be no outer guarantee or link to hold the 
symbolic and the imaginary together, Lacan invented various exclusions to link 
these. Woman as excluded in order to form the negation of the social link as 
discourse is one of these incarnations. The real with its link to the maternal 
Thing is another. The sinthome is an attempt to imagine a subjectivity of this 
excluded that, even so, forms the social link. 
To have a relationship with one’s ow body as though it were foreign is certainly a 
possibility, one that is expressed by the use of the verb to have. One has one’s 
body. To no extent is it something that one is. This is what makes one believe in the 
soul, and there is no reason to stop there. So, one thinks that one has a soul, 
which really tops it all. The form that this dropping of the relationship with the body 
takes for Joyce is, however, altogether suspicious for an analyst. This idea of the 
self, the self as a body, carries weight. This is what is called the Ego.  404
 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII: The Sinthome, 1975–1976, 404
2016, p. 129.
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The relationship to the body in Joyce’s writing (and life) is suspicious to Lacan. 
Lacan claims that the body for Joyce has a function that is not included in this 
identification with an image and the relation between the signifier (symbolic) and 
the signified (imaginary) as secondary. In the case of Joyce, this relationship is 
distinct. It is one of love. 
The Ego is said to be narcissistic because, at a certain level, there is something 
that supports the body as an image. In the case of Joyce, however, isn’t the fact 
that the image is not involved on this occasion the sign that the Ego has an 
extremely particular function for him? And how is this to be set down in my Node 
Bo?  405
The Node Bo is merely the translation of the following, which I was reminded of 
yesterday evening — love, and into the bargain the love that one may qualify as 
eternal, is addressed to the function of the father, in the name of the fact that he is 
the bearer of castration. This at least is what Freud puts forward in Totem and 
Taboo through his reference to the primal horde. The sons love the father to the 
very extent that they are deprived of women.  406
The ego in Joyce is here described as following the function of love rather than 
of identification. Lacan defines love as the feeling the horde has for the father 
as he deprived them of women. Women are representations of the impossibility 
of Woman, or God. The Father has a relation to the representations of God and 
the horde loves the Father as guarantor for the deprivation of the consuming 
relation to the (m)Other/God. The ego, or the relation to the body, follows this 
function in Joyce; Lacan argues here for a loss of relation that is more 
primordial than the loss of the Name-of-the-Father, the loss of the body as non-
discursive, as the feminine or as Woman. This relationship to the body touches 
on an effort to understand jouissance beyond the phallic, a jouissance that 
Lacan had previously placed on the side of the feminine. 
 Lacan, 2016, p. 129.405
 Lacan, 2016, p. 130.406
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But Lacan does not connect these dots, he does not critically review his own 
model of sexuation through this theorisation of feminine jouissance. Sexuation 
is understood as a symptom, as a result of a functional Oedipus complex. 
However, in his turn towards the sinthome, Lacan attempts to understand the 
surplus that has been displaced in the hysteric and in the feminine. But instead 
of investigating sexuation and the sexed body, Lacan turns to the language of 
Joyce, of the associational surplus of language that reaches the limit of the 
symbolic. Where Lacan seems to look for the beyond of language in Joyce’s 
fragmented language, Irigaray finds it both in the failure of language and in 
tactile, bodily experiences.  
In Irigaray’s usage of mimesis, she explicitly aims at renegotiating the feminine, 
yet she refuses to define the feminine, leaving the feminine as a surplus. She 
argues that the feminine should be understood in tactile rather than scopic 
formulations.  The scopic, on a level of identification is, according to Irigaray, 407
phallomorphic — it searches for the phallic marker and turns away in horror 
from the lack thereof on the female body. Irigaray mimics a phallocentric logic in 
order to undermine the assumptions of that logic. As opposed to Lacan and his 
reading of Joyce, Irigaray does not focus on the word and the disruption of logic 
within language; she concentrates instead on the body as a tactile instrument. 
In particular, she foregrounds the female body and its sex that is not visible, in 
its hidden form it accentuates the tactile aspect, the self-touching aspect of this 
sex which is not one.  
This organ which has nothing to show for itself also lacks a form of its own. And if 
woman takes pleasure precisely from this incompleteness of form which also 
allows her organ to touch itself over and over again, indefinitely, by itself, that 
pleasure is denied by a civilization that privileges phallomorphism.  408
This touching aspect without a discernible object is mimicking Lacan’s 
positioning of the feminine as object a and an attempt at taking a morphology of 
the female body to move towards a re-evaluation of the feminine. In Bolton’s 
reading of Irigaray, we can produce images that reveal and enable a self-
 See Irigaray, 1985b [1977].407
 Irigaray, 1985b [1977], p. 26.408
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reflection in women that corresponds to this self-touching, which might be used 
to undermine a phallocentric culture. Mimesis is here a tool for revealing the 
fallacy of masculine discursivity.  But mimesis as a tactile aspect also 409
indicates the boundaries of identification and the narcissistic aspect of the 
bodily self. By mimicking the feminine in Lacanian discourse, Irigaray explores 
this category as an aspect that has been suppressed through a focus on the 
phallic. Now, the phallic is read as the master signifier that guarantees the 
submission to castration on a symbolic level, and the feminine as the position 
that (partially) escapes the master signifier’s order. If that is so, then the 
feminine, as tactile and as non-scopic, is something more than the revelation of 
the fallacy of a phallocentric order and the possibility of female self-reflection. It 
reveals the absence of a possible identification between the characters and 
between the spectator and the characters. This is a different usage of mimesis, 
one that point to the limits of identification rather than towards a utopian 
feminine identity. Tactile, objectless feminine pleasure instead points towards a 
disruption of identification.  
Woman derives pleasure from what is so near that she cannot have it, nor have 
herself. She herself enters into a ceaseless exchange of herself with the other 
without any possibility of identifying either.  410
This proximity to the self and the other does not let in any light, no spectator is 
let in and difference is negotiated not as differentiation but as subtle surfaces, 
as meeting points that do not conform to the phallic master’s discourse. These 
differences work on a subtle, excessive level, where the Oedipal separation of 
the imaginary, symbolic and the real has not been achieved. And as the 
separation has not been achieved, they cannot be linked together. In this 
perspective, the feminine is thus linked through bodily traces that they define, 
but not bound by them. The example of the female sex that Irigaray uses is 
based not only on the physical reality of the female sex but on the interpretation 
or signification of this sex. As it is the sex that is not visible, symbolically it has 
 See Bolton, 2011, p. 47, see also quote above. 409
 Irigaray, 1985b [1977], p. 31.410
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been withheld from identification, and it therefore lends itself to speculations 
about the excluded. 
Conclusion 
I have outlined a model where sexual difference is to be understood as the 
result of a foreclosure through rupture, as opposed to gender as the result of a 
return to the self through a masochistic turn. This turn is not an event but the 
result of a being-with an enigmatic alterity. This being-with is not reducible to 
identification, nor incorporation through what Irigaray and Butler see as a 
melancholic turn towards the self. Yet, between Gaby and Louise sexual 
difference is exchanged, transformed and replaced with a fluidity that the 
foreclosure of sexual difference should not allow.  
This scene, read in this way, presents a critique of the model of sexual 
difference as foreclosure and suggests instead a different model of sexual 
difference. In Irigaray’s tactile formation of the feminine, the distance between 
the self and the self implodes so that there is no room for light, no room for a 
visuality to take place. In Lacan’s formulation of the sinthome, a similar collapse 
of the relationship to the self as body is suggested, where a body is something 
that one has, not is. One is never identical with one’s self. This harks back to 
our initial discussion of the split of the self. It also echoes Lacan’s early 
definition of sexual difference, where man seeks to have the phallus while 
woman seeks to be the phallus. The self that assumes to be the body, to refuse 
the split, is therefore incarnating woman’s position and is excluded from 
discourse. Yet Joyce speaks, he creates meaning. This suggests a possibility of 
meaning beyond castration. This notion is taken up by Ettinger and, as already 
noted in the present thesis, she develops her concept of the matrixial border 
space to negotiate Irigaray’s tactile non-visuality and Lacan’s concept of the 
sinthome as possibilities for meaning ‘beyond’ castration. 
The matrixial borderspace, modelled on the intra-uterine relation between the 
mother and infant, may help to articulate what is going on between Louise and 
Gaby. Their exchanges suggests an identification, or rather a merger between 
the two. This merger does not place them on a continual, hereditary line. After 
the drama and once the snow has melted, Louise will not take her master’s 
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place. Their differences through merger and through simile is a temporary 
failure of the function of sexual difference as I have defined it here. The two can 
never meet, except for this temporary failure of their selves to uphold the 
difference that make them distinct.  
Ettinger’s definition of ‘sexual difference’ is the (non) difference of the 
intrauterine contact between infant and mother — two selves in the waiting. 
Sexual difference in this sense is closer to a self touching itself without being 
able to visualise this and therefore form itself. This conflation of two distinct 
experiences of the self in the same term can be confusing, but rather than 
reading this as an unfortunate confusion in Ettinger’s terminology, I suggest that 
this confusion is an illustration of sexual difference as tactile and fluid, not yet 
conceived of beyond castration or beyond the phallus. This beyond — again — 
does not contradict the phallic, castrating aspect of Louise’s and Gaby’s 
relationship, their differences places them on different planes, unable to have 
rapport. The temporary renegotiation and merger of the two women is possible 
beyond castration, in that room where Louise’s transformation is enacted. 
Sexual difference in that space is the sexual difference of two selves in the 
making, two selves that are not yet, whilst temporarily occupying the same 
space. 
In this chapter, 8 Women has been used to engage critically with the feminine 
and with sexual difference. Through a close reading of the conflictual scene 
between Louise and Gaby, the notion of sexual difference as an escape from a 
porous sibling-like relationship was challenged. Louise and Gaby seem to 
suggest a different direction of this movement, a direction where the failure of 
an Oedipal situation instead leads to a temporary sibling-like relationality. 
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6 Rats and Shit, the Limits of Masochism 
If the sexual is, at the most 
primitive level, the attempted 
replication of a shattering (or 
psych ica l l y t raumat iz ing) 
p leasure , a r t […] i s the 
attempted replication of that 
replication.  
Leo Bersani  
The Freudian Body: 
Psychoanalysis and Art 
In the previous chapters I have discussed sibling relations and the maternal 
through an engagement with hysteria, femininity, maternal and paternal law. 
These discussions have also further informed and developed the concept of 
spectatorship. Ozon’s films have helped illustrate these issues but they also 
suggest new readings of the feminine and sibling relations. In this chapter, I will 
focus on the father in Ozon’s cinema and the relationship between masochism 
and sadism. The sadistic father as a limit to the masochistic fantasy of a sadistic 
father will be investigated on the basis of a number of father figures in Ozon’s 
cinema. In this chapter there will be a greater focus on the normative and 
antinormative. This is because the films discussed seemingly break the tacit 
contract between spectator and film assumed in masochistic spectatorship 
theory. The films in question leave the spectator with an excess of emotions and 
affect, interrogating genre norms in violent ways. 
Masochistic spectatorship has been used to formulate a critique of the active/
sadistic or male gaze in earlier theories of spectatorship. Sadism, on the level of 
the presumed origin of the film, will be explored in this chapter to extend this to 
the very real pain and discomfort caused to the viewer by films in extreme 
cinema. As discussed previously, Deleuze and Deleuzian spectatorship models 
emphasise that the sadist and the masochist are not complementary positions 
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and challenge the Freudian argument that masochism is sadism turned inward 
or turned back on itself. In Deleuze’s model, the masochist remains in control 
and in his study of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch he highlights the male 
protagonists’ ability to scrip and thereby remain the master of their fantasies of 
withheld pleasure and pain.  
Norms and normativity  
As already discussed briefly, Wiegman and Wilson have pointed out an 
allegiance between queer theory and antinormativity. Critical of this, they 
question what would happen if queer theory were disinvested from this desire to 
align itself with antinormativity. Building on Foucault’s critique of repressive 
models of power and normativity, Wiegman and Wilson criticises the anti-
normative stance of queer theory for painting the normative as unrealistically 
rigid and stale.  
Our hypothesis is this: antinormative stances project stability and immobility onto 
normativity. In so doing, they generate much of the political tyranny they claim 
belongs (over there) to regimes of normativity. For in taking a stand against 
normativity, antinormative analyses must reduce the intricate dynamics of norms to 
a set of rules and coercions that everyone ought, rightly, to contest.   411
By making the normative rigid and vilified, the queer project disregards the 
changeability and the complexity of norms, posing the normative as the 
opposite of what is assumed to be queer. This positioning of queer and 
normativity as opposites disregards the interconnections between the two and 
produces the normative as fixed. Wiegman and Wilson argue that, following 
Foucault, the normative and antinormative are not opposing forces but rather 
interlocking movements that produce each other. In the field of queer studies, 
the normative is made passive, receptive to whatever projections those with an 
antinormative stance wish to fight. Wiegman and Wilson point out that “these 
lifeless norms (e.g., heteronormativity) don’t stand prior to our antinormative 
 Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth A. Wilson, ‘Introduction: Antinormativity’s Queer 411
Conventions,’ in differences, 2015, p. 13.
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analyses, awaiting diagnosis; rather, they are one of our own inventions.”  412
Antinormative practices thus produce the normative as an imagined other.  
Antinormativity is antinormative, then, in a way that it presumably does not intend: 
it turns systemic play (differentiations, comparisons, valuations, attenuations, 
skirmishes) into unforgiving rules and regulations and so converts the complexity of 
moving athwart into the much more anodyne notion of moving against.  413
Antinormativity is antinormative in the sense that normativity is in itself flexible 
and ever changing, while antinormativity produces the normative as what is 
inflexible and without complexity. In so doing, the antinormative stance 
produces two fixed opponents, undermining the flexibility that is inherent in the 
normative, at least according to Foucault’s theory of the deployment of 
sexuality. Antinormativity is thus antinormative by creating an opposition devoid 
of the flexibility and dynamic processes of the normative. This remapping of the 
normative and antinormative proposes the normative as a dynamic field, the 
range and grasp of which should be altered rather than undermined. Wiegman 
and Wilson describe normativity as “a structure of proliferations: some of these 
normative proliferations duplicate already existing terms, some twist those 
terms or minimize or amplify or warp them.”  This description of the normative 414
follows Foucault’s sense that the deployment of sexuality is both a production of 
knowledge, a proliferation of sexuality and sex, which serves as the ontological 
assumption of sexuality. 
This discussion also highlights some of the issues discussed in the Preface to 
this thesis. The trope ‘always already’ was there discussed as a closing off of 
the history and changeability of a norm and the incorporation of a self or a 
statement within the citationality. Diana Fuss was quoted arguing that this trope 
function to let essentialism in through the back door. Fuss is not, however, 
unequivocally for or against essentialisation, whether is sneaks in the back door 
or not. Distinguishing between what she calls real and nominal essentialism, 
Fuss makes the argument that essentialism is not as stable as anti-essentialists 
 Wiegman and Wilson, 2015, p. 13.412
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make out. “To insist that essentialism is always and everywhere reactionary is, 
for the constructionism to buy into essentialism in the very act of making the 
charge; it is to act as if essentialism has an essence.”  Similarly to Wiegman 415
and Wilson, Fuss makes the argument that essentialism is made reactionary, 
stable and ultimately essentialist through the argument of anti-essentialism. As 
such, the anti-essentialist and the anti-normative stances foreclose the 
possibility of using these norms or essences. They are instead seen as always 
already problematic and always already fixed in their meaning. Through 
discussions of the feminine and masochism I have shown how normative and 
essential imagery — of submissiveness and subjugation — can be deployed to 
produce something unintentional. In the Preface I used Braidotti’s argument for 
a desire for being as more primary than the subversion of being as well as 
Sedgwick’s notion of periperformatives to challenge the stability of the 
normative and the presumed essence of the being aspired to. Fuss argues that 
Irigaray’s return to morphological metaphors of the feminine should be 
understood as a metonymic deployment of nominal essentialism — in other 
words a destabilising project aimed at the exclusion that is being quoted. “For 
Irigaray […] women are engaged in the process of both constructing and 
deconstructing their identities, their essences, simultaneously.”  Fuss makes 416
this argument in relation to Irigaray’s notion of parler-femme and masculine and 
feminine syntaxes. I have argued against this step as I see this as a link to 
Irigaray’s more positivist (and real essentialising in Fuss’s vocabulary) 
tendencies. I have shown how Studlar’s notion of female masochism becomes 
problematic as it fixes the subjugated position by separating and then conflating 
woman and feminine. My project is focused on the self and the dethroning of 
the ego as a completed entity — an always already achieved being — and 
instead open this self up to affectability and continuous negotiations, goings 
astray and puzzlement at re-discovering a self that is not quite familiar. For this, 
I have been mining discussions of masochism to challenge the established self 
and the dichotomy of active/passive pleasures and readings. For this project, I 
have been less interested in morphologies in Irigaray’s metonymic language 
and more interested in the metaphors of affectability and incomplete ego-
formation that her studies of subjugation and exclusion led her to.  
 Fuss, 1989, p. 21.415
 Fuss, 1989, p. 70.416
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A body of resistance  
In Foucault’s model of the deployment of sexuality, bodies and pleasures are 
described as both the object of and the limitation to any knowledge of sexuality. 
This led him declare that bodies and pleasures are points of resistance to the 
deployment of sexuality.  As the desired object of knowledge, the body and its 417
pleasure function as an ideal point that is sought but always escapes the prying 
eye of the will to know. Bodies and pleasures in their undetermined plural form 
constitute Foucault’s attempt to formulate a ‘beyond’ of the power that produces 
the subject to be known. In this thesis, I have used the ‘feminine’ to name this 
‘beyond.’ The bodies and pleasures of Foucault are not ‘beyond’ in the sense 
that they are excluded from the work of power, nor are they a different layer as 
the matrixial borderspaces. Instead, bodies and pleasures are the unformed 
matter out of which power shapes subjects. In this analogy, the bodies and 
pleasures resemble the shapelessness of the chora or the feminine matter out 
of which selves are shaped by the addition of forms. By invoking Foucault, I 
wish to ask what power is returned in the formation of the self and also how 
power as external norms functions in that process.  
My argument is that the melancholic foreclosure of Butler’s gender formation is 
incompatible with the continuation of bodies and pleasures, or with the feminine 
as a tactile return to the self as not yet shaped. This aspect demands a return to 
the self ‘beyond’ foreclosure — this is in my argument the continuous return to 
the self through affective contact with an enigmatic alterity. This formation of the 
self is not absolute and therefore does not end, nor does it ever form a self that 
is definite. It is forever open to the enigmatic other. The body is what escapes 
only insofar as what is excluded, like Fuss’s argument above, the body is 
produced as that which escapes knowledge, therefore embodying the enigmatic 
that escapes translation. This model, then, takes into account the excluded and 
the limits to the proliferation of the normative. The body in Foucault’s work 
functions as an evasive target for the creation of knowledge, but also as what is 
never an integral part of knowledge. The body serves as what is outside the 
 “The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought 417
not to be sex desire, but bodies and pleasures.” Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, 
Vol 1: The Will to Knowledge, 1998 [1976],  p. 157.
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discursive production of knowledge but it is also what motivates this 
production.  418
This chapter will analyse the normative as a process of expansion and 
absorption, both as reductive processes and via its potential for altering 
normativity. I will focus on Ozon’s See the Sea and Sitcom, two films deploying 
disruptions of norms. In different ways, these films enact notions of the 
normative and the anti-normative. This analysis will also open up a wider 
discussion of this thematic occurrence in Ozon’s cinema. The different 
formulations of the ‘limits’ or ‘beyond’ of norms and language also serve as an 
opportunity to refine further my definition of the ‘feminine’ as an elsewhere, as 
pursued across this thesis. In the previous chapter, this was examined in 
relation to Lacan’s notion of the sinthome as well as Irigaray’s tactility as the 
expression of a refused visuality.  
The masochistic spectator 
As discussed earlier, Studlar has developed theories of masochistic aesthetics 
and the masochistic spectator based on Deleuze’s critique of Freud’s reduction 
of masochism to inverted sadism. Studlar sees the spectator as involved in 
masochistic pleasure based on the pre-Oedipal relationship to the maternal 
object, not the Oedipal model of scopophilic pleasure as related to paternal 
control. This move away from the Oedipal model challenges the phallic 
economy where woman is defined as lack. Studlar writes in opposition to 
Mulvey:  
[In Mulvey,] Spectatorship is determined solely by the workings of the castration 
complex which constructs the female into an image of threatening lack, a passive, 
fetishized object in a theoretical construct of immutable polarities.  419
 Foucault’s distinction between the soul and the body is further revealed in the 418
following quotation: “The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the 
soul is the prison of the body.” Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, 1995 [1975], p. 30.
 Studlar, 1988, p. 37.419
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Against this reduction of the spectator and of the pleasure available for the 
spectator, Studlar posts masochistic pleasure. This is rooted not in castration 
fear but in a pre-Oedipal relation to the mother. In this pre-Oedipal phase, the 
mother is not yet associated with lack.  
In returning to fantasies that have their origin in the prephallic, prelinguistic, 
pregenital stage of development, the masochistic aesthetic suggests that all of film 
may be capable of forming spectatorial pleasures divorced from castration fear and 
sexual difference defined exclusively on feminine lack.  420
The masochistic realm is thus posited as an alternative theory for spectatorial 
pleasure unburdened by castration and its association of the feminine with lack. 
As discussed in the introduction to the present thesis, Studlar argues that the 
masochist clings on to the female as an ideal, rather than an object to be 
consumed, destroyed or fucked, this idealisation leads — in Studlar’s argument 
— to “an almost desexualized contemplation.”  In this challenge to Mulvey, 421
Studlar underscores the pleasure to be had in contemplation. To contemplate 
the object of desire is to remain at a distance, to delay satisfaction indefinitely 
rather than consuming the desired object. Studlar’s argument, however, seems 
to assume that the mother is lacking and that it is only through distant 
contemplation that lack can be kept a bay. In effect, in their attempts to reread 
the mother as a desexualised, ideal object, Studlar and Deleuze confirm the 
phallocentric reading of the mother as lacking, something that can only be 
contemplated as desexualised, always kept at a safe distance so as not to risk 
discovering that lack.   
Studlar sketches out spectatorial pleasures devoid of the phallic and sadistic. 
But this only reveals the underlying assumption of a phallus that the idealised 
object does not have. Studlar calls it ‘an almost desexualized contemplation.’ 
This contemplation allows pleasure (almost) devoid of sex. Certainly, such 
desexualised contemplation may be found in Ozon’s cinema, in the fascination 
with nudity and juvenile beauty, whether masculine or feminine, and a seeming 
lack of interest in the sexual act. This was discussed earlier in this thesis in 
 Studlar, 1988, p. 29.420
 Studlar, 1988, p. 22.421
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relation to the sex scenes in Young and Beautiful, which are remarkably devoid 
of erotization. Such a relationship to the other is also at play between Louise 
and Gaby in 8 Women. The end of Louise’s love for Gaby was caused by the 
collapse of a desexualised contemplation of her beauty, a contemplation that 
needed the distance offered by Marcel. 
At this point in the argument it is important to note that, in the masochistic 
subject’s attempts to conceal, deny and delay pleasure, this type of subject 
merges or at least negotiates the passive/active distinction. The object of desire 
is supposed to be the active part, yet the object also follows a script, namely the 
subject’s fantasy. This contradictory nature of masochistic pleasure is further 
developed in Studlar’s essay ‘Visual Pleasure and the Masochistic Aesthetics’. 
Here, she points out the ambivalence inherent in the child’s relation to the 
mother.  
In Deleuze's view, the mother is regarded with ambivalence. She is both love 
object and controlling agent for the dependent child.  422
As masochistic pleasure originates in this ambivalent relationship, it continues 
to be inhabited by this ambivalence about the object of desire. In Studlar’s 
critique of Deleuze, she points out that he, like Freud, assumes that the 
masochistic subject is male and that, in this case, masochism is a perversion. 
The female subject, as we have seen, is considered to be already masochistic. 
Like Freud, Deleuze positions the male as the fantasizing masochistic subject in 
his study. This exclusion of the female subject might be taken as a sexist limitation 
to Deleuze's analysis, but Deleuze is quick to point out that the female can assume 
the same position in relation to the central figure of the fantasy — the oral 
mother.  423
Studlar goes beyond this afterthought of equivalence, so typical of Freud and 
also seemingly adopted by Deleuze. In her usage of the masochistic subject, 
 Studlar, ‘Visual Pleasure and the Masochistic Aesthetics,’ in Journal of Film and 422
Video, 1985, p. 7.
 Studlar, 1985, p. 7.423
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the ambivalence of the object relation becomes a means of theorising the 
fluidity and ambivalence in gender identification.  
  
Through the mobility of multiple, fluid identifications, the cinematic apparatus 
allows the spectator to experience the pleasure of satisfying "the drive to be both 
sexes" that is repressed in everyday life dominated by secondary process.  424
Thus the masochistic spectator moves away from one identification into an 
ambivalent identification/desire, with the cathartic pleasure of being able to live 
out the drive to be both sexes through the pleasure of cinema. Aaron expands 
on such pleasures in her development of the term masochistic spectatorship. 
Masochism here functions to pull the viewer into the story. As a function of the 
narrative film, masochism relates to suspense and our desire to discover. But 
also a desire not to know, a desire to not be satisfied.  
Suspense, then, further normalises or popularises masochism; it gives masochism 
a (narrative) method. It reveals much about the machinations of spectatorship, for 
where masochism can be attributed to the experience of both characters and 
spectators, suspense is spectatorial.  425
Suspense normalises the function of masochism. Whereas Studlar’s use of the 
term generally relates to identification with characters, Aaron relates it to 
narrative unfolding. She is not here in opposition to Studlar or Deleuze because 
both point out that masochism has a close relation to the narrative. But 
Deleuze’s relation to the narrative tends to be subordinate to the object of 
desire/identification, as the narrative functions to postpone the pleasure to be 
derived from the object. For Aaron, suspense is not necessarily the 
postponement of pleasure derived from an object, but from a mechanism within 
the narrative itself. For Studlar, the spectator may be entangled in ambivalent 
relations to the objects on the screen, but these objects remain gendered and 
related to the feminine. This explains why, though Studlar is critical of both 
Mulvey’s and Deleuze’s blind spots about sexual division, there is still a problem 
 Studlar, 1985, p. 13.424
 Aaron, 2007, p. 71.425
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in this argument in relation to gendered language about the mother and the 
feminine. 
The masochistic fetish signifies the attempt to reconstruct the mother as 
inseparable plenitude and returns the subject to the eroticized transitional object 
marking the point of departure from her.  426
Aaron here focuses on the structural dimension of masochism, on suspense, 
rather than the relational, and on the mother and transitional objects. This 
means that Aaron’s usage of masochist spectatorship is transferrable both to 
cinematic structures and to cinematic objects.  
The spectator’s body 
As noted earlier in this thesis, Marks developed the concept of haptic visuality to 
theorise the effects images can have on an incorporated viewer by engaging 
with memories.  She points out that her definition of the body is not outside 427
the cultural, rather she is interested in “the culture within the body”.  This 428
points to a non-symbolised aspect of meaning. And this, in turn, is related to 
Marks’s usage of mimesis, as a means of relating to the world and to meaning 
without referring to the symbolic.  
Not all accounts of mimesis or of tactile epistemology call for a return to a state 
before language and before representation. They do, however, insist that symbolic 
representation is not the sole source of meaning.  429
Using these definitions of the body, meaning and mimetic approaches to the 
world, it is possible to understand Marks’s separation of two types of vision: one 
 Studlar, 1988, p. 43.426
 Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film, 2000.427
 Marks, 2000, p. 145.428
 Marks, 2000, p. 141.429
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haptic and the other optic.  Haptic and optic visuality are both related to 430
seeing, but the haptic is closer to touch in its involvement of the body in the 
perception of the world. On the haptic side of the scale, meaning is 
communicated through mimetic experiences in the body rather than a symbolic 
communication. A further distinction that Marks makes is between haptic 
imagery and haptic visuality, defining the difference as “a film or video (or 
painting or photograph) may offer haptic images, while the term haptic visuality 
emphasizes the viewer's inclination to perceive them.”  A picture is haptic if it 431
entices the viewer into an embodied reaction. “The haptic image forces the 
viewer to contemplate the image itself instead of being pulled into narrative.”  432
The haptic image is here contrasted with the narrative/symbolic aspect of 
visuality. An image is haptic if it forces the viewer into closeness, if it forces the 
viewer to interpret the picture surface on its own. Marks exemplifies with images 
that are too grainy, too close or too blurry to be easily interpreted. These pull the 
viewer in, pushing the viewer towards more intimate means of interpreting such 
imagery.  
See the Sea 
This was Ozon’s longest film at the time of its making. After a number of short 
films, See the Sea has the unusual length of fifty-two minutes. As so many of 
Ozon’s films, this film is set by the beach in the summer. We first encounter a 
mother with a child. The mother, Sasha, is played by Sasha Hails and her child, 
Sioffra, is Hails’s own daughter Samantha. The mother speaks English to her 
child and we watch the two in long shots as the mother tends to her child. 
Though the scenery is idyllic, the lack of dialogue creates a claustrophobic 
feeling further enhanced by the sounds of crickets and the scorching sun. 
When we are finally introduced to another adult character, it is the rough-looking 
backpacker Tatiana, played by Marina de Van. De Van was also involved in 
writing the script and she has continued as an actress, writer and director, often 
starring in her own productions. Tatiana is first seen walking on a ridge behind 
 Marks, 2000, p. 129.430
 Marks, 2000, p. 162.431
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the sunbathing mother and child out of view for Sasha, but revealed as a 
silhouette traversing the scene for the spectator. The placement of Tatiana 
above and behind Sasha, away from the beach and fully dressed with a 
backpack, alerts the viewer to the impending danger that she poses as well as 
the difference between the two women. They occupy different planes and 
different spaces and they are presented differently through their dress. In a 
subsequent scene, Tatiana abruptly bangs on Sasha’s door, demanding rather 
than asking, to set up her tent in the garden. Sasha first refuses, claiming that 
her husband has to make that decision. Tatiana does not take no for an answer 
and Sasha finds herself accepting the request to use her garden as a camping 
ground. Despite how Tatiana is presented to the spectator, Sasha invites her for 
dinner and later lets her look after her child. In a later scene, Sasha invites 
Tatiana to use the bathroom, where we see Tatiana smoke, shit and take a bath. 
She then takes Sasha’s toothbrush and dips it in the toilet bowl, rubbing it 
against the shit that had apparently not been flushed.  
Sasha’s fascination with Tatiana grows throughout the film, despite Tatiana’s 
aggressive behaviour, Tatiana is depicted as oblivious of all the markers of 
threat and danger that are presented to the viewer. Sasha’s apparent naiveté is 
further emphasised when she finds Tatiana’s notebook with deranged scribbles 
but still continues to invite the visitor into the house and to entrust her with her 
daughter.  After the toilet scene, the two women are shown sitting on the beach, 
Tatiana tells Sasha about a forest close by, where men meet up for casual sex. 
When Tatiana abruptly leaves, Sasha soon leaves her sleeping child on the 
beach to explore the woods. She observes various men having sex before 
having a stranger perform cunnilingus on her. This scene is strange in a number 
of ways. First of all, the beach, which has up until then been a place for Sasha 
and her daughter, a place of bright sunshine and somewhat claustrophobic 
intimacy. This is contrasted by the murky forrest and the men in there. But the 
contrast between the two spaces is not kept separate. As Saha leaves her 
daughter on her own, a sense of danger infects the beach too. It is also 
noteworthy that this is the only time we see other actors in this film. The 
beaches and the landscapes are barren and empty of people, except for this 
murky haven of men looking for anonymous sex. It raises the question if this is 
a fantasy of intimacy with Tatiana displaced onto the sinful forrest full of sexually 
available men.  
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Back in the house, we find out that Sasha’s husband is expected to come the 
following day. Sasha invites Tatiana to spend the night in the house, assuring 
her that her husband will not mind. We then see Sasha and her child, asleep in 
bed. Tatiana enters the room and looks at them, tears rolling down her cheeks, 
before she undresses and walks towards the bed. 
In the next shot, it is daytime, Sasha’s husband is dropped off outside the house 
where he sees Tatiana’s red tent. He looks at it with a confused expression 
before entering the house, calling for Sasha. After having looked in all the 
rooms, he leaves the house and returns to the tent. He asks if anyone is in 
there but gets no answer. As he opens the tent he sees Sasha’s body, tied up 
and naked, covered in blood from what seems to be a series of cuts. Again, 
there are hints at lesbian desire before the spectator is confronted with this 
terrifying scene. Like the forrest, the scene where Tatiana undresses and goes 
to bed with Sasha is dark and is contrasted with the daylight in the following 
scene. If Saha’s desire for Tatiana took place in a displaced fantasy, its potential 
realisation have some terrifying consequences. By mixing these levels of fear of 
the stranger, fear of homosexual desire and the breaking up of the mother-child 
bond, this film produces an uncomfortable amalgam of emotions in the 
spectator. In the final scene, Tatiana is standing on a ferry, holding a crying baby 
as the camera moves away into a panoramic view of the ship and the ocean. 
Sitcom 
In Sitcom, the crime is committed in the opening scene rather than at the end of 
the film. It begins with a theatrical curtain-opening that reveals a large, white 
house with a lush garden. A car enters and drives up to the house, a man steps 
out and enters. The camera leaves the viewer outside, looking at the house, 
while hearing singing from the inside. The sound of a family singing “happy 
birthday Papa” is too clear to have been transported through thick walls, placing 
our hearing in a more intimate relation with the family than our eyes. In contrast 
to the more realistic See the Sea, this sonic illogicality further enhances the 
sense of fantastical creation already suggested by the theatre curtain. The 
singing is then interrupted and we hear voices asking “Why? Why Papa?” 
followed by screams and gunshots. A subtitle then informs us that we are 
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transported to a few months before this event. The drama that we heard but 
were not allowed to see becomes the first narrative device and drives a 
spectatorial will to know. The past functions as a restaging of the future, and the 
camera now takes us inside the house. As beautiful and white on the inside as it 
was on the outside, we encounter the mother (Évelyne Dandry) who is 
instructing her new maid (Lucia Sanchez). The spectator is also introduced to 
her son Nicolas (Adrien de Van) and daughter Sophie (Marina de Van), who is 
being visited by her partner, David (Stéphane Rideau). 
De Van returns in this cast from See the Sea and is joined by her brother, who 
plays her character’s brother. In this role, Marina de Van looks diametrically 
different form the outcast Tatiana. At least initially, in Sitcom, she looks like the 
perfect upper-class daughter.  
We are then confronted by a few stormy shots, where we are introduced to the 
family in a manner reminiscent of the glossy, overexposed cinematography of a 
domestic sitcom. The father (François Marthouret) enters the house and 
announces he has a gift. As we are already aware of his future crime, his 
appearance is foreboding and the bringing of a gift further underscores the link 
with his own birthday a few months later. The gift he has brought turns out to be 
a white lab rat from work. The story then unfolds with the rat as the new 
narrative centre. As each of the characters come into contact with the rat they 
are altered by the encounter. First is the son, Nicolas. He cuddles the rat and, 
after that, refuses his mother’s request to wash his hands before dinner and 
then tells his family that he is gay before rushing off to his room. All three of 
these actions defy his mother’s wishes and are linked together by the staging of 
this sequence of events. 
The maid’s partner, Abdu (Jules-Emmanuel Eyoum Deido) offers to talk to the 
son in his capacity of gym teacher. As Abdu enters Nicolas’s room, he too is 
touched by the rat’s power. After being bitten by the rat, Abdu seduces Nicolas. 
Next in line is the daughter who, after playing with the rat, loses interest in life 
and in her partner. Her subsequent attempt at suicide fails but leaves her 
paralysed from the waist down. She also loses all interest in her lover and the 
sadomasochistic games they indulge in after her suicide attempt leaves her 
bored. The maid turns anarchic, rebelling against her masters by aligning 
herself with the daughter and ignoring her duties in the household. The mother, 
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though at first afraid of the rat, finally plays with it and goes on to seduce her 
son, in order to save him from his homosexuality.  
The only person who seems unaffected by the rat is the father, although we did 
not see him before he was already in contact with the rat. This changes when 
the rest of the family goes for a therapy weekend, an activity the father refuses 
to participate in. We learn that the family has left the house for this weekend 
when the phone wakes up the father from a dream. In this dream, we see the 
first scene of the film, but from the father’s perspective. He enters the house 
and is greeted by his family who all sing ‘happy birthday’. He then takes out a 
gun from his bag and shoots them all. The initial cliffhanger thus turns out to be 
nothing but a dream sequence. When the father picks up the phone, we hear 
the mother explaining that the rest of the family has decided that the rat is the 
problem and that it has to go.  
We then see a series of silent shots where the father places the rat in the 
microwave. Afterwards he eats what miraculously appears to be a nicely grilled 
rat, chewing on a crispy tail. When the family returns to their home, the mother 
is attacked, in her bedroom, by a human-sized rat. Apparently, the father has 
metamorphosed into a rat and is attacking the mother. The mother is at last 
saved by her daughter, who climbs the stairs with her hands, holding a knife 
between her teeth, before using it on her rat father. In the final scene, the family 
buries their father. 
Readings of the films 
These two films have been divided in two different categories by Schilt in his 
monograph on Ozon’s cinematic productions. See the Sea is a part of what 
Schilt calls “the trilogy on female desire”  while the second film, Sitcom, is 433
placed together with two other films under the heading “Paternal Monsters” . 434
Schilt makes a good argument for this and my only critique is that his categories 
are too vague, both could be extended to include many more works by Ozon. 
The monstrous father is present (though sometimes in his absence) in most of 
 Thibaut Schilt, 2011, p. 24. The other films in this trilogy are Under the Sand and 433
Swimming Pool. 
 Schilt, 2011, p. 38. The other two films are Criminal Lovers and 8 Women. 434
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Ozon’s work. Likewise, female desire is a prevailing theme in many of the films. 
The reason that this chapter brings Sitcom and See the Sea together is 
because I want to study how outsiders are dealt with in Ozon’s cinema. These 
two films deal with norms and the breach of norms, both in their cinematic 
language and in their subject matter, they stage outsiders and reactions to 
these outsiders in very different ways. Sitcom also functions as Ozon’s first 
engagement with genre citationality. This film playfully uses markers from 
sitcoms both to create an ironic distance to the narrative and to the genre that is 
being cited. If See the Sea reveals an attempt to find his own voice, Sitcom 
embraces the performative aspects of quoting from established traditions and 
the interaction between the familiar and the strange.  
As mentioned earlier, Ozon’s films tend to whitewash or simply exclude any 
disruption based on class or race or other markers of social exclusion. Even in 8 
Women the insubordination of Louise becomes problematic because of the 
racial divide between the subversive and eroticised white maid and the 
stereotypical, underdeveloped character of the black maid. The two films under 
discussion now deal with some of the trauma of the excluded in liberal ideology, 
and also with the efforts of a self-identified liberal middle or upper class when 
confronted with this excluded other.  
In Sitcom, the rat at the centre of the film is given symbolic meaning through the 
mother’s initial alarm at it, together with subsequent transformations of the 
characters as they come in contact with the animal, this is enhanced by the use 
of sound effects to produce the rat as traumatic and as threatening. Mixed with 
the superficiality of the sitcom genre, however, these attempts are revealed as 
futile and as silly as the mother’s aversion to her son’s homosexuality and her 
insistence that he wash his hands before dinner. In See the Sea, the object of 
fear is produced as a danger using more effective means. In deploying 
metaphoric filmic language that associates aggressiveness, poverty, lesbian 
desire and lack of cleanliness, See the Sea confronts the spectator with the 
amalgam of these fears. In Sitcom, Ozon uses techniques borrowed from horror 
films and thrillers to build fear in the viewer but mixed with sitcom aesthetics, 
these efforts are revealed as impotent and petty, much like the sadomasochistic 
games that leave Sophie bored.  
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When it comes to See the Sea, Schilt chooses merely to sum up the critique of 
this film. He states that “Regarde la mer also touched off, arguably because of 
one single controversial shot, the notorious love/hate relationship between film 
critics and Ozon’s art.”  Only to conclude that though critics have been unable 435
to agree on the value of the ‘one single controversial shot,’ the value of the film 
is apparent by the comparisons to such directors as Roman Polanski, Claude 
Chabrol, Henri-Georges Clouzot, Alfred Hitchcock and Ingmar Bergman.  436
Beyond this, Schilt leaves the controversial shot without comment. By contrast, 
he spends time defending Sitcom from its detractors (including his own and 
Ozon’s initial reaction to this film). Schilt’s argument is that the value of Sitcom 
is not in its engagement with homosexuality but in its address of the paternal 
figure and female desire. He argues that the father’s “complete inability to adapt 
to the fluid environment around him leads to his failure as a patriarch.”  The 437
father, in this analysis, is the only figure in Sitcom who does not change when in 
contact with the rat. He does not go through any transformation but instead 
remains rigid until the end, when he consumes the rat and, catastrophically, 
becomes a giant rat himself. After the father’s transformation, the family is finally 
able to kill him and get rid of him. But, Schilt points out, in the final scene, the 
rat returns, as we see a rat on the father’s grave as the rest of the family walks 
away. “Patriarchy is tough to kill, and male monsters are too crucial in Ozon’s 
cinematic realm to be done away with permanently. In the director’s next 
feature, this archetype takes the form of a taciturn, sadistic ogre-like figure. As if 
to link the two films together even further, the ogre’s cellar is infested with 
rats.”  The feature referred to by Schilt is Criminal Lovers. In this film, 438
however, the rats carry a very different symbolism. They live in a dark, murky 
cellar and they threaten to eat the protagonists while they are kept there. In 
Sitcom the rat is never scary on its own. The albino rat, released from a 
laboratory, looks clean and harmless. It is only when the father becomes the rat 
that it becomes frightening. Up until this point, all the various attempts to shock 
the viewer through the introduction of the rat and the scary sounds only help to 
 Schilt, 2011, p. 24.435
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reinforce the film’s failure to charge the rat with fear, much like the anti-
normative behaviour of the characters. Here it is also important to point out the 
racial connotations of the rat. Rats are symbolically associated with dirt, 
disease, homelessness and general rootlessness. They are often used in 
classist and racist rhetoric to describe lower classes, Jews and/or non-whites. 
But the animal in Sitcom is white, clean, in a cage and with a home. When the 
father metamorphoses, however, the rat becomes brown, playing on the 
racialised function of the rat.  
In Sitcom, after the no longer well-behaved son has come out to his family, we 
see a montage of shots from his bedroom and from the dinner table. From the 
bedroom we follow the son’s initiation by Abdu, the Cameroonian gym teacher 
and the maid’s partner, enacting class, race and intergenerational seduction all 
at once. In parallel, we witness the remaining dinner guests’ attempts at dealing 
with the news that the son is gay. While the son is being seduced, the father 
remarks on homosexuality in ancient Greece and the other dinner guests tell 
stories about homosexual teachers that were good even if they were gay. The 
maid notes that even in Spain there are homosexuals and that nowadays it is 
quite easy to live as a homosexual, especially in big cities. After this we see the 
mother with a facial expression indicating unwillingness to accept her son’s 
sexuality. Schilt contextualises these scenes by reference to a time when gay 
rights were still contested in France. “One must remember that the film was 
released the year before the French parliament officially recognized the civil 
union of same-sex (and opposite-sex) couples in the form of the PaCS, voted in 
November 1999.”  He then argues that, because the dinner guests turn 439
directly to the camera as they give their defences of homosexuality, this reflects 
a wish to direct this not only to the doubting mother, but directly to the spectator.  
Although a countershot of a devastated Hélène creates the illusion that the three 
interlocutors were attempting to convince the mother that her son’s life was far from 
doomed. Ozon’s choice of mise-en-scène — close shots on the characters and, 
more importantly, direct gazes at the spectator — suggests that in the late 1990s 
Hélène is certainly not the only person in need of convincing.  440
 Schilt, 2011, p. 46.439
 Schilt, 2011, p. 48.440
222
For Schilt, Ozon is trying to make an argument for the acceptance of 
homosexuality. But as Schilt points out, this is precisely what this film has been 
criticised for: trying to kick down doors already wide open. He quotes Pierre 
Murat in Télérama, who stated that “attacking in 1998 the social and moral 
order that the family represents is comparable to ‘shooting a mosquito with a 
machine gun’” . But if this film is not actually an attempt to convince the 441
spectator of the harmlessness of homosexuality, what could the function of this 
scene with the devastated Hélène be? 
Breaking the norm 
By juxtaposing this film with See the Sea and its ‘one controversial shot,’ I would 
like to suggest something different about these films. These films are in direct 
conversation with their viewers. Not in the sense, as Schilt suggests, that they 
are trying to convince us of the harmlessness of homosexuality, but rather to 
confront us with our own value systems. In Ozon’s early career he was known 
as a gay director, as we have seen from his reaction to being categorised as a 
gay director, and so his film was unlikely to be watched by any conservative 
viewers or by anyone still opposed to homosexuality. Instead, the choice to 
have the actors talk straight into the camera as they come up with defences for 
Nicolas’s homosexuality can be read as an attempt to mirror rather than lecture 
the spectator. The aim is not to be convincing. We are here faced with the 
liberal values of the upper-class family we are watching as a mirror of the 
presumed viewer of the drama, or someone with the same superficially liberal 
values even if not of the same social class as this family. The futility of these 
defences then reveal the assumed necessity for defending Nicolas’s sexual 
preferences. By arguing along the lines that being gay does not affect the life of 
whoever is gay, the liberal order is evidently trying to consume, to incorporate 
the excluded, and to retain the gay son as no longer threatening. The 
statements around the dinner table all function to normalise homosexuality.  
 Pierra Murat, “Contre: Une potache postpubère.” Télérama, 27 May 1998. Quoted 441
by Schilt, 2011, p. 44.
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In Asibong’s analysis of Sitcom, the rat takes on a Žižekian demand to ‘enjoy!’ 
Asibong points out that it is the father’s pet and that he is the last to be affected 
by it. In relation to the father’s acceptance of everything that is going on in the 
house, “the unbelievably tolerant figure of Jean, Sitcom represents the absurd 
extremities of a certain ‘post-ideological’ liberalism that has contributed to the 
gradual blurring of categories of political struggle”.  The pair, father and rat, 442
thus function in tandem to create this late capitalist situation where the law of 
the father has been emptied out while the imperative to enjoy has taken the 
place of the law. Asibong quotes Slavoj Žižek, stating that “the direct injunction 
‘Enjoy!’ is a much more effective way to hinder the subject’s access to 
enjoyment than the explicit Prohibition which sustains the space for its 
transgression.”  In this reading of Sitcom, Asibong points out the limitation of 443
the characters’s liberation. “Ozon’s Sitcom rat seems to destroy the film’s 
underlying dream of revolt and renewal, encouraging its pet humans to take it 
up on its offer of ‘new relations’, but then mocking their naive gullibility as they 
find themselves more trapped than ever in frustrated and frustrating forms of 
desire.”  Asibong’s reading of See the Sea follows a similar pattern and he 444
relates the rat in Sitcom to the homeless Tatiana in See the Sea, describing her 
thus: 
A true precursor to Sitcom’s magical rat, like Michel Piccoli’s devilish Husson in 
Buñuel’s Belle de jour, she contaminates her prey with the desire for fruitless 
transgression, before swallowing the hapless transgressor with a truly cataclysmic 
force.  445
In sum, Asibong describes these films as failed transgressions, where the 
playful sadomasochistic role-swap is revealed as fruitless in the sadistic hands 
of the rat or Tatiana. Asibong also extends this sadism to Ozon and de Van 
themselves in See the Sea, pointing out that the two kept Hails unaware of the 
 Asibong, 2008, p. 37.442
 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology, 1999, p. 443
367. Quoted in Asibong, 2008, p. 37.
 Asibong, 2008, p. 39.444
 Asibong, 2008, p. 57.445
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film’s ending. She was forced to improvise a scene where Tatiana interrogates 
Sasha about the act of giving birth, knowing that she had recently given birth to 
her own daughter who is also Sasha’s daughter in the film.  This is in line with 446
Asibong’s reading of 8 Women and the demonic director/father. He further 
posits that this sadistic tendency breaks with the sadomasochistic playfulness of 
role-change if the films in question are read as being about class. In Asibong’s 
interpretation of See the Sea and Sitcom it is the limits to transgression that 
come to the fore. 
This stands in contrast to Schilt’s readings, which take the films more at face 
value. Asibong takes into account the effects on spectators, but the narrative 
and the internal relations of the characters remain his focus. Both Schilt and 
Asibong avoid analysing ‘the one controversial shot.’ Their two monographs 
represent the most thorough works on Ozon’s cinema to date and it is striking 
that this shot remains unapproachable for both. 
Reintroducing the discharged 
As already mentioned, the first scenes of See the Sea are claustrophobic in 
their lack of dialogue. Sasha is only interacting with Sioffra, who is depicted as a 
mild nuisance for her mother. One example is when Sasha is unable to read as 
her child is playing with her book. Sasha looks lonely and displaced in this idyllic 
setting. The entrance of another adult is forewarned to the viewer, but not to 
Sasha, the looming figure of a person with a backpack, walking across the ridge 
over the beach where mother and child are sunbathing.  
The child is repeatedly presented as an uncanny element, the scenes of her 
sleeping in the sun are eerily reminiscent of a child corpse. As she sleeps, her 
head is covered or she is turned away from our gaze, the burning sun on her 
skin and the perceived heat gives a sense of discomfort that is realised in the 
scene where Sasha leaves her child on the beach to enter the forrest. Image 2 
shows the mother and infant asleep in the heat after the mother has given up 
trying to read as her child climbs on her. The two are stuck in a symbiosis, 
sleeping and awake at the same time, making any alone time impossible for 
Sasha. In this shot, it is clear how the cinematography focuses on the intimacy 
 See Asibong, 2008, p. 56.446
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and exclusiveness of the mother/child couplet. The shot does not take in 
anything but the two. The child is at once exposed to the sun and at peace on 
her mother and the hidden gaze of the mother is turned away from the child 
while her body both holds and support the child. When the second adult is 
finally introduced to the film, after a silent introduction as a looming stranger 
passing above the two, she beats loudly on the door, breaking the silence and 
stillness once and for all. The two women are portrayed in stark contrast: one 
lives in a house, the other in a tent; one is stable, the other does not stay in one 
place for more than two weeks; one is wealthy and safe, the other is poor and 
unsafe. Tatiana’s lack of safety is transformed into a general feeling of unease 
around her. She becomes unsafe, unruly and dangerous in Sasha’s eyes. 
Sasha clearly does not want her near her house or her baby.  
Still, as soon as she accepts Tatiana’s presence, her proximity to her home, she 
starts acting like a good host. Presumably to make up for her fear, she invites 
Tatiana into her home, offering her to have dinner together. This is an example 
of what Asibong refers to as “a supremely elegant comedy of manners, almost 
in the tradition of Buñuel, picking apart the neuroses and compulsions of a 
repressed bourgeois housewife with a playful savagery.”  Sasha fights her 447
 Asibong 2008, p. 54.447
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Image 2. Mother and daughter on the beach in See the Sea. The grainy film stock together 
with the colour palette gives an impression of scorching heat.
impulse, one that we share, to distance herself from the threatening stranger so 
as to overcome her fear. This initial fear is turned around in an attempt to not be 
the uptight bourgeois stay-at-home-mother that she seems to be. This is also an 
attempt to normalise the vagabond stranger, giving her a safe place to live and 
eventually to invite her into her home. Like the family around the dinner table, 
Sasha looks to incorporate the strange into the the fold of the normal and the 
knowable.  
In her attempts at finding a common ground, Sasha only further reveals the 
distance between her and Tatiana. Sasha tells her guest about a moment when 
she and her friends were travelling together and they ended up in a situation 
where she feared she might be raped. She was locked up in a room, at the 
mercy of her host, whom she thought might be getting his friends. But instead 
her story ends with the host returning to unlock the door to reveal a feast he and 
his wife had prepared. This heartfelt story possibly hints a Sasha’s and the 
spectator’s wish that everything will be fine, that the stranger is not a threat, that 
life and normality will simply expand and include the stranger. As she tells this 
story, we are led to conclude that Tatiana has been through similar situations 
but without such happy endings. Asibong points out that “Tatiana might be 
considered as a filmic descendant of the Sandrine Bonnaire character in Agnès 
Varda’s Sans toit ni loi (1985)”.  Seen in relation to this film, Mona (Sandrine 448
Bonnaire) is given a history after her death. Vagabond  is constructed as a 449
search for answers after the body of a female wanderer has been found in a 
ditch. Mona is portrayed as the author of her own destiny, but also as the victim 
of circumstances that led to her death. In contrast to Mona, who solicits our 
sympathy, Tatiana resits any possible sympathy.  
As Sasha ends her story with a nervous laugh to fill the silence that comes from 
her guest’s lack of reaction, Tatiana goes on to devour the remains on her plate 
by licking it clean. This is a sign both of a lack of table manners and of an 
insatiable hunger for food, a double marker of the social difference between the 
women. This difference is then challenged by a series of shots where the 
women are connected through physical contact and there is a developing sense 
of intimacy. This intimacy, however, is disrupted by de Van’s careful acting; she 
 Asibong, 2008, p. 54, note 4.448
 Sans toit ni loi in French, this can be translated as Without Roof Nor Law. 449
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communicates a discord to the viewer that Sasha remains unaware of. As seen 
in image 3, Tatiana’s disdainful regard is contrasted by Sasha’s blissful 
expression. As spectators we see Tatiana looming behind Sasha. This scene is 
a repetition both of the scene where the spectator is first alerted to Tatiana’s 
arrival and the shot where Sasha is resting on the beach with her daughter on 
top of her. Once again, Sasha’s gaze is hidden in the intimacy of a shot that 
excludes anything but the two characters. In this shot, however, Sasha is 
enjoying the physical proximity and touch of the other. This pleasure is 
contrasted by Tatiana’s gaze, directed at Sasha while her head seems to pull 
away from her host and her face expresses contempt. As onlookers we share a 
secret that Sasha is unaware of. This complicates the possible identification 
with Sasha as the kind mother and host. 
As Sasha invites Tatiana to use her bathroom, we see a series of shots that 
mirror those of Sasha from earlier that morning. These images are further 
juxtaposed with shots of Sasha looking after her child in the garden. The 
mother-child relation has now taken an idyllic tone, both are laughing 
animatedly in the sun and the harshness of the heat on the beach is replaced 
with a lush green surrounding. Mother and child are now enjoying each other’s 
company. We are lulled into a feeling that maybe everything is going to be fine. 
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Image 3. Tatiana and Sasha in See the Sea, where the direction of Tatiana’s gaze breaks the 
doubling of the two, hinting at the sadism that she will later display. Meanwhile, Sasha 
appears unaware and is instead enjoying the massage.
As we see this transformation, we also follow Tatiana as she is using the 
bathroom. We see her legs and feet as she sits on the toilet. They are the 
opposite of Sasha’s legs that we saw before: blemishes, yellowed toenails and 
hairy toes and legs. Tatiana takes a bath, masturbating with the soap, she then 
submerges herself into the water with her eyes open, giving the viewer a sense 
of stinging eyes, emphasised by her red eyes as she comes out of the bath. 
The bath does not seem to clean her so much as soil the bathroom, causing 
further spectatorial discomfort. This is an example of haptic visuality not reliant 
on the closeness of the visual but rather on our identification with the sensations 
we imagine Sasha is feeling. These scenes are also silent, allowing for the kind 
of haptic engagement through silence that Bolton suggests. As viewers we are 
in a state of recognition, beholding an image including our own embodiment. 
The haptic aspect of this scene implants a painful feeling in relation to Tatiana’s 
visit to the toilet as opposed to the open-air freshness of Sasha in the grass with 
her child. This sensation, both affecting and incorporating the viewer, is one of 
rejection and disgust, a physical version of the fear that Sasha is trying to get 
over. She is out in the grass, playing with her child as she seems to enjoy 
having a new friend. She has projected this expectation onto Tatiana already 
and she is not going to be swayed from this belief. She is acting as the good 
hostess, embracing what she at first found disturbing.  
Scenes of Sasha changing her child’s nappies are then mixed with Tatiana 
getting out of the bath and taking Sasha’s toothbrush and dipping it in the toilet 
bowl, rubbing it against the excrement that is still there. In a following scene, we 
see Sasha brushing her teeth with this toothbrush. This scene and the 
connection between the shit and Sasha’s mouth is disturbing, testing the limits 
of the haptic connection that has been established leading up to this moment. It 
is a scene that is difficult not to feel. Though the scenes of Tatiana in the bath, 
with her red eyes, gave us a feeling of pain and dirt, the sight of a toothbrush 
rubbing against excrement still comes as a shock. And this is further brought 
home by the following scene where Sasha uses that toothbrush. The haptic 
aspect of this scene does not disrupt the narrative so much as it enhances and 
is enhanced by the placing together of these two scenes of cleaning teeth and 
excrement. There is a physicality in these scenes that is hard to deny. The 
implementation of the body is here overwhelming and acute. 
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This scene is the main reason why Quandt placed Ozon in the category ‘New 
French Extremity.’ Bonnaud decries this film as being “heavy-handed, 
underlining something that would have been much stronger and smarter had it 
been passed over in silence.”  Bonnaud’s repulsion, he claims, is rooted in the 450
bluntness and the overtness in the shock-value of this sequence. He blames 
this, and his own inability to look beyond it, for not being able to see this film for 
what it is — “a youthful effort, a cruel tale grounded on the notion of phobia,” 
this film, Bonnaud continues, “doesn’t adequately conceal its psychological 
hypothesis: because she has had an abortion she has not yet come to terms 
with, a drifter kills a mother and kidnaps her young daughter, leaving behind her 
tent as a tomb of fabric for the horribly mutilated corpse.”  In this reading of 451
the scene, the trauma is Tatiana’s. The drifter is the one suffering from the 
memories of an abortion and so she murders the mother and steals her baby. I 
concur that Tatiana is portrayed as deranged, through the manic scribbles in her 
notebook, the toilet scene and her killing and baby-snatching. But is the trauma 
really Tatiana’s?  
A different reading would revolve around the fear that we as spectators project 
onto Tatiana. In this interpretation, she is a proxy for all of our fears of strangers. 
Unlike the lab rat, the drifter is already a feared object. The female stranger 
entering the home of another woman is also an archetypal Hollywood trope 
foreboding insanity and murder. It reminds us of the maternal Thing and the 
insanity that threatens us if the father’s limitations are not installed. By realising 
this fear, we are confronted with Sasha’s (and our) desire to not be controlled by 
it, to be open to strangers, even to the extent of letting them use our bathrooms 
if in need. But what shocks us here is that our fears were justified. The stories 
about the big bad she-wolf were true. There is also a counter movement at play 
here, as we see what Sasha does not see and as Sasha’s blissful ignorance of 
the dangers that the stranger presents reminds the spectator of the numerous 
victims of the Hollywood trope. In this counter movement, where we are invited 
to identify with Tatiana’s sadistic impulses against Sasha, the limits to our 
identification with this sadism is tested. 
  Frédéric Bonnaud, ’Wannabe Auteur Makes Good’, in Film Comment, 2001 pp. 450
52-55. p. 53.
 Bonnaud, 2001, p. 53.451
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Whose trauma? 
My argument is that this is not a story about Tatiana’s trauma, but about 
Sasha’s attempt to overcome her fear of the threatening other. It is the clash of 
two discourses, or two expectations: a fear of the stranger set alongside a 
humanist, liberal inclusion of the stranger, rather like the dinner guests’ attempts 
to disarm the gay son’s strangeness. When Tatiana first appears on her 
doorstep, Sasha denies her shelter. On failing to reject the stranger, Sasha 
instead tries to manage her fears and invites the stranger into her home. Once 
she is confronted with the stranger, her need to be a good host and treat her 
visitor with respect takes over. When we see Sasha, we see something familiar 
on the screen. She seems to represent the familiar and the safe, the white hats 
of old westerns. Even if we do not identify with her, we have all seen her on 
screen before, she represents what is wholesome, safe and good. Tatiana is the 
threat. The toilet scene can be interpreted as revenge for Sasha’s perfection. 
But by going too far, this scene does not conform with the masochistic pleasure 
of experiencing an acceptable level of discomfort, nor does it conform wholly 
with a sadistic pleasure of seeing the perfect Sasha become the victim. The 
transgression goes too far to fit in either category.  
This scene’s bluntness is not a sign of the director’s heavy-handedness but of 
the bluntness of the fantasy of the threatening wanderer. We want Tatiana to be 
a threat. She is the incarnation of the dangerous underclass that might invade 
the safe home of a lonely wife with her child. Or the vengeful agent that goes 
too far in punishing the idealised, ignorant woman in her perfect house and her 
perfect life. While we might accept standard filmic transgressions against 
Sasha, even including her mutilated body towards the end, the disgust we feel 
when we see the toothbrush and the shit goes too far. As such it reveals our 
expectations of the ‘normal,’ acceptable transgressions by the stranger and the 
vagrant.  
The trauma is not Tatiana’s, she shows no sign of struggling with her abortion. 
The trauma is instead in the gaze looking at Tatiana, judging her for her abortion 
and her unwillingness to display sadness about it, judging her blunt ways of 
demanding to stay close to the house, judging her for her unkept physical 
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appearance. It is our fantasy as viewers that she must be dangerous that is 
confronted by becoming reality. When Tatiana stands on the boat, with the 
crying baby in her arms, she is confronting the viewer: this is what you wanted 
me to do, this is your fantasy of me! 
This response to the enigmatic message that Tatiana represents reveals our 
intentions. Sasha, like the defenders of Nicholas’s homosexuality, is held up as 
a mirror to the viewer. But she is not as a mirror to identify with this time. Rather, 
it is a revealing mirror, divulging our judgements of Tatiana. But this is not the 
whole story. The toilet scene is blunt, it is transgressive. The physical revulsion 
we feel is not the same as the pain in our eyes felt in relation to the prior scene; 
where the haptic aggression against our bodies is acceptable. By mixing shit 
with Sasha’s mouth, this transgresses the contract between viewer and director. 
Within masochistic pleasure, we expect a certain amount of pain to be inflicted 
when we watch a film. But this pain/pleasure must be held within limits defined 
by the narrative of the film. So the transgression here comes from the scene’s 
breaking away from the filmic language of See the Sea, it does not comply with 
the masochistic pleasure of the film. In comparing Ozon with Hitchcock, Mark 
Hain writes that: 
In these instances, the filmmakers dredged up more of the darkness lurking 
beneath the surface than we wanted to see; what was titillating in its hidden-ness 
now confronts us, and our sadistic pleasures profoundly disturb us. It’s as if we’ve 
been betrayed — not simply by the directors, but by the limits of our own capacity 
to justify our voyeuristic thrills.  452
Hain indicates these acts of betrayal though he theorises them within a 
framework of voyeuristic thrills as sadistic pleasures. The point becomes even 
clearer if we translate this into a masochistic understanding of pleasure. For the 
masochist, the contract is essential. Trust is necessary for enjoyment of the 
pain, its cathartic effects can only be embraced within certain limits. When this 
contract is broken, we feel betrayed. The toilet scene can therefore be 
interpreted as a sadistic transgression of masochistic pleasure. As Deleuze 
 Mark Hain, ‘Explicit Ambiguity: Sexual Identity, Hitchcockian Criticism, and the 452
Films of François Ozon,’ in Quarterly Review of Film and Video, 2007, pp. 277–288, p. 
282.
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pointed out, the masochist is not looking for a sadist to satisfy their needs, 
instead the sadist is incompatible with masochistic pleasure. 
The distinction between masochistic and sadistic pleasure is further 
emphasised by the symbolics of the toilet scene. The transgression not only of 
inflicting pain on the spectator. But the mixing of body fluids and body orifices 
challenges the stability of the self. If Ozon posited an occupation of the same 
space in the scene between Gaby and Louise, in the toothbrush episode this 
failure of sexual difference to foreclose a rapport or a link with the stranger is 
traumatically challenged. The renegotiation of our distance from the stranger is 
no longer a playful act but a threat that imposes itself on us. In relation to 
McCormack’s mucosal monsters, the shit scene can be suggested to challenge 
the distance or perspective of looking on. Using Irigaray’s notion of mucosal as 
a liminal relationality, McCormack argues for a mucosal spectatorship “For 
Irigaray the body does not occupy a threshold but is threshold. Its meaning 
emerges as perception, antagonistic to essence or ontology.”  The shit, 453
following this line of thought functions as a threshold or a touching surface 
between Tatiana and Sasha as well as between Tatiana and the spectator. 
However, as I have argued here, the shit scene, rather than open up a mucosal 
affectability, closes it of through its traumatising transgression.    
As mentioned above, Tatiana first takes on the paternal function in a traditional 
Oedipal triangle by introducing a third into the mother/child dyad. This function 
is further enhanced by recognising the sadist/father incorporated by Tatiana in 
her repeated violence. De Van was a co-author and through her active part in 
improvising and keeping Hails in the dark, her sadistic insertion in the narrative 
is a meta-insertion of the sadistic pleasure of the author in the text.  454
 Patricia MacCormack, ‘Mucosal Monsters’ in Carnal Aesthetics, 2013, p. 228.453
 Marina de Van has continued her career as a director a writer parallel to her career 454
as an actor. In In My Skin, (Dans ma peau, 2002), she takes extreme filmic language to 
a further level. In this film, which she wrote and directed, she also plays the lead role. 
The film is a gory study in self-mutilation and self-consumption, depicting the 
protagonist as taking great pleasure in cutting, biting and pealing her own skin and 
then play with and drink her own blood. This study, however, follows its own logic, 
supporting a masochistic pleasure where the pain of the spectator remains cathartic 
as it is sustained by its narrative logic. The spectator is given reason and introduction 
to the self-mutilation through a scene where the protagonist accidentally falls and hurt 
herself. 
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This sadist/anal imposition in the masochist/oral pleasure of the spectator is 
symbolised through the transfer of the shit, via the toothbrush, to Sasha’s 
mouth. My point here is that this external (as opposed to inter-narrative) attack 
on Sasha and the viewer should not be reduced to youthful bluntness. Instead, 
the aggression towards the spectator should be analysed via its own 
performance. The bluntness of these shots alienates us from the film. It tests 
us, and it makes the haptic feeling of violation hard to resist. The end of the film 
can be inserted in a meta-narrative such as Bonnaud’s interpretation of 
Tatiana’s trauma of a terminated pregnancy. However, the shit-scene or the 
toilet-scene refuse this type of reduction. The haptic inclusion of violation and 
trauma defy a narrativisation of the traumatic experience of the other as a 
sadistic figure. 
Sadist interruptions  
In an early short film by Ozon, Truth or Dare (1994), the viewer is lured in to a 
story of youth and pleasure. Four teenagers are playing truth or dare, 
challenging each other to go further and further, from kisses to touching each 
other. Then one of the girls is challenged to touch another girl under her dress 
and describe the smell to the rest. When she pulls her hand out, it is covered 
with blood. The viewer is then confronted with the gaze of all four actors, one 
after the other, in absolute silence. The laughter and innocent pleasure is gone, 
the last face we are confronted with is the girl whose menstrual blood we have 
just seen, starring directly at us, seemingly to accuse us of something.  
The display of blood, faeces or Sasha’s dead body is not simply a crude, heavy-
handed director’s attempt to express something within the narrative. There is an 
aggressiveness towards the viewer here. This aggression is sometimes 
included in the narrative of Ozon’ s films. In Time to Leave (2005), the young 
protagonist isolates himself after finding out that he has terminal cancer, using 
his disease as an excuse, he explodes his previously narcissistic tendencies 
into overt attempts to chase away his family and his lover. It is only when he 
achieves this that he is able to love, to miss his lover and his family and to have 
a child with a barely known couple.  
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These examples reveal a double movement in Ozon’s work rather than a simple 
development of his directorial skills. Ozon is both trying to reject his audience 
and trying to question this rejection. By inserting anger in the narrative he 
develops a potentially therapeutic aspect, whereas the outside attack of See the 
Sea or Truth or Dare represent a non-therapeutic transgression. Read in this 
way, the shit in See the Sea is not an expression of youthful bluntness, but a 
measured attempt to confront his audience with its own falsely liberal values. 
The shit in the toilet points to a limit in our acceptance of the stranger.  
In Time to Leave, there is also an echo of the scene where Nicolas professes 
his homosexuality in Sitcom. The protagonist’s sister is trying to comfort the 
photographer by saying that, in a few years, gay people will be able to adopt 
too, which then triggers an expression of rage against the sister. This scene 
follows shortly after the protagonist finds out that he will not be around for years; 
this may explain his reaction, but based on the reaction of their parents, this 
outburst is not unique. The aggression within the narrative is a reformulation of 
the sarcastic aggression that is displayed in Sitcom. Nicholas was not able to 
defend himself against the pitying attempts to normalise his behaviour. We have 
to wait for Time to Leave to get the cathartic expression that normalising is 
simply not good enough.  
Read in relation to norms, and in relation to Aaron’s general model for 
masochist spectatorship, the tacit understanding is that the pain inflicted should 
follow a consensual dynamic, “the masochist agrees to — both desires and 
requires — the other party’s infliction of pain within a consensual dynamic.”  . 455
The closest this consensual dynamic comes to being written down, is perhaps 
the genre description of a film. The norms that govern what a film can do to its 
audience are not static or fixed. The limits change over time and between 
genres. What is acceptable in a horror film is not acceptable in a comedy. It is 
this genre restriction that constitutes the new Extreme cinemas. Often, these 
are not gorier than contemporary horror films, but audiences expecting an art 
house or auteur film are not prepared for their violence. Similarly, Martine 
Beugnet has argued in relation to Trouble Every Day (2001) that “it is less the 
‘gore’ effects in themselves which attract disapproval than the fact that neither 
the filmmaker, nor the film itself, can be fully assimilated into the generic terms 
 Aaron, 2007, p. 91. 455
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and categories that the film evokes.”  The breach of this contract may be what 456
Wiegman and Wilson calls an ‘anodyne notion of moving against.’ And some 
sadistic interventions in the tacit masochist contract may indeed be anodyne. 
However, from the reactions discussed here, the shit scene is far from dull or 
anodyne. The question is, then, if the shit scene points to the limits of discourse 
and the normative, the elsewhere of the feminine, the bodies and pleasures? Or 
does it actually reinforce the normative other of chosen antinormativity, 
rendering it as more rigid than it is, and in the process missing a chance to 
subvert the normative.  
See the mother 
One aspect of See the Sea that is lost in translation is that Regarde la mer is a 
homonym for regarde la mere — ‘see the mother’ or rather the imperative ‘look 
at the mother!’ In fact, the sea is not looked at in this film, in contrast to other 
films by Ozon. Instead, the camera repeatedly places us with the sea behind us, 
looking at the mother. Tatiana is the escape from this looking at the mother. As 
an adult with a voice, she opens up the story and offers space for a narrative as 
opposed to the timelessness in the long silent shots at the beginning. The shit 
scene, read from this perspective, then functions to collapse the escape from 
the mother/child dyad. The Oedipal promise of escape from the maternal Thing 
through the paternal figure breaks down, just as the bodily limitations are 
literally broken down in this scene. Young and Beautiful suggested a possible 
being alongside or being-withness with the sibling and seriality of self, and 8 
Women a reverse movement from an Oedipal mOther kept at a distance 
through the paternal figure into a seriality that breached generational 
differences. See the Sea, on the other hand, reveals a traumatic limit to this 
being-withness. The intimacy of porous selves, explored through relations to the 
maternal and to the feminine as a non-hermeneutic self, here finds its limits. 
Instead of Victor telling Isabelle that he does not know what he thinks about 
Felix because he is a boy. We, the spectator and the critic, may exclaim that this 
is heavy-handed, childish and brutal filmmaking, making it impossible to see the 
intricate and sublime qualities that the enfant terrible later hones and develops. 
 Beugnet, 2007, p. 37.456
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Sexual difference is here not enacted between characters, but between the 
spectator and the characters and the images.  
The fluidity of bodies and the transmission of bodily fluids enact what is 
threatening in the displacement of desires and pleasures in others. The loss of 
self in-between Sasha and Tatiana reaches its catastrophic limits when this is 
sadistically played out. And our reaction is to flee into a notion of a rigid, 
hermeneutic self, protecting us from the loss of self in an other, from the 
borderspaces that the tactile feminine self enables. If we read this Oedipal 
situation via Mulvey, we would identify with Tatiana to enjoy Sasha; this further 
traumatises our position as it makes us do the unthinkable. In Sitcom, Ozon 
uses a rat as a plot vehicle and to transform the characters on screen. The rat is 
first introduced as someone’s phobic object: the mother screams and runs up 
the stairs as her husband uncovers the cage and the animal he has brought 
home from work.  
After this initial meeting we follow the rat as it affects the family members, one 
by one. When the mother finally embraces the animal, she decides to seduce 
her son. In the following scene she is speaking to her therapist about the 
incident, presented as a dream sequence. However, after the therapist tries to 
assure her that it was only a dream, she reveals that it was not. This scene 
stands in contrast to a previous one, where the mother talks to her therapist as 
she sees her family falling apart around her. Here, we listen to her trying to 
soothe herself and the therapist by downplaying her daughter’s attempted 
suicide and ensuing loss of mobility, her son’s homosexuality and her husband’s 
distance from the family. 
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Images 4 and 5. In Sitcom, the laboratory rat functions to release inhibitions through touch. 
The film’s attempts to charge the rat as a phobic object is contrasted by its initially clean and 
‘safe’ appearance. 
This assurance echoes Sasha’s attempts to welcome Tatiana into her family 
and home. The rat brings to the surface what seems to be hidden in the idyllic 
family but, by using a rat instead of excrement, Ozon places the feared object 
within the narrative, within the boundaries of masochistic pleasure. The rat does 
not in itself produce an effect on the audience. As already argued, the white 
laboratory rat is devoid of many negative connotations usually associated with 
rodents. This discrepancy is emphasised by the generically scary music that we 
hear every time the the rat comes into view. Even so, behind the slapstick 
humour of Sitcom, we are still on trial. 
Conclusion
In See the Sea, we were confronted by a narrative that makes real our fear of 
the outcast. In Sitcom, it is instead our attempts to explain away, like the mother 
with her psychologist or the dinner guests, to diminish the pain of a 
transgressive enactment on the screen. For both cases, it is an inclusive 
normativity that is on trial. Asibong calls this “a certain ‘post-ideological’ 
liberalism that has contributed to the gradual blurring of categories of political 
struggle in late capitalist Western Europe: this is perhaps, the film’s most 
significant contribution to contemporary French cinema and culture.”  This 457
post-ideology, where anything goes, is turned against the viewer, mirrored in the 
mature and weighed responses of the dinner guests. By the time we see the 
mother seduce her son, not even this incestuous act is a surprise. It happens 
entirely within the film’s narrative norm, reflected in the acceptance of any act 
by the rest of the family members. Together, the two films pose a question: is 
not the anti-normative, disruptive stance of See the Sea a better method of 
waking up the spectator from his fantasy? Here, masochistic pleasure is 
disrupted by introducing the extra-narrative, sadistic pleasure. Lee Edelman  458
has suggested reading the queer challenge to the normative via the death drive, 
as this suggests an impossible identity with queer. Edelman calls this the 
sinthomosexual, merging Lacan’s concept of the sinthome with homosexual. He 
uses it to refer to an incarnation of the non-heterosexual who is not invested in 
the reproduction of society. 
 Asibong, 2008, p. 37.457
 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, 2004.458
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See the Sea can be read as a challenge to such an identification with the 
rupture of the norm. As Tatiana breaches the norm, she remains our fantasy of 
the frightening stranger. She may challenge this by reflecting this fantasy back 
at us, but she still remains our fantasy of the she-devil who steals the babies of 
unsuspecting, kind mothers. The breach challenges the being-withness of 
matrixial borderspaces rather than building them. The sinthome was an attempt 
to imagine a link that would make sexual rapport possible, not break it down. So 
the sinthomosexual would be closer to being-withness than to a fracturing, 
sadistic challenge to an imagined norm. The sinthome, though a breach, 
ultimately functions to link the symbolic, imaginary and the real back together. 
As Ettinger suggests, the ethical challenge may be in being able to stand the 
stranger and to be with the borderspace that the sinthome presents, as a 
‘beyond’ but not opposed to or a replacement for the norm. The scene between 
Gaby and Louise explores a non-traumatic experience of this being with the 
tactile — the always too close other — that breaches but still does not consume 
nor is consumed by the norm. Though this was only temporary within the 




7 Conclusion, Or why won’t the director go 
away? 
As institution, the author is 
dead … but in a text, in a way, I 
desire the author: I need his 
figure (which is neither his 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n n o r h i s 
projection), as he needs mine 
(except to ‘prattle’). 
Roland Barthes 
The Pleasure of the Text 
Throughout this thesis, I have returned to the notion of an auteur and its relation 
to notions of subjectivity and the speaking and acting self. These discussions 
are central to the questions a play in this thesis. Though the focus has been on 
the notion of spectatorship and the relatability and affectability of the self in the 
face of an enigmatic external, previous discussions have suggested the notion 
of the auteur as a reader, not just of genres and film history, but as a reader of 
the self and what the self leaves behind. This also links with what it means to 
write this thesis, from the perspective of masochistic spectatorship and as a 
process critical of the interpretative, ossifying tools of interpretation. In short, 
this chapter will bring the earlier considerations and questions back to the self 
as both reader and writer, as both active and passive, enjoying the seductive 
other but also the act of seducing and creating something seductive. The origin 
or intention behind the film is an ideal position that we are led to assume. Like 
the spectator, who is the ideal focal point of the camera angles and address, so 
is the auteur an ideal focal point of origin. 
In my reading of 8 Women I suggested that the psychologisation of Ozon and 
his fascination with doll’s houses forecloses a reading of this film where it 
seems to me that the director is actually identifying with one of the female 
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characters. Specifically, I demonstrated that Louise, the young maid, could be 
read as an incarnation of the director within the script. Like Victor in Young and 
Beautiful, Louise functions as a way in to this story and though Ozon denied 
that Victor was an incarnation of him within the film, I would challenge his 
assumption that Victor has to be either Ozon or the spectator. I have argued 
that Ozon’s method of making films and the speed with which he writes or re-
writes, shoots and edits them aims to dislodge a critical perspective and I will 
now argue that this technique transforms the auteur into a spectator of their own 
creation as it unfolds. Walter Benjamin argued that the public has a much more 
radical appreciation of experimental cinema than of art, comparing Chaplin and 
his contemporary cinema with exclusionary avant-garde art creation: “Dadaism 
attempted to produce with the means of painting (or literature) the effects which 
the public today seeks in film.”  The accessibility inherent in the filmic 459
language make techniques that required a level of taste and knowledge of art-
history essential to appreciation democratically available, at least to consume. 
Ozon’s method of relieving his work process of the panoptic gaze of ideological 
supervision can be read along a stream-of-consciousness tradition. The 
bemused character within the drama who is at once inside and outside the 
drama unfolding can be seen as a representation of writer looking on as a story 
writes itself. The choice of a child symbolically trying to figure out what is going 
on in the room next door can be read to aid Ozon as much as it aids the 
spectator to interpret and sympathise with the other characters. 
A stated fascination for doll’s houses in relation to a film about eight women, 
who are grasping to define themselves without the presence of the father figure, 
must surely also be linked to Henrik Ibsen’s play A Doll’s House.  In it, a wife 460
leaves her husband, accusing him of treating her and the children as dolls. This 
play was controversial at the time of its premiere, not least because it was an 
informed analysis of women's roles in a male-dominated society.  From this 461
perspective, 8 Women could be read as a meditation on what would happen if 
the father would suddenly disappear. In Ibsen’s play, it is the wife who walks 
 Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second 459
Version’, 2002, p. 118
 Henrik Ibsen, A Doll’s House, included in the collection Henrik Ibsen, Four Major 460
Plays, 2008.
 See Henrik Ibsen, Notes for a Modern Tragedy.461
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out, leaving her husband and her children behind. This act was denounced by 
Ibsen’s contemporary, August Strindberg, who criticised the female character in 
Ibsen’s play, but also what he argued was its one-sidedness, where the plight of 
the husband is ignored. Strindberg’s The Father was written as a reply to 
Ibsen’s A Doll’s House. In Strindberg’s story, a husband’s assumption that he is 
the father of his daughter is questioned and, through a series of manipulations, 
the wife has her husband committed to a mental asylum.  This last turn in The 462
Father is a sinister reference to the inspiration behind Ibsen’s play. Laura Kieler, 
a friend of Ibsen, was the model for Nora in A Doll’s House. In the real story, 
Laura forged her husband’s signature and as a punishment was sent to a 
mental asylum for two years. Ibsen’s inspiration for Nora in A Doll’s House could 
not leave her husband, and her attempt to gain a level of freedom led to her 
internment. The point of this excursus is not to prove that Ozon intentionally 
quoted Ibsen when making 8 Women. I do not claim that this speculation is 
correct. Rather, my argument is that the assumption of the director as master 
manipulator, as the unequivocal origin of the story, leads to a diminished 
comprehension of the ‘ideal focal point’ behind the film. The problem is equally 
acute in Mulvey’s early assumption that the spectator’s gaze is necessarily 
sadistic. 
In the last two chapters I have discussed the demonic or monstrous father 
figures in Ozon’s cinema, as well as the limits of masochistic pleasure. In this 
chapter I will further explore the link between demonic father figures, specifically 
the ever returning father in Ozon’s cinema, and the notion of an auteur, a 
creator behind the film. This undead father — in 8 Women as the father coming 
back from the dead and in Sitcom as the rat returning on the father’s grave — 
refuses to go away. Even when dead, his presence is felt and it often drives the 
narrative in Ozon’s films. Certainly, the problematic relationship between Ozon, 
the director, and the notion of an omnipotent Director may be found in several of 
Ozon’s narratives, which hinge on problematic relationships to ‘monstrous 
fathers’ as both sources of pleasure and destruction. These fathers lend 
themselves to a reading of a masochist director/reader in relation to an ideal 
Director/author within Ozon’s narrative.  
 See August Strindberg, The Father, included in August Strindberg, Three Plays, see 462
also Getting Married by Strindberg for a direct response to Ibsen’s play.
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The problematic relation to the sadistic element in Ozon’s films are evident in 
my readings of 8 Women and See the Sea. When discussing 8 Women, I 
suggested that the demonic but absent father is an incarnation of two things. 
First, there is the legacy of earlier directors and, second, there is the silently 
judgmental spectator, seeing everything and always ready to find faults. In this 
reading I suggested that we should see Louise as the incarnation of Ozon the 
director. Louise had been the mistress of the great Director/spectator/critic. But 
what she really desired, her ‘real’ reason for being in the house, was her love for 
Gaby, the iconic femme fatale from Belle de jour. This reading posits the films’ 
director/origin as the victim of the Director/spectator/critic. In a film such as See 
the Sea, however, the director as assumed intention behind the film is revealed 
as harbouring open aggression towards the spectator/critic in my suggested 
reading.  
In this concluding chapter I will return to Freud and Laplanche to probe further 
the connection between sadistic and masochistic impulses in order to interpret 
this duality as a continuation of conflict, not a maturation of a director who was 
once an enfant terrible. In A Child Is Being Beaten, Freud discerns three phases 
of the fantasy of a child being beaten.  The first is “My father is beating the 463
child whom I hate”, the second “I am being beaten by my father”, and the third 
“A child is being beaten”.  Freud points out that the first phase is not really a 464
fantasy. “It is perhaps rather a question of recollections of events which have 
been witnessed, or of desires which have arisen on various occasions.”  The 465
second phase, Freud claims, “is the most important and the most momentous of 
all. But we may say of it in a certain sense that it has never had a real 
existence. It is never remembered, it has never succeeded in becoming 
conscious. It is a construction of analysis”.  In contrast, the third phase is the 466
fantasy that remains conscious whilst the preceding two have to be 
reconstructed through analysis. It is worth pointing out here what Freud is 
saying, the middle phase in this construction, the one linking the two and that 
makes sense of the other two, has no source outside analysis. It is through 
  Sigmund Freud, ‘‘A Child is Being Beaten’ A Contribution to the Study of the Origin 463
of Sexual Perversions.’ (1919) in SE 17, pp. 175-204.
 See Freud (1919), pp. 185-186.464
 Freud (1919), p. 185.465
 Freud, (1919), p. 185.466
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interpretation or translation of the other two phases that the third, the link, the 
one that provides meaning — is to an extent made up. My argument is not that 
this invalidates the interpretation, though we should perhaps be alerted to the 
value of interpretation. Silverman points out the gender of the patients that 
Freud refers to here to make the argument that Freud’s use of the only male 
patient’s reconstruction of the missing middle fantasy links the formation of the 
feminine to male masochism.  Silverman concludes that this gender 467
displacement in the formation of erotogenic and feminine masochism conceals 
the gender displacement necessary in this transitional phase.  
The final phase attests to three transgressive desires, not one of which Freud 
remarks upon, but which clamor loudly for my attention: to the desire that it be boys 
rather than girls who be loved/disciplined in this way; to the desire to be a boy 
while being so treated by the father; and, finally, to the desire to occupy a male 
subject-position in some more general sense, but one under the sign of femininity 
rather than that of masculinity.  468
The fantasy of the child being beaten starts as one of another child being 
punished. This looks like a sadistic fantasy, but Freud points out that it is the 
father, not the fantasising child, who does the beating. It is not until the second 
phase that the fantasising child is directly implicated, at this stage as the one 
being beaten. And this recreated fantasy is a male fantasy of masochism, of 
taking the feminine position. As we have seen in the initial chapters of this 
thesis, this feminine position has been repeatedly articulated as secondary, as 
the turning back of the sadistic/phallic/male position. But as we can see here, 
this masochistic position is rather the first incorporation of an external, viewed 
position. The third position that can be sadistic or masochistic is the result of the 
initial incorporation of the passivity in relation to an adult beating a child. In 
Silverman’s reading, this argument is linked with gender to argue for a complex 
male subject position as well as a a complex female subject position. Read from 
the perspective of reader/auteur rather than male/female or sadistic/
masochistic, this reading would open up for a complex identification and desire 
between the director and the spectator as well as their incorporations within 
narratives. 8 Women could be read as an expression of this second phase, 
 See Silverman, 1988, p. 48. 467
 Silverman, 1988, p. 48.468
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where the director dreams about being in thrall to the father, about being 
symbolically beaten. However, the fantasy is perhaps turned on its head since 
the relationship between Louise and Marcel was sexual. The fantasy of being 
beaten is therefore reversed to a sexual relation, a substitutional fantasy, but 
between Gaby and Louise, rather than between Marcel and Louise. 
The second phase has the double function of punishing the desire for the father 
and, simultaneously, keeping this desire as a regressed expression of the 
desire to be loved. “It is not only the punishment for the forbidden genital 
relation, but also the regressive substitute for that relation”.  In Louise’s 469
relation to Marcel, the genital relation becomes the regressive substitute for the 
courtly love of her ‘true’ master, Gaby. It should be noted that in this formulation 
of masochism the turn towards the self includes both the prohibition and the 
transgression of this prohibition. Hence the violence directed at the self is both a 
representation of the sexual act directed towards the self as passive and, 
simultaneously, the representation of a prohibition of this act. I have proposed 
using a masochistic model rather than a melancholic one for the formation of 
the self and for the incorporation of norms and prohibitions in the self. The 
desire for the father’s sexual acts is here not foreclosed, there remain symbolic 
traces of this prohibition and its acts. In my argument, the melancholic version 
of this turning back towards the self is a subcategory of masochistic turning 
back. In chapter 1 of this thesis — Freud and Femininity — I developed a 
reading of Irigaray’s model of a melancholic refusal of identity as a  particular 
foundation of the self. In this reading of Irigaray’s argument, this occurs when 
identification between the emerging self and an object is arrested because it 
cannot be visualised, and this therefore leads to a collapsed self whose borders 
are not visualised and thereby not clearly defined. I argued that the feminine 
escapes or refuses identification because it lacks visual evidence of existence. I 
suggested that this should be read as a melancholic aspect of the message that 
is implanted. From there, I suggested using Laplanche to theorise the formation 
of the self through passive, masochistic implementations of untranslatable 
messages. Based on these two strands of my argument, the feminine can be 
read as the message of the already masochistic pleasure of alterity. Under the 
heading ‘Enigmatic gender’ in chapter 1, I further argued for a reading of 
 Freud, (1919), p. 189.469
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Laplanche’s theory of seduction where we are first of all passive receptors of a 
seduction into the world, including appellations or prescriptions into gender. This 
seduction is enigmatic because it is unconscious and not yet understandable, 
the balance of power lies on the side of the sender or seducer. 
The duality of a fantasmatic replacement of the sexual and the prohibition 
against the sexual relation is what Freud calls “the essence of masochism.”  470
Masochism uses the memory or part fantasy of a child being beaten by the 
father to formulate a repression of the desire towards the father, where the act 
of beating is both a visualisation of the prohibition of this love and the 
replacement, through regression, of this love. The third phase of the child being 
beaten returns to the original phase where another child is being beaten. But 
through its genealogy this third phase carries with it its masochistic desire. 
Freud points out that: 
[…] only the form of this phantasy is sadistic; the satisfaction which is derived from 
it is masochistic. Its significance lies in the fact that it has taken over the libidinal 
cathexis of the repressed portion and at the same time the sense of guilt which is 
attached to the content of that portion. All of the many unspecified children who are 
being beaten by the teacher are, after all, nothing more than substitutes for the 
child itself.  471
The sadistic turn is here secondary to masochistic desire, it is a turning outward 
of the regressed desire to be loved/beaten. This model contradicts Freud’s 
earlier assertion that “[m]asochism, in the form of a perversion, seems to be 
further removed from the normal sexual aim than its counterpart; it may be 
doubted at first whether it can ever occur as a primary phenomenon or whether, 
on the contrary, it may not invariably arise from a transformation of sadism.”  472
In this earlier text, masochism is the secondary phase, the result of a failed 
sadism that has been turned inward. Masochistic desire is simply the reverse of 
sadism. “The most common and the most significant of all the perversions — 
the desire to inflict pain upon the sexual object, and its reverse — received from 
 Freud, (1919), p. 189.470
 Freud, (1919), p. 191.471
 Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905a). in SE 7, 472
pp. 123-246, p. 158.
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Krafft-Ebing the names of 'sadism' and 'masochism' for its active and passive 
forms respectively.”  Freud’s definition of masochism as a passive form of 473
sadism in this early essay, aligns the sadist and masochist division with Freud’s 
division of masculine and feminine. The passive, masochist or feminine position 
is a reversed active, sadist or masculine position. As we saw in the last chapter, 
this is further emphasised by the anal/sadistic desire as opposed to the 
nurturing breast/masochist desire in Deleuze’s usage. In Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes, Freud still maintains the opinion put forward in Three Essays. He 
even exemplifies ‘reversal into its opposite’ and ‘turning around upon the 
subject’s own self’ with the case of masochism. The process from sadism to 
masochism is described in the following three stages: 
(a) Sadism consists in the exercise of violence or power upon some other person 
as object. 
(b) This object is given up and replaced by the subject's self. With the turning round 
upon the self the change from an active to a passive instinctual aim is also 
effected. 
(c) An extraneous person is once more sought as object; this person, in 
consequence of the alteration which has taken place in the instinctual aim, has to 
take over the role of the subject.  474
This process is closely related to the tripartite process of the fantasy of a child 
being beaten. However, the differences are significant. In this particular model, 
the movement constitutes a turning around, the subject becomes object. In 
contrast, in the fantasy of the child that is being beaten, the vicissitudes of 
desire takes a different path. Freud emphasises that the first phase of the 
fantasy is not a fantasy. Instead, it is constructed by experience. The 
foundational phase is therefore not an involvement with the object through a 
sadistic desire, but rather an observed relation. This observed relation, 
formulated as ‘my father is beating a child’ is a relationship that corresponds to 
step (a) in the Vicissitudes essay. The relation between the father and the child 
being beaten is one of ‘exercise of violence or power upon some other person 
 Freud (1905a), p. 157.473
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as object.’ But as this relation is being observed rather than desired by the 
subject, this stage is not sadistic. The violence has not yet become sexual.  
In the second phase, the child is replaced by the subject. The internalisation 
here takes place not on the level of identification but as replacement, it is “the 
regressive substitute”  for the desire to be loved. There is a hint here of a 475
further stage in between the first and second phase, a stage where the 
fantasising child is jealous of the child being beaten. This is expressed in 
Freud’s quick move from an impersonal “My father is beating a child” to the 
supplementary “My father is beating a child whom I hate”  The pain as 476
transgression was directed towards a child who had the desired father’s 
attention. As the transgression of love is prohibited, even as fantasy, this is 
instead replaced by a fantasy to be beaten, to experience the transgression of 
pain caused by the desired object. 
In A Child Is Being Beaten the separation of the beater from the one creating 
the fantasy replaces the sadistic origins with a scene or fantasy, in relation to 
which the child remains passive. This passivity is then carried through to the 
second stage, where the fantasising subject is itself the object of the beating. 
This renders the passive position as primary, as opposed to Freud’s earlier view 
of a simple reversal of a previous, sadistic phase. This leads him to formulate 
the notion of a primary or erotogenic masochism, as opposed to a feminine or 
moral masochism. Moral masochism is the split between the ego and the 
superego, where the ego takes on masochistic tendencies while the superego 
takes on sadistic tendencies. This relationship between ego and superego is 
symbiotic in that each serves to strengthen the other. In the later model of the 
child being beaten, the passive position is explored as prior and independent of 
the active/sadist position. “Instincts with a passive aim must be taken for 
granted as existing, especially among women.”  Again, Freud connects 477
passivity and women. “In the case of the girl the unconscious masochistic 
 Freud, (1919), p. 189.475
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phantasy starts from the normal Oedipus attitude; in that of the boy it starts from 
the inverted attitude, in which the father is taken as the object of love.”   478
Primary masochism 
Freud would later concede that he is open to the possibility of a primary 
masochistic desire. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he states that “there 
might be such a thing as primary masochism — a possibility I had contested at 
that time.”  In A Child Is Being Beaten masochism is not yet conceived of as a 479
primary drive; it is still achieved through the memory/fantasy of a father beating 
a child. This memory/fantasy is then turned into a fantasy of the subject being 
beaten by the father. In The Economic Problem of Masochism, Freud calls this 
primary, non-reversed masochism erotogenic. “Masochism comes under our 
observation in three forms: as a condition imposed on sexual excitation, as an 
expression of the feminine nature, and as a norm of behaviour. We may, 
accordingly, distinguish an erotogenic, a feminine and a moral masochism.”  480
In this text, Freud also aligns masochism with the death drive. In this manner, 
sadism and masochism become different expressions for this destructive drive. 
If one is prepared to overlook a little inexactitude, it may be said that the death 
instinct which is operative in the organism — primal sadism — is identical with 
masochism. After the main portion of it has been transposed outwards on to 
objects, there remains inside, as a residuum of it, the erotogenic masochism 
proper, which on the one hand has become a component of the libido and, on the 
other, still has the self as its object.  481
In moral masochism, sadist and masochist impulses are split off into the ego 
and the superego. Masochism is located in the ego whereas sadism is in the 
superego. “The sadism of the super-ego and the masochism of the ego 
 Freud, (1919), pp. 198-199.478
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supplement each other and unite to produce the same effects.”  Masochism, 482
directed towards the self in this later version, can take on outer actors to inflict 
pain on the self, like the fantasy of the father beating the child. This, however, 
becomes an externalisation of a relation that has been internalised. In Ozon’s 
cinema, as I have argued, there is a duality within the sadism expressed within 
the narrative. Either the sadistic figure is presented within the narrative, as in 8 
Women or Sitcom, or if the sadistic act transgresses the narrative and points to 
a sadistic figure outside that narrative, as in See the Sea. When the sadistic 
figure is placed within the narrative, there emerges the potential of killing the 
father and being free from his controlling gaze. 
When, however, the sadistic father figure is kept outside the narrative, the origin 
of sadism is transported to the ideal point of origin. It is the Director’s sadism 
that is assumed. Tatiana in See the Sea may be vindictive and sadistic in her 
torture of Sasha, but the sadism that the viewer feels is the sadism of the 
scenes. It lies in the act of placing the scene with the toothbrush and the shit 
next to the scene where Sasha is using the same toothbrush to clean her teeth. 
The transgression against the viewer comes from this transgression between 
the characters. Clearly, this aspect of extreme cinema lends weight to Mulvey’s 
assertion that certain filmmakers are already breaking down the fiction of the 
narrative, revealing looks that are traditionally hidden from the spectator. But 
whereas Godard and Bergman were including shots of the camera to destroy 
the illusion of the narrative, Ozon, Gaspar Noé or Lars von Trier use violence as 
a transgression of the tacit contract between the viewer and the imagined origin 
of the film, so as to undermine the illusion of narrative. 
Ozon’s fathers 
As mentioned before, Schilt discusses the monstrous fathers in Ozon’s films. 
For him, these fathers signify a questioning of the father but not as a direct 
attack on the paternal institution. Instead, he argues, “with a filmmaker like 
Ozon, any seemingly straightforward chastisement of the patriarchal system 
becomes, upon closer analysis, a much more ambiguous depiction that 
redefines the boundaries between normalcy and monstrosity, between the 
 Freud, (1924), p. 170.482
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familiar and the queer.”  Schilt places monstrosity and queer as opposites to 483
the familiar and normal. The monstrous fathers thus seem to inhabit a position 
of opposition to the familiar and the normal. Queer fathers, however is not what 
Schilt is suggesting when he speaks of monstrous fathers. Instead this 
monstrosity of the father falls within gendered power relations that are all too 
familiar, all too normal. The excess of the monstrous father is a perversion of 
the normal, not a queer questioning of the norm. Schilt sees Ozon’s 
monstrously patriarchal fathers as ambiguous, both victims and sadistic 
manipulators. One example is “Marcel, the unseen paterfamilias in 8 femmes, 
though first assumed to be a victim of one of the eight women’s murderous 
scheme, is later revealed to be a sadistic manipulator and possibly incestuous 
father.”  So the victim turns out to be the manipulator behind the scenes. The 484
other films Schilt discusses in this section are Criminal Lovers and Under the 
Sand. In all of these films the paternal figures end up being punished “two will 
die, and one is arrested by police.”  According Schilt, ambiguity is given to 485
these fathers by means of on-screen punishment. He sees this as a critique of 
the father figure, however ambivalent. Conversely, Asibong argues that the 
patriarchal structure of Ozon’s films excludes the possibility of exploring 
feminine identity. “How is it possible to negotiate a feminine or significantly 
feminised identity within a social framework at the unreachable centre of which 
sits a silent, bland or indifferent patriarch?”  This absent/ever present patriarch 486
is then applied to Ozon as manipulator behind the scenes.  
As I argued above, the reference to a love of dolls’ houses and dolls may point 
in a different direction than the one proposed by Asibong. Ozon’s approach to 
making a film about women, but it’s all about men,  may have recalled his 487
fascination for dolls and dolls’ houses as a kind of self-critical remark. In 
remaking an old film all about women, he may well have likened himself to 
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Torvald in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House, or even reference the play as another male 
writer’s attempt to explore female subjectivity. This interpretation is not present 
in the film nor in Ozon’s commentary, but like Freud’s reconstructed masochistic 
phantasy between the observed and the imagined, this link is not unimaginable 
and arguably it could help connect the masochistic pleasure I have been 
arguing for in this thesis with the position of a masochistic auteur behind the 
scenes. And the fantasy of the sadistic father within a narrative is then a 
representation of the third position where we are all seeing the abusive father. 
The masochistic director does not contradict the sadistic father figure on screen, 
in fact, the masochistic director, as Silverman has shown, will keep reproducing 
the scene with the abusive father. And perhaps this can allow both auteur and 
spectator to work through this fantasy. This aspect of the father as undead, as 
returning from the ashes, is something that the rest of this chapter will pursue. 
But I do not regard this as “a sharply increased cynicism, an altogether more 
solemn renunciation of the potential, no matter how ludic, for new forms of 
intimacy, kinship and community.”  On the contrary, I shall question this 488
identification of the presumed subject behind the films with the father figures 
within the films. Rather than analyse these as representations of sadistic 
inflexibility, I will read them as masochistic representations of the problematic 
relation between the author, the text and the viewer. 
The evasive auteur 
In the short film Little Death (1995) Ozon deals with the father image in relation 
to self-formation and self-assertion. The focus of this early film is negotiations of 
the gaze, definitions of beauty and self-image as seen through the eyes of a 
young photographer. All this is set in a triangular drama between two siblings 
and a dying father. Paul (François Delaive) is a photographer who is haunted by 
an image of himself as a toddler. Paul has been told, that his father who was 
away on a business trip during his birth, though that a picture of him as a new-
born was so ugly that the he doubted that it could be his son. In this film, Paul is 
engaged in a project where he is taking pictures of people in the moment of 
orgasms. The title links the orgasmic petite mort with the impending death of 
 Asibong, 2008, p. 82.488
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Paul’s father. His sister insists that he should go and see their father who is in a 
hospital, Paul at first refuses. And when he finally goes, it is in order to take 
pictures of the dying man. These pictures can be understood as an act of 
revenge on the dying and helpless father. Paul, as a toddler, was not asked if 
his picture could be taken, and so the father is not asked. The father’s expiring 
body is exposed to underline its ugliness and helplessness. As Paul is 
photographing his father’s naked and dying body, his sister walks in on him. 
Outraged by her father’s exposure and Paul’s lack of respect, she kicks him out 
of the room. 
Later, in the darkroom, Paul finds a picture of his father where he is awake, his 
glaring eyes look right into the eye of both photographer and spectator. This 
triggers something in Paul and he cuts the eyes out, replacing them with his 
own as he looks into a mirror through the holes in the print. This doubling 
indicates that Paul’s revenge has brought him closer to his father, but not in a 
reconciliatory way. Instead his father’s anger becomes his, both in his act of 
revenge and in the aggression he reveals towards his lover and his sister. The 
photographer, in exposing his father has also captured his dying father and in 
the accusing eyes that look back he seems to have come across the punctum 
of Barthes theory of photography. The eyes looking back are Paul’s eyes. The 
demonic father who has haunted Paul becomes him, his judgmental look has 
become Paul’s. This movement contains a linking, a rapport between the father 
and son. However, this link does not lead to reconciliation. Instead it increases 
Paul’s anger and aggressive refusal of his lover and his sister. Like Barthes’s 
punctum, the eyes haunt without allowing for mourning, there is no decrease in 
tension or in pain.  
The stranger within 
Barthes argues that there is no culture, not mourning where this punctum is, 
there is no history, only melancholic preservation. And Paul’s wearing his 
father’s face, looking through this face with his own judgmental eyes enacts this 
impossibility of resolution and the eternal return of the demonic father. If, 
however, we turn to a masochistic reading of the punctum, there are means to 
process and to work through the impasse of the demonic father. As opposed to 
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the foreclosed loss of melancholia, the masochistic model suggest that the 
punctum is outside the grasp of translatability — it is strange but not blocked. 
Through translation we can start picking at it.  
In Laplanche’s theory, the punctum, or the image we cannot comprehend is 
understood as something other inside the self and he sources his formulation of 
this in Freud’s early model of seduction as the cause of pathological 
developments of sexuality. “Das Andere, the other thing in us: this is the 
unconscious as it is discovered before 1897 and as it will re-emerge at 
numerous points in Freud’s work.”  The first step where a child is seen being 489
beaten in A Child Is Being Beaten is an example of this reemergence of 
something that is neither reducible to a fantasy nor its pure materiality, but as 
something observed with meaning that escapes us. Real events are 
intermingled with fantasies and, accordingly, the child tries to understand these 
real events. So the child being beaten is connected to masochism, and to the 
linking of sexuality and prohibition with a violent act. In this, the beaten child 
becomes a version of the primal scene. Freud is ambiguous about whether the 
primal scene is a fantasy or a real event. For the child hearing the uncanny 
sounds of adults next door, it is the perceived sound that triggers a divination of 
what cannot be known or fully translated. This is Laplanche’s notion of a third 
real. This real is neither reducible to the factual sound reaching the child nor the 
fantasy that the child creates through its imperfect divination or translation, 
mingled with previous divinations and translations. The self is then not the effect 
of a turning back against a pre-existing will or sexuality, but the implementation 
of an other thing in the self as the self. It now becomes possible to formulate a 
model of the self where seduction by the outside world simultaneously prohibits, 
directs and entices the will or sexuality behind the deed, while also leaving the 
door open for the psychoanalytic insight that every translation is a failure.  
A masochistic model based on Laplanche’s reworking of the seduction theory is 
already turned against itself. The primary transgression, through erotogenic 
discomfort and passivity, allows for a model where the will is secondary. Sadism 
comes after masochism. “What must be affirmed is the following: if the primary 
is the unconscious, and the unconscious is the repressed, then this ‘primary’ 
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has ‘become primary’, so to speak.”  Conversely, in Barthes’s critique of the 490
author, the core of the author is not only given up on the level of origin but also 
at the level of target. Barthes points out that the author as myth is linked with 
the critic as myth. In these twinned myths, there is an origin or a self to be 
represented in the text, a core knowledge in the text and an attainable correct 
interpretation. “Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text 
becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that, to 
furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing.”  The death of the author 491
thus also signifies a death of the limited series of interpretations. Barthes 
concludes his short manifesto with a celebration of the reader as opposed to the 
writer/critic of classic criticism.  
Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader; for it, the writer is the 
only person in literature. We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer 
by the arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the very 
thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers, or destroys; we know that to give writing its 
future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the 
cost of the death of the Author.  492
The birth of the reader implies a liberation of interpretations but also a focus on 
the reader/spectator as a point of critique of the selfsame origin of the text/film. 
The death of the author also has a temporary aspect to it. As I pointed out 
above, reasoning along similar lines about the self as the effect of the deed 
does not imply a death but rather a birth of the self. Although it should be noted 
that Butler’s critique of the self and consciousness reaches a point where the 
origin of the self is blurred. This is because the motion that starts the return 
does not begin from the split between two types of bodies. Instead, it is the split 
between body and self or soul that is the effect of the returning motion. 
This critique of the ontology of the body and soul theorises the self as 
simultaneous with the body as an object of consciousness. Or, rather, the two 
are always already there, they are both found when turning back on 
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themselves. This, however, does not question the originating process of the 
(false) return to the self or the body. In facing the self through identification with 
the law and the lost object, the self is produced as a false ontology. In Barthes’s 
manifesto, however, the author is dead. To be more precise: by being produced 
simultaneously with the text, the author as authoritative figure is dead. The 
death of the author is related to a temporality for Barthes: “As soon as a fact is 
narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that 
is to say, finally outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the 
symbol itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author 
enters into his own death, writing begins.”  The relation to reality, as opposed 493
to writing, is always happening in a now, just as reading happens in a now. 
However, the author has to turn away from reality to write, therefore the writing 
is dislocated in its temporality, it represents a past in a now. The act of retelling 
is a return to something and therefore comes with a disjunction between the 
author and the retold. The voice also loses its origin in the text. The Author is 
removed by the temporary disjunction between the written and the author. 
When we read, the author is simply not there, the written is not occurring now 
and the text is an artefact instead of a presence. In a manner of speaking, the 
writer of a text or the director of a film both become immortal through their 
works.  
Authors are selves present in and through their works. They become immortal 
through their texts but, as such they also become a part of a past. The text 
produces not only the author as a self but the author as a fixity. After the writing 
is done, the writer can no longer change, update and transform the text in 
relation to their audience. If they do this, it will always be in the past of the 
viewing/reading of the text/film. The author always implies a temporality. It 
implies a then, when the movie was made or the text was written. The author 
always speaks from the grave, no matter if alive or not. This of course is similar 
to Benjamin’s understanding of the translator’s work and Barthes text can be 
read as a universalisation of what Benjamin said about translation into any form 
of writing.  
In a later text, Barthes returns to the author. “As institution, the author is dead … 
but in a text, in a way, I desire the author: I need his figure (which is neither his 
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representation nor his projection), as he needs mine (except to ‘prattle’).”  The 494
author here returns in a relation with the reader. The author is desired, just like 
the reader is desired by the author. Is Barthes not here leaving out the 
masochistic aspect of this desire? Though he hints at it, in the added subclause; 
as an afterthought, the author needs us. Or so we are lead to believe, we can 
only desire the author behind the text if they are assumed to desire us. Surely, 
they wanted to say this to us! 
The desired author becomes the desiring writer in this text, it is by deploying 
this split into the text that the author and reader can remain a “‘living 
contradiction’: a split subject, who simultaneously enjoys, through the text, the 
consistency of his selfhood and its collapse, its fall.”  Barthes speaks about a 495
bliss in this living contradiction, a bliss that cannot be expressed in words but 
only between lines.  The resurrected author is first and foremost a reader. As 496
such the producer of text can create a text that is contradictive, a split subject, 
the author. That allows the reader to explore the amorous relation between 
reader and text. In this equation, the author as object had to die in order to 
return, alive, through the reader’s birth. For the masochistic spectator, this 
desired author/father must return to inflict pain upon us. The transgressive 
director is desired in the text. So it may well be that the placement of a 
monstrous father within the narrative is an incarnation of our desire for a 
Director who dares to take us on a journey. At the same time, it is also an 
incarnation of the director’s desire to be that Director. This, of course, only 
further emphasises the director as a masochist, as a reader, before becoming a 
sadist, a Director. 
If one bases a model of the self on a masochistic construction rather than a 
melancholic one, it becomes possible to encapsulate the incorporation of a law 
with the incorporation of bodily identification and, at the same time, to account 
for this splitting of the self into active and passive aspects. Melancholia follows 
a movement of Freud’s thought, a development where the ego is explored as an 
internalised object. This development in Freud’s thought is reflected in his 
development of masochism as a reversal that is primary. The model of 
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melancholia, as developed in Mourning and Melancholia, is thus linked to 
masochism, but masochism when linked to sexuality and femininity is not 
theorised as a finalised event. 
A Director is beating the director  
When Ozon kills the patriarch it is not only the Director he kills, it is also himself, 
as a director. But the Director keeps returning. In Lacanian terms, the young 
man is unable to be the phallus, and therefore the lack of the Other cannot be 
satisfied. In 8 Women, the Director/father is presumed to be dead only to return, 
as if out of revenge he must be the one to kill himself. And if we return to the 
young photographer in Little Death, the young man seeking revenge by 
exposing his father instead becomes his father. So how do we break the 
deadlock of the returning father? The punctum or the foreclosed history of 
‘always already’ allows the father to maintain his thrall, the melancholic 
response incorporates and makes the other a part of the self. In Death 24x a 
Second, Mulvey explores the “narrative disintegration,” by “digital editing 
systems” that “have enabled film to be quoted and referred to with 
unprecedented ease.”  This quotability of films, caused by digital editing 497
systems democratises the the filmic medium both in the sense that we are all 
photographers and cinematographers today, and in the sense that we now have 
access to and can comprehend what has previously been exclusive to the 
avant-garde. Echoing Benjamin’s assertion that what was once the 
incomprehensible techniques of elitist dadaists or surrealists becomes available 
for popular consumption in the hands of Chaplin, Mulvey asserts that “as the 
cinema ages it acquires greater cultural legitimacy and the divide between art 
and popular film has narrowed almost to invisibility.”  And this quotability and 498
manipulability also allows the spectator to see the photographs that are hidden 
in the flow of film, revealing the 24 deaths per second that the normal flow of 
these images hide by its perpetual movement. In Little Death this hidden aspect 
of death and photography in film is represented by Paul’s photography. This film 
links the hight of pleasure with the death of a demonic father in the expression 
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la petite mort — linking orgasm and the sense of satisfaction with the stillness of 
death. As Paul captures the passing moment of la petite mort his photography 
enacts the punctum of photography, but in relation to taboo and symbolic death. 
It is not until he turns his camera toward his dying father that the punctum 
becomes traumatic and overwhelming for the photographer. And it is not the 
death but his father’s open eyes that breaks down the protective distance that 
his photography allowed Paul. The eyes looking back is the punctum that 
shatters Paul’s world and the flow of time. In his attempt to humiliate and 
degrade his father, the link to the demonic father is opened instead of closed 
off. How does Ozon’s film suggest that we move on from this impasse? The 
reconciliatory moment comes after the death of his father. His sister gives him a 
box of photos that belonged to their father and in the final scene of the film we 
see Paul opening an envelope with his name on it, in there there is a picture of 
a father holding a child lovingly. Paul looks up and the film fades to blue. But we 
had already seen his sister writing on this envelope, placing a photograph in the 
envelope and sliding it in amongst their father’s actual photographs. The sister 
makes up this lie about the father to allow his brother to heal. As spectators we 
are left with the ethics of this action. Paul’s healing is based on a lie, his father 
never could make his son feel loved, instead it is up to his sister to make him 
feel loved the only way she knows how to. 
The staging of Paul’s mourning process starts when the film ends, this in a 
sense enacts the photography as this marks the end of the filmic time. We can 
interpret this as the beginning of something new, but we also know that the new 
is based on a lie, so while Paul might be able to start his mourning process, the 
spectator has the mourning process halted and the past of the film haunts the 
viewer despite the fading to blue which acts as a counter colour to the red of the 
dark-room where Paul discovered his father’s gaze. The film thus seem to push 
in two directions, one toward reconciliation and the other toward remaining in 
the traumatic refusal of closure. Using Mulvey, we could read this contradiction 
in movement as an example of how “the delayed cinema dissolves the 
imaginative power of the fiction, as well as the forward drive that, Barthes 
argues, obscures a cinematic punctum.”  And this is the birth of the pensive 499
spectator. Left to the stillness of time, the spectator is left to grapple with and try 
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to make sense of Paul’s trauma and the lie that seems to heal this trauma. “The 
pensive spectator attempts to translate these different experiences of time into 
words along the lines suggested by Barthes in relation to the still photograph: 
the persistence of a present that is now past, ‘this was now’.”  The ‘this was 500
now’ of Paul’s life are the ‘this was now’ of the now when his father reacted to a 
picture of him as if he was too ugly to be his son. And the ‘this was now’ of the 
picture of a father lovingly holding a child, a now that is real for Paul but that we 
know is a lie. So while Paul can heal, we are pushed into becoming the pensive 
spectator.  
As mentioned in the preface, Barthes’s punctum as something outside of culture 
does not mean that Barthes does not create culture around it. So what happens 
when we ‘attempt to translate these different experiences of time’? Does the 
punctum remain in its melancholic elsewhere, always already excluded and 
talked about but never successfully translated? If Mulvey’s argument moves 
from the moving and from life, to the still and death to reveal the presence of 
death in life, then Emma Wilson explores the opposite direction in Love, 
Mortality and the Moving Image. “I see stillness denied, nudged into motion, in 
the animation of cinema. Cinema in its matter and make-up is concerned more 
than other media with the line between the still and the moving, between the 
living and the dead.”  Instead of focusing on the arrested time in the 501
photograph, Wilson’s approach to photography, film and death focus on the 
nudge toward life in its opposite. Barthes does not stop by the image of his 
dead mother, it pulls him back and in but also forward, to write, to translate, the 
image and his affect. And what is this if not the opposite of stillness? I have 
argued for a masochistic model of the self as a more porous notion of the self, 
one that is not based on the foreclosure and exclusion of the punctum and its 
own formation but that places the self in relation with this other within and other 
without. My argument has been that the strangeness or the enigmatic aspect of 
the internal or external does not ground, ossify or halt the self in a set form, but 
rather opens the self up, affectively and productively with the world and with 
itself. “The tacit acknowledgement that mastery, knowledge, possession of 
other, or the self, will remain an illusion, opens the way to a different way of 
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holding that other, that self.”  Wilson’s focus is death and palliative care as a 502
site of the hesitant and affective meeting between life and death and its relation 
to art. My focus has been the formation of the self in the encounter with the 
nebulous demands of the world as well as how we continuously live with the 
traces of this formation at the start of life. I have used the language of gender 
and sexual difference as well as the feminine and the queer to understand 
exclusion and subjugation as a haunting site but also as a productive site. I 
have investigated the possibilities of being affected by something external and 
something that escapes our understanding, but also the limits to this 
affectability.  
As we leave Paul to mourn what he now believes to be his loving father, we are 
left with the uncanny, not of death or of the frozen past in a still image, but of the 
uncanny and not quite intelligible intentions of Paul, Paul’s father, his sister and 
of the film. We become aware, not so much of the punctum of time lost, but of 
the multiple and shadowy intentions of fictional as well as real characters. And 
we are left to translate, to keep reading and keep trying to understand.  
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